



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

804-806 OLDHAM ROAD, NEWTON HEATH, MANCHESTER
SHOWROOM & STORAGE BUILDING (192 sqm.)

FOR: G.A. Armstrong Ltd. Office Furnishing

VERSION A: 27/11/2020

REFERENCE: 2008/1205/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

804-806 Oldham Road, Newton Heath, Manchester

URN: 2008/1205/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Secure enclosure to the east side and rear of the building, including bringing forward the rear gate to the building line along Ridings Street, so as not to create a publicly accessible recessed area that could hide an offender from view while attempting to gain unauthorised access.
- Given the lack of activity, surveillance and overlooking along Ridings Street at night, consideration should be given to additional protection to the publicly accessible shutter to the west elevation of the building, which may be vulnerable to ramming out-of-hours.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail): Risk Analysis	
	2.3 Theft (Retail): Risk Analysis	
	2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Industrial/Storage/Distribution): Risk Analysis	
	2.5 Theft (Industrial/Storage/Distribution): Risk Analysis	
	2.6 General Risk Factors	
	2.7 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	11
	3.1 Proposed Development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Points for Further Consideration	
4	Physical Security	12
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Windows & Shutters	
	4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	4.4 Alarm	
	4.5 Boundaries	
	4.6 Lighting	
	4.7 CCTV	
	4.8 Landscaping	
	4.9 Other	
5	Management & Maintenance	15
6	Construction	15
7	Useful References	15
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact Register.....	16
B	Associated Documents.....	16
C	CIS Version History	16
D	Glossary	17


1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the south side of Oldham Road (at the junction with Ridings Street) – the main arterial route between Oldham town centre (to the north-east) and Manchester city centre (to the south-west). It is currently vacant and contains some rubble and scrub vegetation, enclosed with temporary herras fencing.

To the east and south of the site is a commercial works fronting towards Grimshaw Lane – including a landscaped area to the immediate east (enclosed with railings and planting along the Oldham Road frontage) and a large works building to the immediate south (enclosed with Palisade fencing along the Ridings Street frontage and the southern boundary of the site itself).

To the west of the site, on the opposite side of Ridings Lane, is a castings and mouldings showroom fronting onto Oldham Road, with an external area enclosed with Palisade fencing to the rear. Ridings Lane itself is a quiet, poorly surfaced route serving a number of commercial/industrial sites (many of which have blank facades fronting onto the route) - meaning it is somewhat lacking in activity, footfall, overlooking and natural surveillance, particularly at night.

Oldham Road is a wide route, busy with passing vehicular traffic. There is a large cash and carry unit on the opposite side of Oldham Road from the site, which fronts onto Monsall Road. The Oldham Road frontage is formed by high Palisade fencing and dense/mature vegetation and trees – meaning the site benefits from little/no direct overlooking from the buildings that surround it.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary


Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
10	20	31	70	57	5	<5	16	9	<5

- 2.1.1 In general, the volume of crime in the local area is relatively low, which can be partially attributed to the presence of large industrial premises within the research area, reducing the density of development and population in the locale - making criminal and anti-social activity may be less likely to be observed or detected. The most prevalent types of crime in the area have been violence and theft.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, with concentrations around/off the main arterial route of Oldham Road, the residential estates to the north (around/off Pitsford Road/Emmett Street East) and the primarily industrial area to the south-west (around/off Norton Street). Assaults and public order offences have been the highest occurring types of crime, particularly domestic disputes and incidents between known offenders. The majority of thefts have occurred along Oldham Road, with offenders making off without payment for fuel or targeting businesses.
- 2.1.3 As this CIS relates to a proposed commercial showroom with ancillary storage, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester peaks slightly on Wednesday, but remains relatively consistently high across the week.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late and night and during in the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target commercial premises at these times when they are closed, it is dark and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being observed or detected.

Manchester Retail Burglary – Point of Entry




2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** In burglaries at Manchester retail premises, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.
- Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.
- Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.
- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.


2.3 Theft (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.

Manchester Retail Theft – Day Range




Manchester Retail Theft – Time Range



2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester retail premises remains consistently high across the week. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and early evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or off/from the handbags of shoppers (such as mobile phones, purses etc.). Theft of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Industrial/Storage/Distribution): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial/storage/distribution premises, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Manchester industrial/storage/distribution premises peaks on Thursday and is lowest on Friday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks late at night/during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target industrial premises at these times when it is dark, industrial areas are typically quiet, units are closed or operate with fewer staff and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.
- 2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at Manchester industrial/storage/distribution premises have been committed through doors, which offenders have forced open doors using tools/implements or have smashed locks to gain entry. Windows have also been targeted (predominantly by smashing the glazing) as have shutters, which offenders have damaged or forced shutters upwards to gain access to doors and windows behind. Offenders have regularly used a variety of tools to gain unauthorised access – suggesting incidents are more likely to have been planned rather than being opportunistic. In a number of cases, the point of entry was unknown. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before gaining access to 'staff only'/unauthorised areas and stealing property unnoticed.

2.5 Theft (Industrial/Storage/Distribution): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Manchester area.



2.5.1 **Day Range:** The risk of theft at Manchester industrial/storage/distribution premises peaks on Friday.

2.5.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft is greatest around midday and during the late evening. There are more opportunities for offenders to access buildings and private areas anonymously during the working day, before targeting the personal property of staff, as well as tools, plant and externally stored materials. External materials/equipment can often be vulnerable at night, particularly when compounds are not securely enclosed.

2.6 General Risk Factors

2.6.1 **Retail:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6.2 **Industrial/Storage/Distribution:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft

- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.7 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Manchester retail and industrial/storage/distribution premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Retail & Industrial/Storage/Distribution:** A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 3.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- **Retail & Industrial/Storage/Distribution:** Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 3.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by. Advice on glazed panels can be found below.

- **Retail & Industrial/Storage/Distribution:** Windows have also been prised open and glazing within them (and doors) has been smashed by offenders

Possible Solution - All external windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 3.2) where possible, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 3.2), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Vulnerable shopfronts should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours (see Section 3.2).

- **Retail:** A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 3.3).

- **Retail:** Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration.

-
- **Industrial/Storage/Distribution:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers before gaining access to unauthorised 'staff-only' areas to commit theft

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access. All individual rooms/areas within the building should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

- **Industrial/Storage/Distribution:** Theft of externally stored materials, tools and plant equipment

Possible Solution - The integrity of the boundary treatments should be evaluated and regularly checked for defects. Inappropriately parked vehicles/trailers and other externally stored items can obscure the spread of lighting and CCTV coverage, creating potential areas of intense shadowing and blind spots. It is recommended that this is considered in the external arrangement, and 'no store/park' areas specifically identified to avoid inadvertently blocking surveillance. Storage/parking areas close to boundaries should also be avoided as they may mask any damage to perimeter fencing.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a 2 storey office furniture showroom and storage building, with associated external yard and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The building will front towards Oldham Road and will feature a small yard to the east and a narrow passageway to the south of the building. There will be gates onto Oldham Road and Ridings Street and the yard itself will include cycle racks, cardboard cages and bin storage. The building will include a small reception, W/Cs, a showroom and stores at ground level and additional stores at first floor level, with roller shutters to either side of the building (accessed off the external yard and directly off Ridings Street).

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The development will bring a vacant site back into use and provide greater levels of activity and surveillance to the area, particularly during the day.
- 3.2.2 The building will present an active frontage to Oldham Road, enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm. The glazed façade of the building offer both surveillance opportunities and a greater level of artificial light onto the street during operational hours.
- 3.2.3 The more hidden side/rear elevations of the unit will be enclosed and secured out-of-hours to prevent unauthorised access to where they could be attacked unseen.
- 3.2.4 The proposed building will have a simple footprint that will provide few potential places of concealment and facilitate efficient surveillance of the external areas. It will also be sufficiently tall enough to make unauthorised access to the roof difficult.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The east side and rear of the building must be securely enclosed to prevent unauthorised access to the more hidden elevations of the building, where offenders could attack doors/shutters hidden from the street (see Section 4.5). The gate to the rear (south-west) of the of the building, off Ridings Street, should be brought forward to the building line, so as not to create a publicly accessible recessed area that could hide an offender from view while attempting to gain unauthorised access.
- 3.3.2 Given the lack of activity, surveillance and overlooking along Ridings Street at night, consideration should be given to the installation of a retractable bollard or vehicle arm-barrier directly in front of the publicly accessible shutter to the west elevation of the building, in order to provide a visual deterrent to ramming the shutter out-of-hours.
- 3.3.3 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas within the unit should not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to storage rooms, staff rooms or offices should be solid-core and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times). Any cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a certified doorset to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ☐ Any loading bay or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ All ground floor windows/glazed doors should be secured with shutters out-of-hours, certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, any externally mounted shutters should have shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric


- ☐ All glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any areas of cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack. Internal walls between the units themselves should be similarly robust to prevent unauthorised access from one unit into another.

4.4 Alarm

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover the unit, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder or a security patrol team). The alarm itself should ideally have two secure signalling paths (one being GSM radio back-up).

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The service yard to the side (east) of the building and the narrow alleyway to the rear (south) should be enclosed with 2400-3000mm high rigid-panel welded-wire mesh fencing or railings. If panic mechanisms are required on the internal face of the gates for emergency egress purposes, they should be fitted so that they cannot be reached/operated from the external face of the gates.
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and there should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and any gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, lighting columns, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through. If double vehicular gates are used, they should overlap when shut/locked any should be robust enough to resist being forced open.
- ☐ The site boundary treatments should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary. The condition of fencing should be regularly inspected for damage/attack.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.



4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors/loading bay doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *Acceptable Standard* that will allow for *Identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are **Overview** and **Recognition**, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [the main entrance to the unit and all external facades, all sales counters and internal/external circulation spaces](#).

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations, such as around entrances/building frontages, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots. These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.9 Other

- ☐ There must be no features of the building envelopes which create sheltered/hiding places or ledges, which could endanger passers-by or encourage loitering.
- ☐ There should be no features of the buildings (such as projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows.
- ☐ The proposed cycle rack should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>
- ☐ A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the unit must be prepared and remain in place for its day-to-day running. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of the unit, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash storage/management within the premises;
 - Any cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices;
 - Management of stock deliveries and waste collection;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access controls, lighting, alarm system, CCTV cameras etc; and
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of any graffiti, litter etc.
- 5.1.2 Any high value equipment within the building (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items in each unit.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
11 th November 2020	SITEC Architectural	Receipt of instruction form & plans
13 th November 2020	SITEC Architectural	Confirmation of instruction/fee
27 th November 2020	SITEC Architectural	Email sent re: report completion & payment
24 th to 26 th May 2021	Wiplow	Email correspondence re: invoice/payment
27 th May 2021	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
-	1:500 and 1:1250 Scale OS Plans	-	-
GDA/01A	PROPOSED SINGLE STOREY SHOWROOM and RECEPTION and TOILET Facilities - Plans & Elevations	-	-
GDA/02	Proposed Elevations	Oct 2020	-
GDA/03	Site Plan	-	-
-	Transportation & Highways Report	Feb 2017	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstdesign.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk