



## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

20 Lord Street

28 Supported Accommodation Units and  
Office Space

For: Intro Developments

Version A: 25/05/21

Ref: 2007/0309/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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20 Lord Street

2007/0309/CIS/02

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Development Supported - Minor Design Changes Advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found acceptable. Further consideration of certain aspects is recommended as stated in section 3.3 of this report. These include:-

- Access control

**Please note:** At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Salford Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design (SBD), accreditation. Should the recommendations as listed within Section 4 of this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.



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# 1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site lies on the northern edge of Manchester city centre. The area is principally commercial, having developed with small-scale textile factories, warehousing and wholesale businesses. In recent years the functions of the neighbouring sites to the south have developed into high-rise residential apartment schemes.


The site appears to have contained a number of uses at ground floor and the floors above; office and factory spaces. To the rear on Stocks St East, the site contains a warehouse/factory building.

Due to the proximity to city centre and Manchester Arena, there is considerable demand for car parking space in the vicinity. This area and numerous locations along Cheetham Hill Rd has developed into informal car parking for the local area and city centre users.

There are a number of vacant plots in the area; predominately used for car parking, these are frequently neglected and can become a dumping ground for rubbish. In turn this creates the impression that the environment is not cared for and that abuse is tolerated.

A variety of measures have been used to protect nearby premises from unauthorised access via the introduction of metal bars and security shutters to ground floor windows and doors.


Cheetham Hill Rd is a busy arterial route in & out of the city centre with a number of bus stops for a variety of bus companies.



1 – Proposed site on Lord St & Stock St East.




2 – Proposed side access point on Stocks St East.



3 – Proposed site on Lord St & Stock St.



4 – View south on Hornbeam Way.



7 – Evidence of broken car window glass on the pavements.



6 – View south down Stocks St East.



5 – View south down Stocks St.

## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1<sup>st</sup> July 2018 to 30<sup>th</sup> June 2019.

### 2.1 Crime Summary

| Recorded Crime within 500m of Site |                       |                 |                       |       |         |                  |                          |                        |               |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------|---------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| Domestic Burglary                  | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
| 11                                 | 58                    | 109             | 297                   | 80    | 28      | 16               | 419                      | 28                     | 11            |

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is 108% above the average crime rate for Manchester with less serious wounding and vehicle crime being the highest recorded crimes taking place within the local area. Domestic burglary is low within the area. However domestic burglary in the area is likely to be low due to the number of dwellings. The proposed site is located within the Cheetham Hill area of Manchester, on the outskirts of the city centre, which mostly consists of retail and storage units.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings are taking place throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences occurring to the west, around Southall Street, where HMP Manchester is located and to the west around Victoria Train Station/ New Bridge Street. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings in the area, with the majority of assaults occurring between prisoners at HMP Manchester as well as domestic incidents. Public order offences have mostly taken place between unknown associates at places of work or public transport stops.
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime in the local area is high, a hotspot of offences taking place to the south of the proposed site, around New Bridge Street and Red Bank. The south of the proposed site consists of large car parking facilities as it is within close proximity to the city centre. Vehicles within these car parks are usually left for long periods of time, unsupervised, creating low risk opportunities for offenders.

### 2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry.

*Possible Solution - All external doors and accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Entrance doors should be positioned where they can be easily seen from neighbouring properties and passers-by. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.*

- 2.2.2 Breaking glazing in windows and doors (mostly ground floor windows) using implements.

*Possible Solution - All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high and robust fencing with lockable gates so that rear windows are only accessible to residents. Secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible, as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.*

- 2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

*Possible Solution - A robust access control system is required to prevent unauthorised entry to communal areas. Communal entrance doors and all individual apartments should be provided with a security-certified entrance door set (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Apartment entrance doors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. Any ground floor doors opening onto private or communal garden space must fall within a secure boundary line.*

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- 2.2.4 Entering apartment building by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and entering communal areas (mostly corridors and bike storage areas).

*Possible Solution - Internally, a secure lobby arrangement should be introduced at the entrance(s) to the block in order to reduce potential tailgating opportunities. This would require additional, access-controlled doors to prevent unauthorised entry to the stairs and residential corridors. Apartments should not be directly accessed off the lobby. Installation of a monitored CCTV can also assist in identification of intruders.*

## 2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems





## 2.4 Risk Factors - Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft

## 2.5 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.




- 2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **84% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **72% lower** than Greater Manchester and **61% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **74% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **174% higher** than Greater Manchester and **193% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **13% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **64% higher** than Greater Manchester and **143% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **430% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **863% higher** than Greater Manchester and **1579% higher** than England & Wales.


## 2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry




2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Tuesday, Friday and Sunday during the early hours of the morning (12am - 3am & 6am - 8am). Offenders often target properties in the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Forcing open shutters in order to gain access to apartment building garages.
- Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents in order to gain access to communal areas.

## 2.7 Non-Domestic Burglary (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night/into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.7.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries against Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors. Windows behind them.

## 2.8 Theft (Offices): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.



The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

- 2.8.1 **Day/ Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest during the working week, when the opportunities to offend are greater, and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours/staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

## 2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis



- 2.9.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crimes is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Thursday and Saturday during the morning and into the evening (9am - 5pm & 6pm - 11:30pm). Offenders often target vehicles within close proximity of the city centre as they are left unattended for long periods of time, usually by commuters, creating low risk opportunities for offenders.

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## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises the change of Use and redevelopment of an existing commercial building for use as a homeless shelter providing 28 single bedrooms with en-suite facilities.
- 3.1.2 The proposal will provide 24 hour staff supported living accommodation for homeless male adults. Incorporated into the building will be; main entrance reception and waiting area, meeting room and staff offices, kitchen & dining room facilities for the residents and a garden space.

### 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

#### **General Layout**

- 3.2.1 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.
- 3.2.2 The proposal provides a new use and the redevelopment of the building. Greater opportunities for additional natural surveillance within and around the sites will support a safer community.
- 3.2.3 The private garden spaces to the sides/rear of the building will be enclosed, preventing unauthorised access to where criminals could attack the building/exploit opportunities unseen.
- 3.2.4 Due to the nature of the building use, the development will incorporate communal amenity spaces allowing friendships to develop and building a sense of community within the building.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can appear hostile and increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

### 3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

- 3.3.1 Access into/around the building must be robustly controlled to prevent unauthorised access. The reception desk adjacent to the main entrance should ideally be staffed at all times (at least during the day and into the evening), ensuring visitors are greeted and vetted before being allowed further access into the building. A high and wide reception desk will allow staff to have full surveillance of everyone entering and exiting the building and across publicly accessible external areas. The external entrance door/s should be capable of being secured and controlled remotely by staff if/when required (e.g. at night when the reception may not be staffed at all times), to prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.1). All back-of-house/staff facilities should only be accessible to staff.
- 3.3.2 The access-control strategy adopted for the development should be capable of confining movement into and through the building, thus allowing staff, visitors and residents to only enter parts of the site to which they have legitimate reason to be present. Access permissions should be fully auditable and regularly reviewed.
- 3.3.3 Access controls and flexibility of use within the building. When accommodating customer requirements for increased flexibility of space within the building, the security of these areas must not be compromised nor impact on other parts of the building. Space shared by a variety of users at varying times means that an intruder is less likely to be identified – it is therefore essential that accommodation is provided for the secure storage of personal items, for instance while staff are away from their work space. Facilities intended for use by external visitors (e.g. conference and meeting rooms), must be designed so that further access to the building is rigorously controlled. It should not be possible for the staff/visitors of one office floor / suite to access another. All individual office levels or residential areas

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should be fitted with self-closing, access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards / fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and all rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. Where the upper floor residential areas are subdivided into smaller individual bedrooms, each room should be capable of separation with their own individual access controls. Access to plant / service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only).

- 3.3.4 It is recommended that all corridors leading to the resident bedrooms and the staircore / lift serving the other floors of the building should be fitted with a security-certified door-set fitted with access controls (operated by resident key-cards/fobs), to ensure that only residents who are staying can access the bedroom floors (see Section 4.1/4.5). The ground floor back-of-house areas should only be accessible to staff.
- 3.3.5 Communal facilities and amenity space. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
- 3.3.6 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed in section 4 are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

## 4 Physical Security

*The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.*

### 4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted for use under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery. NOTE: Any escape-only doors have a Nurse call system.
- ☐ The main communal entrance to the building should be security-certified to one of the below standards, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. There should also be an external audio access control system linked to the reception/admin office, to allow staff to remotely secure the external doors, vet callers and control access into the building if/when required (e.g. at night).
- ☐ The internal doors/frames providing access to any offices, kitchens, laundries, staff rooms (as well as general stores, plant areas etc.) should be solid-core and capable of being deadlocked to secure them when unoccupied. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys and passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ☐ All individual bedroom doors must be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), have multipoint locking and a minimum of 3 hinges with a door viewer, operable by Vingcard or similar according to the management strategy.

### 4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

### 4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

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## 4.4 Alarm

- ☐ All ground floor external doors to communal areas should be fitted with alarm contacts, linked to the building intruder alarm system, to alert staff if anyone attempts to gain unauthorised access. Escape only doors should be alarmed 24/7 and should be signed as such to deter casual use.

## 4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The sides and rear of the building should be enclosed and defined as private space by 2100mm high weld mesh fencing, railings or close-boarded timber fencing (with a masonry/solid base). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. Care should also be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to any posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. Any pedestrian gates to private space should be self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key/fob operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut. If a panic mechanism is required on the internal face of the gate for emergency egress purposes, it should be fitted so that it cannot be reached / operated from the external face of the gate. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

## 4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external communal doors.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

## 4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an **acceptable standard** that will allow for **identification** of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

**Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

**Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are '**Overview**' and '**Recognition**', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [the main entrance lobby](#), [internal/external circulation areas](#) and [all parking areas](#).

## 4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

## 4.9 Other

- ☐ A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ The cycle parking area should be well-overlooked from the buildings and should include 'Sheffield' stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/downloads>.
- ☐ There should be no features of the building (such as projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows.

# 5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
  - Litter removal
  - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

# 6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

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## 7 Useful References

### 7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

## A Contact register

| Date     | Contact With | Summary of Contact   |
|----------|--------------|----------------------|
| 28/09/20 | TMD Design   | Application received |
| 06/05/21 | TMD Design   | Client confirmation  |
| 06/05/21 | GMP          | Invoice issued       |
| 26/05/21 | DfS          | Site visit           |
| 28/05/21 | DfS          | CIS completed        |
| 28/05/21 | DfS          | CIS issued           |
|          |              |                      |

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No.      | Drawing Title                                   | Date     | Rev |
|------------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------|-----|
| LRW_7970_L(00)58 | Design and Access Statement Part 1 and 2        | Aug 20   |     |
| LRW_7970_L0034   | Proposed Ground Floor Plan Lift Option          | 18/06/20 | A   |
| LRW_7970_L0035   | Proposed 1 <sup>st</sup> Floor Plan Lift Option | 15/09/20 | B   |
| LRW_7970_L0036   | Proposed 2 <sup>nd</sup> Floor Plan Lift Option | 15/09/20 | B   |
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PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

## C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made | Date |
|---------|----------------|------|
| A       |                |      |
|         |                |      |

## D Glossary

### Burglary Resistance Standards

#### BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.*

#### BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.*

#### ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

*The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:*

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

#### LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

*This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.*

#### STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

#### STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

#### EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

*A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.*

### Commonly Used Acronyms

#### CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

#### CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

#### CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

#### INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

#### PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

#### LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

#### UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

### Useful Websites

#### Design for Security

[www.designforsecurity.org](http://www.designforsecurity.org)

#### Secured by Design

[www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com)

#### RIBA Product Selector

[www.ribaproductselector.com](http://www.ribaproductselector.com)

#### LPCB – Red Book Live

[www.redbooklive.com](http://www.redbooklive.com)

#### Crime Reduction (Home Office)

[www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk)

#### DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

[www.designagainstcrime.org](http://www.designagainstcrime.org)

#### Building for Life

[www.buildingforlife.org](http://www.buildingforlife.org)

#### CLG (Communities and Local Government)

[www.communities.gov.uk](http://www.communities.gov.uk)