



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

A development of 23 houses and 45 apartments, and associated landscaping, boundary treatment, car parking & cycle parking

AT Land at Downley Drive, Ancoats, Manchester

FOR: Great Places Housing Association

VERSION B: 28.04.21

2021/0083/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

We welcome the redevelopment of the site and consider a residential scheme most appropriate. It has been well-designed from a crime prevention perspective and its presence is likely to positively affect patterns of crime and anti-social activity previously associated with the site and its surroundings

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include: an appropriate balance of types, tenures and size of properties; a suitable amount of defensible space around each property; with appropriate fencing, there will be a clear distinction between public, semi-private and private space; and, secure car and cycle parking have been included.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in section 3.3. The recommendations are summarised as follows:

- where feasible, close informal pathways on the eastern fringes of the site;
- deliver environmental enhancements to the streetscape at appropriate spaces within the development;
- whilst accepting that this is outside of the application boundary, the removal of existing seating and boulders at St Vincent's Street by other parties, Manchester City Council, for example, is likely to improve the safety and security of the development;
- include measures to prevent anti-social parking on the surrounding streets and spaces;
- install appropriately secure fencing and gates to define and secure the front and rear boundaries to the houses and apartment building;
- install automated vehicle gates to secure the apartment building car park and electronic locking to the pedestrian entrance gates;
- Install a modest CCTV to monitor activity in and around the apartment building;
- consider arrangements for mail delivery to the apartments that will not compromise the security of the mail or of the apartment building; and,
- the development should be constructed to the Secured by Design standard.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning supporting the application subject to the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.



Adrian Murphy MRTPI
Consultant

e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

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

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1 Visual Audit

The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. The 0.69hectare site, edged in red on the plan, is located to the north and east of St Vincent's Street, New Islington, about half a mile north-east of Manchester city centre. St Vincent's Street is a cul-de-sac, closed to traffic at its northern end, with two modern, apartment buildings - Burgess House and Engels House. The apartments on the south-eastern site of these buildings overlook the St Vincent's Street and a large part of the site; the apartments on the north-western side overlook Rochdale Canal and its narrow towpath. Access to the towpath at the rear of Engels House has been restricted by the erection of temporary, mesh fencing although, when visiting the site, the fencing had been forced over. St Vincent's Street is heavily congested with vehicles parked partly on the pavement on both sides of the carriageway. At the head of the street, adjacent to the canal there are a series of boulders and a bench that form part of an amenity area; drug taking is a regular event in this area. Engels House boundary wall is daubed with graffiti whilst the glazed door at the northern end of has been temporarily secured with a timber panel. East of the site are two culs-de-sac, Downley Drive and, slightly longer, Kingham Drive, both comprise houses with front and rear gardens, and driveway parking. The western ends of both of these streets adjoin the site and there are footpaths that facilitate access to the site.



Looking west across the southern part of the site from St Vincent Street towards Downley Drive



Houses on Woodward Place overlook the enclosed, southern fringes of the site



Congested with parked cars, St Vincent Street & Engels House adjoin the site's western boundary



The northern part of the site is an amenity space, with several mature trees around the periphery



A view of the site from the Rochdale Canal bridge a short distance to the north



The eastern approach to the site from Downley Drive

Contemporary, on-street, houses face Woodward Place, the windows to which overlook site from the south. Each of these houses has garage parking. Woodward Street is narrow and is a 'shared' surface with some 'on-street' parking. At the northern end of the site, there is an area of grassed amenity area criss-crossed with pathways some of which connect with a bridge over the canal. The Rochdale Canal and towpath adjoins the site's north-western fringe. A housing development is under construction on land to the north-east of the site. The development site itself comprises an area of grassed amenity land, bisected by a tarmac pathway that connects Downley Drive to the east, with the amenity area on the western edge of the site, at the northern end of St Vincent's Street. The larger part, south of the pathway is enclosed with welded-wire, mesh fencing; the northern part is not secure. Houses once occupied the site but they have long since been demolished. Extensive redevelopment has taken place in the wider neighbourhood over the last ten years, resulting in a more balanced community with a mix of modern houses and apartments, including private and social housing. There are, however, a number of social issues in the area; drug dealing and drug taking are particular problems.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 and 30th June 2019.


