

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Hanover House and E-Block

Retail (5,791sqm)

For: Noma (GP) Limited on behalf of Noma Limited Partnership
C/o Hermes Real Estate

Version A: 08/12/20

Ref: 2012/0440/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

Hanover House and E-Block

2012/0440/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported with minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access to back-of-house areas.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design (SBD), accreditation. Should the recommendations as listed within Section 4 of this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.



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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The Hanover Building forms part of the historic Cooperative estate and is the latest building to be redeveloped as part of the wider NOMA masterplan.

The site is located within an area currently undergoing significant regeneration. The area immediately to the north west of the site is being developed and a number of the Co-operative buildings are in the process of refurbishment.

The area contains a mix of development types, comprising residential, commercial, and hotel buildings.

The Manchester Victoria train station is approx. 100m west of the site, and is a major transport hub for people entering and leaving the city centre. Shudehill transport interchange (Bus station & tram stop), is approx. 200m south east from the site.


The existing building backs onto the redeveloped Sadler's Yard public square. To the rear of the building is the Pilcrow single storey bar.

Saddler's Yard and Dantzic St. form part of the newly developed public realm connecting Victoria train station and the city centre to the Co-op HQ and the NOMA district. Both these routes have considerable footfall across the day.




1 – View along Corporation St.


2 – View towards Victoria train Station, Balloon St.


3 – View towards Sadler's yard along Federation St.


4 – Existing entrance from Balloon St.

7 – View towards rear of Hanover House from Sadler's Yard.

6 – View Hanover St.

5 – View along Corporation St.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
29	136	239	901	542	215	36	491	31	88

2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high; however the proposed site is located within Manchester City Centre. Less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded crimes within the local area. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, with a high concentration taking place to the south east of the proposed site, where the Arndale Centre and Northern Quarter are situated; there are a large proportion of licenced premises and retail outlets within this area. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings with the majority of offences taking place within the late evening and early hours of the morning, when licenced premises in the area are closing.

2.1.3 Thefts in the local area have mostly been taking place in the licenced premises, restaurants and retail premises situated around Shudehill and the Arndale Centre; with offenders targeting mobile phones, wallets/ purses and cash. Offenders are using pick pocketing and distraction methods to obtain the personal belongings.

2.1.4 Vehicle crime has been taking place throughout the local area with vehicles parked on the local streets and in secure car parks being targeted. Thefts from motor vehicles is the highest recorded vehicle crime taking place in the area with smashed glazing being the most common entry point.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Opening of secured doors and windows using bodily force or implements to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified door-sets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks and the fittings. They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, security personnel or passers-by. Consideration should also be given to security-certified shutters (see Section 4) to protect particularly vulnerable door.

2.2.2 Smashing glazing in windows and doors to gain entry.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

2.2.3 Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or

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areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.

2.2.4 Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

Possible Solution - Secure store rooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove, and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular community access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.

2.2.5 Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas.

Possible Solution - Monitoring of people entering and leaving the building helps to discourage intruders. Additionally, CCTV and regular staff patrols will deter potential offenders from attempting to steal personal property. Doors for emergency egress should be alarmed so that building managers are alerted if they are used, and staff discouraged from using them informally, e.g. for smoking breaks and robust access controls to separate visitor/staff only areas.

2.2.6 Shutters have been prised open to target doors/windows behind them

Possible Solution – Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

2.3 Risk Factors - Licenced Premises

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Risk Factors - Restaurants & Takeaway Establishments

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues

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
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

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
2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area.


Licensed Premises Burglary – Day Range



Licensed Premises Burglary – Time Range



Licensed Premises Burglary – Point of Entry



2.1.1 Day/ Time Range: In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises between Monday and Wednesday and is lowest on Friday. The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas/streets where they are typical found are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.

2.1.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- Forcing open secure doors and windows – mostly fire doors located to the side and rear of the property are targeted – using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors/ tailgating staff into restricted areas, taking property belonging to employees and the business.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements to access the doors and windows located below.
- Broken glazing to windows and doors – located mostly to the front of the property, with glass in doors highly targeted- using bricks or implements located around the scene.

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
2.2 Theft (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area.

Licensed Premises Theft – Day Range



Licensed Premises Theft – Time Range




2.2.1 Day/ Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets, cash and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, from bags hung on chairs/stored under tables or via pickpocketing and distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.


2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary (Restaurants / Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.

Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Day Range




Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Time Range



Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Point of Entry

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2.3.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafes in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday. The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.

2.3.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the premises.
- Breaking glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the windows and doors located underneath.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors, accessing restricted areas and removing goods belonging to staff and the company.

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
2.4 Theft (Restaurants / Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.

Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Day Range



Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Time Range




2.4.1 Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants / cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants / cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses / wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

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
2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (Cafés/Takeaways): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against café and takeaway premises, recorded in the Manchester area.


Non-Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Non-Domestic Burglary – Time Range



Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day & Time Range: The risk of burglary at Cafes/Takeaways in the Manchester area peaks on a Sunday and Monday and during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target commercial properties at these times when it is dark, streets are generally quieter and premises are unlikely to be open/staffed, meaning that offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being observed/detected.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In Manchester, offenders have utilised the following entry points and MO's when targeting cafes/takeaways:


- In the majority of cases, doors have been targeted by offenders, who have forced them open using bodily pressure/implements or have smashed the glazing within them to gain unauthorised access.
- Where entry points are unknown/legitimate, it is likely that offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.
- Windows have also been prised open and smashed by offenders, but to a lesser extent.
- Door and windows have been exploited when left insecure by staff.

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
2.6 Theft (Cafés/Takeaways): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against café and takeaway premises, recorded in the Manchester area.

Theft – Day Range



Theft – Time Range




2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of theft at Manchester cafes/takeaways fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Saturday. The risk of theft often increases at the weekend, when these types of premises are typically at their busiest, creating more opportunities for theft. The risk of theft increases in the late afternoon and into the evening, when premises tend to be busier and the opportunities for theft arise at a greater frequency (particularly when victims have been drinking alcohol). Mobile phones and bags belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, while hung on chairs or stored under tables on the floor. Pickpocketing and distraction methods are also used in queues within busy establishments – particularly late at night.


2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.7.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Thursday and Saturday during the afternoon and into the evening (12pm - 10:30pm). Offenders often target vehicles within the city centre as they are left unattended for long periods of time, creating low risk opportunities for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposal seeks to redevelop the existing ground & lower ground floor units within the Grade II listed Hanover Building for Retail use.

3.1.2 New entrances into the retail units will be formed Corporation St, Federation St. Existing corner entrance will be utilised where necessary. The central atrium will not provide any connections into the retail units.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development comprises conversion of existing Ground & Lower Ground floors of the listed buildings, and in order to preserve their character, the potential to make alterations and upgrade the physical security of the building is limited. It is appreciated that any changes need to be sensitive to the architecture, and the following recommendations are made on this understanding. If the identified security risks cannot be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the building and its occupants will be dependent on effective management and deployment of the on-site security presence.

3.2.2 The proposed building clearly defines the different uses of the building and all entrances can be easily located and navigated.

3.2.3 The proposals will help to bring additional vitality to the area for longer periods of the day and should attract more legitimate activity to this part of the city centre at times when it is currently quiet. Informal policing provided by members of the public and staff will help to marginalise criminal and antisocial activity.

3.2.4 The proposals do not introduce any new external features that would constitute aids to climbing, potentially allowing unlawful access to upper floors / windows.

3.2.5 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 The cash management strategy at the end of trading day should be robust and remove the opportunity for crime and theft of cash. Consideration should be given to using a Cash & Valuables in Transit company to collect takings at the end of the day, reducing the risk to staff carrying this out presently and reducing the opportunities for theft.

3.3.2 The primary functions of the development are kept separate, will operate independently of each other, and have no shared facilities within the building that could compromise security – Internally, fire escape stairs must not allow access to other floors. Use of the fire escape stairs for general circulation should be avoided as it could compromise the security of the building, weakening the integrity of the access control system. The building(s) must be capable of being divided into zones with separate access controls restricting entry to various areas inside - this should involve self closing and automatically locking doors operated by swipe cards or fobs.

3.3.3 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

☐ All external doors where applicable and does not affect the heritage aspect of the existing building must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.

☐ Sliding doors should be tested and certified to BS PAS 24, ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.

4.2 Windows

☐ Windows where applicable and does not affect the heritage aspect of the existing building must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

☐ Security ratings higher than those listed above may be required dependant on:

- type of risk,
- level of crime risk,
- location of building *or*
- security level of the door or window to be protected.

4.3 Glazing

☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible and where applicable and does not affect the heritage aspect of the existing building) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass. It is recommended that glazing to elevations adjoining pubic areas or evacuation routes should also be laminated.

4.4 Alarms

☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- Main Entrance Doors
- Turnstiles / doors off reception lobby
- Doors to each individual level / suite

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- Refuse / service areas
- Doors into cycle store
- Conference / meeting rooms

☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated / disabled to ensure that misuse is prevented.

4.6 Lighting

External lighting

☐ Consideration should be given for the provision of external lighting to entrance lobby locations which does not affect the heritage aspect of the existing building. Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

Internal Lighting

☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

4.7 Fit out

☐ Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-users requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:

- Internal access control
- Internal doors in to premises
- Alarm systems
- ATM cash dispensers

☐ These features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide free advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5 Internal Layout Guidance for Bar/Lounge

The internal layout of the ground floor bar/lounge area should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5.1.1 Licensed premises can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in restaurants/licensed premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.

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- Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent restaurants/licensed premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

5.1.2 The external entrance to the building must be staffed and effectively managed when in use (i.e. when meetings/conferences are being hosted) to ensure safe access/egress, avoid potential conflicts arising and ensure unauthorised access to the bar/lounge and up to bedroom floors is prevented. Staff should also have clear views of any access to W/Cs to monitor their use.

5.1.3 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

5.1.4 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counter, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).

5.1.5 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

5.1.6 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 4.1) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

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5.1.7 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



5.1.8 Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.

☐ Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided

5.2 CCTV

☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

☐ Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

☐ Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The

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remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas.

5.3 Other

☐ Effective signage is important to help customers / visitors navigate around the area, so they can easily find the various facilities and locate exit points.

6 Management & Maintenance

6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

7 Construction

7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
04/12/20	Deloitte	CIS application submitted
04/12/20	Deloitte	CIS application confirmed
04/12/20	GMP	Invoice issued
07/12/20	DfS	Site visit
08/12/20	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Planning Pre App	20/11/12	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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