

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

1a, Stevenson Square

Leisure / Commercial Development (690m^2)

for: Mr Whaid Ahmed

version A: 16th June 2021

URN: 2013/0684/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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1A, Stevenson Square, Manchester

2013/0684/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Security additions advised

The nature and level of disorder in the immediate area could make the development and its occupants vulnerable to abuse, and it is therefore essential that the scheme does not incorporate features that would increase crime or raise the fear of crime in and around the site.

The following issues have been identified as potential generators of insecurity, and should be addressed as described within the report (see Section 3.3 for more details):

- *Operation of unit entrances*

Our support for this scheme is subject to the above issue being satisfactorily addressed, and inclusion of the recommendations relating to on-going management and maintenance of the premises, as stated in section 5 of this report.



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Contents

1 Visual Audit 4

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 5

2.1 Crime Summary

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.3 Risk Factors - Retail

2.4 Risk Factors - Leisure Facilities

2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

2.6 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

2.7 Non-Domestic Burglary (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

2.8 Theft (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

3 Layout Appraisal 11

3.1 Proposed development

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security

4 Physical Security 12

4.1 Doors

4.2 Windows

4.3 Glazing

4.4 Alarms

4.5 Lighting

4.6 CCTV

4.8 Other

5 Management & Maintenance 14

6 Construction 15

7 Useful References 16

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Appendix

A Contact register 17

B Associated Documents 17

C CIS Version History 17

D Glossary 18

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1 Visual Audit

The site shown red on plan, is located in the Northern Quarter of central Manchester, within the Stevenson Square conservation area. Buildings in this area generally front directly on to the street, and are low and medium rise structures containing minimal external / servicing space. The network of streets and back streets creates a very permeable layout that can provide convenient access / escape routes for potential offenders.

Stevenson Square is semi-pedestrianised and pavement space is used for outdoor seating / markets and small-scale events. Spear Street and Faraday Street have a back street character providing service access to properties facing other streets. Overlooking / natural surveillance is low, allowing incidents of disorder to occur unwitnessed. Occupants of adjoining premises have installed overt security measures and there is evidence of criminal damage.




View of premise from Stevenson Square


Outdoor seating in front of adjacent premises


Faraday Street at rear of premises


Stevenson Square frontage

Extensive graffiti on walls of premises


Spear St / Faraday St junction looking towards Stevenson Square

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
49	224	296	1711	952	413	67	394	47	166

2.1.1 The volume of crime in the local area is extremely high – with the most prevalent types of crime being violence, theft, vehicle crime and theft. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of the violence has occurred around the Northern Quarter area, particularly round Thomas Street and the surrounding roads, where there is a high concentration of licensed premises. Incidents peak in the evening/during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people tend to visit the city centre and attend licensed premises, often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Opening secure doors (all door types) using bodily pressure and implements to access the premises.

Possible Solution – Security-certified door sets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks and the fittings (see section 4). They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Access should be restricted to any hidden elevations of the building, where any doors could be attacked unseen from the street.

2.2.2 Breaking glazing in doors and windows, mainly to the front of the premises, using implements to gain access.

Possible Solution – All ground floor / accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within / directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

2.2.3 Entering premises as legitimate customer and tailgating staff/ exploiting insecure doors to access staff only areas.

Possible Solution – Staff-only areas should be effectively separated, both visually and physically, so that customers cannot readily gain entry. This can be achieved by the use of access-controlled doors or barriers, but they should create a clear distinction so that any intruder can be more easily identified. There should be provision within the staff only areas for the secure storage of personal belongings while at work.

2.2.4 Forcing open shutters using implements and bodily force to gain access to the doors and windows located beneath.

Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2. Shutters should be mounted integrally, so that boxes are less vulnerable to tampering. Use of shutters in more concealed areas, where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed or detected, should be of a higher security certification, or consider use of additional protection such as internal security blinds or grilles.

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2.3 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.4 Risk Factors - Leisure Facilities

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Burglary
- Theft of user / staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of / from parked cars
- Uncontrolled access
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Cash robbery / attacks on vending machines
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

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
2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.


Retail Burglary – Day Range



Retail Burglary – Time Range



Retail Burglary – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:


- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

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
2.6 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.

Retail Theft – Day Range



Retail Theft – Time Range




2.6.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses and bags.

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
2.7 Non-Domestic Burglary (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.


Leisure Facilities Burglary – Day Range



Leisure Facilities Burglary – Time Range



Leisure Facilities Burglary – Point of Entry



2.7.1 Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at leisure facilities in the Greater Manchester area peaks on Thursday / Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon / early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon / early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets / areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.7.2 Point of Entry: The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting leisure facilities:


- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

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
2.8 Theft (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.

Leisure Facilities Theft – Day Range



Leisure Facilities Theft – Time Range




2.8.1 Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at leisure facilities within the Greater Manchester area peaks on Tuesday, but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.


2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.9.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon (12pm – 4:30pm) and evening (6:30pm – 11pm). Offenders have mostly targeted vehicles using private car parking and on street parking facilities. Vehicles are often left unsupervised for long periods of time in areas where footfall is reduced, creating a perceived low risk opportunities for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development comprises creation of 3 separate retail / leisure units on two levels with separate access points, off Spear Street, Faraday Street and Stevenson Square.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The footprint of the buildings at ground level are relatively free of recesses that could provide cover for offenders.

3.2.2 The proposed development provides potential to improve ambience of street scene which has been neglected / degraded by criminal and antisocial activity. The development could encourage more legitimate use in the neighbourhood, which can marginalise the

3.2.3 The main entrance off Stevenson Square benefits from good levels of natural surveillance from the public realm.

3.2.4 The proposed development provides an opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 High crime area. The development lies in an area where the rates of many crime types exceed the local and national averages, and thus the developer must carefully consider all the security recommendations listed below in order to reduce the potential risk of crime for proposed occupants and legitimate users of the site.

3.3.2 Proposed Entrances off Spear Street / Faraday Street. General activity levels along these streets are low, with obvious signs of neglect. The lack of natural surveillance provided by overlooking premises along these routes has allowed offenders to carry out criminal / antisocial activity without fear of being witnessed. Customers and staff accessing the premises are therefore at increased risk of becoming victims of crime. The location of primary access points on these streets is only acceptable if a security presence is provided at the doors during opening hours, in particular during hours of darkness and late evenings. The Mezzanine access on Faraday Street benefits from being opposite The Hive which is most active during the daytime. Doors should also benefit from CCTV coverage and effective lighting.

3.3.3 Bin storage / refuse disposal. Accommodation for the safe storage of bins within the building should be identified. It is not acceptable for refuse receptacles to be left outside overnight or for extended periods as they can be subject to abuse.

3.3.4 Extraction systems. The premises should be designed with efficient ventilation / extraction systems capable of reducing temperatures and providing sufficient ventilation without the need for staff or customers to open service doors (to the side or rear of the premises) that could undermine the integrity of other security arrangements.

3.3.5 Any ground floor glazed elevations adjoining the streets should be protected from ram-raid type attacks by creative use of hard landscape features in the adjacent public realm, or installation of anti-ram bollards / re-enforced stall risers.

3.3.6 Improving sightlines on stairs and corridors. Doors within the communal areas should include glazed elements to improve sight lines, and use of mirrors / reflective surfaces at corners can help to aid visibility inside the building and on stair cases. Avoid any narrow openings which can create congestion and have potential for concealment. Where possible, corners should be chamfered to improve sight lines.

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3.3.7 Graffiti on surfaces. This kind of abuse is particularly prevalent in the vicinity of the site. Expanses of blank wall exposed to public areas should be formed of a graffiti-resistant surface or have a resistant coating applied at the outset to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings.

3.3.8 Cash storage. The position of any safes / tills should be out of public reach, and securely fixed to other structures to prevent easy removal. Arrangements for cash handling should be considered so that the distances that large amounts of cash are carried is minimised. Safes should provide adequate capacity, with a deposit facility, certified to LPS 1183. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs.

4 Physical Security

The proposed development comprises conversion of an existing building which involves changes to the existing structure, thus the potential to make alterations and upgrade the physical security of the building is limited. The following recommendations are made on this understanding, but should apply to all new installations. If the identified security risks cannot be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the building and its occupants / users will be dependent on effective management and deployment of an on-site security presence and / or monitored alarms / CCTV.

4.1 Doors

- External doors including French Windows, must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts.
- Doors to storage, staff-only or office space should be solid core, with multi point locking.

4.2 Windows

- Any new windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950, must be key-lockable, and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm. Where this is not possible for dimensional reasons, window construction should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can be limited to standard dimension sizes.
- Any shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Shutters should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage).
- Doors used for deliveries, and any shutters that may be used to protect these entrances when not in use, should include a vision panel or door viewer to enable staff to identify visitors prior to allowing entry.

4.3 Glazing

- Any new external glazing must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- An intruder alarm should be installed linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors should cover any rooms with windows.

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- It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

4.5 Lighting

- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.6 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to complement the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: external doors (front and rear), till points / bar area, the entrance / waiting areas / outdoor seating space

4.7 Fit Out

- Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-users requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:
  - Internal doors and access controls to staff areas / offices / stores
  - Cash management offices and safes, as well as cash-in-transit arrangements
  - Internal layout - including pay-point positions, aisles and product displays, arrangement of internal furnishings etc.
  - Alarms
  - CCTV
  - ATM cash dispensers

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- These features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide further advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

4.8 Other

- Any bollards or other street furniture included specifically to prevent ram-raiding should be certified to BS PAS 68-1:2013.
- Metal theft from buildings is a significant issue and consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction. Metal pipework and cabling should be concealed.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The success of the proposal will be dependent on effective management of the premises, and a zero tolerance policy should be adopted with customers who behave inappropriately.

5.1.2 A security presence is required at the entrances during opening hours.

5.1.3 Café / Bar / Restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Patrons of restaurants are stationary for extended periods of time making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction, and other factors mean patrons are easily distracted.
- **Customer turnover** – High customer turnover with high levels of customer movement within the establishment offer greater anonymity and allow more opportunities for offenders to operate unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – These are often available and likely to be on show, (a particular problem on any external seating areas). Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, portable goods – mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys, etc. and people often make use of these items when sitting in a restaurant.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues can provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences

5.1.4 In order to minimise these and other security issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- Customers entering / leaving the premises through the main entrances should be easily observed by staff.
- All back-of-house / staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- Large amounts of cash should not be stored in the premises and signage should be installed to indicate this. Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach. Casual access to the rear of service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled). No tills should be kept outside.
- The internal layout of the premises should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding pinch points.
- There should be no places for concealment in public areas to allow staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation. Installation of mirrors in strategic locations can assist staff in monitoring areas outside their direct line of sight.

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5.1.5 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. A maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:

- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras, lighting, doors and locks etc.
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti;
- Opening and closing of premises including staff arrival and departure, with particular attention to lone members of staff.
- Cash management within the premises
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices
- Management of stock deliveries.

5.1.6 Outdoor Seating

- The outdoor seating areas should be supervised and a duty of care exercised to ensure seating does not stray outside the permitted area and cause obstruction to pedestrians.
- No seating or tables should be left in accessible areas outside the premises overnight. Seating must be stacked and secured outside the permitted hours of use.

5.1.7 Toilets should be clearly signed so that there is no excuse for customers finding their way to the back of house.

5.1.8 A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development, and should not require bins to be left on the street for extended periods. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

5.1.9 High customer turnover in cafe / bars, with high levels of customer movement within the establishment are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed – staff must be able to easily monitor people arriving or leaving the premises from any potential access point.

5.1.10 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers, music equipment, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5.1.11 Opening hours should be in accordance with other similar premises in the area, taking account of the potential for noise nuisance to occupiers of nearby premises.

5.1.12 Procedures for opening up at the start of business and closing premises at the end of business should be devised to minimise the risk to staff. Due to the current ambience of the area it is strongly advised that lone staff are not required to open / close the premises.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

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7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
21/04/2021	Zaid Ahmed	CIS instruction received
26/04/2021	Zaid Ahmed	Commission confirmed
07/05/2021	Zaid Ahmed	Payment received
09/06/2021	N/A	Site visit
10/06/2021	Zaid Ahmed	Progress Update
16/06/2021	Zaid Ahmed	CIS version A issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
1SQ(PL)A101	Existing Ground Floor Plan	20/02/21	
1SQ(PL)A102	Existing First Floor Plan	20/02/21	
1SQ(PL)A103	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	20/02/21	
1SQ(PL)A104	Proposed First Floor Plan	20/02/21	
1SQ(PL)E306NE	Proposed Faraday Street Elevation	20/02/21	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door / window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French / double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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