



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Sale Road, Northenden

227 Houses

For: Miller Homes North West Ltd

Version A: 03/06/21

Ref: 2009/0462/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Sale Road

2009/0462/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported - Minor design changes

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Boundary treatment to the side and rear of properties
- Effective street lighting
- Designated boundary treatment
- Landscaping design and features
- Secure sheds & bin stores

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is situated just on the outskirts of, Northenden centre, approx. .5km west of the high street.

The site is currently used by Manchester College and formed part of its wider campus estate.

This section of Northenden is predominately residential.

Currently the site contains a mix of educational buildings, car parking for staff & students and sports playing fields.

Northenden has good vehicle & public transport links to nearby popular destinations such as Sale and Didsbury. The M60 & M56 motorways provide excellent links to M/cr Airport and the wider Greater M/cr district.

The proposed site can be accessed via a number of existing road networks which will form part of the new access routes for the residential development.

Part of the eastern boundary is adjacent to the slip road for the A56 dual-carriageway which also contains public footpath connections.

Landscaping is mature and dense around much of the perimeter boundary. In sections within the site landscaping is overgrown around existing structures. Generally the site is well maintained.

Existing boundaries vary in their materiality around the site, ranging from timber fencing to metal palisade structures.



1 – View of proposed site



2 – View north west on Sale Road



3 – Out-buildings on the site.



7 – Footpath leading to locked gate.



6 – Perimeter footpath



5 – Boundary with existing residential properties.



4 – Existing closed access gates to Hollyhey drive

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
14	7	39	52	9	<5	5	21	<5	5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate over the last 12 months is 23% below the average rate of crime for the Manchester Division, with the most prevalent types of crime in the local area being less serious wounding, criminal damage (primarily against vehicles) and vehicle crime. In general, the local rates of domestic burglary, wounding, criminal damage and vehicle crime have been lower than average for Manchester, approximately average for Greater Manchester and above average for England & Wales (see below). The majority of crime has occurred to the north west of the proposed site, around Yewtree Lane and Rackhouse Road. Offences have occurred within dwellings and residential streets, with the majority of violence being carried out by known offenders during a domestic dispute or incidents between friendship groups.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to BS PAS 24 security standard. PAS 24-rated doors are very difficult to force open. All ground floor or otherwise accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- 2.2.2 Smashed glazing in windows and doors (mostly to the rear windows of the property) using implements.

Possible Solution - An appropriate glazing specification should be used to adequately secure the building. All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection. However, the layout of the building and position of windows should be designed to avoid vulnerabilities as much as possible. Any damage arising from vandalism should be repaired quickly in order to maintain a culture of care and respect, as a lack of maintenance can often attract further abuse.

- 2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doorsets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks and the fittings. They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, security personnel or passers-by. Consideration should also be given to security-certified shutters (see Section 4.2) to protect particularly vulnerable/hidden doors.

- 2.2.4 Front and rear doors were targeted when left insecure by residents.

Possible Solution - Front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.




- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **55% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **22% lower** than Greater Manchester and **12% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **25% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **18% higher** than Greater Manchester and **26% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **10% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **31% higher** than Greater Manchester and **95% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **1% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **80% higher** than Greater Manchester and **214% higher** than England & Wales.


2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on a Wednesday and Thursday during the late evening (8pm - 11:59pm). Offenders often target properties in the late evening when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Entering the rear garden of the property and using bodily pressure and implements gain access to the garden shed.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Thursday, Saturday and Sunday during the evening (3pm - 9:30pm) and the early hours of the morning (12am - 4am). Offenders often target vehicles in residential areas, using on street parking facilities as they are often parked out of the sight of the owner, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development seeks to construct 227 residential properties with a variety of house types and densities.
- 3.1.2 The urban design will provide a new road layout with each property having off-street parking in front of the house.
- 3.1.3 Each property will have garden space to the front and rear of the property.
- 3.1.4 Extensive landscaping of the public realm to the streetscape and green spaces will complement the proposed masterplan. A series of pedestrian routes will be implemented to encourage less reliance on vehicles.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 Resident amenity spaces provide opportunities for residents to meet and foster community relations within the development. Schemes which have good social communities are less likely to tolerate inappropriate behaviour and are more willing to challenge unfamiliar faces in the development.
- 3.2.2 The houses should have habitable room windows to their front elevations, maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.
- 3.2.3 The main circulation routes are obvious, leading people directly to where they need to go. The proposals are intended to integrate with surrounding circulation routes.
- 3.2.4 The new road layouts will create an interesting landscape opportunity across the Masterplan. The hard & soft landscaping will help to generate a sense of place, pride and ownership in the community and create new links to existing neighbourhoods.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development will result in an increase in footfall in the area, improving vitality across the wider area, providing additional natural surveillance, which can help promote a greater sense of safety on the street.
- 3.2.6 The mix and size of properties will offer a broader range of individuals and families the opportunity to live within the district of Northenden. A diverse resident population brings with it a likelihood of a level of activity around the development throughout the day, and a greater prospect of a more stable population as residents may be more likely to remain. Residents who remain for the long term are more likely to develop social ties with the area and with other long term residents who then have more of a vested interest in the maintenance and security of the development. Developments with greater social cohesion, and active management, tend to be less prone to the effects of crime and disorder.
- 3.2.7 Security measure carefully incorporated into the environment and building design can ensure that buildings and the environment is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The boundary treatments to the houses are vitally important to secure them; any parked vehicles will prevent unauthorised access to private spaces. The sides (including gables up to or as close as possible to the front building line) and rear of the houses should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.5). Any of the dwellings with a boundary to a pedestrian/vehicle route /pathway adjacent to the houses will leave them exposed to publicly accessible space and particularly vulnerable to unauthorised access unseen (already an M.O.

utilised in this area – see Section 2.3). As such, these rear boundaries should be particularly robustly defined.

- 3.3.2 Any communal rear access alleyways should also be gated at their outermost point, in order to prevent access to where dwellings can be vulnerable to unauthorised access unseen and ensure that any offenders attempting to gain access can be clearly seen from the street.
- 3.3.3 Height of rear boundary fencing adjoining public space / footpaths. These boundaries should be 2.1m high – the top 300mm can be formed of trellis to improve natural surveillance (see section 4.5).
- 3.3.4 Bin storage – space should be identified within the enclosed rear gardens to accommodate waste bins, avoiding the need for free-standing bin stores in front of the houses where they could provide potential hiding places and targets for criminal damage.
- 3.3.5 Definition of front gardens. Definition of frontage. Front and side garden boundaries should be well-defined to indicate ownership, using low walls, railings, planting and / or surface materials, and discourage intruders from approaching the dwellings and parked vehicles, or taking short cuts.
- 3.3.6 It is important to formalise the proposed pedestrian links between the locations at Hollyhey Road and the footpath adjacent to the A56 and the new development. A gate / 'A' frame / 'kissing' gates or chicane post arrangement should be incorporated at this location to remove or slow down the opportunity for motorbikes. An obstacle at this location also forces cyclists to dismount and slowing down opportunists from escaping quickly from one area to another.
- 3.3.7 The creation of a shared surface/'home-zone' design for the street, rather than a standard engineering solution will emphasise 'territoriality', promote 'ownership' of the 'street' amongst residents, and encourage play/socialising in the street – all of which adds to the overall supervision of the public spaces and deters crime. .
- 3.3.8 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation and parking arrangements for larger vehicles.
- 3.3.9 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ French/double doors or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.

-
- ☐ Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors in to garages and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ Rear boundaries should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- ☐ Rear boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- ☐ Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.
- ☐ The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
- ☐ Gates in to the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
- A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
 - A key operable deadlock
- ☐ If residents are likely to use these gates when leaving their property, then the gates must be lockable from both sides.

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.
- ☐ Lighting to public areas (footpaths and roads) should be evenly distributed and not create areas of shadowing or pooling. Any low level lighting should be positioned to avoid creating glare.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Any garden sheds must be securely fixed to a concrete foundation and the shed door fitted with a certificated 'Sold Secure' Silver Standard padlock, hasp and staple (coach bolted through the shed structure). The shed door should be at least 44mm thick so that the door can be locked into the doorframe using either a mortise deadlock or mortise sash lock certificated to BS 3621: 2007.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and metal pipework and wiring should not be visible.
- ☐ A fixed Bin store should be provided to each property allowing residents to position bins in a specific location within the grounds of the property. This reduces the opportunity for bins to be used as climbing aids to a specific location. Bin stores also support a well maintained urban layout.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
06/05/21	Client	Application received
11/05/21	Client	Client confirmation
12/05/21	GMP	Invoice issued
09/06/21	DfS	Site visit
09/06/21	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
SK09	Northenden, Manchester -	Apr 21	
	2131-BT-01 -Boundary treatment plan		
	2131-SL-01-B - Proposed overall site layout		
	20052 (PL) 100 B Wilson		
	20052 (PL) 101 B Burnett		
	20052 (PL) 102 B Dalton		
	20052 (PL) 103 B Burgess		
	20052 (PL) 104 B McKellen		
	20052 (PL) 105 C Joule		
	20052 (PL) 106 B Winterson		
	20052 (PL) 107 B Lowry		
	20052 (PL) 108 B Turning		
	20052 (PL) 109 B Gaskell		
	20052 (PL) 110 B Pankhurst		
	20052 (PL) 205 Elevation Options		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk