



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Ancoats Mobility Hub. Poland Street,
Ancoats, Manchester

For: Manchester Life Strategic Development
Company Limited

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Version C: 10th May 2021

Ref: 2021/0130/CIS/01

Poland Street, Ancoats, Manchester

2021/0130/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported - Minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings
- Service vehicle entrance/egress access
- Secure cycle store provision
- Access control for entrance lobbies
- Ground floor external material protection against graffiti

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application subject to the design team suitably addressing the recommendations contained in the report (Sections 3.3, 4 & 5), and will seek the inclusion of a planning condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.



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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.





The site is situated on Poland St, in the Ancoats district on the outskirts of M/cr city centre, located near the busy arterial Oldham Road. The site currently contains a number of light industrial commercial units arranged around a central service yard/car park.

The site shares a boundary with a public park; Ancoats Green on the north eastern side. The boundary treatment consists of metal palisade fencing and dense landscaping on the park side.

This area of Ancoats contains a mix of single storey industrial units and residential developments. Opposite the site are a number of single storey commercial units facing onto George Leigh St. There is no boundary treatment between the site and the pavements. Material waste has been dis-guarded around the service yard frontage creating an unkempt appearance to the immediate area.

Parking is in high demand within the area, partly due to the proximity to the city centre and the high density of dwellings in the area, together with limited on-street parking.

There was visual evidence of graffiti in and around the site and recesses in neighbouring buildings were being used as outdoor toilets.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
26	32	106	178	62	45	10	228	34	24

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is relatively low for Manchester, with an exception to vehicle crime which is high; however the location of the proposed site should be taken into consideration. The proposed site is located within the Ancoats area which is just on the edge of the city centre. This area largely consists of residential property and car parking facilities, which is reflected in the large number of vehicle crimes taking place around the proposed site, with vehicle crime accounting for 45% of all crime within the local area. Theft from a motor vehicle and criminal damage to a motor vehicle account for 80% of all vehicle crime taking place. Offenders have targeted vehicles using private car parks, parking within apartment buildings and on street parking.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have occurred throughout the area, with assaults and public order offences accounting for 73% of all violence in the local area. Offences have mostly taken place during a domestic dispute or between known associates. Offences have mostly occurred within dwellings and surrounding streets.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Theft of motor vehicles.

Possible Solution – To minimise the risk of theft of vehicles:

- include vehicle barriers, which can only be activated with a code, token or key card;
- prevent offenders casually entering the car park by installing high, visually permeable, perimeter fencing;
- limit the number of entry points to the car park and try to ensure entrances are in a location where there is an element of passive supervision;
- employ an attendant should to supervise the car park and assist customers as required;
- install a CCTV system; and, install appropriate lighting.

2.2.2 Theft from motor vehicles.

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk of theft from vehicles:

- prevent offenders casually entering the car park by installing high, visually permeable, perimeter fencing;
- limit the number of entry points to the car park and try to ensure entrances are in a location where there is an element of passive supervision;
- employ an attendant should to supervise the car park and assist customers as required;
- signs should be erected to remind customers not to leave valuable visible with their vehicle;
- CCTV cameras should monitor the car park; and, the site should be illuminated in accordance with the British Standards for car parking lighting.

2.2.3 Criminal / accidental damage to motor vehicles.

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk damage to vehicles in the car park:

- prevent desire lines forming between cars by clearly defining pedestrian routes that are connect directly to car park entry points and pay points;

do not located pay points in areas where pedestrians may come into conflict with vehicles; and, if defined, parking bays should large enough to accommodate larger vehicles.

- 2.2.4 Opening of secured doors using implements such as crowbars or hammers at retail premises.

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- 2.2.5 Forcing open shutters using crowbar-like implements or by ramming with vehicles at retail premises.

Possible Solution – Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- 2.2.6 **Restaurant/Café:** Entering the property as a legitimate customer and then moving into restricted areas, usually through insecure counters or doors.

Possible Solution – There should a be robust access control system in place (see Section 5.1) to ensure that public access is not possible to staff-only areas. All individual back-of-house rooms/offices/stores etc. should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour. CCTV covering till points should be incorporated into the interior design of the space.

- 2.2.7 **Restaurant/Café:** Offenders targeted insecure personal property, namely mobile phones, cash and bags.

Possible Solution - Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.

2.3 Risk Factors - Car Park/ Cycle Storage

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Cash robbery/attacks on vending machines
- Controlled access (staff/user only)
- Safety of children
- Loitering groups
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Robbery

-
- Employee theft
 - Theft of personal belongings at work
 - Unauthorised access to buildings/private space

2.4 Risk Factors - Restaurant/Cafe


The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period


2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary Car Park: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against Car Park, recorded in the Manchester area.


Burglary Car Park– Day Range



Burglary Car Park – Time Range



Burglary Car Park – Point of Entry





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at car parking premises in Manchester peaks on a Monday and Saturday during the early hours of the morning (3am – 6am). Offenders target properties during the early hours of the morning when it is usually dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that there is a lower risk of being caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open shutters using implements in order to gain entry.
- Tailgating residents/ employees into secure car parking areas.
- Posing as a legitimate visitor to residential apartments and by means of tailgating staff/ exploitation of insecure doors gain access to communal areas.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors

2.6 Theft Car Park: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against car park, recorded in the Manchester area.




- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft at car parking facilities in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week peaking on a Thursday and Sunday during the morning and into the afternoon (9am – 2:30pm). Offenders have targeted parked vehicles and by means of broken glazing, gained entry to vehicles and removed personal belongings.


2.7 Non-Domestic Burglary Bike Storage: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against Bike Storage facilities recorded in the Manchester area.


Burglary Car Park – Day Range



Burglary Car Park – Time Range



Burglary Car Park – Point of Entry





2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at car parking premises in Manchester peaks on a Monday and Saturday during the early hours of the morning (3am – 6am). Offenders target properties during the early hours of the morning when it is usually dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that there is a lower risk of being caught or identified.

2.7.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the building.
- Forcing open shutters in order to gain access to the building, using bodily pressure and tools.
- Exploitation of insecure doors,
- Using tools in order to obtain bicycles.

2.8 Theft Bike Cycle: Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against Bike Storage facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft at bike storage facilities in Manchester peaks on a Tuesday and Wednesday during the afternoon and into the evening. Offenders have targeted bicycles stored within communal buildings and within residential car parking. Tools have been used to remove the bicycles - chains often cut.

2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Restaurants / Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.1.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafés in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday. The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.

2.1.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the premises.
- Breaking glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the windows and doors located underneath.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors, accessing restricted areas and removing goods belonging to staff and the company.

2.2 Theft (Restaurants / Cafés): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.2.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants / cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants / cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses / wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Monday Friday and Sunday during the morning and into the late evening. Offender often target vehicles parked within close proximity of the city centre as they are often left unattended and not overlooked for long periods of time, creating a low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Development of land bounded by Poland Street to the west, the City Court Trading Estate to the south, Crown Industrial Estate to the north and Ancoats Green to the east to deliver a mobility hub development of up to 8 storeys including 150 cycle parking spaces, 408 car parking spaces, a ground floor retail unit and a delivery hub.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed building forms the opportunity to create a public link between Poland St and Ancoats Green. The redevelopment of the site will provide an interesting and diverse use, offering employment opportunities, pedestrian activities and another interesting piece of architecture and open public space within this district of the city.
- 3.2.2 The building proposes a number of ground floor activities increase the levels of pedestrian and public uses. In-turn these offer the advantage of good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.3 Crime in the Ancoats area is relatively high. There will be an onsite private management/security team patrolling the area regularly which will deter offenders from operating in the area and, potentially, from targeting the proposed multi-storey car park.
- 3.2.4 The proposed building clearly defines the different uses of the building and all entrances can be easily located and navigated.
- 3.2.5 The public realm of the proposal is generally permeable, accommodating a variety of transport methods and pedestrian movement to be concentrated on the spaces between development zones. Building use activities have been strategically placed to animate new streetscapes and open public spaces. Communal facilities have been located in good locations which promote activity and natural surveillance across new vistas.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development will result in an increase in footfall in the area, improving vitality across the wider area, providing additional natural surveillance, which can help promote a greater sense of safety on the street.
- 3.2.7 Glazed elevations to most of the public elevations will help to enliven the street scene and enhance natural surveillance of and from the building.
- 3.2.8 The foyer/reception zone provides the opportunity for good levels of security at a central control point for the building users.
- 3.2.9 Facilities with multiple entrances and exits can often provide offenders and those antisocially minded with various escape routes, facilitating offending. The plans indicate that customers in vehicles will be directed through a single entrance/exit (the pay machine lobby) rather than having a choice of multiple entrances/exits. In addition to the single vehicle point there are two pedestrian entrance/exit points located adjacent to each stair core.
- 3.2.10 The car park will have a one way system which will reduce the potential for collisions.
- 3.2.11 Bays and directional markings will be clearly demarcated.
- 3.2.12 The site will be covered by a comprehensive monitored CCTV and lighting system.
- 3.2.13 Security measure carefully incorporated into the environment and building design can ensure that buildings and the environment is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime or safety. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The car park should include access controls on all entrances – vehicular and pedestrian. Access should only be available to those holding an appropriate ticket/permit. Electronically operated barriers should secure the vehicles entrance and exit, whilst electronic locks should secure the pedestrian doors.
- 3.3.2 All external pedestrian doors should include door closers which fully engage the locking mechanisms upon closure. Escape doors should be used for escape purposes only and not for general circulation. Escape doors should be signed and alarmed to deter customers from using these routes.
- 3.3.3 Staff should be present throughout the day to conduct regular patrols of the facility.
- 3.3.4 Payment machines should be covered by CCTV cameras. Ticket machines should be emptied regularly and cash should be stored in a safe certified to the relevant Loss Prevention Standard. If there is a cash room within the car park where the safe is located it should have solid blockwork walls (or reinforced studwork walls) and the door set should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- 3.3.5 Help points should be positioned on each floor so that users of the facility can speak to a member of the security team if necessary (i.e. in the case of an emergency).
- 3.3.6 The car park should be illuminated in accordance with to BS 5489 – see table L1 below.
- 3.3.7 Parking bays should be generous enough to accommodate large vehicles (i.e. SUV, Crossover & 4x4) to reduce the potential for conflict between users.
- 3.3.8 Clear signage should direct traffic and pedestrians to the appropriate exit.
- 3.3.9 There should be a comprehensive CCTV system covering the parking facility. Cameras should cover all pedestrian and vehicular entrance points, all parking floors, and the building elevations.
- 3.3.10 Access in to staff only areas should be restricted to staff. Signage should be provided so that it is clear which areas are restricted to staff, to prevent confusion being used a legitimate excuse for accessing staff only areas.
- 3.3.11 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors (single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ All external pedestrian doors should include door closers which fully engage the locking mechanisms upon closure. Escape doors should be used for escape purposes only and not for general circulation. Escape doors should be signed and alarmed to deter customers from using these routes.
- ☐ Any shutters or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ The doors/frames to internal offices / rooms etc. should be robust / solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and capable of being secured when unoccupied. Staff should be able to store their belongings in a secure area while at work.
- ☐ The vehicular and pedestrian access and egress points to the hub should be secured with automatic 2100-2400mm high gates. Ideally, the vehicular gates should be sliding. If not, any double gates should overlap when closed and should be capable of being forced open. They should operate as quickly as is safely possible, in order to reduce the opportunities for tailgating/unauthorised access. The pedestrian gate should be self-closing/locking and any internal release button/mechanism should not be capable of being reached or operated from the public side of the fence line. The gates should be controlled on access by staff key-fob/proximity reader or via an audio access-control system for visitors (linked to individual office suites or the main reception of the building). Ideally, there should be no automatic egress (i.e. access control 'out' through the vehicular gates via staff key-fob, a token/ticket issued from within the building or controlled remotely by reception staff).
- ☐ The ground floor door-sets to the stairwells serving the multi-storey car park should be security-certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. However, robust FD30 or FD60 door-sets will be acceptable.

4.2 Windows and Shutters

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
 - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as **P4A** under **EN 356**. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Building Fabric

- ☐ The structure of the multi-storey car park and stairwells should be robust and non-climbable, with fixings that cannot be easily removed from the exterior of the structure.
- ☐ Wall construction should be of a robust nature enough to withstand physical attack through the material.
- ☐ Where a lightweight wall construction is being considered a reinforced lining such as welded steel mesh will need to be incorporated. Alternatively, there should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.5 Lighting

- ☐ All levels of the car park should be adequately and uniformly lit (in accordance with BS 5489, see table opposite), avoiding any areas of pooling/shadowing and supporting any CCTV system installed. Light coloured walls and ceilings can help reflect lighting and create a safe and non-threatening environment.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should also be installed to all external doors and gates/barriers.
- ☐ To assist with the spread of lighting within the car park decks, the surface materials should have a light-coloured finish.

Table L1: Lighting requirements for multi-storey/enclosed car parks

Areas	Av. lux	Min. lux	Uniformity
Parking bays and lanes	75	50	0.6
Ramps, corners and junctions	150	75	0.5
Vehicular entrances/exits	75 (night) 300 (day)	n/a	n/a
Pedestrian areas (stairs, lobbies etc)	100	50	0.5
Open roof level	30	10	0.33

Please Note:

*The Av (average) lux is the maintained average horizontal illuminance on the floor

*The Min (minimum) lux is the minimum horizontal illuminance at any location

*Reference should be made to BS 5489 part 9, for further information and guidance

*There may be scope for compromise on the above levels due to external factors

4.6 Surveillance, Help Points & CCTV

- ☐ Staff should undertake frequent patrols of the facility during operational hours, reporting anything suspicious or any acts of vandalism and maintaining cleanliness. There is a 24 hour Building Manager or Security Officer presence on-site at Kingsgate House, with off-site Response Team support should more than one member of staff be required.
- ☐ Sightlines within the facility can be aided by steel-mesh that allows visibility to parking decks above and below. Glazed panels in stairwell lobby doors are recommended to allow surveillance through them.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to the provision of help points (ideally on each level), to allow users to contact reception/security staff within the building when in need of assistance.
- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to complement the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
 - CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
 - Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
 - With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
 - Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the

camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are **overview** and **recognition**, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: **pedestrian and vehicular access and egress points, stairwell lobbies and parking areas on each level, any help points, cycle store, delivery lockers**. It is recommended that the CCTV system is monitored by on-site staff, to allow an immediate response to any incidents recorded.

4.7 Other

- ☐ There should be clear signage to the facility, which should include:
 - The name of the facility, details of the owner/operator and means of how to contact them.
 - Copy of the owners/operators Terms & Conditions.
 - Including clear information on the operational hours and use of the facility, to be located near the vehicle entrances.
 - Clear and visible directional signage should also be provided to identify entrances, exits, any customer help points etc.
 - Advisory signage reminding users not to leave valuables in their vehicles.The owner/operator should monitor the condition and cleanliness of all signage and should report and repair any defects as soon as possible.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to the facility achieving accreditation under the Safer Parking Scheme (see Section 7.2).
- ☐ Racks within the bike store should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels, and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com for details).
- ☐ Places that may be vulnerable to graffiti such as expanses of wall and doors should be formed of graffiti-resistant materials or have a protective coating applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal (e.g. 'easy on' – see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).
- ☐ Metal pipework and cabling should be concealed and inspection covers / service access should be secured to prevent unauthorised access.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

7.2 Park Mark Safer Parking Scheme (PMSPS)

- 7.2.1 The Safer Parking Scheme, run by the British Parking Association (BPA) is designed to create a benchmark standard for all parking areas across the UK, in order to create safer parking areas for the public and their vehicles. Car parks with the award are provided with signage featuring the distinctive ‘Park Mark’ tick, so that drivers know exactly where to go for safer parking. More information about the scheme and the process of accreditation can be obtained from the BPA at www.britishparking.co.uk.

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
03/03/2021	Deloitte LLP	CIS instruction received
26/03/2021	Deloitte LLP	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
15/04/2021	Deloitte LLP	Progress enquiry
04/05/21	GMP	CIS revised
10/05/21	GMP	CIS revised

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
210128	GMP Presentation		
210128	GMP Presentation low res		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Visual Audit revised	04/05/21
C	Project title and point 3.2.9 amended	04/05/21

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk