



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

19-23, SHUDEHILL, MANCHESTER

CHANGE OF USE TO BAR

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

FOR: ICENI PROJECTS LIMITED

VERSION B: 21ST APRIL 2021

URN: 2015/0068/CIS/01

19 – 23, Shudehill, Manchester

2015/0068/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design Changes Not Required

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

As an adaptation of an existing building, the physical scope to introduce additional security interventions is limited. However, all proposed alterations and the internal fit out should take account of the recommendations contained within this report.

The success of this proposal will be reliant on effective management of the premises, and our support for this development is dependent on adoption of the measures highlighted in sections 3, 4 & 5 of this report.



Michael Craig Dipped CMLI

Consultant

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1 Visual Audit




Shudehill is a busy route within the city centre, carrying high levels of pedestrian and vehicular traffic at all times of day. Streets at the back of the premises are relatively narrow, lacking regular activity and natural surveillance.

Major local facilities include the Arndale Shopping Centre with its market and car park, and Shudehill bus station / tram stop.

The site is close to the popular "Printworks" leisure complex, which contains several licensed premises.

The number of licensed premises in this area has increased significantly in recent years, as many retail and commercial premises have become bars or restaurants. This mix of uses is reflected in the developments around the site and in normal times the area has a very active evening / night time economy.

The proposed development is not a listed building but the site lies within Shudehill Conservation area.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 – 30th June 2019

2.1 Crime Summary


Recorded Crime in 500m Centred on Site									
Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
31	207	290	1710	1005	427	63	330	36	165

- 2.1.1 The volume of crime in this area is very high, which is typical for such a city centre location. The volume of violent crimes, theft, robbery and vehicle crime are exceptionally high, and the rate (per 1,000 properties) of burglary at commercial premises is much greater than is experienced across Manchester as a whole.

2.2 Common Local / Use Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Theft of customer property

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see below) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also increase surveillance opportunities and help deter offenders. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.



2.2.2 Rear doors and windows have been forced open with tools

Possible Solution – Security-certified door sets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks and the fittings. They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Windows should also be certified to recognised security standards, with key operated locks and opening restrictors. It may be necessary for more vulnerable windows to be fitted with security-certified shutters or grilles, in order to provide some additional protection.

2.2.3 Shutters have been forced upwards

Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2. Shutters should be mounted integrally, so that boxes are less vulnerable to tampering. Use of shutters in more concealed areas, where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed or detected, should be of a higher security certification, or consider use of additional protection such as internal security blinds or grilles.

2.2.4 Burglary where rear windows have been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – An appropriate glazing specification should be used (incorporating at least one pane of laminated glazing) to adequately secure the building. In vulnerable locations, shutters or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings / private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of / from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The change of use of existing premises to a bar, covering the ground, first and second floors of 19, Shudehill and the first floor of 21 and 23 Shudehill. All customer access is from Shudehill via no.19. Service access is from

3.2 Design Considerations

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal makes positive use of a currently vacant building, and improves potential natural surveillance in and around the site.
- 3.2.2 The main entrance for customers is in an obvious location on Shudehill and is clearly visible on approaching the premises.

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.2.3 The areas outside the premises do not appear to provide sufficient space for any outdoor seating. Consideration should be given to where smokers could gather without obstructing the pavements or compromising the security of the premises (both front and rear).
- 3.2.4 Servicing. No provision for refuse storage is indicated on the plans. It is not acceptable for bins to be left out on the adjacent streets for extended periods. Bins should be contained within a secure enclosure to prevent abuse.
- 3.2.5 The internal layout should be uncluttered and free of recesses and pinch points that would create opportunities for criminal or antisocial behaviour. Any narrow openings and passages in the internal layout can cause congestion and have potential for concealment. Where possible, corners should be chamfered to improve sight lines, and inclusion of reflective surfaces and mirrors would help customers and staff to see who is present.
- 3.2.6 Back of house functions should be well separated from public areas. Include doors with access controls to prevent customers accessing restricted areas (e.g. basement store).
- 3.2.7 The premises should be designed with efficient ventilation / extraction systems capable of reducing temperatures and providing sufficient ventilation without the need for staff or customers to open service doors (to the rear of the premises) that could undermine the integrity of other security arrangements.

4 Management and Operational Considerations

- 4.1.1 The premises has been in operation for about 6 years without incidence of serious antisocial / criminal activity requiring police attention. Established management practices have been largely successful in eliminating disorder at the premises and these should be continued.
- 4.1.2 The application does not involve fundamental physical changes to the building. As such the success of the proposal will be dependent on effective management of the premises and a zero tolerance policy should be adopted with customers who behave inappropriately.
- 4.1.3 Café / Bars can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:
- **Opportunities** - Patrons are stationary for extended periods of time making them easier to target.
 - **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction, and other factors mean patrons are easily distracted.

- **Customer turnover** – High customer turnover with high levels of customer movement within the establishment offer greater anonymity and allow more opportunities for offenders to operate unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – These are often available and likely to be on show. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, portable goods – mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys, etc. and people often make use of these items when sitting in a cafe.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues can provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences

4.1.4 In order to minimise these and other security issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- Customers entering / leaving the premises through the main entrances should be easily observed by staff.
- All back-of-house / staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- Large amounts of cash should not be stored in the premises overnight and signage should be installed to indicate this. Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach. Casual access to the rear of the service counter should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled).
- The internal layout of the premises should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding pinch points.
- There should be no places for concealment in public areas to allow staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation. Installation of mirrors in strategic locations can assist staff in monitoring areas outside their direct line of sight.

4.1.5 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. A maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:

- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras, lighting, doors and locks etc.;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti;
- Opening and closing of premises including staff arrival and departure, with particular attention to lone workers.
- Cash management within the premises
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices
- Management of stock deliveries.

4.1.6 Toilets should be clearly signed so that there is no excuse for customers finding their way to back of house areas.

4.1.7 A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development, and in preference should not require bins to be stored or left on the street for extended periods (if so, they should be secured to prevent unauthorised removal). Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

4.1.8 Permitted opening hours should be the same as similar nearby premises.

4.1.9 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers, music equipment, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

Physical Security

The proposed development comprises conversion of an existing building which involves only minor changes to the existing structure, thus the potential to make alterations and upgrade the physical security of the building is limited. The following recommendations are made on this understanding, but should apply to all new installations. If the identified security risks cannot be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the building and its occupants / users will be dependent on effective management and deployment of an on-site security presence and / or monitored alarms / CCTV.

4.2 Doors

- 4.2.1 External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- 4.2.2 External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- 4.2.3 Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- 4.2.4 All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts.
- 4.2.5 Doors to storage, staff-only or office space should be solid core, with multi point locking.

4.3 New Windows and Shutters

- 4.3.1 Any new windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950, must be key-lockable, and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- 4.3.2 Any shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

4.4 Glazing

- 4.4.1 Any new external glazing must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarms

- 4.5.1 An intruder alarm should be installed linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors should cover any rooms with windows.
- 4.5.2 It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

4.6 Lighting

- 4.6.1 Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- 4.6.2 Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- 4.7.1 CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

-
- 4.7.2 Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
 - 4.7.3 With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
 - 4.7.4 Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: **external doors (front and rear), till points / bar area, the entrance / waiting area.**

4.8 Other

- 4.8.1 There must be no features of the building envelope which create sheltered / hiding places or ledges, which could endanger passers-by or encourage loitering.
- 4.8.2 Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Construction

- 5.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 5.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

6 Useful References

6.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
22/01/2015	Aticus Law Solicitors	CIS Instruction Received
30/01/2015	N/A	Site Visit
27/02/2021	Aticus Law Solicitors	CIS version A issued
14/04/2021	Iceni Projects Ltd	Request for update
21/04/2021	Iceni Projects Ltd	CIS version B issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
-	Existing & proposed ground floor plan	-	-
-	Site location plan	-	-
-	Planning Statement	03/2021	-
LXA-WHM-101	Proposed Planning Layout	19/02/21	-
LXA-WHM-103	Proposed Lift Option Plan	19/02/21	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status	Revisions Made
A		
B		Amendments to Title page, Summary, Sections 3,4 & 5, and Appendix (21-04-2021)

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk