



## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Ancoats Dispensary

39 Apartments

for: Great Places Housing Group

version A: 28<sup>th</sup> April 2021

URN: 2017/0390/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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# Ancoats Dispensary, Old Mill Street, Ancoats

2017/0390/CIS/02

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Minor design changes / security additions advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to expose any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime within the proposal.

The following issues have been identified as potential generators of insecurity, and should be addressed as described within the report (see Section 3.3 for more details):

- *Cycle storage*
- *Boundary treatments*
- *Access controls*

Our support for this scheme is subject to the above issues being satisfactorily addressed, as described within the report.

**Please note:** Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



**Michael Craig** DipLD CMLI

DfS Consultant

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# Contents

|   |                                                                                                                               |    |
|---|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 1 | Visual Audit.....                                                                                                             | 4  |
| 2 | Crime Statistics & Analysis.....                                                                                              | 5  |
|   | 2.1 Crime Summary                                                                                                             |    |
|   | 2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)                                                                                       |    |
|   | 2.3 Risk Factors                                                                                                              |    |
|   | 2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales |    |
|   | 2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis                                                                                          |    |
|   | 2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis                                                                                              |    |
| 3 | Layout Appraisal.....                                                                                                         | 10 |
|   | 3.1 Proposed development                                                                                                      |    |
|   | 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal                                                                                          |    |
|   | 3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security                                                                               |    |
| 4 | Physical Security .....                                                                                                       | 11 |
|   | 4.1 Doors                                                                                                                     |    |
|   | 4.2 Windows                                                                                                                   |    |
|   | 4.3 Glazing                                                                                                                   |    |
|   | 4.4 Alarms                                                                                                                    |    |
|   | 4.5 Access Control                                                                                                            |    |
|   | 4.6 Boundaries                                                                                                                |    |
|   | 4.7 Lighting                                                                                                                  |    |
|   | 4.8 CCTV                                                                                                                      |    |
|   | 4.9 Other                                                                                                                     |    |
| 5 | Management & Maintenance .....                                                                                                | 13 |
| 6 | Construction .....                                                                                                            | 14 |
| 7 | Useful References .....                                                                                                       | 14 |
|   | 7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)                                                                                                   |    |

## Appendix


|   |                           |    |
|---|---------------------------|----|
| A | Contact register .....    | 15 |
| B | Associated Documents..... | 15 |
| C | CIS Version History ..... | 15 |
| D | Glossary .....            | 16 |

# 1 Visual Audit

The site shown red on the plan, is located within the Ancoats / New Islington district of Manchester, on the eastern edge of the city centre. The neighbourhood is undergoing significant regeneration to transform it into a mixed residential, leisure and commercial area.

The area still retains some vacant plots and empty buildings. Vacant and neglected plots provide opportunities for antisocial behaviour which often escalates into criminal behaviour. The area includes a network of canals. Canal-side footpaths are commonly used by offenders to access the area, as they often offer limited natural surveillance from neighbouring properties, facilitating a rapid escape without fear of detection. The ramps around the entrance to the neighbouring Chips building create some obstructions to sight lines – these features can provide hiding places or informal sitting areas that may attract antisocial groups, causing nuisance to residents.

The site is occupied by what is left of the 19<sup>th</sup> century structures of the old dispensary, enclosed within hoardings. The former surface car park to the south of the site is being redeveloped with a substantial apartment block.




Old Mill Street frontage




Hoardings around the existing structure.




Construction site entrance at the rear of the site



Lampwick Lane looking north towards site



Old Mill Street looking east with site in middle distance



Access to basement car park for Chips Building



Nearby seating can encourage gathering close to dwellings.

## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1<sup>st</sup> July 2018 to 30<sup>th</sup> June 2019.

### 2.1 Crime Summary

| Recorded Crime within 500m of Site |                       |                 |                       |       |         |                  |                          |                        |               |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------|---------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| Domestic Burglary                  | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
| 26                                 | 19                    | 120             | 197                   | 36    | 52      | 9                | 125                      | 23                     | 32            |

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is relatively high, with less serious wounding and vehicle crime being the highest recorded offence types. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to an increase of crime and disorder issues. The local area is a mix of residential properties and car parking facilities, which commuters into the city centre use. The increased volume of vehicles can explain the higher number of vehicle crime offences within the area.

### 2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.

*Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas at the back of the premises and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.*

- 2.2.2 Smashed glazing in windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property) using implements.

*Possible Solution - All ground floor / accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards. All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high and robust fencing with lockable gates so that rear windows are only accessible to residents.*

- 2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

*Possible Solution - A robust access control system should be in place to prevent tailgating by intruders. The main entrances should be located in a highly visible position and well-lit to deter offenders from trying to break-in. Apartment doors should not be positioned in recesses and should be readily visible along the internal corridors. Additionally, where postal deliveries are made to an internal rack of mailboxes, a double door entry system should be used and the secondary door set should also be certified to recognised security standard and include a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system (N.B it is not acceptable for postal / delivery personnel to have free access inside the block).*

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



## 2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

## 2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **75% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **57% lower** than Greater Manchester and **39% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **29% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **11% higher** than Greater Manchester and **19% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **18% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **19% higher** than Greater Manchester and **77% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **35% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **146% higher** than Greater Manchester and **328% higher** than England & Wales.

## 2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on a Tuesday and Sunday during the afternoon and into the evening. Offenders often target properties during the day when residents are likely to be away from the property, attending work / socialising, leaving the property unoccupied, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Posing as a legitimate visitor / resident and entering communal areas of apartment buildings (car parks, mail rooms, bike storage and corridors).

## 2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Friday during the evening (6pm – 11:59pm.) Vehicles targeted have mostly been parked on streets and private car parks. During the evening it is often dark with less footfall in the area, the offender perceives that there is less of a risk of being caught / identified.

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## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises construction of an apartment block containing 39 dwellings over six levels. The listed Old Mill Street and Lampwick Lane façades of Ancoats Dispensary will be restored and incorporated into the new building.

### 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

- 3.2.1 The proposed development makes a positive use of a semi-derelict structure that has previously been subject to minor acts of criminal damage and other abuse. Repopulation and regular use of the proposed facility will bring additional vitality and should help to improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 The main entrance to the building off Old Mill Street is clearly defined in an obvious location readily apparent on approaching the site.
- 3.2.3 The main residents' entrance to the building has potential to be laid out with a double door entry system, creating a lobby / foyer area and inner access-controlled doors to allow further entry to the lifts and stair well. This helps to discourage tail-gating into the blocks, which is the most common method of entry for intruders. Arrangements for delivery of post should not require postal delivery staff to have unrestricted access to internal areas of the residential block. Any mail boxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a "through-the-wall" arrangement allowing external delivery / internal collection so that delivery staff do not require access to residential corridors.
- 3.2.4 The layout of internal areas within the block is relatively free of projections or recesses that could impede sight lines. Doors within communal corridors and landings should contain a glazed element to improve informal surveillance.
- 3.2.5 Individual apartment entrance doors appear to be flush with the corridor walls.
- 3.2.6 Many of the flats will have routinely-occupied rooms overlooking the adjoining public realm, which will help to increase natural surveillance along adjacent streets and areas around the block.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides an opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

### 3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

- 3.3.1 Cycle storage for residents. This should be provided within a secure room within the building or a secure cage within the service yard, with access controlled / restricted to residents only.
- 3.3.2 Secure enclosure. Boundaries intended to create a secure barrier should be a minimum of 2.4m high. The interface with fencing around the service yard of the neighbouring property should not create any weaknesses and careful detailing will be required to avoid creating potential climbing aids that would undermine the security of rear garden spaces and the Lampwick yard.
- 3.3.3 On exposed elevations along Old Mill Street, the recesses in the building footprint provide some cover for criminal and antisocial behaviour. It would be advisable to include a low railing or deterrent paving / shrub planting in the recesses to discourage access to the windows and remove potential hiding places.
- 3.3.4 Access controls / CCTV. Access controls will be required to restrict entry into and movement within the site / service area / cycle store – see section 4.5. The pedestrian gate should be fob in and fob out only, should include a self-closing device and lock on closing. Any internal release button should not be accessible from outside the gate. It is advised that a CCTV system is installed to allow coverage of vulnerable communal spaces and facilities – see section 4.8.

- 
- 3.3.5 Communal facilities and amenity space. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
- 3.3.6 Where possible, the physical security measures listed below should be incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

## 4 Physical Security

***The proposed development incorporates an existing listed structure, and in order to preserve its character, the potential to make alterations and upgrade the physical security of this is constrained. It is appreciated that any changes need to be sensitive to the architecture, and the following recommendations are made on this understanding. If the identified security risks cannot be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the building and its occupants will be dependent on effective management and deployment of an on-site monitoring and security systems. All new-build elements should be constructed in accordance with the following standards to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.***

### 4.1 Doors

- External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621 / 8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- External escape-only doors should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

### 4.2 Windows

- Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

### 4.3 Glazing

- Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

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## 4.4 Alarms

- If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

## 4.5 Access Control

- Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas / doors should operate on access control:
  - Residential communal entrance doors
  - Inner doors off lobby
  - Access to / from yard at southwest of building – (off Old Mill Street and from building)
  - Cycle stores

## 4.6 Boundaries

- Secure boundaries should be formed of 2400mm high walls / railings (with no mid-rails that could aid climbing). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps / gaps that would provide a climbing aid.

## 4.7 Lighting

- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

## 4.8 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to complement the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances, lobbies, rear elevation of the building, cycle stores](#).

## 4.9 Other

- Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable. Readable meter housings for the houses should be located on the front elevation of the property.
- Cycle stands must be either located within a secure cage with an access-controlled gate. Racks within the enclosure should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels, and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see [www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com) for details).
- Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of robust / masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- Mail boxes should be obtained from a supplier approved by Secured by Design and installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions (see [www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com) ).
- Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

## 5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
  - Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
  - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, alarms, CCTV)
  - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting is not impaired.
- 5.1.3 Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
- 5.1.4 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

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## 6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

## 7 Useful References

### 7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

## Appendix

### A Contact register

| Date       | Contact With                    | Summary of Contact                                     |
|------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| 15/03/2021 | Deloitte                        | CIS instruction received                               |
| 19/03/2021 | Deloitte                        | Commission confirmed / fee agreed                      |
| 01/04/2021 | Deloitte / Buttress / Gt Places | Meeting with Planning Consultant, Architect and client |
| 01/04/2021 | Great Places                    | Payment received                                       |
| 15/04/2021 | N/A                             | Site visit                                             |
| 23/04/2021 | Deloitte                        | Progress enquiry / update                              |
| 28/04/2021 | Deloitte                        | CIS version A issued                                   |

### B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No.     | Drawing Title    | Date       | Rev |
|-----------------|------------------|------------|-----|
| 210326_8803_GMP | GMP Presentation | March 2021 |     |
|                 |                  |            |     |
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PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

### C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made | Date |
|---------|----------------|------|
| A       |                |      |
|         |                |      |

## D Glossary

### Burglary Resistance Standards

#### **BS PAS 23-1, 1999**

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.*

#### **BS PAS 24-1, 2012**

General security performance requirements for door / window assemblies.

*An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French / double doors, and sliding doors.*

#### **ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)**

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

*The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:*

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

#### **LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)**

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

*This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.*

#### **STS201 Issue 4: 2012**

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

#### **STS202 Issue 3: 2011**

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

#### **EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)**

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

*A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a*

*6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.*

### Commonly Used Acronyms

#### **CIT**

*Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).*

#### **CPTED**

*Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*

#### **CRS**

*Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)*

#### **INPT**

*Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.*

#### **PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)**

*A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.*

#### **LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)**

*A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.*

#### **UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)**

*The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.*

### Useful Websites

#### **Design for Security**

[www.designforsecurity.org](http://www.designforsecurity.org)

#### **Secured by Design**

[www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com)

#### **RIBA Product Selector**

[www.ribaproductselector.com](http://www.ribaproductselector.com)

#### **LPCB – Red Book Live**

[www.redbooklive.com](http://www.redbooklive.com)

#### **Crime Reduction (Home Office)**

[www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk)

#### **DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre**

[www.designagainstcrime.org](http://www.designagainstcrime.org)

#### **Building for Life**

[www.buildingforlife.org](http://www.buildingforlife.org)

#### **CLG (Communities and Local Government)**

[www.communities.gov.uk](http://www.communities.gov.uk)