



## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Jersey Wharf

190 Dwellings and Retail (636sqm)

For: **Manchester Life Development Company 3 Limited**

Greater Manchester Police

Version B: **09/12/21**

design**for**security

Ref: **2021/0397/CIS/01**

---

# Jersey Wharf

2021/0397/CIS/01

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Development Supported - Minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings.
- Secure cycle store provision
- Ground floor external material protection against graffiti

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

**Please note:** At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application subject to the design team suitably addressing the recommendations contained in the report (Sections 3.3, 4 & 5), and will seek the inclusion of a planning condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

**David Maher** *Dip Arch*  
Consultant

e: [david.maher@gmp.police.uk](mailto:david.maher@gmp.police.uk)

---

# Contents

|   |                                                                                                              |    |
|---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 1 | Visual Audit.....                                                                                            | 4  |
| 2 | Crime Statistics & Analysis.....                                                                             | 5  |
|   | 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)                                                               |    |
|   | 2.3 Risk Factors - Residential                                                                               |    |
|   | 2.4 Retail Risk Factors                                                                                      |    |
|   | 2.5 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester |    |
|   | 2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis                                                                         |    |
|   | 2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis                                                                             |    |
|   | 2.8 Burglary Risk Analysis (Retail Uses)                                                                     |    |
|   | 2.9 Theft Risk Analysis (Retail Uses)                                                                        |    |
| 3 | Layout Appraisal.....                                                                                        | 13 |
|   | 3.1 Proposed development                                                                                     |    |
|   | 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal                                                                         |    |
|   | 3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations                                                                       |    |
| 4 | Physical Security (Residential).....                                                                         | 14 |
|   | 4.1 Doors                                                                                                    |    |
|   | 4.2 Windows                                                                                                  |    |
|   | 4.3 Glazing                                                                                                  |    |
|   | 4.4 Alarms                                                                                                   |    |
|   | 4.7 Other                                                                                                    |    |
| 5 | Physical security (none residential).....                                                                    | 16 |
|   | 5.1 Doors                                                                                                    |    |
|   | 5.2 Shutters                                                                                                 |    |
|   | 5.3 Windows                                                                                                  |    |
|   | 5.4 Glazing                                                                                                  |    |
|   | 5.5 Alarms                                                                                                   |    |
|   | 5.6 Access Control                                                                                           |    |
|   | 5.7 Lighting                                                                                                 |    |
|   | 5.8 CCTV                                                                                                     |    |
| 6 | Management & Maintenance .....                                                                               | 18 |
| 7 | Construction .....                                                                                           | 18 |
| 8 | Useful References .....                                                                                      | 18 |
|   | 8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)                                                                                  |    |

## Appendix

|   |                           |    |
|---|---------------------------|----|
| A | Contact register .....    | 19 |
| B | Associated Documents..... | 19 |
| C | CIS Version History ..... | 19 |
| D | Glossary .....            | 20 |

# 1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located in the Ancoats district on the outskirts of M/cr city centre. Bounded by Jersey St & the Rochdale canal to the south east. Part of the site has been derelict for some time, with the remaining section of the site containing a warehouse .



Opposite the site is Poland St. The far end of Poland St. connects to the Oldham Rd, a busy arterial road into M/cr city centre from the east. Oldham St. combines a mix of commercial/retail/leisure/residential uses which provide high levels of activity throughout the day & evening. Oldham St. is heavily used for bus services for the city centre.

There are several well-established residential buildings within the vicinity, developed over the last 15 years. The proposed development site is the latest of several sites coming forward under the Ancoats/New Islington masterplan


Parts of the Ancoats area are heavily pedestrianized and in parts, traffic free. Several buildings provide commercial/retail ground floor uses, some with external seating areas onto the pedestrianized streets supporting the area as a cultural & vibrant destination.

Parking is in high demand within the area, partly due to the proximity to the city centre and the high density of dwellings in the area, together with limited on-street parking.

There was visual evidence of graffiti in and around the site and recesses in neighbouring buildings were being used as outdoor toilets.



1 – View into the site off Jersey St.




2 – View along the Rochdale canal towards the site.



3 – View east along Jersey St.



7 – View across Rochdale canal.



6 – View along Jersey St towards Miles Platting.



5 – View of the existing building on site off Jersey St..



4 – Car park entrance of neighbouring residential building.

## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1<sup>st</sup> July 2018 to 30<sup>th</sup> June 2019.

### Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

| Domestic Burglary | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------|---------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| 29                | 30                    | 125             | 192                   | 64    | 49      | 9                | 127                      | 29                     | 26            |

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is 33% below the average rate of crime for Manchester, with the most prevalent types of crime being less serious wounding, as well as vehicle crime, criminal damage and theft. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings, have taken place throughout the local area - with particular hotspots occurring to the west of the site along Oldham Road and Great Ancoats Street. Assaults and public order offences have been the most commonly occurring, with domestic incidents and incidents between intoxicated individuals or groups, largely during the late evening and early morning.
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime in the area is high; however, this is likely because of the large car parks located in the area. Vehicles parked within close proximity of the City Centre are mostly used by commuters leaving vehicles unattended for long periods of the day.

## 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Entering apartment buildings by means of tailgating residents/ exploiting insecure doors and accessing communal areas (mostly corridors/ post and bike storage areas).

**Residential:** Possible Solution - All individual apartments should be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.), cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. A staffed 24/7 concierge desk will support the management and security of the entrance lobby.

- 2.2.2 **General:** Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key.

- 2.2.3 **General:** Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.4), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.4). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

- 2.2.4 **General:** Forcing open shutters using implements and tools in order to gain access to the doors and windows located beneath.

Possible Solution – (If proposed within the development), Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

- 2.2.5 **General:** Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

---

*Possible Solution – All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Ensure that rubbish and loose material is removed from the areas around the site. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.*

- 2.2.6 **Commercial/Retail:** Posing as a legitimate customer and entering restricted areas by means of insecure doors and tailgating employees.

*Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).*

- 2.2.7 **Café/Restaurant:** Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

*Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.*

- 2.2.8 **Office:** Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

*Possible Solution - Secure store rooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building or fit-out. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove, and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Portable equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular visitor access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.*

## 2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft off/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

## 2.4 Retail Risk Factors





The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft

- 
- Theft of customer / staff property
  - Criminal damage to property

## 2.5 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



- 2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **78% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **62% lower** than Greater Manchester and **46% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **48% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **18% lower** than Greater Manchester and **13% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwelling is **33% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **3% lower** than Greater Manchester and **45% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **28% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **132% higher** than Greater Manchester and **304% higher** than England & Wales.

## 2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Tuesday, Thursday and Friday during the evening (5:30pm – 8pm). Offenders often target properties during the evening when residents are likely to be away from the property, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Posing as a legitimate resident and gaining access to communal areas by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents.

## 2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis


The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Monday and Friday during the afternoon and into the evening. Offenders have targeted vehicles using on street parking facilities and private car parks, where they are often left unattended for long periods of time, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught.

## 2.8 Burglary Risk Analysis (Retail Uses)

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.8.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.8.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

## 2.9 Theft Risk Analysis (Retail Uses)

*The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.*



- 2.9.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses and bags.

---

## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposal seeks to develop land; part of which has been partially vacant for a number of years and part of the proposed site contains an existing warehouse building with service yard and car parking space.
- 3.1.2 Up to five separate commercial units within Use Class E (retail, food and beverage, indoor sport and recreation [to be confirmed]). Located on the ground floor facing Jersey Street to create active frontages as well as at the rear of the building facing the Rochdale Canal encouraging footfall and activity of the canal side public realm.
- 3.1.3 The Planning Application is for a residential development of up to 190 dwellings (Use Class C3) and ground floor commercial uses (Use Class E) with associated landscaping, car and cycle parking and canal side public realm improvements and associated works.
- 3.1.4 Amenity spaces for residents will provide secure cycle parking, residents lobby space and a private courtyard garden.

### 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

- 3.2.1 The proposal will generate additional legitimate activity into a neighbourhood which has been subject to criminal damage and other abuse. Redevelopment with housing and repopulation of the site should help to create a sense of ownership and responsibility and improve informal policing of the area (see also 3.3.1).
- 3.2.2 The building footprint at ground floor level is relatively free of recesses or projections that could provide cover for criminal or antisocial activity.
- 3.2.3 The apartments will have routinely occupied rooms overlooking the adjacent public areas, which will help to increase natural surveillance of accessible areas around the block.
- 3.2.4 The building provides ground floor activity in the form of residential entrances, office and reception space, commercial/retail use and in-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent public realm.
- 3.2.5 The proposed building clearly defines the different uses of the building and all entrances can be easily located and navigated.
- 3.2.6 The foyer/reception zone provides the opportunity for good levels of security at a central control point for the development.
- 3.2.7 The internal layout of the building appears capable of being divided into identifiable zones, allowing separation of accessible and restricted areas. The access-control strategy adopted for the development should be capable of confining movement into and through the building, thus allowing staff and visitors to only enter parts of the site to which they have legitimate reason to be present. Access permissions should be fully auditable and regularly reviewed.
- 3.2.8 Current drawings show two secure cycle parking rooms for residents and staff is contained in dedicated room off the ground floor via the canal side public garden courtyard and off Jersey St. Entry into these spaces should be strictly limited via the access-controlled system under the building management system ensuring only genuine cyclists can gain access. Racks within the cycle stores should allow bikes to be locked by the frame and both wheels and should be obtained from a Secured by Design approved supplier (see [www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com)).
- 3.2.9 The car parking has been well laid out, avoiding potential hiding spaces for intruders.
- 3.2.10 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

---

### 3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

- 3.3.1 Residents private courtyard gate between the Club room & Commercial Unit B. Boundary treatment must not provide climbing holds or ease of access around the canal edge of the fence, thus allowing an opportunist access into the private garden space.
- 3.3.2 Mailbox location. Arrangements for delivery of post should not need postal delivery staff to have access to internal corridors and stairwells of the residential block. Mailboxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a "through-the-wall" arrangement allowing external delivery / internal collection.
- 3.3.3 Residential post/parcel/grocery room. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal or grocery delivery staff to have access to internal areas of the residential block beyond the GF reception space. Postal workers should not be given unfettered access to the entire building as this could potentially leave apartments and residents vulnerable. (see Section 4.1 for more information)
- 3.3.4 Balconies and external elevations generally. The cladding / facing materials should not provide external aids to climbing that could allow an intruder to gain access to the upper floor balconies. The detailing of the façades and the relationship between the building and any other external landscape features / street furniture will need to be carefully planned to avoid introducing this kind of vulnerability.
- 3.3.5 Graffiti on surfaces. This kind of abuse is particularly prevalent in the vicinity of the site. It is important that external cladding materials at ground floor are sealed, protected and supports the removal of graffiti, a resistant coating applied to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings. The external space should not contain climbing aids that could allow an intruder to gain access to the upper floor balconies. The detailing of the façade and any proposed external landscape features will need to be considered to avoid introducing an access vulnerability point into the building.
- 3.3.6 Communal facility maintenance. The robust management of such features is essential as poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.

## 4 Physical Security (Residential)

*In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.*

### 4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system linked to the concierge desk, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

---

## 4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950. Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

## 4.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

## 4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

## 4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
  - Main Entrance doors
  - Secondary entrance doors off internal lobbies
  - Bin stores
  - Cycle stores
  - Staff-only areas

## 4.6 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances](#), [foyer](#), [stairs](#), [lift lobbies](#), [landings](#), [cycle stores](#), [bin store entrances](#).

## 4.7 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

## 5 Physical security (none residential)

*All new-build elements should be constructed in accordance with the following standards to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.*

### 5.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

### 5.2 Shutters

- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:
  - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
  - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

### 5.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

---

## 5.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

## 5.5 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room. Additional fuse spurs should be incorporated into each apartment to allow residents the option of installing a private alarm for their property.

## 5.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
  - All external doors where regular staff access is required.
  - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
  - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)
  - Cycle store

## 5.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Lighting to vehicle circulation areas, service yards and car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

## 5.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas.

## 6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
  - Litter removal
  - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
  - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 6.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

## 7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

## 8 Useful References

### 8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

## A Contact register

| Date     | Contact With | Summary of Contact                |
|----------|--------------|-----------------------------------|
| 13/08/21 | Deloitte LLP | CIS application submitted         |
| 27/08/21 | Deloitte LLP | Client confirmation               |
| 21/09/21 | Deloitte LLP | Design Team presentation          |
| 14/09/21 | DfS          | Site visit                        |
| 15/11/21 | DfS          | CIS completed                     |
| 09/12/21 | DfS          | CIS amended as per email 08/12/21 |
|          |              |                                   |

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No. | Drawing Title                                        | Date     | Rev |
|-------------|------------------------------------------------------|----------|-----|
|             | BA9225_1015 - Ground Floor Plan                      | 10/11/21 |     |
|             | BA9225_1016 - First Floor Plan                       | 11/11/21 |     |
|             | BA9225_1043 - Seventh Floor Plan                     | 11/11/21 |     |
|             | BA9225_1052 - North & South Elevations               | 11/11/21 |     |
|             | BA9225_1053 - Courtyard Elevations - West Block      | 11/11/21 |     |
|             | BA9225_1054 - Flank Elevations - East and West Block | 11/11/21 |     |
|             |                                                      |          |     |
|             |                                                      |          |     |
|             |                                                      |          |     |
|             |                                                      |          |     |
|             |                                                      |          |     |
|             |                                                      |          |     |
|             |                                                      |          |     |
|             |                                                      |          |     |
|             |                                                      |          |     |
|             |                                                      |          |     |
|             |                                                      |          |     |
|             |                                                      |          |     |
|             |                                                      |          |     |
|             |                                                      |          |     |

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

## C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made     | Date     |
|---------|--------------------|----------|
| A       |                    |          |
| B       | General amendments | 09/12/21 |

## D Glossary

### Burglary Resistance Standards

#### BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.*

#### BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.*

#### ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

*The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:*

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

#### LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

*This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.*

#### STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

#### STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

#### EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

*A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.*

### Commonly Used Acronyms

#### CIT

*Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).*

#### CPTED

*Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*

#### CRS

*Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)*

#### INPT

*Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.*

#### PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

*A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.*

#### LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

*A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.*

#### UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

*The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.*

### Useful Websites

#### Design for Security

[www.designforsecurity.org](http://www.designforsecurity.org)

#### Secured by Design

[www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com)

#### RIBA Product Selector

[www.ribaproductselector.com](http://www.ribaproductselector.com)

#### LPCB – Red Book Live

[www.redbooklive.com](http://www.redbooklive.com)

#### Crime Reduction (Home Office)

[www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk)

#### DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

[www.designagainstcrime.org](http://www.designagainstcrime.org)

#### Building for Life

[www.buildingforlife.org](http://www.buildingforlife.org)

#### CLG (Communities and Local Government)

[www.communities.gov.uk](http://www.communities.gov.uk)