2.1 Crime summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
30	17	133	194	55	50	12	93	19	23

- 2.1.1 In the period analysed, there were 726 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood in which the site is located, which, when compared with other neighbourhoods within Manchester, is significantly higher than the average. The stand-out crimes in this neighbourhood are crimes involving the use or threat of violence, criminal damage, vehicle crime, theft and robbery.
- 2.1.2 The rate for vehicle crime is comparable to that of the City of Manchester, but much higher than the Greater Manchester and national rates. This is not unusual for neighbourhoods on the fringe of the city centre where commuter parking tends to be commonplace. Whilst the volume of crime recorded in the neighbourhood is very high, the density of dwellings results in quite modest rates of crime when compared with the city, conurbation and national rates.
- 2.1.3 Comparing all streets in the neighbourhood, there were three streets with 50 or more crimes, they are: Oldham Road, Ridgway Street and Woodward Street. There were 10 recorded crimes on St Vincent's Street and 4 on Woodward Place; vehicle-related crimes were most common on these two streets.
- 2.1.4 Almost 43% of all recorded crimes in this neighbourhood involve the use, or threat, of violence (including robbery), and are particularly common in the vicinity of Oldham Road, Butler Street and Woodward Street. Woodward Street and its immediate environs is a particular focus for robbery.
- 2.1.5 Vehicle crime accounts for 30% of the total volume of crime recorded in the neighbourhood; it is common throughout the neighbourhood with no specific hotspots.
- 2.1.6 Criminal damage, including damage to cars, makes up 18% of the recorded crime. There is a hotspot of criminal damage close to the site. Vehicles are twice as likely to be targeted as houses.
- 2.1.7 Crimes affecting residential property (but excluding violent crimes), i.e., damage to property, and theft, of parcels and other mail, from cars, burglary, and, theft from gardens, garages, and garden sheds, account for about 21% of the total. The analysis indicates that there were no particular burglary hotspots.



2.2 Crime rate comparison

Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales *England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.*



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **79% lower** than the rate for Manchester, **64% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **49% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.



- 2.2.2 The rate of wounding per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **49% lower** than the rate for Manchester, **20% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **14% lower** than the rate across England & Wales.




- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **34% lower** than the Manchester rate, **5% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **42% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.
- 2.2.5 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **4% lower** than the Manchester rate, **75% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **205% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Burglary: risk analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.




- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary is marginally greater on Tuesdays and in the late afternoon and early evening.



- 2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** In two thirds of cases of burglary, offenders entered the property by forcing a door, often front doors. In some cases the offenders simply walked in through an unsecured door.

2.4 Vehicle crime: risk analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime fluctuates through the week with a marginally greater risk on Friday. The afternoon and evening are the most common times for such crimes to be executed. Offenders have targeted vehicles in private car parks as well as those parked on the street.

2.5 Modus operandi used by offenders in committing burglary in Manchester & measures to reduce vulnerability

2.5.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard;
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations;
- side or rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates so that rear doors are only accessible to residents; and,
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping and damage to fencing.

2.5.2 Doors have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- front doors should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- communal entrance doors to apartments should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closing;
- where this can be balanced with the design of a development and its ability to fit the context of the local area, defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the 'street', i.e. a small front garden enclosed with a suitably high fence. Separation of the passing public from a property can also help to reduce the risk of criminal damage; and,
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors.

2.5.3 Windows have been prised open by offenders

To minimise the risk of prising windows open:

- all ground floor windows should include key operated locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to the rear of the dwellings should be controlled by the erection of robust boundaries and locking gates. Pedestrian routes alongside the rear boundaries should be avoided wherever possible.

2.5.4 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glass in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground floor of the development.

2.6 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.6.1 Features of the physical environment can influence criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.6.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the neighbourhood includes a large number of apartments, which tend to be less targeted by burglars than conventional houses, resulting in a reasonably low rate of burglary;
- as the area is redeveloped, there has been an increasing level of street activity and passive surveillance of the public realm, which can help to deter criminal activity;
- the adjacent streets, tower blocks and houses appear to be well-maintained. Neighbourhoods where there are clear signs of physical deterioration and neglect tends to increase an offenders' perception that areas are vulnerable to crime and their actions will go unchallenged; and,
- nearby street and canal-side CCTV may help to detect offenders operating in the neighbourhood.

2.6.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site lies in a neighbourhood with a large number of drug-dependent residents. Drug dealing and drug consumption are not uncommon on the streets and areas of open space, including the canal-side. Discarded needles and human waste are often seen. Neighbourhoods where there are significant drug related issues often attract further criminality, in particular street based crime of theft and robbery, both of which are common occurrences in this area;
- there are numerous streets and pathways around the site, including the canal towpath, which facilitate movement through the neighbourhood. Overly permeable neighbourhoods can sometimes be exploited by offenders who often use less well-trafficked pathways, identifying targets as they move through the area;
- the increasing number of people and properties in the neighbourhood gives criminals a broader range of targets than when the neighbourhood had large swathes of undeveloped land. The constant presence of contractor compounds in the area have also attracted criminals; and,
- several streets in the neighbourhood are congested with parked cars, suggesting there is pressure for parking in the area. The concentration of cars parking in vulnerable areas has led to a cluster of vehicle related crimes, including on Woodward Place and St Vincent's Street.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development, by Great Places Housing Group, will deliver sixty-eight affordable homes, comprising of twenty-three houses and forty-five apartments within a four-storey building, alongside associated landscaping, boundary treatment, car parking for 44 cars, and 68 cycle parking spaces.

Houses

- 3.1.2 A range of three house types will be constructed on the south-western half of the site, currently enclosed with mesh fencing. The houses will be set out in two distinct blocks, one facing St Vincent's Street and one facing an extended Downley Drive, with connection to Woodward Place. There will be 5no. terraces of four houses and a single terrace of three houses.
- 3.1.3 Twenty of the houses will have three bedrooms and be two and a half storeys in height, the remaining three, facing Downley Drive, will be two-storey, two-bedroom houses. Houses will be offered for part-ownership or affordable rent.
- 3.1.4 Each house will have a modest front garden largely taken up by the single in-curtilage parking space and bin store, and a larger, rear garden. A timber cycle store will be provided in the rear gardens of all houses.

Apartments

- 3.1.5 Located at the north-eastern part of the site, the apartment building will be four-storeys in height and contain 45no. a balanced mix of one and two-bedroom apartments. With the exception of a small part of the western elevation, the apartment building, and its associated car park and amenity space will be set within a secure perimeter.
- 3.1.6 As well as the apartments, the ground floor of the building will include: an entrance lobby, stair and lift core, bin store, cycle store, plant rooms and a second means of escape stair. The cycle and refuse stores will share an external entrance door and each have two internal doors to secure the respective store and provide access to the ground floor circulation corridor.
- 3.1.7 The communal entrance door will be located on the western elevation facing the end of St Vincent's Street. The entrance will be set behind a tall railed fence and pair of hinged, pedestrian entrance gates. The doors that will provide access to the bin and cycle store, and the sub-station will fall outside of the secure boundary. Means of escape doors will be located at the eastern end of the building and on the canal-side elevation, where a pathway will connect the door alongside the building to a gate that opens out onto St Vincent's Street. The six ground floor apartments on the south-western side of the building, car park side, will have a door that connects the living room to the pathway around the edge of the car park and amenity space. Whilst the three apartments on the ground floor of the canal-side elevation will have a similar door, which will open onto the amenity space between the building and the boundary railings
- 3.1.8 Externally, there will be a 21 space, gated car park for the use of residents. The car park will be accessed from St Vincent's Street. Outdoor amenity space is limited to the fringe of the car park.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals

- 3.2.1 A residential development is an appropriate use for the site given the surrounding land uses.
- 3.2.2 The proposals result in the redevelopment of a site that attracts drug users, whose activities affect the quality of life of existing residents of Engels House in particular.
- 3.2.3 The development will be managed by Great Places, a housing association with a strong reputation for property management, and who have significant property interests in this neighbourhood so are familiar with the area and some of its challenges.
- 3.2.4 There are a significant number of houses and apartments within the development which increases the likelihood of residents of some of the houses and apartments being present throughout the day. The presence of residents or even just visible signs of people present - cars on driveways, lights on in houses, external lighting on at entrance doors, for example - will help to deter offenders.

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- 3.2.5 The apartment building is suitably located, and includes parking and a small area of amenity space on the site. The proposed location of the communal entrance door is appropriate and a secure lobby can be created with the installation of access controls to the inner doors.
 - 3.2.6 Front doors and principal room windows of the houses face the 'street', which helps to promote street activity and promotes natural surveillance over the public realm and to and from neighbouring houses and apartments.
 - 3.2.7 'Defensible space' is provided to the front, sides and rear of all of the houses and all but the western elevation of the apartment building.
 - 3.2.8 Private amenity space is provided within rear gardens of the houses, which will be appropriately secured with suitably high, boundary fencing and gates.
 - 3.2.9 Rear access pathways to the gardens of the houses will be restricted to residents only with the inclusion of secure, communal entry gates located at appropriate points between the terraces.
 - 3.2.10 Landscaping, albeit limited, will support the quality of the local environment. Well-maintained verdant environments tend to attract less crime and anti-social behaviour.
 - 3.2.11 The proposed in-curtilage parking arrangements for most of the houses and apartments will facilitate the security of vehicles. Car parking provision that is separated from the passing public, on driveways, especially gated driveways, or in secure car parks, where vehicles can be readily supervised by residents, is less likely to be targeted by offenders than cars parked on the street or within ill-defined, communal parking areas.
 - 3.2.12 Secure cycle parking is provided in the apartment building and in stores in the rear gardens of the houses.
 - 3.2.13 A refuse store is provided within the apartment building and bin storage has been considered in the front gardens of the houses.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the scheme

Houses

Rear garden walls, fencing and gates

- 3.3.1 Because of the exposure to passing pedestrians and vehicles manoeuvring, the boundary with Woodward Place should be particularly robust and secure. A 2000mm high wall or railings (with planting or screens to maintain privacy) would be appropriate on this boundary. A railing, around 1000mm high, would be suitable to define the greenspace at the corners of the two plots that adjoin Woodward Place.
- 3.3.2 Timber fences and gates securing rear gardens, and access to them, of all houses should, typically, be 1800mm high. The height may drop down to 1200mm-1500mm of close boarded fencing with 600mm or 300mm sections of trellis to complete the fence and facilitate neighbour interaction.
- 3.3.3 To allow cyclists to come and go, garden entry gates should be fitted with a lock that allows entry and exit with the use of a key.
- 3.3.4 Because of the likelihood of frequent use by a range of residents, communal entry gates between the terraces should be more robust, so should be constructed with a steel frame, fitted with a key operated lock, and be self-closing and self-locking. These gates should omit any features that might assist climbing.
- 3.3.5 In order to differentiate parking bays where they adjoin those of the neighbouring house, railings or stone setts should be used to form a dividing line.
- 3.3.6 To clearly define ownership and responsibility for maintenance at the front of adjoining houses, a low rail or distinct change of surface should mark the boundaries.

House security

- 3.3.7 Security certified doors, window frames and glazing should be installed within each house. Front and rear doors should be illuminated from dusk to dawn. An intruder alarm is advised or provision be made, i.e. a 13 amp, non-switched, fuse spur, to allow future residents to connect an alarm should the occupier choose to do so.

Cycle stores

- 3.3.8 Cycle stores should be fitted with a Sold Secure™ ground anchor to which residents can secure their bicycles.
- 3.3.9 The cycle stores should be secured with a Sold Secure™ hasp and staple, and Sold Secure™ padlock.

Bin stores

- 3.3.10 Given the accessibility to the rear of each house, it would seem appropriate to locate bins in the rear gardens, rather than in designated stores at the front of each property. The presence of bins in front gardens can reduce the visual quality of a development and poorly located bin stores can interfere with visibility across a development and provide a means which offenders can access upper floor windows. However, if at detailed design stage, the bin stores are designed in such a way that will minimise these risks, then they can be acceptable in front gardens.

Apartments

Control entry into the site

- 3.3.11 The gates and railings securing the front of the building, and car park and the amenity space around the car should be 1800mm high. The railings and gates must be designed to discourage intruders, so a pointed top as well as defensive planting in the more peripheral northern and eastern fringes of the site is advised.
- 3.3.12 The railings securing the canal side of the development, including the means of escape route gate, must be at least 1500mm high; they must be designed to discourage intruders, so a pointed top and defensive planting in the buildings amenity strip is advised. The gate must include panic hardware that cannot be operated from the 'public' side of the gate and it must be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.
- 3.3.13 The vehicle gates must be automated and activated with a fob, card or similar method used to enter and exit the car park. Electronic gates are recommended in this neighbourhood.
- 3.3.14 The pedestrian gates must be fitted with an electronic lock with a holding force of around 4500Newtons. They must be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.
- 3.3.15 An audio-visual unit with a link to each apartment should be fitted at the St Vincent's Street entrance gate, so that when visitors call, residents can vet them prior to releasing the gates lock from within their apartment, allowing access to *bona fide* visitors only. A similar intercom should be installed at the entrance door.

Control entry into the building

- 3.3.16 The communal entrance doors must be security-rated and self-closing and locks upon closure. The doors should be secured with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a programmable fob or card.
- 3.3.17 An audio-visual unit with a link to each apartment should be fitted at the St Vincent's Street entrance door, so that when visitors call, residents can vet them prior to releasing the lock from within their apartment, allowing access to *bona fide* visitors only.
- 3.3.18 To further minimise the risk of offenders 'tail-gating' legitimate residents/visitors via the entrance door, the inner lobby door may include a fob/card-operated, electronic lock.
- 3.3.19 The communal entrance doors should be particularly well lit.
- 3.3.20 The means of escape doors on the canal-side elevation should not be used to enter or leave the building; external ironmongery should be omitted and the door should be must be self-closing and lock upon closure. An alarm should sound locally and at the housing association alarm monitoring centre when the door is opened.
- 3.3.21 The means of escape door at the northern end of the building should only be used as a means to exit the building; external ironmongery should be omitted and the door should be must be self-closing and lock upon closure.

Mail delivery

- 3.3.22 Individual, robust and lockable, postal boxes for each apartment should be located in the entrance lobby at the front of the building, in an internal mail store or mounted on the wall adjacent to the entrance door.

Apartment security

- 3.3.23 Each apartment should be fitted with a security-rated entrance door with door viewer and opening limiter.
- 3.3.24 Amenity space/car park access doors to the ground floor apartments should also be security-rated.
- 3.3.25 Ground floor windows should be security-rated, fitted with key-operable locks and have opening restrictors fitted. Glazing in all external doors and all accessible windows should include laminate glass.

Cycle and bin stores

- 3.3.26 The external doors that allow access to the service corridor serving the cycle store and bin store should be security-rated, fitted with an electronic lock operated by a fob/card, and be self-closing and lock upon closure.
- 3.3.27 The internal doors connecting the service corridor to the cycle store should be at least FD30 rated, fitted with an electronic lock that controls both entry and exit and be self-closing and self-locking.
- 3.3.28 The doors that connect both the cycle store and the bin store to the apartment corridor should be at least FD30 rated, fitted with an electronic lock that controls both entry and be self-closing and self-locking.
- 3.3.29 Securely anchored, Sheffield stands should be installed within the cycle store.

CCTV

- 3.3.30 A proportionate CCTV system should be installed that is capable of monitoring activity in and around the apartment building.

Streetscape

- 3.3.31 The Neighbourhood Policing Team wish to see the removal of the closure/removal of informal pathways immediately east of the site, in order to restrict access to offenders and drug users who use these pathways to access the canal from their places of residence, particularly on Woodward Street, and vice versa. The security of existing housing on Downley Drive and Kingham Drive as well as that of the proposed development would be improved if these paths were extinguished. Their closure will encourage greater use of more appropriate, formal pathways, of which there are several, and they have the benefits of having a degree of passive surveillance and street lighting. However, it is recognised that there are other considerations to consider on this matter - for example Highways and Planning - which mean that the total removal of access routes is not always possible. For example, there may be a need to replace any existing informal/formal public rights of way to an appropriate standard.
- 3.3.32 If possible, and recognising that this area falls outside of the boundary of the application, for reasons relating to drug abuse highlighted earlier in the Statement, the bench and boulders situated between Engels House and the proposed apartment building should be removed.
- 3.3.33 The application of a high-quality treatment to the streetscape around the development is encouraged. Rather than an engineered solution, the installation of a 'shared surface' design for these spaces will emphasise 'territoriality' and promote 'ownership' of the space amongst residents. Supervision of the space will be enhanced with children playing or adults and families socialising; their presence will deter offenders. The inclusion of measures such as: rumble strips; ornate blockwork or a coloured/textured tarmac; and bespoke, pedestrian-focused lighting should be introduced. Such measures will suggest a space where the actions of non-residents may be under closer supervision and so, deter offenders.
- 3.3.34 Physical measures or regulations to prevent anti-social parking on the streets and spaces around the development should be considered where the land in question is within the ownership of the Applicant.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

Houses

- ☐ Front doors and back doors, including French doors, must all be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS 202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Front doors should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key when closed.
- ☐ Front doors should have fixed sidelights or a door viewer, as well as an opening limiter fitted, so that residents can identify visitors prior to opening the door fully.
- ☐ Chain or similar opening limiters should be fitted to the front doors.
- ☐ Letter plates should meet the Door Hardware Federation's Technical Standard 008 (TS 008), be fitted with deflector plate, and be located a minimum of 400mm away from the internal handle and locking hardware.

Each house should be clearly numbered with the number visible from the street.

Apartments

- ☐ The communal entrance doors should be:
 - compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2;
 - include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system; and,
 - self-closing and lock automatically on closure.
- ☐ An audio, and ideally visual, unit should be located at the pedestrian entry gate and the communal entrance door to allow visitors to communicate with residents.
- ☐ Residents should have a handset in their apartment to speak to (and view) visitors.
- ☐ Residents should be able to operate the locks of the communal entry gate and entrance door remotely from within their apartments to allow bona fide visitors entry.
- ☐ Inner lobby doors should be self-closing and an electronic lock should be considered to restrict access to card/fob holding residents.
- ☐ Internal doors securing the cycle store and the bin store should be FD30 rated and fitted with a fob/card operated, Secured by Design approved, electronic lock. The doors should be self-closing and self-locking.
- ☐ The following doors must also be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2:
 - apartment entrance doors
 - ground floor apartment amenity space access doors
 - external door to the cycle store and bin store
 - external means of escape doors
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must include a door viewer.
- ☐ Chain or similar opening limiters should be fitted to apartment entrance doors.
- ☐ Each apartment should be clearly numbered.

4.2 Window frames

- ☐ Ground floor windows of houses and apartments must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within, and surrounding, all external doors and all ground floor windows of the houses and apartments must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356.

4.4 Intruder alarm

- ☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each property. Alarms should be linked to contacts on all external doors, with PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms that have windows. In the absence of an alarm, a 13amp fuse spur should be provided to allow future residents to fit their own alarm.

4.5 Boundaries

Houses

- ☐ The fronts of properties should be demarcated by a change in surfacing and, where appropriate, i.e. at street corners using railings around 1000mm tall.
- ☐ Rear gardens should be secured with walls or fencing to a height of 1800mm - 2000mm.
- ☐ Pedestrian gates into the rear gardens should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments (1800mm or 2000mm high) and incorporate a key operable sash or deadlock, lockable from both sides. Security would be enhanced if pedestrian gates were fitted with self-closing hinges and the locked automatically upon closure.
- ☐ Communal entry gates located between the terraces should be constructed of steel railing within a steel frame, fitted with a key-operated lock, and be self-closing and self-locking.

Apartments

- ☐ The car park and amenity space east of the apartment building should be enclosed with railings at least 1800mm high.
- ☐ The canal side of the building should be secured with 1500mm high railings and a, self-closing, self-locking pedestrian gate that restricts public access to the means of escape door.
- ☐ Where feasible, prickly, 'defensive' planting, hedges should be formed at the edges of the site to deter intruders and promote privacy for residents.
- ☐ Vehicle gates should be 1800mm high, automated and activated by residents' fob/card, and be designed so that climbing is difficult.
- ☐ The pedestrian entrance gate should also be 1800mm high, be fitted with fob-operated electronic locks, be self-closing and self-locking, and be designed so that climbing is difficult.

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In order to facilitate natural surveillance across the development, any shrub planting within front gardens and around the edges of the apartment building and car park, should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies throughout the public realm of the site should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lighting must be provided to:
 - the access roads;

- the exterior of the front and rear doors of all houses;
- the apartment car park and pedestrian entrance gates; and,
- the external doors to the apartment building - including entrance door, the external doors to the cycle and refuse stores, and means of escape doors.

☐ Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives.

4.8 CCTV

☐ Great Places Group should install a modest CCTV system capable of monitoring activity in the following areas: communal entrance doors; entrance lobby; means of escape doors; vehicle and pedestrian entrance gates; car park; the service corridor; and the cycle store.

☐ The images should be recorded on site in a secure room or, off-site, at a suitably accredited, monitoring facility.

4.9 Garden sheds/cycle stores

☐ If garden sheds or cycle stores are provided for the houses, each should be fitted with Sold Secure locks, hasp and staple and a ground anchor or shed shackle, to allow residents to secure valuable equipment and/or bicycles.

☐ The apartment cycle store should be secured with security rated and access controlled doors and fitted with Sheffield stands to allow cyclist to secure the frame and wheels.

4.10 Meter cupboards

☐ Unless smart meters are installed, meters should be located in ground level boxes to the front of each house, not with the secure area at the side or rear of the properties and in suitably secure but easily located place within the apartment building, e.g., the entrance lobby.

4.11 Downpipes

☐ Wherever possible, downpipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the brickwork to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address maintenance of the apartment building and its car park, amenity areas and gates.

6 Construction

☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.

☐ The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.

☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved.

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
09.02.20	Andrew Cowan, Deloitte	Request for Crime Impact Statement
03.03.21		Site visited
05.03.21	Deloitte, GPHG, Buttress	Meeting to discuss the project
07.04.21	Andrew Cowan, Deloitte	Revised plans received
14.04.21	Andrew Cowan, Deloitte	Report issued
26.04.21	Andrew Cowan, Deloitte	Text changes requested and amended plan received
28.04.21	Andrew Cowan, Deloitte	Amended site plan (rev 12) received
28.04.21	Andrew Cowan, Deloitte	Report re-issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
8801-BA-00-00-DR-A-01-003	Existing Site Location Plan	30/03/21	2
8801-BA-00-00-DR-A-04-001	Site Plan Proposed	09/04/21	12
8801-BA-00-00-DR-A-04-100	2BED/4 Terrace Affordable Rent	01/04/21	6
8801-BA-00-00-DR-A-04-101	3BED/5 Terrace Affordable Rent	01/04/21	6
8801-BA-00-00-DR-A-04-102	3BED/5 Shared Ownership	01/04/21	7
8801-BA-00-00-DR-A-04-200	Ground Floor Apartment Floorplate	01/04/21	9
8801-BA-00-00-DR-A-04-201	First Floor Apartment Floorplate	01/04/21	9
8801-BA-00-00-DR-A-05-010	3BED - Elevations	16/12/20	2
8801-BA-00-00-DR-A-05-011	2BED - Elevations	16/12/20	2
8801-BA-00-00-DR-A-05-200	Apartments Elevations	01/04/21	5
8801-BA-00-00-DR-A-06-200	Proposed Apartments Sections	01/04/21	3
8801-BA-00-00-DR-A-05-001	Street Elevations	01/04/21	7

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		14.04.21
B	Text changes to reflect the scope of the development, revisions to scheme, & to clarify specific recommendations	28.04.21

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- Resistance of glazing
- Performance of hardware
- Resistance to static loading
- Resistance to dynamic loading
- Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk