



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Manchester Arena

Associated Public Realm & Commercial
(206sqm)

For: SMG Europe Holdings Ltd

Version A: 12/02/21

Ref: 2016/0042/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Manchester Arena

2016/0042/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported with design elements to be considered

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more depth within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed when developing detailed proposals for future development, and these include:-

- Existing routes and connections
- Access & maintenance
- Public realm landscaping design and features
- Lighting
- Event management

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the overall strategy for development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located within an area currently undergoing significant regeneration; Chathams School of Music, NOMA and the Co-op estate.

The area contains a mix of development types, comprising residential, commercial, educational, ecclesiastical and hotel buildings.


The surrounding routes have considerable footfall across the day as the station is a major city centre commuter hub.

The proposed site is afforded good public transport links with local bus routes and a number of tram stops in close vicinity. Vehicle transport routes to the site are provided along Victoria St/Great Ducie St with controlled access along Hunts Bank for buses, taxis & vehicle drop-offs; with good links to, in and around the city.

There are notable level changes across the site, rising up from the west to the east towards the station's main entrance.

The entrance to Victoria train station is immediately located to the east of the site, and is a major transport hub for people entering and leaving the city centre. Shudehill transport interchange (Bus station & tram stop), is approx. 200m south east from the site.


The existing entrance sequence into the Arena is situated on Hunts Bank and is approached via an imposing flight of steps.




1 – View of site from Victoria St.




2 – View up along Hunts Bank



3 – Existing street furniture, heritage asset.




4 - Existing site Sub-station .




8 – View of roof terrace over the Sub-Station.



7 – View towards Victoria Station.



6 – View down Hunts Bank, existing street furniture & planting.



5 – Stepped entrance to Arena.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
18	84	184	604	316	148	22	424	28	43

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high; however the proposed site is located within Manchester City Centre. Less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded crimes within the local area. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of reported crimes have taken place to the east and south of the proposed site, where the City Centre is located. The north of the proposed site has experienced a high volume of vehicle crime, as this is where the majority of car parks and residential parking are located, commuters often use this area as it is often less expensive than the City Centre.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings are taking place throughout the local area, with a high concentration taking place to the south/south east of the proposed site, where the Arndale Centre and Northern Quarter are situated; there are a large proportion of licenced premises and retail outlets within this area. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings, with the majority of offences taking place within the late evening and early hours of the morning, often when licenced premises in the area are closing, verbal and physical assaults have mostly been carried out by unknown offenders.
- 2.1.3 Thefts in the local area have mostly been taking place in the licenced premises, restaurants and retail premises situated around Shudehill and the Arndale Centre; with offenders targeting mobile phones, wallets/ purses and cash. Offenders are using pick pocketing and distraction methods to obtain the personal belongings.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime has been taking place throughout the local area, particularly to the north of the proposed site where cheaper parking facilities are located, with vehicles parked on the local streets and in car parks being targeted. Thefts from motor vehicles is the highest recorded vehicle crime taking place in the area with smashed glazing being the most common entry point, as well as theft of number plates/ vehicle parts.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Retail:** Burglaries at retail premises are relatively common, with the forcing open of external shutters with instruments or vehicles being a particularly common MO for burglaries at retail premises, most likely because at the times when burglaries take place retail premises have their shutters closed.
- 2.2.2 **Offices:** Burglaries and other thefts are the most common offences at office premises across Manchester after malicious communications, most likely due to the number high value items in offices including computers, cash and other electrical equipment.
- 2.2.3 **Sports/Leisure:** As well as common burglary MOs such as forcing entry using instruments or exploitation insecure entry points, a particular MO has been used against sports and leisure facilities across Greater Manchester in which outdoor storage units have been forcibly opened using instruments such as bolt cutters or crowbars.
- 2.2.4 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doorsets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks and the fittings. They are the best long-term

measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- 2.2.5 Forcing open shutters using implements and tools in order to gain access to the doors and windows located beneath.

Possible Solution - Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR 2 or equivalent burglary resistant standard. Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. It is generally preferable for shutters to be provided internally but if external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed and ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

- 2.2.6 Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution – All windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.4), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, external bars or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

- 2.2.7 Posing as a legitimate customer and entering restricted areas by means of insecure doors and tailgating employees.

Possible Solution – Monitoring of people entering and leaving the building helps to discourage intruders. Additionally, CCTV and regular staff patrols will deter potential offenders from attempting to steal personal property. Doors for emergency egress should be alarmed so that building managers are alerted if they are used, and staff discouraged from using them informally, e.g. for smoking breaks and robust access controls to separate visitor/staff only areas.

2.3 Retail Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.4 Public Realm Risk Factors

The typical security / disorder risks for a development of this nature are:

- Personal robbery
- Theft of personal belongings
- Criminal damage to property
- Arson
- Violence towards the public and staff at commercial/retail premises

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- Unauthorised access to buildings/private spaces
 - Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
 - Antisocial behaviour
 - Loitering groups
 - Alcohol and drug misuse
 - Alcohol related disorder




2.5 Risk Factors - Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of customer and staff property
- Criminal damage to property and parked vehicles
- Cycle security
- Tailgating and uncontrolled access
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.7 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.7.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses and bags.

2.8 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Thursday and Saturday during the afternoon and into the evening (12pm - 10:30pm). Offenders often target vehicles within the city centre as they are left unattended for long periods of time, creating low risk opportunities for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Full planning application for the creation of a new arrival experience at Hunts Bank, including the creation of community (Use Class F.1) and commercial, business and service (Use Class E) floorspace, new external canopies and other external works, improvements to the pedestrian access points at Trinity Way, and associated landscaping and bollards.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 Engagement at the early RIBA stages has previously proven to afford those involved in the development the opportunity to 'build-in' protective measures, which often results in more aesthetically pleasing and cost-effective measures. The design team have discussed the design proposals with a GMP Design for Security consultant and CTSA advisor.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will dramatically improve the immediate public realm and address the entrance sequence to the event space. Overall the visitor and user experience will be greatly enhanced.
- 3.2.3 The proposal will enhance the existing leisure and event destination for the area bringing in a new diverse range of people to the area with the addition of the music community hub, thus helping to continue to repopulate this part of the city and generate activity throughout the day and night at specific times and dates. Additional activity associated with the site will help support informal policing and natural surveillance.
- 3.2.4 The redevelopment of the site will provide an interesting and diverse use; offering opportunity for employment, interesting and safer public realm and a chance to create an exciting destination.
- 3.2.5 Multiple public transport methods and local taxis are easily accessible at nearby tram stops and bus stops within Victoria train station or within a short walking distance from the development area.
- 3.2.6 The building has been designed to meet the requirements of crowd flow, security searches via walk through detectors and rummage search of bags A4 size or smaller. Visibility and wayfinding will be part of the building design and supported within the planning application pack.
- 3.2.7 Information points and event staff will be positioned at key locations to guide visitors to and from the building at key locations.
- 3.2.8 As part of the management plan 'soft checks will take place outside the building by event staff prior to event goers entering the building. Inspection checks for bags and tickets for events will take place at a number of locations along the proposed entrance ramp sequence. Thus reducing potentially large numbers of people on the street and into a controlled environment.
- 3.2.9 A number of emergency exit routes have been provided; exiting around the existing building. The high number of exits reflects the large capacity of the venue for which it can cater.
- 3.2.10 An Operating schedule and Event Management Plan will be submitted in support of the planning application and reviewed by the events team on a regular basis. An Operating Manual will be submitted as part of the Premises Licence application and will explain how the proposed development will operate on a day-to-day basis as well as during events. The plans will form part of the planning submission. An Events management plan will be prepared in advance of each event and will be a key event communication tool for relevant partners.
- 3.2.11 The main circulation routes and entrances are obvious, leading people directly to where they need to go. The proposals are intended to integrate with surrounding circulation routes.
- 3.2.12 The public realm landscaping will help to generate a sense of place, pride and safety in the community and will upgrade existing links to within the immediate area.
- 3.2.13 The proposed development will result in an increase in footfall in the area, improving vitality across the wider area, providing additional natural surveillance, which can help promote a greater sense of safety on the street.

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- 3.2.14 The public realm of the proposal is permeable, allowing pedestrian movement to be concentrated on the pavements. Commercial facilities are also well located helping to promote activity and surveillance across the area.
 - 3.2.15 The design of the proposals has incorporated ground floor amenity uses providing a community hub, terrace areas with a food & beverage opportunity for event goers before an event. These uses provide activity to specific locations around the proposal and offer good opportunities for natural surveillance across the public realm areas. The design of the amenity frontages has incorporated a robust approach to the facing materials and function, ensuring a secure building envelop is maintained out of business hours.
 - 3.2.16 The building footprint is free of deep recesses that could provide shelter, impede surveillance or attract antisocial behaviour.
 - 3.2.17 A proposal for external light within and around the public realm will be submitted as part of the planning application. The proposals are to incorporate a lighting scheme that will distribute illumination evenly around the space without areas of shadowing or pooling and work coherently with the wider security requirements of the site such as CCTV.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The development of the public realm space will encourage further significant pedestrian footfall in the area. The aspirations of the plans also seek to extend the use of this space beyond event times. It is therefore recommended that planners, developers, and architects concerned with this development consult with Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSA), throughout the planning and implementation of this development with a view to ensure protection from all attacks is as comprehensive as realistically possible. This engagement will also afford the opportunity to consider other attack methodologies and potential mitigations against them. The design team have on a number of occasions discussed the proposals with a GMP CTSA consultant and team leader and most if not all public dwell spaces are within protected Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) 'zones'.
- 3.3.2 Any glazing to proposed elevations along or in close proximity to crowded pedestrian routes should incorporate laminated glass (see section 4.2 for further detail).
- 3.3.3 **Community Hub:** The access-control strategy adopted for the development should be capable of confining movement into and through the building, thus allowing staff and visitors to only enter parts of the site to which they have legitimate reason to be present. Access permissions should be fully auditable and regularly reviewed.
- 3.3.4 **Community Hub:** Internally, fire escape stairs must not allow access to offices on other floors. Use of fire escape stairs for general circulation should be avoided as it could compromise the security of the building, weakening the integrity of the access control system.
- 3.3.5 **Community Hub e:** Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required, to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/anti-social behaviour in/around the entrance lobby. If the building is to be open at any time without a concierge or security presence in the lobby area, the doors should be secured and a single-leaf entrance door should be controlled by means of a video access control system linked to each individual office suite (allowing staff to vet callers before allowing them access).
- 3.3.6 **Community Hub:** It should not be possible for the staff/visitors of one office/suite to access another. All individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to receptions and all rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. Access to plant/service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only). Security measure carefully incorporated into the environment and building design can ensure that buildings and the environment is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors into the stair / lift core must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Sliding (or revolving) doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Any sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ All doors / frames to staff areas / stores / offices should be robust / solid core (minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys / passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ☐ The venue should consider if any doors or roller-shutters to be added as part of this redevelopment would play a part in the site's response to a Marauding Terrorist Attack. Additional security capability may be required to achieve this. Furthermore, it may be that the redevelopment places a greater emphasis on the security capabilities of existing doors or other barriers. Further guidance can be found in:
https://www.cpmi.gov.uk/sites/default/files/featured_images/MTA%20Supplementary%20guidance%20-%20physical%20barriers_0.png

4.2 Windows and Shutters

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass. It is recommended that glazing to elevations adjoining public areas or evacuation routes should also be laminated.
- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any louvres to the ground floor servicing areas should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows.

Roller shutters and grilles

- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
 - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1
- ☐ Security ratings higher than those listed above may be required dependant on:
 - type of risk,
 - level of crime risk,

- location of building or
- security level of the door or window to be protected.
- Also refer to the guidance given from the CPNI link provided in section 4.1.

4.3 Safes and strong rooms

- ☐ Commercial safes must be certified to:
 - LPS 1183: Issue 4.2
 - BS EN 1143-1 :2012
- ☐ Internal doors that are identified as a security risk must be installed to the following standards:
 - PAS 24: 2012
 - STS 201
- ☐ High risk internal doors must be installed to the following standards:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR 2
 - STS 202: Issue 3, BR 2
- ☐ Wall construction should be of a robust nature enough to withstand physical attack through the material.
- ☐ Where a lightweight wall construction is being considered a reinforced lining such as welded steel mesh will need to be incorporated.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the entire site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Access Controls

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Entrance doors to the commercial unit
 - Internal doors off entrance lobby
 - Control room(s)
 - Access to lifts and levels
 - Back of house areas
 - Bin stores
 - Shutters / gates to plant areas, including any side doors
 - Doors to office areas (out-of-hours and if reception is not staffed)
 - The system should be auditable and policies and procedures to ensure cards are cancelled when necessary. CPNI guidance can be found here:
[https://www.cpni.gov.uk/system/files/documents/e7/88/Automatic Access Control Systems for Pedestrian Systems.pdf](https://www.cpni.gov.uk/system/files/documents/e7/88/Automatic%20Access%20Control%20Systems%20for%20Pedestrian%20Systems.pdf)

- It is recommended to specify a two-factor authentication for sensitive areas, such as the control room. This would mean two of 'what you are' (biometrics), 'what you have' (PAC cards/fobs) and 'what you know' (PIN codes) are required to get through access control systems.
- Some of the above areas mentioned may be suitable for just one-factor authentication, if the end user and design team considers an area as 'sensitive' such as a control room then it is advised a two-factor authentication system is incorporated.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an **acceptable standard** that will allow for **identification** of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are '**Overview**' and '**Recognition**', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations should include: **The entrance lobbies, lift lobbies, public lifts, public stairs, service ramp, cycle store entrances, external elevations of the building.**

4.8 Other

- ☐ Directions and signage. Visitors to the site should be clearly directed to appropriate entrances and exits. Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people to and through the buildings, but also to deter unauthorised access to restricted areas. Lack of orientation can provide legitimacy to an intruder.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The design team must ensure that this report is included within the BIM management model so that all parties are aware of the requirements for construction and management.
- 5.1.2 The design team and end user must consider a robust approach when sharing the BIM model; if the model is made available to a wider audience it may highlight vulnerabilities within the building. The model must comply to **BS EN ISO 19650-5**.
- 5.1.3 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews / exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.4 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.
- 5.1.5 Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
- 5.1.6 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

Construction

- 5.1.7 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 5.1.8 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

6 Useful References

6.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 6.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
04/09/20	Avision Young	Initial meeting with CTSA & DfS
04/12/20	Avision Young	AO Arena Manchester GMP presentation with CTSA & DfS
08/01/21	Avision Young	GMP presentation
29/01/21	DfS	Site visit
19/01/21	DfS	CIS application
20/01/21	DfS	CIS instruction confirmed
26/01/21	DfS	Invoice issued
15/02/21	DfS	CIS Draft issued to CTSA for comment
08/03/21	DfS	CIS completed & issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Design and Access Statement Part 1&2	01/09/20	
	A-0201 - PROPOSED PLAN - TRINITY WAY	11/02/21	
	A-0202 - PROPOSED PLAN - HUNTS BANK COMMUNITY SPACE	11/02/21	
	A-0203 - PROPOSED 3D - HUNTS BANK COMMUNITY SPACE	11/02/21	
	A-0204 - PROPOSED PLAN - HUNTS BANK SUBSTATION ROOF	11/02/21	
	A-0205 - PROPOSED 3D - HUNTS BANK SUBSTATION ROOF	11/02/21	
	A-0206 - PROPOSED PLAN - HUNTS BANK CONCOURSE	11/02/21	
	A-0207 - PROPOSED 3D - HUNTS BANK CONCOURSE	11/02/21	
	A-0208 - PROPOSED PLAN - HUNTS BANK ROOF	11/02/21	
	A-0209 - PROPOSED 3D - HUNTS BANK ROOF	11/02/21	
	A-3201 - PROPOSED ELEVATIONS 01	11/02/21	
	A-3202 - HUNTS BANK RENDERING	11/02/21	
	A-3701 - PROPOSED SECTIONS 01	11/02/21	
	A-3702 - PROPOSED SECTIONS 02	11/02/21	
	DESIGN NOTE_HVMBOLLARDS	11/02/21	
	DESIGN NOTE_LIGHTING rev2	11/02/21	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk