



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Development of 24 houses and 19 apartments

AT Butler Street, Miles Platting, Manchester

FOR: Lovell Partnerships Ltd

VERSION A: 22.01.21

2020/0755/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

Development Supported

We welcome the redevelopment of the site and consider a residential scheme most appropriate.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include: an appropriate balance of types and size of properties; a suitable amount of defensible space around each building; with appropriate fencing, there will be a clear distinction between public, semi-private and private space; and, car and cycle parking have been included.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in section 3.3. The principal recommendation is to encourage greater activity and supervision of the two, rear, access roads and avoid them becoming the sort sterile spaces to which offenders are attracted or, alternatively, to simply to secure them with automated gates. The recommendations are summarised as follows:

- reviewing the security and design of the rear access roads including considering gating the access roads;
- environmental enhancements to the streetscape at appropriate spaces within the development;
- installing appropriately secure fencing to define and secure front and rear boundaries to the houses and apartments;
- introducing windows to gable elevations to promote passive surveillance;
- ensuring that the pathway that connects Gunson Street with Oldham Road is safe for users, and that passing pedestrians do not compromise the security of the development or the amenity of the residents of the house adjacent;
- including measures to prevent anti-social parking;
- arrangements for mail delivery to the apartments do not compromise the security of the mail or the building; and,
- the development being built to Secured by Design standards.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.



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Contents


1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood	
	2.2 Crime rate comparison	
	2.3 Burglary: risk analysis	
	2.3.3 Vehicle crime: risk analysis	
	2.4 Modus operandi used by offenders in committing burglary in Manchester & measures to reduce vulnerability	
	2.5 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	8
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals	
	3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the scheme	
4	Physical Security	12
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Window frames	
	4.3 Glazing	
	4.4 Intruder alarm	
	4.5 Boundaries	
	4.6 Landscaping	
	4.7 Lighting	
	4.8 Garden sheds	
	4.9 Meter cupboards	
	4.10 Downpipes	
5	Management & Maintenance	14
6	Construction	14
7	Secured by Design (SBD)	14

Appendix



A	Contact Register.....	15
B	Associated Documents.....	15
C	CIS Version History	15
D	Glossary	16

1 Visual Audit

The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. The site, edged in red on the plan, is located at the junction of Oldham Road and Butler Street in an area marketed as Platting Village in Miles Platting, about half a mile north-east of Manchester city centre. Oldham Road, A62, a major arterial route into the city centre defines the northern edge of the site. In the immediate vicinity of the site, Oldham Road is a dual carriageway, has very generous footpath width, and includes parking restrictions and a bus stop with associated shelter. The light controlled junction of Oldham Road and Butler Street is situated adjacent to the site's south-western corner. Butler Street defines the south-western and south-eastern edges of the site; there is a bus lay-by and shelter on Butler Street next to the site, whilst Tribe, a refurbished, thirteen-storey, residential tower, stands opposite on the south side of the street, overlooking the site. A series of four other, thirteen-storey, residential towers line Oldham Road to the north-east of the site, including The Apple Building, which is situated adjacent to the site and is undergoing some refurbishment. Gunson Street adjoins the eastern side of the site. Butler Court, a high and low rise, residential tower containing 71 apartments for older people is situated on the western side of Gunson Street opposite the site. Elsewhere, there has been extensive remodelling and infilling of the estate to the east of the site by Lovell Homes, who have developed a range of 2, 3 and 4 bedroom, high quality family houses for sale to the area, including those opposite the south-eastern boundary of the site on Gunson Road.



Looking north-east across the site from the junction of Butler Street and Oldham Road



A view across the site towards the residential tower blocks that overlook the site



Looking west across the site towards the Tribe apartment building



The tree-lined southwestern boundary of the site at Butler Street



Looking north on Gunson Street with the site on the left



A footpath connects Gunson Street and Oldham Road at the north-eastern edge of the site

The development site itself is irregularly shaped area made up highways and pathways, amenity land and plots of land formerly occupied by commercial and residential buildings that have long since been demolished and the land converted to amenity space whilst awaiting redevelopment. The south-western edge of the site includes the grass verge at the side of Butler Street. The verge is defined with 600mm high, hoop-topped, metal railings and includes several tall, mature trees, which along with the grass combine to create a pleasant edge to the site and the street. The other expanses of grass amenity space within the site all have had their edges mounded to prevent vehicles encroaching. Portugal Street, Butler Lane, East Newton Street and Rigel Street all traverse the site and are a legacy of the former use of the land for housing. These roads serve little purpose today other than providing parking space for local residents, contractors working on the estate or commuters seeking to avoid paying to park close to the city centre. A semi-formal footpath defines the north-eastern edge of the site, connects Gunson Street with Oldham Road. The northern edge of this pathway is edged with landscaping and 1100mm high, hoop-topped railings and a 1800mm high, weld-mesh fence, both of which enclose the grounds of The Apple Building.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 and 30th June 2019.


2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
23	14	123	162	50	36	9	139	18	18



- 2.1.1 In the period analysed, there were 677 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood in which the site is located which, when compared with other neighbourhoods within Manchester, is significantly higher than the average. The stand-out crimes in this neighbourhood are crimes involving the use or threat of violence, criminal damage, vehicle crime, theft and robbery; the rates for vehicle crime and criminal damage are much higher than the City of Manchester, Greater Manchester and national rates. Comparing all streets in the neighbourhood, there were two streets with over 50 crimes recorded, they are Rochdale Road, Oldham Road and Woodward Street.
- 2.1.2 Vehicle crime accounts for 38% of the total volume of crime recorded in the neighbourhood; it is a particular issue on Rochdale Road, especially at the car parks that serve city centre commuters.
- 2.1.3 Just over one third of all recorded crimes in this neighbourhood involve the use, or threat, of violence (including robbery), and are particularly common in the vicinity of Oldham Road, Butler Street and Woodward Street.
- 2.1.4 Criminal damage, including damage to cars, makes up 18% of the recorded crime. There is a hotspot of criminal damage on Woodward Street. Vehicles are twice as likely to be targeted as houses.
- 2.1.5 Crimes affecting residential property (but excluding violent crimes), i.e., damage to property, and theft, from cars, burglary, and, theft from gardens, garages, and garden sheds, account for about 13% of the total. There are no particular streets affected but 8 of the 23 burglaries have occurred within 100metres of the development site.

2.2 Crime rate comparison

Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales *England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2019.*





- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **69% lower** than the rate for Manchester, **46% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **31% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **16% lower** than the rate for Manchester, **32% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **53% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.




- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **20% higher** than the Manchester rate, **74% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **154% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **122% higher** than the Manchester rate, **303% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **538% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Burglary: risk analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.




- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary is low and fluctuates through the week, rising on Thursday and Friday, and in the mid-afternoon.



- 2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** In two thirds of burglaries offenders entered the property by forcing a door, often front doors. In some cases the offenders simply walked in through an unsecured door.

2.3.3 Vehicle crime: risk analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.3.4 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Monday, Tuesday and Friday during the morning and into the evening. Offenders have targeted vehicles using private car parking facilities, as well as on street parking. Offenders often target vehicles in these areas as there is less foot fall during the day as vehicles are left unattended, creating low risk opportunities for offenders.

2.4 Modus operandi used by offenders in committing burglary in Manchester & measures to reduce vulnerability

2.4.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard;
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations;
- side or rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates so that rear doors are only accessible to residents; and,
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping and damage to fencing.

2.4.2 Doors have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- front doors should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- communal entrance doors to apartments should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closing.
- defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the 'street', i.e. a small front garden enclosed with a suitably high fence. Separation of the passing public from a property can also help to reduce the risk of criminal damage; and,
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors.

2.4.3 Windows have been prised open by offenders

To minimise the risk of prising windows open:

- all ground floor windows should include key operated locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to the rear of the dwellings should be controlled by the erection of robust boundaries and locking gates. Pedestrian routes alongside the rear boundaries should be avoided wherever possible.

2.4.4 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glass in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground floor of the development.

2.5 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

- 2.5.1 Features of the physical environment can influence criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:
- How easy will it be to enter the area?
 - How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
 - What are the chances of being seen?
 - If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
 - Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?
- 2.5.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:
- the site is located in a part of the neighbourhood with a low rate of burglary;
 - the adjacent streets, tower blocks and houses appear to be well-maintained. Neighbourhoods where there are clear signs of physical deterioration and neglect tend to increase an offenders' perception that areas are vulnerable to crime and their actions will go unchallenged; and,
 - nearby street-based CCTV may help to detect offenders operating in the neighbourhood.
- 2.5.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:
- the site lies adjacent to Oldham Road, one of the principal arterial routes into the city centre. Routes such as this can act as a conduit for crime, with criminals using the route to access the city centre seeking out crime opportunities as they do so;
 - there are numerous street connections around the site, including the pathway that connects Gunson Street to Oldham Road, which facilitate movement through the neighbourhood, overly permeable neighbourhoods can sometimes be exploited by offenders who use less well trafficked streets to seek out opportunities for crime or disorder; and,
 - parts of the site and the adjacent roads are congested with parked cars, suggesting there is pressure for parking in the area, whether that is related to the nearby residential towers or commuters is not clear. The concentration of cars has led to a cluster of vehicle related crimes at the junction of Oldham Road and Butler Street/Gunson Street.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development involves the clearance of the grassed amenity areas that occupy much of the site and closure of Portugal Street, Butler Lane, East Newton Street and Rigel Street, followed by the erection of an apartment building and 24 houses.

Apartments

- 3.1.2 Labelled as Block B on the plans and located at the south-western corner of the site, the apartment building will be four-storeys in height and contain 19 no. two-bedroom apartments. The building will be. It will have four apartments on the ground floor, two of which will be accessed via a secured walkway at the rear of the building; each of the upper floors will house 5 apartments.
- 3.1.3 As well as the apartments, the ground floor will also include the entrance lobby, refuse store and a cycle store. The cycle and refuse stores will have internal and external doors.
- 3.1.4 The lift and stair core stair will be slightly detached from the apartment building. Access to the upper floor apartments will be gained via walkways that connect the apartments to the core.
- 3.1.5 The communal entrance door will be located on the southern elevation facing Butler Street. Both the cycle store and the refuse stores will have an external door and an internal door connecting the respective store to the building's core.

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- 3.1.6 Externally, there will be a 19 bay, unsecured, car park for the use of residents. The car park will be accessed from Butler Street via a short, service road. Amenity space is limited to peripheral areas of the building.

Houses

- 3.1.7 A range of three house types will be constructed set out in three distinct blocks, Block A, Block C and Block D.
- 3.1.8 Block A will be constructed in the north-western corner of the site, with the houses facing Oldham Road. The block comprises a terrace of six properties, each two and a half storeys in height, one of the houses will have four bedrooms and the others will have three. Each house will have a modest front garden and a larger, rear garden, although much of the rear is taken by parking space for a single car, or two spaces in the case of the house at the northern end of the terrace. Access to these, in-curtilage, parking bays is taken from Gunson Street via a short, service road with turning head. Additional amenity, in the form of a terrace on the second floor of the property, is included in the three bedroom houses.
- 3.1.9 Block C also consists of a terrace of 6 houses similar to those in Block A. The houses will be situated at the southern edge of the site facing Butler Street. All six will have three bedrooms, an elevated terrace at second floor level and have a parking bay in the rear garden. Access to these, in-curtilage, parking bays is taken from Butler Street via the, service road which also serves the apartments in Block B.
- 3.1.10 Block D comprises a series of six pairs of four-bedroom, semi-detached houses. The houses will occupy the land at the northern-eastern and south-eastern edges of the site and will face either Butler Street or Gunson Street. Each house will have a front and rear garden with two parking bays per house. In the cases of plots 32, 35 and 36, the parking bays will be located to the rear of house; all other bays are to the side of the house. Access to the parking spaces to plot 32 will also be gained from Butler Street, via the service road which also serves the apartments.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals

- 3.2.1 A residential development is an appropriate use for the site given the surrounding land use.
- 3.2.2 The proposals result in the redevelopment of a site that attracts criminal activity, i.e. offenders who carry out vehicle related crime, which may affect the quality of life of existing and future residents.
- 3.2.3 There are a significant number of houses and apartments within the development which increases the likelihood of residents of some of the houses and apartments being present throughout the day. The presence of residents or even just visible signs of people present - cars on driveways, lights on in houses, external lighting on at entrance doors, for example - will help to deter offenders.
- 3.2.4 The apartment building is suitably located, and includes parking and a small area of amenity space on the site. The proposed location of the communal entrance door is appropriate and a secure lobby can be created with the installation of access controls to the inner door and rear access door.
- 3.2.5 Front doors and principal room windows of the houses face the 'street', which helps to promote street activity and promotes natural surveillance over the public realm and neighbouring houses.
- 3.2.6 'Defensible space' is provided to the front, side and rear of all of the houses and the apartment building.
- 3.2.7 Private amenity space is provided within rear gardens of the houses, which can be appropriately secured with suitably high, visually permeable, boundary fencing and gates.
- 3.2.8 Retention of the grassed verge and trees on Butler Street, and the landscaping of the modest front gardens of all properties will support the quality of the local environment. Well-maintained verdant environments tend to attract less crime and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.9 The existing houses on the opposite side of Butler Street will benefit from mutual supervision of the street and opposing houses.
- 3.2.10 The proposed in-curtilage parking arrangements for most of the houses will facilitate the security of vehicles. Car parking provision that is separated from the passing public, on driveways, especially gated driveways, or in secure car parks, where vehicles can be readily supervised by residents, is less likely to be targeted by offenders than cars parked on the street or within ill-defined, communal parking areas.
- 3.2.11 Secure cycle parking is provided in the apartment building.
- 3.2.12 A refuse store is provided within the apartment building.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the scheme

THE SITE

Front garden boundaries to houses and apartments

- 3.3.1 Front gardens should be defined with 1100mm high walls with railing infill, similar to the Lovell houses on the opposite side of Butler Street.

Security of the proposed rear access roads and apartment parking

- 3.3.2 Given the very high volume of vehicle related crime, our preferred means of securing the rear access roads and apartment parking bays is to install automated gates at the entrance to each service road. The gates should be 1800mm high and operated by residents' fob. A separate gate should be included for pedestrians and cyclists. The gates will help to secure the vehicles as well as deterring intruders approaching the rear gardens or properties intend on burglary or theft.
- 3.3.3 An alternative to security gates is to create a space that to promotes ownership, encourage play/socialising and reduce the risk of offenders exploiting this secluded space. The application of a high-quality treatment to the service roads is encouraged. Rather than an engineered solution, the installation of a 'home-zone' styled design for these spaces will emphasise 'territoriality' and promote 'ownership' of the space amongst residents. Supervision of the space will be enhanced with children playing or adults and families socialising, which will deter offenders. The inclusion of measures such as: a rumble strip, ornate blockwork or a coloured/textured tarmac; additional, ideally bespoke, pedestrian-focused lighting; and, signs to indicate the private nature of the space and that children are playing, should be introduced at the entrance to the service roads at Butler Street and Gunson Street junction. Such measures will suggest that a threshold has been crossed into a space that is private.
- 3.3.4 The rear boundary fencing to the houses that adjoin the shared spaces should be visually permeable so that the space can have a sense of being under the supervision of residents.
- 3.3.5 Measures to prevent anti-social parking on the rear access road should also be considered. Both accesses are narrow and any vehicles parked, even those partly on the pavement may obstruct the flow of traffic, particularly delivery and refuse contractor vehicles.
- 3.3.6 The two rear access roads must be quite separate with a robust fence dividing the two spaces. A 2000mm high, welded-wire mesh fence, or railings, screened with dense planting adjacent to it would be ideal.

The pathway connecting Gunson Street to Oldham Road

- 3.3.7 In addition to the solid timber fencing that will provide privacy for the residents of plot 01, the southern edge of the pathway should be defined with a visually permeable fence such as a welded-wire, mesh fencing or railings around 1800mm in height. Given the frequency of criminal damage offences in the neighbourhood, the mesh fencing/railings will help to protect the timber fence, as well as prevent desire lines forming across the service road if not secured with gates. The amenity space adjacent to the pathway should be subject to a maintenance contract or included in the domain of plot 01.

APARTMENTS

Control entry into the building and site

- 3.3.8 The front and rear communal entrance doors must be security-rated and self-closing and locks upon closure. The doors should be secured with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a programmable fob.
- 3.3.9 An audio-visual unit with a link to each apartment should be fitted at the front, communal, entrance door, so that residents can vet callers prior to allowing access to *bona fide* visitors only.
- 3.3.10 To minimise the risk of offenders 'tail-gating' legitimate residents/visitors via the front entrance door, the inner lobby door should include a fob-operated, electronic lock.
- 3.3.11 The communal entrance doors should be particularly well lit.
- 3.3.12 Escape doors should not be used to enter or leave the building; so external ironmongery should be omitted and they must be self-closing and lock upon closure.
- 3.3.13 The gates and railings separating the car park from the apartment building, and the gates securing the access to the refuse store on Butler Street, should be 1800mm high. The gates should be fitted with an

electronic lock. Cyclists should use the rear entry gate to access the cycle store rather than the Butler Street gates, which should be for management staff or contractor use only.

3.3.14 Mail delivery

- 3.3.15 Individual, robust and lockable, postal boxes for each apartment should be located in the entrance lobby at the front of the building.

Apartment security

- 3.3.16 Each apartment should be fitted with a security-rated entrance door with door viewer and opening limiter.
- 3.3.17 Ground floor windows and those accessible from the elevated walkways should be security-rated, fitted with key-operable locks and have opening restrictors fitted. Glazing in all external doors and all accessible windows should include laminate glass.
- 3.3.18 Pedestrian gates to the rear gardens should include a lock that can be operated from either side to allow cyclist and drivers to enter and leave without compromising security. The gates should be self-closing and self-locking.

Cycle store

- 3.3.19 The external door to the cycle store and refuse store should be security-rated, fitted with an electronic lock operated by a fob, and be self-closing and lock upon closure.
- 3.3.20 The internal doors connecting both stores to the core should be FD30 rated, fitted with an electronic lock that controls both entry and exit and be self-closing and self-locking.

HOUSES

Front garden boundaries

- ☐ In order to differentiate parking bays where they adjoin those of the neighbouring house, railings or stone setts should be used to form a dividing line.
- ☐ Ownership management responsibility between plots should be clearly defined with a low railing or similar.

Rear garden fencing and gates

- 3.3.21 The rear garden fences and gates of plots 01 - 06 and plots 26-32 should be around 1200mm high to allow supervision of the rear access, effectively making the houses dual fronted.
- 3.3.22 Where exposed to accessible part of the rear access roads, rear gardens of the houses on plots 38-43 and plots 32 - 33 must be enclosed with 2000mm high, timber fencing and gates. Both the fencing and gates, which may include a significant element of trellis to allow residents to supervise the rear access road.
- 3.3.23 Pedestrian access to rear gardens of Block D houses should be secured with an 1800mm-2000mm high gate that includes a lock that can be operated from either side to allow cyclist and drivers to enter and leave without compromising the security of the property. Ideally, the gates should be self-closing and self-locking.

House security

- 3.3.24 Security certified doors, window frames and glazing should be installed within each house. An intruder alarm is advised.

Windows in gable elevations

- 3.3.25 Windows, ideally bay windows on the ground floor, should be introduced to the gable elevations of plots 31, 32 and 43 to facilitate passive surveillance over the entrances to the rear access roads.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

Apartments

- ☐ The communal entrance doors should be:
 - compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2;
 - include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system; and,
 - self-closing and lock automatically on closure.
- ☐ An audio, and ideally visual, unit should be located at front, communal, entrance door to allow visitors to communicate with residents.
- ☐ Residents should have a handset in their apartment to speak to (and view) visitors.
- ☐ Residents should be able to operate the communal entry door locking mechanism remotely from within their apartments to allow bona fide visitors entry.
- ☐ The following doors must also be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2:
 - apartment entrance doors
 - external door to the cycle store
 - external door to the refuse store
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must include a door viewer.
- ☐ Chain or similar opening limiters should be fitted to apartment entrance doors.
- ☐ Each apartment should be clearly numbered.

Houses

- ☐ Front doors and back doors, including French doors, must all be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS 202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Front doors should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key when closed.
- ☐ Front doors should have fixed sidelights or a door viewer, as well as an opening limiter fitted, so that residents can identify visitors prior to opening the door fully.
- ☐ Chain or similar opening limiters should be fitted to the front doors.
- ☐ Letter plates should meet the Door Hardware Federation's Technical Standard 008 (TS 008), be fitted with deflector plate, and be located a minimum of 400mm away from the internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Each house should be clearly numbered with the number visible from the street.

4.2 Window frames

- ☐ Ground floor windows of houses and apartments must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within, and surrounding, all external doors and all ground floor windows of the houses and apartments must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356.

4.4 Intruder alarm

- ☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each property. Alarms should be linked to contacts on all external doors, with PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms that have windows. In the absence of an alarm a 13amp fuse spur should be provided to allow future residents to fit their own alarm.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such walls and railings to height of around 1100mm.
- ☐ Sub-divisional boundaries to the front of houses should be defined with a 900mm railings, fencing or hedges.
- ☐ Pedestrian and vehicle gates into the rear gardens of Block D houses should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments (1800mm or 2000mm high) and incorporate a key operable sash or deadlock. If residents, especially drivers or cyclists, are likely to use these gates when entering or leaving their property, then the gates must be lockable from both sides. Security would be enhanced if pedestrian gates were fitted with self-closing hinges and the locked automatically upon closure.
- ☐ Sub-divisional, close-boarded, timber fencing at the rear of the houses should include a privacy screen 1800mm high, perpendicular to the house. The fencing may be reduced to 1500mm for the remainder of the boundary or include a 1500mm fence finished with a 300mm high section of trellis in the Block D houses. If dual-fronted, the sub-divisional fencing in the Block A and Block C houses should be around 1200mm in height but still include the 1800mm high privacy screen.
- ☐ The rear grounds of the apartment building should be secured with 1800mm boundary railings. Gates should be fitted with fob-operated electronic locks and the gates should be self-closing and self-locking. The design of these security gates should exclude features that might aid intruders seeking to climb over.
- ☐ If vehicle gates are installed at the entrances to the rear access roads, they should be 1800mm high, automated and activated by residents' fob. The adjacent pedestrian/cyclist gates should also be 1800mm high, be fitted with fob-operated electronic locks, be self-closing and self-locking, and be designed so that climbing is difficult.

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In order to facilitate natural surveillance across the development, any shrub planting within front gardens and around the edges of the apartment car park, should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies throughout the public realm of the site should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External, dusk-to-dawn lighting must be provided to the rear access roads, secure entrance gates, all front and rear doors of all properties, to the cycle and refuse stores door and to the apartment building car park.
- ☐ Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives.

4.8 Garden sheds

- ☐ If garden sheds are provided, they should be fitted with Sold Secure locks, hasp and staple and a ground anchor or shed shackle, to allow residents to secure valuable equipment and/or bicycles.

4.9 Meter cupboards

- ☐ Unless smart meters are installed, meters should be located in ground level boxes to the front of each property, not with the secure area at the side or rear of the properties.

4.10 Downpipes

- ☐ Wherever possible, downpipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the brickwork to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address maintenance of the apartment building and its car park, amenity areas and the rear access roads.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.
- ☐ The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved.

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
15.12.20	Sainabou Jack, PRP	Request for Crime Impact Statement
13.01.21		Site visited
15.01.21	Sainabou Jack, PRP	Additional drawings received
22.01.21	Sainabou Jack, PRP	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
AA6770-2000	Site Location Plan	Dec 2020	A
AA6770-2004	Proposed Site Plan	Jan 2021	D
AA6770-2006	Proposed Roof Plan	Dec 2020	A
AA6770-2030	Block A - HT03 & HT04 - Plans and Elevations	Jan 2021	A
AA6770-2031	Block B - APT01 & APT02 - Plans	Jan 2021	A
AA6770-2032	Block B - APT01 & APT02 - Elevations	Jan 2021	A
AA6770-2033	Block C - HT03 - Plans and Elevations	Jan 2021	A
AA6770-2034	Block D1 - HT01 - Plans and Elevations (Pitch Roof)	Jan 2021	A
AA6770-2035	Block D2 - HT01 & HT02 - Plans and Elevations	Jan 2021	A
AA6770-2036	Block D3 - HT01 - Plans and Elevations (Dormer)	Jan 2021	A
AA6770-2037	Block D4 - HT01 - Plans and Elevations (Gable)	Jan 2021	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary to review the recommendations.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		22.01.21

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk