



INVICTA HOUSE

2-4 ATKINSON STREET
MANCHESTER
M3 3HH

HENRY BOOT DEVELOPMENTS &
KE HOTELS

SECURE BY DESIGN

GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE
2015/0784/CIS/02
APRIL 2017



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

INVICTA HOUSE, 2-4 ATKINSON STREET, MANCHESTER
HOTEL (5,462sqm.)

FOR: KE Hotels (Manchester) Ltd.

VERSION A: 27/04/17

REFERENCE: 2015/0784/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Invicta House, 2-4 Atkinson Street, Manchester

URN: 2015/0784/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Control of access into and around the hotel – including to the main entrance, onto bedroom levels and back-of-house areas.
- Secure enclosure of the recessed service area to the rear of the building, in order to protect the hidden doors and the staff cycle store from attack unseen and prevent the sheltered area itself from fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour.
- Adequate enclosure of potential external seating area and care to ensure that it does not conflict with the existing seating area on the opposite side of Scott Place - reducing the width of the pedestrian footway and impeding movement/funnelling pedestrians into close proximity with table/chairs (where items can be easily reached/stolen).

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart *MTCP*

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit


The site lies on the north side of Atkinson Street and is bounded by Scott Place to the west and Tivoli Street/Sidney Street to the north. It is currently occupied by a three-storey office building fronting onto Atkinson Street, with a small surface car park to the rear accessed off Sidney Street/Tivoli Street.

Sydney Street/Tivoli Street is a narrow, cobbled rear access route, which is not well-overlooked from the adjacent buildings, and there are a number of rear service doors that could be vulnerable to attack unseen. Tivoli Street lies at a higher ground level from Scott Place and is secured with low-level railings to prevent through-access.

The network of streets and backstreets in the city centre area provide convenient escape routes and hiding places for potential offenders to utilise and exploit. Recessed doorways are also regularly subject to abuse.

Scott Place is a pedestrian-only route linking Atkinson Street and Hardman Street. There are 2 no. café/restaurant units which front onto the route, which have external seating areas along it. One of the external seating areas is well defined as separate from the route by planters – funnelling pedestrians away from being in close proximity of table/chairs, where offenders could easily reach over and steal items.

The site lies on the edge of the Spinningfields estate, on the west side of Manchester city centre bounded by Deansgate, the River Irwell, Quay Street and Bridge Street. It includes commercial, civic, residential, hotel, leisure and retail spaces set within a network public spaces and thoroughfares. The public realm within the Spinningfields estate has an extensive CCTV system, which is monitored 24/7 from a dedicated on-site control room, and benefits from regular security patrols.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2016 and 31st March 2017.

2.1 Crime Summary



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
18	207	148	730	509	68	33	236	22	203


- 2.1.1 The most frequently occurring offences in the local area over the last 12 months have been less serious wounding, miscellaneous theft and vehicle crime. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place around/off Deansgate and in the evening/during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises (often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts).
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed hotel, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.

2.2 Burglary Other (Hotels): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against hotels, recorded in the City Centre area.




- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at hotel premises in the North Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on a Monday, Friday and Sunday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary at North Manchester hotels is greatest around lunchtime and is high in the evening and the early hours of the morning. It is likely that offenders target hotels at these times when guests are likely to be out of their rooms or when staffing levels are likely to be lower – allowing offenders time to attempt to gain unauthorised access without being detected.
- 2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** Where offenders have targeted hotels across Manchester, they have used the following points of entry:



- 2.2.4 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of burglaries at city centre hotels, the point of entry has not been determined. It is likely that these burglaries have occurred when offenders have entered hotels posing as legitimate guests and gained access to hotel rooms without using force – possibly when they have been left insecure by cleaners or by using stolen or forged keys/cards. Where doors have been targeted, offenders have applied bodily pressure or have used tools to force entry.

2.3 Miscellaneous Theft (Hotels): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against hotels, recorded in the City Centre area.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** The risk of theft at North Manchester hotels generally increases over the weekend. It is possible that the risk increases at the weekend when hotels typically have more guests and the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater. However, offenders do also target hotels between Monday and Friday when they are typically less busy and the risk of being caught/challenged is lower.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft is greatest around lunchtime and in the evening/early hours of the morning. This is when hotel restaurants, bars and gyms are likely to be at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

2.4 General Risk Factors

2.4.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Violence towards staff
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.5.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting hotel premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Offenders forcing open doors to hotel rooms to commit theft
Possible Solution - All individual bedroom doors should ideally be security-certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Where this is not possible, access controls should be incorporated to limit and regulate access to bedroom floors.
- Offenders, posing as guests or legitimate customers, accessing staff-only/restricted areas to steal property
Possible Solution - The main reception should be located to have full view of everyone entering and leaving the premises and all routes to bedrooms and staff areas. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour. Access controls should be used to restrict access to vulnerable areas and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.
- Offenders entering rooms using forged or stolen electronic keycards or fobs
Possible Solution - Auditable electric locking systems (such as Vingcard or similar) should be used, which can be easily activated/disabled electronically by reception staff.
- Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables
Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to refurbish and extend the existing building to form a 9 storey hotel (totalling 5,462sqm.).
- 3.1.2 The existing façade fronting onto Atkinson Street will be retained, but the main entrance to the hotel will front onto Scott Place to the west. The basement of the building will house back-of-house areas and plant rooms and the ground floor will house more back-of-house areas, a bar, seating areas, business suite and W/Cs. A potential external seating area is proposed along the western elevation of the building (along Scott Place) and there will be a recessed service area to the rear (north) of the building, which will also contain a staff cycle store. Steps are also proposed to provide a pedestrian link between Scott Place and Tivoli Street/Sydney Street. The upper floors of the building will feature guest bedrooms, stores and housekeeping rooms and a fitness suite on the first floor level.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity and surveillance to the area, at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The building will present an active frontage onto Scott Place and Atkinson Street, enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.3 The glazed façades of the building offer both surveillance opportunities and a greater level of artificial light onto the street/public realm.
- 3.2.4 The hotel reception area should be located directly adjacent to the main entrance, providing staff with good views of all people entering/leaving the building and external circulation areas. Staff should be able to observe and direct customers and deter unauthorised access to bedroom floors.
- 3.2.5 The layout of the hotel corridors provides clear views and contain few recessed areas. Doors within the communal corridors should contain a glazed element to improve passive surveillance.
- 3.2.6 The hotel bedrooms will be provided well-above street level, reducing the potential impacts of noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.


3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The control of access into and around the hotel is paramount to the security of the development. A reception desk within the main entrance lobby of the hotel must be staffed at all times to meet and direct guests. All visitors should report to the reception for vetting by staff before gaining access to the rest of the building. A high, wide reception desk increases the distance between reception staff and any potential aggressive visitors and aids surveillance of all parts of the entrance lobby/waiting area. A personal attack alarm should be provided at the reception desk, which activates a loud alarm at the scene – clearly signalling that assistance has been requested. The building should be designed to maximize surveillance from the reception of both the internal lobby area and the external space around the main entrance. Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The revolving door at the main entrance to the hotel should be capable of being secured and the adjacent single-leaf pass door should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if/when required (e.g. into the evening/at night), in order to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/anti-social behaviour in or around the entrance lobby.

3.3.2 All stairwells/lifts serving bedroom floors should be fitted with access controls (operated by guest key-cards), to ensure that only guests who have already booked in at reception and are staying at the hotel can access their own bedroom floor and no other (see Section 4.1/4.5).

3.3.3 The recessed/sheltered service area to the rear of the building (accessed off Tivoli Street) will not benefit from good levels of overlooking or natural surveillance. The hidden doors and staff cycle store will be vulnerable to attack unseen and the sheltered area itself could foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour if left publicly accessible. It is therefore highly recommended that the recessed service area is secured with a shutter or full-height railings and a gate/s to prevent unauthorised access. Any shutter should be certified to LPS 1175 SR1/2, operated by staff key fob/proximity reader. If there is to be an internal emergency override mechanism for the shutter, it should be alarmed and signed as such to deter casual/unauthorised use. If railings are used, care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that there are no large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and any gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, lighting columns etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. If double vehicular gates are used, they should overlap when shut/locked any should be robust enough to resist being forced open. Again, if a panic mechanism is required on the internal face of the gate/s for emergency egress purposes, it should be fitted so that it cannot be reached/operated from the external face of the gate/s. Further advice relating to the staff cycle store can be found within Section 4.9.



3.3.4 The potential external seating area should be clearly defined as separate from the pedestrian footway along Scott Place by screens, barriers or planters, ensuring that pedestrian do not pass close-by – leaving personal belongings hung on chairs and on table tops vulnerable to theft. Care should also be taken to ensure that the proposed external seating area does not conflict with the existing seating area on the opposite side of Scott Place - reducing the width of the pedestrian footway, meaning that pedestrians could be funnelled into even closer proximity with any adjacent tables/chairs (where offenders could easily reach over and steal items). In order to ensure pedestrian movement is not impeded and the security of the existing and proposed external seating areas are not compromised, the overall width of the existing and proposed seating areas should be no wider than 50% of the total width of the route. Further advice relating to the potential external seating area can be found within Section 4.7.

3.3.5 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The revolving door to the main entrance cannot be certified to the above standards. It should be tested and certified to BS ENV 1627 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ Reception staff should be able to remotely secure and control access through the main entrance door if/when required (e.g. into the evening/at night). At these times, the revolving door should be locked in place and a security-certified, single-leaf pass door should be operated remotely by reception staff or by staff/guest key-card.
- ☐ The ground floor door into the access core serving the upper bedroom floors (off the reception/entrance lobby area) and the doors off the access core at each level should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 and fitted with electromagnetic locks permitted as part of the certification, operated by guest key-card (which should fail safe in the event of a fire alarm), ensuring that non-guests cannot access bedroom floors and guests can only gain to their particular building/floor and no other. Any doors to escape-only cores should also be security-certified with electromagnetic locks, connected to the fire alarm. These doors should be alarmed and clearly signed to deter casual use. Once an emergency escape core is accessed by a member of the public, the only means of egress should be at ground floor level onto the street. Staff access/egress into or from any access cores should be controlled via fob/swipe card.
- ☐ All individual hotel bedroom doorsets/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), self-closing and secured with 3 hinges and an electronically operated lock, controlled by Vingcard or similar. They should also be fitted with door viewers and chain limiters.
- ☐ All doors/frames to staff areas/rooms, offices, plant areas and stores should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Careful consideration should be given to the design of any cash office/s, which should have solid masonry walls, no false/suspended ceilings, a security-certified doorset (to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2) and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover, certified to LPS 1183. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ☐ The internal door/frame to the first floor fitness suite should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by guest key-card. Each individual business/meeting room at ground level should also be capable of being secured when unoccupied.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All ground and first floor windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any new ground and first floor opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ The existing low-level windows along the Atkinson Street elevation may be vulnerable to damage and consideration should be given to retaining the existing railings within the rebates, in order to deter and prevent such abuse.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground and first floor glazing must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ Any louvres to the rear of the building should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows or onto the roof. Security-certified louvered doorsets are also available (e.g. <http://www.securedbydesign.com/members/premier-ss-ltd/>) if required.

4.4 Alarm

- ☐ All internal/external escape doors should be fitted with alarm contacts, linked to a 24/7 intruder alarm system.
- ☐ Alarm activations should be relayed to the hotel reception, so staff can investigate or call the authorities as appropriate.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by staff swipe card/fob or by guest key-card, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The single-leaf main entrance door out-of-hours.
 - The doors into all access cores at ground level.
 - The doors off each lift/stair lobby at each bedroom level.
 - The entrance to the first floor fitness suite.
 - All vulnerable back-of-house areas and any cash office/s (for staff only).
- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff and guest key-cards should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by staff to ensure that mis-use is prevented.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the exterior of the building and the surrounding public realm, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and to the recessed service area to the rear of the building.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light, and fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Potential External Seating Area

- ☐ Any external seating area should be clearly defined as separate from the pedestrian footway by screens, barriers or planters.
- ☐ The overall width of the existing and proposed external seating areas (including all tables/chairs and screens/barriers/planters) should be no wider than 50% of the total width of the pedestrian route along Scott Place. Tables directly adjacent to the pinch points, such as around existing lamp or signage posts, should be avoided.
- ☐ The tables and chairs (and any heaters) should be removed from the area and stored within the premises out-of-hours, in order to prevent damage or mis-use and prevent the space from fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour when the premises are closed. All awnings should be retracted out-of-hours.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see below) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats.



- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that any advertising A-boards signs do not inadvertently provide additional features that may narrow the footway and funnel pedestrians into close proximity with the proposed external seating area.
- ☐ The success of the external seating area is largely dependent on the effective management of the space, particularly at peak times. Staff should closely monitor customer use/behaviour and should regularly clear away used crockery/cutlery to prevent theft or mis-use.

4.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are ‘**Overview**’ and ‘**Recognition**’, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [all external doors, the main entrance lobby, all lift/stair lobbies on each floor and all bar areas/till positions.](#)

4.9 Other

- ☐ Each guest bedroom should have a small wall or floor safe, operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.
- ☐ Secure lockers should be provided for fitness centre users and they should be encouraged to utilise them rather than leave any unattended items insecure/accessible. Any changing facilities should be frequently patrolled by staff. The internal layout of the fitness centre should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour and allow unimpeded CCTV coverage. Any vending machines should be well-overlooked by staff/CCTV cameras.
- ☐ The staff cycle store should include ‘Sheffield’ style racks, or similar, that allow staff to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/downloads.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping or features of the building that could inadvertently create sheltered/hiding places, ledges, seating or loitering spots. These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.
- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Guidance on Internal Layout of Hotel Bars/Restaurant

The internal layout of any bar/restaurant area should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5.1.1 Licensed premises and restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating bars/restaurants generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent bars/restaurants means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys, MP3 players etc.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

5.1.2 In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff, who should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- Again, it is highly recommended that tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see Section 4.7).
- Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).
- Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 4.1) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:
 - Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.

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- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the hotel must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the development. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 6.1.2 The opening hours of any bar/restaurant should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict. An operating/maintenance plan for the bars should also be prepared, which focuses on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 6.1.3 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools, portable gym equipment etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 6.1.4 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.
- 6.1.5 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to certain areas.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
29 th March 2017	NJL Consulting	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
3 rd April 2017	NJL Consulting	Confirmation of instruction & fee
24 th April 2017	NJL Consulting	Telephone correspondence re: progress & payment
27 th April 2017	NJL Consulting	Email sent to Agent re: progress & payment
3 rd May 2017	GMP Finance Dept.	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
PL(00)002	Existing Site Plan	Jan 17	-
PL(00)010	Basement Plan	Jan 17	-
PL(00)011	Ground Floor Plan	Jan 17	-
PL(00)012	Level 01 Plan	Jan 17	-
PL(00)013	Level 02 Plan	Jan 17	-
PL(00)016	Level 03-05 Plan	Jan 17	-
PL(00)018	Level 06-07 Plan	Jan 17	-
PL(00)019	Level 08 Plan	Jan 17	-
PL(00)020	Roof Plan	Jan 17	-
PL(00)030	Proposed Section AA	Jan 17	-
PL(00)031	Proposed Section BB	Jan 17	-
PL(00)040	Proposed Elevations Atkinson Street	Jan 17	-
PL(00)041	Proposed Elevations Scott Place	Jan 17	-
PL(00)042	Proposed Elevations Deansgate / Oddfellows House	Jan 17	-
PL(00)043	Proposed Elevations Tivoli Street	Jan 17	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk