



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

WHITEHOUSE CLUB, MIDDLETON ROAD, CRUMPSALL

RESIDENTIAL (24 NO. APARTMENTS & 50 NO. HOUSES)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

For: Dappa Homes Ltd.

Version A: 12/05/17

Reference: 2017/0243/CIS/02

Whitehouse Club, Middleton Road, Crumpsall

2017/0243/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Protection to the side/rear boundaries of the houses and apartments that will be exposed to the steeply sloping open land along the southern boundary of the site - leaving them vulnerable to unseen, unauthorised rear access.
- Adequate definition and treatment of the car parks serving the apartment blocks, ensuring that parked vehicles are well-overlooked, adjacent windows are protected and the car parks themselves are clearly defined for the use of residents only.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart *MTCP*

Design for Security Consultant

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
1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the west side of Middleton Road, in the Crumpsall area of north Manchester.

The site is formed by open land to the rear of The Whitehouse Club – a part single-storey, part two-storey social club and function room fronting onto a hard surface parking area accessed off Middleton Road. The site itself has previously been used as a football pitch and bowling green, but they have not been used in over 10 years. Planning permission is also being sought for the redevelopment of the social club site.

The frontage of the social club site along Middleton Road is formed by high, dense hedging and the vehicular and pedestrian access points remain open and insecure at night/when the club is closed. This leaves the site accessible and could leave the building itself vulnerable to unauthorised access unseen from the street. The sides of the building and the land to the rear are enclosed by high Palisade fencing, walls and gates, as well as the rear boundaries of the adjacent residential dwellings. This results in little/no natural surveillance of overlooking over the site from the surrounding buildings or streets.

The land surrounding the site is primarily residential in nature. To the north and west are semi-detached and detached dwellings fronting onto Middleton Road/Whitehouse Avenue/Cobb Close/Windsor Crescent/Edenfield Road. To the south are blocks of flats surrounded by undulating open space, pedestrian routes separated vehicular movement and communal parking areas. This type of layout can create easy access and escape routes that can be utilised by criminals, leaving hidden and publicly accessible windows and doors vulnerable to attack unseen and parked vehicles separated from their owners, leaving them vulnerable to damage or theft.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2016 and 31st March 2017.




2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
32	8	38	86	11	9	<5	12	11	<5

- 2.1.1 In the local area, the most prevalent types of crime in the last 12 month have been less serious wounding, criminal damage and burglary dwelling. Incidents of violence have predominantly occurred over the weekend, when licensed premises tend to be busier and patrons tend to consume more alcohol – leading to conflicts and alcohol-related incidents. Incidents of criminal damage have predominantly been against vehicles (e.g. smashing glazing, damage to vehicle bodywork, etc.), as opposed to against residential properties or commercial premises.
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will look at residential burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)


The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **lower** than the average rate for Manchester and **higher** than the average rate for Greater Manchester as a whole.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **higher** than the average rate for Manchester and **higher** than the average rate for Greater Manchester as a whole.
- 2.2.3 The rate of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **lower** than the average rate for Manchester and **lower** than the average rate for Greater Manchester as a whole.
- 2.2.4 The rate of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **lower** than the average rate for Manchester and **lower** than the average rate for Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.3 Residential Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within 500m of the site.




- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of residential burglary in the local area peaks mid-week (Wednesday), with a noticeable decrease over the weekend (Friday to Sunday).
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks in the late afternoon/early evening. Offenders often target residential properties at these times when it is more likely that residents will be away from home (e.g. at work, collecting children from school etc.) and they perceive a lower risk of being detected/disturbed or observed from other properties. During the autumn/winter months, it is darker, streets are quieter and it can be easier for offenders to observe which dwellings are unoccupied at these times.

- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** The most frequently targeted entry point is doors – particularly to the front of properties. Offenders have forced open doors with bodily pressure or have smashed the glazing in door panels to gain unauthorised access. Several properties were targeted by offenders when doors were left insecure by residents or by using distraction/deception to gain entry. The glazing within windows has also been smashed and insecure windows have been exploited to gain entry.

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area is greatest on Friday/Saturday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of vehicle crime peaks at during the early hours of the morning when it is dark, streets are quiet and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected. Vehicles parked within open car parks or on-street, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within the curtilages of individual properties or within secure garages/parking facilities.

2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of or from vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have been forced open using bodily pressure and/or tools

Possible Solution - All external doors to the houses and apartment blocks should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1 & 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All private spaces to the sides/rears of the dwellings should be robustly enclosed (see Sections 4.6), particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of the dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.7).

A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the apartment buildings before allowing them access (see Section 4.2). The main communal entrances should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset, to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

- Offenders have targeted doors and windows when they have been left insecure

Possible Solution - All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.2), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

The locks to the front doors of the houses should be fitted with split-spindles, essentially meaning they are key-only entry and are locked from the exterior of the dwelling when shut. This will ensure that they cannot be left insecure (see Section 4.1).

All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.3) and secured with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Again, unauthorised access to the rear of properties should be deterred by robust boundaries and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes/publicly accessible areas to their rear.

- Vehicles parked on-street have been targeted for theft and criminal damage.

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that residents vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Ideally, any communal parking areas serving apartments or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side/rear or undercroft communal parking areas must be secured to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is for an outline residential scheme, with access, layout and scale to be determined. The scheme will include 2 no. 3 storey blocks of 12 apartments each and 50 no. 2/2.5 storey houses, with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The apartment blocks will be located to the east of the site (adjacent to the proposed social club site), on either side of the new access road taken off Middleton Road. They will front towards the access road itself and will each feature landscaped areas to their front, sides and rear, as well as communal parking areas (comprising of 12 no. spaces) along their eastern elevations.
- 3.1.3 To the west of the site will be a mixture of detached, semi-detached and terraced houses fronting onto a circular access road. The houses will each have enclosed front/rear gardens and will be served by at least one off-road parking space, located directly in front/to the side of each dwelling.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring a currently vacant site into use and provide additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The proposed houses and apartment blocks will front onto the proposed access road, resulting in good levels of surveillance of and from dwellings and parked vehicles.
- 3.2.3 Many of the proposed houses will back onto the rear gardens of the existing/proposed properties – leaving their rear boundaries inaccessible.
- 3.2.4 The houses and apartment should have habitable room windows to their front elevations, maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.
- 3.2.5 The design of the dwellings should be kept simple, with no front doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).
- 3.2.6 The proposed houses will be served by in-curtilage off-road parking spaces, allowing residents to secure/overlook their own vehicles and limiting opportunities to criminals.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration


The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The boundary treatments to the houses and apartment blocks are vitally important to secure them, any parked vehicles and prevent unauthorised access to private spaces. The sides and rears of the dwellings should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access, particularly robust where adjacent to publicly accessible space (see below). The front elevations of all of the dwellings should be protected by some defensible space (defined by low- railings) - creating small areas in front of each property entirely separate from the street and in ownership/control of the residents themselves, providing protection to accessible windows from unauthorised access, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (see Section 4.6).

3.3.2 The side/rear boundaries of the houses and apartments to the south of the site will be exposed to the steeply sloping open land along the southern boundary - leaving them vulnerable to unseen, unauthorised rear access. As well as robust boundary definitions (see Section 4.6), it is also highly recommended that the side/rear boundaries of the dwellings are protected by belts of mature defensive planting (i.e. densely branched, thorny shrubs), in order to deter and discourage damage and scaling. The location of boundaries should be amended if necessary to allow for this requirement. Care should also be taken to ensure changes in ground levels to not inadvertently aid climbing over boundaries to private space.

3.3.3 The car parks serving the proposed apartment blocks will be open/publicly accessible, which could leave the parked vehicles and the windows along the side elevations of the blocks themselves (particularly those well off the street) potentially vulnerable to attack unseen. There is also the potential for them to be mis-used by patrons of the adjacent social club site, if the car park serving the club is full during busy periods. If they are to remain open, the following measures should be incorporated:

- The car parks should be enclosed with low-level railings along the street frontage, with a symbolic barrier at the entrance (e.g. brick pillars, change of road surface texture/colour etc.) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents, psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a purpose from entering (see opposite for example). There should also be clear signage to state that the car parks are for the use of residents only.
- The adjacent side elevations of the apartment blocks should also be protected by low-level railings, in order to provide the windows with some defensible space without impeding views of and from the car park (see opposite for example). Where possible, the side elevations of the apartment blocks adjacent to the parking areas should include habitable room windows, in order to allow surveillance over parking vehicles.
- The parking areas should be lit to an adequate and uniform level (see Section 4.7), so as not create any areas of pooling or shadowing. There should be no hard or soft landscaping features that would impede views of/from parked vehicles (see Section 4.8).
- Any bin stores within parking areas should be located to the rear of the facilities, in order to avoid the creation of a hidden space behind them which could foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour, as well as leave parked vehicles hidden and vulnerable to attack unseen. Bin stores themselves should be fully enclosed and lockable (see Section 4.9).



3.3.4 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors (Houses)

- ☐ Front and rear doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. Any external french/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key. Full instructions should be provided to residents to ensure that they understand that the key must be used to fully lock/secure the door.
- ☐ Front doors should also have either fixed sidelights or door viewers. Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential. Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Any integral garage doors (if there is a connecting internal door with the dwelling) must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR1. Alternatively, the internal connecting door must be to the same burglary resistant specification as the front door (normally BS PAS 24). If there is to be no internal connecting door, garage doors should be of robust construction, with a multi-point locking mechanism.

4.2 Doors (Apartments)

- ☐ The main communal entrance doorsets must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. They should be single-leaf, self-closing and controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet callers to the buildings before allowing them access.
- ☐ Postal delivery arrangements should ideally allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. If not, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries without providing access to all floors of the buildings.
- ☐ Any other external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended, but not generally essential.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarms

- ☐ Each house and apartment should have either an alarm, or a dedicated non-switched fuse spur to allow for the installation of an alarm. If alarms are installed, they should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems; or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.

If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ The sides (including gables up to/as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the houses should generally be enclosed with 2100mm high robust close-boarded timber fencing (with the top 300mm consisting of robust integral trellis if required) or walls/railings. Boundaries to private space that are adjacent to publicly accessible space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base. Any side pedestrian gates to the private spaces of houses should also be 2100mm high and should be fitted with either a pad-lockable bolt (to the mid-point of the internal face) or a key operable deadlock. Sub-divisional rear boundaries should be 1500-1800mm high.
- ☐ Any communal side/rear access alleyways within the site should be gated at their outermost point to prevent unauthorised access to where the dwellings could be attacked unseen. The gates themselves should be self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut.
- ☐ The sides and rears of the apartment blocks should be enclosed and defined as private space by 2100mm high railings and lockable gates (see Section 3.3 for illustration). The gates should be self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights, trees etc. The hinges should also not provide footholds and the gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls/railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ☐ Defensive planting (i.e. densely branched, thorny shrubs) should be provided on the publicly accessible side of the exposed side/rear boundaries of the dwellings along the southern boundary of the site, in order to deter unauthorised access/damage. The location of boundaries should be amended to allow for this requirement.
- ☐ The front gardens/driveways of houses and the street/car park frontages of the apartment blocks, as well as the car parks themselves (see Section 3.3 for illustration), should be enclosed/demarcated by low-level railings to an approximate height of 1200mm.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to all roads/footpaths should be to adoptable standards (to comply with BS 5489).
- ☐ Lighting to the apartment block car parks should also be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 20, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of houses and apartment blocks, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.

-
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
 - ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.9 Other

- ☐ Ideally, meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of houses only and not in the private areas, in order to deter bogus callers.
- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Any communal external cycle stores to the apartment buildings should be enclosed with 2100mm high railings and self-closing, 'slam to lock' gates (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key operated from both sides) that cannot be left unlocked when shut. It should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/downloads
- ☐ Similarly, any external communal bin stores serving the apartment buildings should also be enclosed with 2100mm high walls, railings or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and self-closing, 'slam to lock' gates. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste can take place while retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (e.g. access controls, boundaries, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as gable walls, boundaries to private space or parking bays).

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
4 th April 2017	Grays Architecture Ltd.	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
24 th April 2017	Grays Architecture Ltd.	Confirmation of instruction & fee. Receipt of Design & Access Statement
28 th April 2017	GMP Finance Dept.	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
4050/002	Existing Site Plan – Housing Development	Jan 2017	C
4050/102	Proposed Site Plan – Housing Development	Jan 2017	A
-	Development of 74 no. Units at Whitehouse Club – Design & Access Statement	Feb 2017	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status	Revisions Made
A	Minor security additions required	

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk