



## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land at Deansgate South  
Student Accommodation (272 Units)  
For: Fusion Manchester Devco Ltd

Greater Manchester Police  
**designforsecurity**

Version B: 27/01/21  
Ref: 2018/0600/CIS/02

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# Land at Deansgate South

2018/0600/CIS/02

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Development Supported / Minor design changes

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Access control from entrance lobbies
- Ground floor external material protection against graffiti

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

**Please note:** At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design (SBD) accreditation.



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# 1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The vacant site lies at the junction of the A56 and Deansgate.


The area contains a mix of established development types, comprising residential, commercial, and hotel buildings. There are a number of vacant plots used for car parking pending redevelopment under the wider Great Jackson St. Masterplan, much of which is currently under transition.

To the East of the site is the Knott Mill district; an established area with a mix of commercial office, residential and leisure uses. The River Medlock passes close-by and connects into the Bridgewater canal basin. Further along Deansgate road is a public footpath connecting onto the tow-path leading into the Castlefield canal basin and surrounding Castlefield area of M/cr.


Across the development site are changing levels from the A56 dropping down to Deansgate.

The site is well served with public transport connections; buses, trains & Metrolink services. Deansgate train station & tram stop are approx. 200m to the north east. With bus stops located on the A56 in close proximity to the site.


During normal, none Covid times this part of the city contains a number of bars/restaurants and leisure destination and is popular throughout the day & evening and across the year. During the summer months there are a number of outdoor events/gigs at Castlefield bowl; increasing the footfall around the area.



7 – Adjacent residential development lower ground floor.




6 – Adjacent residential development, vehicle parking area.



5 – View along Deansgate.



1 – Neighbouring apartment block & vehicle access.



2 – Existing adjacent wall and hoarding to proposed site.



3 – View of site from Chester Road.



4 – View towards vehicle entrance of neighbouring apt block

## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1<sup>st</sup> July 2018 to 30<sup>th</sup> June 2019.

### 2.1 Crime Summary

| Recorded Crime within 500m of Site |                       |                 |                       |       |         |                  |                          |                        |               |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------|---------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| Domestic Burglary                  | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
| 27                                 | 55                    | 99              | 399                   | 246   | 109     | 20               | 177                      | 12                     | 42            |

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is relatively high, with less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft being the highest recorded crimes. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings are mostly taking place to the north and east of the proposed site, around Deansgate and Whitworth Street. The assaults in the area are mostly taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning over the weekend period, which is when licenced premises have a larger attendance and are open for longer periods. The assaults are mostly carried out by unknown offenders.
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime in the local area is mostly taking place in the north and east of the proposed site, around Great Jackson Street and Liverpool Road. Theft from a Motor vehicle is the highest occurring vehicle crime with smashed glazing being the most common entry point to the vehicle.
- 2.1.4 Thefts have occurred around the north and east of the proposed site, around Deansgate/ Castleford Metrolink stop and to the north around Liverpool Road, where pickpocketing has been most commonly used to obtain goods. Thefts have also occurred around the licenced premises in the area, with mobile phones and purses/ wallets being taken.

### 2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Posing as a legitimate resident/ visitor and entering communal areas (mostly corridors and bike storage rooms) by means of insecure doors or tailgating residents.
- Possible Solution - Monitoring of people entering and leaving the building helps to discourage intruders. Additionally, CCTV and regular staff patrols will deter potential offenders from attempting to steal personal property. Doors for emergency egress should be alarmed so that building managers are alerted if they are used, and staff discouraged from using them informally, e.g. for smoking breaks and robust access controls to separate visitor/staff only areas.*
- 2.2.2 Exploitation of insecure doors and windows (mostly front doors).
- Possible Solution - All individual cluster flats/apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance door-set (see appendix 2), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.*
- 2.2.3 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the building before allowing them access. The main communal entrance should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Lighting to the front and rear of properties can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime.*
- 2.2.4 Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

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*Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points. Windows to accessible elevations should be protected by some defensible space, to define them as entirely separate from the street and protect them from attack and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.*

- 2.2.5** Offenders targeted entrance apartment doors by 'tailgating' or posing as legitimate visitors, before forcing open individual apartment doors or targeting those left insecure by residents.

*Possible Solution - All individual apartments should be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.), cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. A staffed 24/7 concierge desk will support the management and security of the entrance lobby.*





## **2.3 Risk Factors**

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

## 2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2019.




- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **86% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **76% lower** than Greater Manchester and **70% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **23% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **21% higher** than Greater Manchester and **40% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **64% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **48% lower** than Greater Manchester and **24% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **15% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **55% higher** than Greater Manchester and **145% higher** than England & Wales.


## 2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Wednesday and Thursday during the afternoon. Offenders often target properties during the day when residents are likely to be away at work, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Offenders posing as legitimate residents/visitors and entering restricted areas through insecure doors or tailgating residents.
- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as unknown, offenders have most likely targeted insecure windows and doors.

## 2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.*



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Saturday during the evening (6pm – 11:59pm.) Vehicles targeted have mostly been parked on streets and private car parks. During the evening it is often dark with less footfall in the area, the offender perceives that there is less of a risk of being caught/ identified.

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## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is comprised of 272 student bed residential units over 28 storeys.
- 3.1.2 A controlled reception space serves the ground floor entrance. The ground floor also contains student amenity lounge spaces.
- 3.1.3 A resident cycle store is located on the Lower Ground Floor with access via a lobbied entrance from Deansgate.
- 3.1.4 The accommodation of the building is located from level 1 to 28. External terraces are located on levels 22, 24 and 26.

### 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring vitality to a site which has remained disused for a number of years. The building will present an active frontage to the public elevations around the site, which will help to improve natural surveillance of the surrounding public realm and animate the street scene. Occupation of the ground floor reception spaces is essential in order to provide the much-needed natural surveillance at street level and enliven the surrounding public realm as intended, which will help to discourage antisocial activity and more serious disorder around the development.
- 3.2.2 The building plot provides ground floor activity in the form of student amenity spaces, meeting rooms and reception space uses. In-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent streets, hotel car park and public realm.
- 3.2.3 The footprint of the building facing onto the public realm is relatively simple and free from deeply recessed concealed areas. Where ground floor amenity spaces have been located, consideration appears to have been taken through the use of external facing materials; glazing, providing good levels of activity.
- 3.2.4 Student amenity spaces provide opportunities for residents to meet and foster community relations within the development. Schemes which have good social communities are less likely to tolerate inappropriate behaviour and are more willing to challenge unfamiliar faces in the development.
- 3.2.5 The main entrance will be accessed via an electronic access control fob system for residents and staff. The arrangement of the lobby space is greeted and controlled via a concierge.
- 3.2.6 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

### 3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

- 3.3.1 Access in to the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access in to the reception area only prior to providing access further into the building.
- 3.3.2 Residential post/parcel room. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal delivery staff access to internal areas of the residential areas beyond the reception space. Mail boxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a 'through-the-wall' post box arrangement. Due to the significant increase in on-line postal ordering, considerations should be given to appropriate post room area; avoiding parcels/post being left in an unsecure location. Further design details of these ancillary spaces are to be developed.

- 3.3.3 Given the prolific high levels of graffiti within and around the site, it is important that external cladding materials at ground floor are sealed, protected and supports the removal of graffiti.
- 3.3.4 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

## 4 Physical Security

*The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.*

### 4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves, visitors to be greeted in reception by the resident.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

### 4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.  
Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

### 4.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P2A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

### 4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems

- BS 6799 for wireless systems

☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

## 4.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

- Main Entrance doors
- Secondary entrance doors off internal lobbies
- Bin stores
- Cycle stores
- Staff-only areas
- Cluster apartment access
- Level only access from lift and stair lobbies

## 4.6 Landscaping

☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

## 4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

## 4.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances](#), [foyer](#), [stairs](#), [lift lobbies](#), [landings](#), [cycle stores](#), [bin store entrances](#).

## 4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

## 5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
  - Litter removal
  - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
  - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

## 6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

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## 7 Useful References

### 7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

## A Contact register

| Date     | Contact With        | Summary of Contact   |
|----------|---------------------|----------------------|
| 25/11/20 | Cushman & Wakefield | CIS Application      |
| 26/11/20 | Cushman & Wakefield | CIS Instructed       |
| 02/12/20 | GMP                 | Invoice issued       |
| 07/12/20 | DfS                 | Site visit           |
| 14/12/20 | DfS                 | CIS completed        |
| 14/12/20 | DfS                 | CIS issued           |
| 27/01/21 | DfS                 | CIS Version B issued |

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No. | Drawing Title                                           | Date     | Rev |
|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------|----------|-----|
|             | 20269-0201-00 Existing - Site Plan                      | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | 20269-0300-01 Proposed - Site Location Plan             | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | 20269-0301-00 Proposed - Block Plan                     | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | 20269-0310-00 Proposed - Plan - Lower Ground Floor      | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | 20269-0311-00 Proposed - Plan - Ground Floor            | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | 20269-0312-00 Proposed - Plan - Mezzanine Level         | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | 20269-0313-00 Proposed - Plan - Typical First to Twenty | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | 20269-0315-00 Proposed - Plan - Tenth Floor             | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | 20269-0316-00 Proposed - Plan - Twenty Second Floor     | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | 20269-0317-00 Proposed - Plan - Twenty Third Floor      | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | 20269-0318-00 Proposed - Plan - Twenty Fourth Floor     | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | 20269-0319-00 Proposed - Plan - Twenty Fifth Floor      | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | 20269-0320-00 Proposed - Plan - Twenty Sixth Floor      | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | 20269-0321-00 Proposed - Plan - Twenty Seventh Floor    | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | 20269-0322-00 Proposed - Plan - Roof                    | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | 20269-0340-00 Proposed - Section - Section A-A and B-B  | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | 20269-0341-00 Proposed - Section - Section C-C          | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | 20269-0350-01 Proposed - Elevation - North and South    | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | 20269-0351-01 Proposed - Elevation - East and West      | 30/11/12 |     |
|             | Public Consultation Boards                              | 30/11/12 |     |
|             |                                                         |          |     |

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

## C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made          | Date     |
|---------|-------------------------|----------|
| A       |                         |          |
| B       | Building height revised | 27/01/21 |

## D Glossary

### Burglary Resistance Standards

#### BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.*

#### BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.*

#### ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

*The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:*

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

#### LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

*This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.*

#### STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

#### STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

#### EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

*A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.*

### Commonly Used Acronyms

#### CIT

*Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).*

#### CPTED

*Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*

#### CRS

*Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)*

#### INPT

*Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.*

#### PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

*A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.*

#### LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

*A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.*

#### UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

*The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.*

### Useful Websites

#### Design for Security

[www.designforsecurity.org](http://www.designforsecurity.org)

#### Secured by Design

[www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com)

#### RIBA Product Selector

[www.ribaproductselector.com](http://www.ribaproductselector.com)

#### LPCB – Red Book Live

[www.redbooklive.com](http://www.redbooklive.com)

#### Crime Reduction (Home Office)

[www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk)

#### DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

[www.designagainstcrime.org](http://www.designagainstcrime.org)

#### Building for Life

[www.buildingforlife.org](http://www.buildingforlife.org)

#### CLG (Communities and Local Government)

[www.communities.gov.uk](http://www.communities.gov.uk)