



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

43-47 Piccadilly Gardens, Manchester, M1
2AP

Office Development & Ground Floor
Commercial Unit

Trafalgar Leisure

Greater Manchester Police

VERSION A: 30th January 2018

designforsecurity

URN: 2017/1120/CIS/01

43-47 Piccadilly Gardens, Manchester, M1 2AP

2017/1120/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed development and layout do not raise any serious concerns, from a crime prevention perspective, and for this reason the development would be supported at planning application stage. There are a number of recommendations made in section 3 of this report and where possible these should be implemented.



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


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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Manchester city centre area, on the junction of Lever Street and Piccadilly. Developments in the local area are typically commercial, with a high number of retail offerings – particularly on Piccadilly and Market Street. Oldham Street and Lever Street are the terminus for a number of bus routes into and out of the city centre from the North.

Wellington House is opposite on Lever Street, the ground floor unit is currently vacant but has previously been a occupied by Natwest. Opposite the site on Piccadilly Gardens is Wellington's Statue.

The site includes the listed building at no. 47 Piccadilly, which will be retained, no. 47 Back Piccadilly, and a triangular parcel of land adjacent that forms the boundary to lever Street and Piccadilly.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2017 to 31st December 2017

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
39	258	364	3129	1140	463	48	240	385	285

- 2.1.1 The most frequently occurring offences over the previous 12 months in the research area have been less serious wounding, miscellaneous theft and criminal damage. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises (often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts).

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Offices:** Doors have been forced open using bodily pressure and tools, as well as being target when left insecure by employees.

Possible Solution –

- 2.2.2 **Offices:** Theft of personal property left on desks

Possible Solution -

- 2.2.3 **Retail** Shutters were units forced upwards

Possible Solution – It is highly recommended that any roller shutters are certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR 22). It is recommended that perforated shutters are used to prevent opportunities for defacement.

- 2.2.4 **Retail:** Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure




Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- 2.2.5 **Retail:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers/visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property

Possible Solution - There should be a robust access control system in place (see section 4.4) to ensure that callers to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed entry into the building. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.

2.3 Burglary Risk Analysis (Offices)



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail premises recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in North Manchester is greatest on Friday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary against office premises in North Manchester is greatest in the late evening and during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target office buildings when they are closed for the day, it is dark, the areas they are typically located in are quieter and they perceive a lower risk of being detected.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of office burglaries in North Manchester have been committed through doors. Many of the burglaries against office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. A number of burglaries have also been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff-only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.4 Theft Risk Analysis (Offices)



The data below relates to thefts within/against retail premises recorded in the Manchester area.




- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of miscellaneous theft at offices is greatest on Wednesday and is much lower during the weekend – when many are likely to be closed.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of miscellaneous theft is concentrated between mid-morning and 6pm in the evening – aligning with standard working hours. During these times, many office workers will take their breaks (particularly at lunch), leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts often peak at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing and premises are likely to be less secure, possibly while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.5 Burglary Risk Analysis Offices

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against office premises recorded in the Manchester area.



2.5.1



2.5.2 **Day Range:** During the week the risk of burglary does not vary greatly. On average the risk is highest between Monday and Friday than at the weekend.



2.5.3 **Time Range:** During the day the risk of burglary is concentrated in the early hours of the morning. The risk of burglary at retail premises is typically greatest at night when it is dark and retail areas are not subject to high levels of footfall, leading offenders to believe the risk of being caught or identified as low, in addition to allowing them greater lengths of time to target properties.

2.5.4 **Point of Entry:** The most favoured entry point at retail premises in Manchester were as follows:

- Shutters were forced upwards using bodily pressure or tools.
- Offenders have posed as legitimate customers to access premises when they are open before targeting insecure doors or tailgating to restricted areas.
- Front and rear doors were forced open using bodily pressure/implements, particularly metal bars. In several cases, glazing was smashed in front door windows. The frequent use of tools/implements demonstrates offenders came well-equipped to offend.

2.6 Theft Offices - Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against office premises recorded in the Manchester area.



2.6.1 **Day Range:** During the week the risk of theft does not vary greatly, with the exception of Sunday. The risk of theft often drops on Sunday when retail premises are open for shorter periods of time.

- 2.6.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft is greatest in the afternoon, peaking between 13:00 & 17:00, it is likely that offenders target retail premises during this period when they are typically busiest and offenders perceive the risk of being caught as low due to operating in crowded areas where their activities are less likely to go noticed.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is of a nine storey building, with a commercial unit at ground floor, first floor, and basement level – accessed from the corner of Piccadilly Street and Lever Street, with offices at first floor and above. The existing listed building, no. 47 Piccadilly, will be retained as part of the proposals.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The main entrance into the offices at first floor and above will be taken from Lever Street, which experiences high levels of footfall during the day and in the evening – allowing for passive surveillance opportunities. There are also busy bus stops opposite on Lever Street which will contribute surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.2 Access to the ground floor/basement level commercial unit (retail/food & drink) will be taken from the corner of Piccadilly and Lever Street, where it will be overlooked by nearby premises and subject to high levels of passive surveillance from pedestrians.
- 3.2.3 The bin store and substation are self-contained and access to the building cannot be gained from it.
- 3.2.4 The offices and retail uses will be self-contained, with no shared access arrangements.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The office entrance/reception should be staffed during standard office hours (i.e. 9am-5pm) to allow visitors to be vetted before being permitted access into the building,
- 3.3.2 There should be a video/audio intercom on the main entrance to allow staff to vet visitors to the building when the main reception is not staffed.
- 3.3.3 Access from the entrance lobby into the circulation cores of the building should be restricted with turnstiles, or similar, to restrict access to members of staff.
- 3.3.4 Individual office suites should have a secure door set (i.e. BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR 2).
- 3.3.5 Individual office suites should be covered by an alarm system. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility – be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team.
- 3.3.6 Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
- The main office entrance doors (out-of-hours and if reception is not staffed).
 - Access to the lift and stair core from reception should be controlled with turnstiles (operated by staff fob/swipe card or remotely by reception staff) for added security.
 - Doors to each individually let office suites/floors.
 - Doors on each leading into emergency escape cores.
 - All other entrance doors used regularly by staff
 - Plant/service/storage areas

-
- 3.3.7 If the ground floor unit is to be occupied by a licensed premises, the opening hours should be in keeping with similar uses in the local area.
 - 3.3.8 All ground floor external doors should be illuminated with dusk-till-dawn lighting.
 - 3.3.9 Any blank facades should be treated with an anti-graffiti coating, to an approximate height of 2000mm, so that graffiti can easily be cleaned.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Any revolving doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2+. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ If the building is to be occupied by multiple tenants, it is recommended that all individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled doors, certified to BS PAS 24.

4.2 Windows & Building Fabric

- ☐ Ground floor windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Alarms should be installed to cover the entire building and each individual office suite, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility - be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

Offices

- The main office entrance doors (out-of-hours and if reception is not staffed).
- Access to the lift and stair core from reception should be controlled with turnstiles (operated by staff fob/swipe card or remotely by reception staff) for added security.

- Doors to each individually let office suites/floors.
- Doors on each leading into emergency escape cores.
- Plant/service/storage areas

Commercial unit

- External doors
- Areas restricted to staff

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
15/12/2017	Stuart Palmer	CIS application received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
2074-PS-GA-02	Site Plan	04/01/17	R1
2074_GA_01	Proposed Ground Plan	01/06/17	
2074_GA_02	Proposed First Floor Plan	01/06/17	
2074_GA_03	Proposed Second Floor Plan	01/06/17	
2074_GA_04	Proposed Third Floor Plan	01/06/17	
2074_GA_05	Proposed 4 th – 8 th Floor Plan	01/06/17	
2074_GA_06	Proposed 9 th Floor Plan	01/06/17	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- Resistance of glazing
- Performance of hardware
- Resistance to static loading
- Resistance to dynamic loading
- Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk