



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Pall Mall Court, King Street, Manchester

Retail / Office Refurbishment

for: Bruntwood Pall Mall Ltd

version A: 20th April 2022

URN: 2008/1068/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Pall Mall Court, King Street, Manchester, M2 4PD

2008/1068/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Proposed Development Supported

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

In general the proposed scheme has been found acceptable and within the constraints of working within a listed structure, the proposed development should help to improve security in and around the site.

The success of this proposal will be reliant on effective management of the premises, and our support for this development is dependent on adoption of the measures highlighted in section 5.



Michael Craig DipLD CMLI

Consultant

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
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1 Visual Audit


The site, shown red on plan, lies in central Manchester within the Upper King Street Conservation Area. The application premises is a listed building, constructed in the late 1960s. The site is located within the long-established commercial district but the nature of the area is changing with more retail, restaurant, bar and hotel uses occupying former office space King Street is a highly active thoroughfare carrying both pedestrian and vehicular traffic, including regular bus services.

The main pedestrian entrance to the building is currently positioned on King Street, with service access located off Brown Street. There is a basement parking area which is accessed from Marsden Street by a vehicular ramp, access to the car parking area is restricted with an automated shutter.

The design of the building includes many concealed, sheltered spaces at ground floor level which have been subject to antisocial abuse and exploited by rough sleepers. Views into the courtyard area from King Street and Marsden Street are obscured by the building and the large planting bed above the car park entrance. The courtyard is accessible to the public at all times and the design of the building, with overhanging areas concealed from view, is a generator of antisocial and criminal behaviour to the detriment of the building occupiers. Most of the building is currently unoccupied.



Accessible entrance off King Street




Sections of flat-topped wall provide informal sitting areas and a repository for drinks containers



Steps and overhang in courtyard



Deeply recessed window, Brown Street elevation



Gated service yard off Brown Street, shared with neighbouring property



Fire exit, Marsden Street



Concealed sheltered spaces provide cover for criminal and antisocial behaviour

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2021 to 31st December 2021.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
33	175	323	2124	1353	236	59	192	21	183

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high for Manchester, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime being the highest reported crimes. The location of the proposed site should be taken into consideration when looking at the crime statistics as the site is located within the city centre where there is a high concentration of retail outlets, licenced premises and restaurants, leading to an increase of crime and disorder in the area.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly around Deansgate and towards the Northern Quarter and Piccadilly Gardens. Both areas have a high volume of bars and clubs. Offences have mostly occurred over the weekend period (Friday – Sunday) during the late evening and early hours of the morning when most premises in the area are closing. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings in the local area, with offences often taking place between known associates, with alcohol often being a factor.
- 2.1.3 Thefts have taken place throughout the area, with hotspots occurring to the northeast, around Piccadilly Gardens and to the north around Quay Street and Market Street. Offenders have mostly used pick pocketing techniques and distraction methods in order to obtain personal belongings, mostly mobile phones, bags and purses/ wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (mostly mobile phones) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the local area has mostly taken place in private car parks and vehicles using on street parking facilities. Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime with offenders using implements and objects in order to smash glazing and access the interior of the vehicle. Offenders have also targeted vehicle registration plates, using tools to remove them.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements, in order to gain access.

Possible Solution – All ground floor / accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within / directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- 2.2.2 Posing as a legitimate customer and gaining access to staff only areas by means of tailgating staff and exploitation of insecure doors.

Possible Solution – Staff-only areas should be effectively separated, both visually and physically, so that customers cannot readily gain entry. This can be achieved by the use of access-controlled doors or barriers, but they should create a clear distinction so that any intruder can be more easily identified. Visitors to the office suites should be prevented from progressing beyond the entrance lobby without having reported to reception staff. There should be provision within the staff only areas for the secure storage of personal belongings while at work.

- 2.2.3 Opening secured doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain access to premises.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. External doors should be alarmed and covered by CCTV.

-
- 2.2.4 Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the doors located below.

Possible Solution - Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2. Shutters should be mounted integrally, so that boxes are less vulnerable to tampering. Use of shutters in more concealed areas, where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed or detected, should be of a higher security certification, or consider use of additional protection such as internal security blinds or grilles.




2.3 Risk Factors – Retail and Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces / Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property / personal belongings
- Criminal damage to property
- Violence towards staff
- Cycle theft
- Arson

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.4.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.4.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.5 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses and bags.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Monday, Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon (12pm – 4:30pm) and evening (6:30pm – 11:59pm). Offenders have mostly targeted vehicles using private car parking and on street parking facilities. Vehicles are often left unsupervised for long periods of time in areas where footfall is reduced, creating perceived low risk opportunities for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises reconfiguration of the ground floor to create retail premises adjacent to the external spaces round the building, together with more comprehensive refurbishment of the upper floor office accommodation and communal facilities.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will help to develop activity in the ground floor premises, and together with relocation of the main office entrance within the courtyard, this should generate additional footfall and improve natural surveillance, which in turn should help to reduce potential for unwitnessed antisocial and criminal activity.
- 3.2.2 Some of the spaces and concealed areas that have been subject to abuse and provided shelter for antisocial activity will be removed or be better overlooked from within the buildings. New retail units will contain glazed frontages which will improve casual surveillance of public areas around the building. Some areas will remain at risk of abuse, such as recessed windows and doors on the Brown Street and Marsden Street elevations – these should be specifically covered with lighting and CCTV, and be specifically incorporated into security patrols.
- 3.2.3 Individual commercial units are designed to be self-contained and include no shared facilities that could compromise the security of the rest of the building.
- 3.2.4 A comprehensive access control system is proposed which will prevent unauthorised entry to restricted areas.

3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Waste disposal strategy. Arrangements for storage and disposal of refuse should not compromise the security of the development. Entry to refuse stores should be strictly controlled. Collection of waste should not require or allow external operatives to enter restricted areas within the site. Waste bins must not be stored on the streets for prolonged periods or overnight.
- 3.3.2 CCTV / surveillance review. The site-wide lighting and CCTV systems should be adapted to reflect the changes to the layout. CCTV cameras should be capable of identifying all vehicle and pedestrian movements into and out of the site as well as the building entrances and lobbies. To facilitate the CCTV system, dusk until dawn lighting should be provided, particularly around the access doors / gates and any loading bays. Signage should be located at the site entrance to inform visitors that their movements will be monitored and recorded.
- 3.3.3 Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required, to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance / antisocial behaviour in / around the entrance lobbies. If the building is to be open at any time without a concierge or security presence in the lobby area, the revolving doors should be secured and one of the single-leaf entrance doors should be controlled by means of a video access control system linked to each individual office suite (allowing staff to vet callers before allowing them entry).
- 3.3.4 Management. The success of the development in reducing offending in and around the building will be dependent on implementation and continuation of effective management of the site. This should involve 24/7 monitoring of CCTV and a prompt response to any incidents, coupled with regular patrols around the site and liaison with the local policing team and managers / occupants of neighbouring sites. Vacant premises at ground floor level will not provide the benefits of overlooking and until tenants are installed. The level of formal surveillance activity around the site should compensate for this and be reviewed once the premises are occupied and the businesses are operational.

4 Physical Security

The proposed development includes adaptation of an existing listed building, and in order to preserve its architectural character, the potential to make alterations and upgrade the physical security of certain elements of the scheme is constrained. It is appreciated that any changes need to be sensitive to the architecture, and the following recommendations are made on this understanding. However, the following standards should be the minimum applicable to all new-build elements of the proposal. If the identified security risks cannot be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the buildings and their occupants will be more dependent on effective management.

4.1 Doors

- All external door-sets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- Sliding or revolving doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- All back-of-house / staff areas to any retail units, licensed premises or restaurants should not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to storage rooms, staff rooms and offices should be solid-core and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times). Any cash offices should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false / suspended ceilings and a certified door-set to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys / passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Windows

- All windows should be certificated to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950. Where this is not possible for dimensional reasons, window construction should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can be limited to standard dimension sizes.
- Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Shutters should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage).
- Any louvres to servicing areas should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows.

4.3 Glazing

- All glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- All glazed elevations of the building fronting directly onto the street should ideally be protected by re-enforced stall risers, or bollards (at 1400mm centres), to deter ram-raid type attacks.

4.4 Alarms

- A monitored alarm system should be installed, linked to contacts on all external doors / shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Landscaping

- In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow unimpeded surveillance and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- Any bollards to protect building fabric should be certified to BS PAS 68.

4.6 Lighting

- External lighting should be provided in accordance with BS 5489. The spread of lighting should be evenly distributed with no areas of shadowing or pooling. Levels should be sufficient to support the CCTV systems in operation in the area. The position of light sources must not create glare or be dazzling at eye level, nor shine directly into the CCTV cameras.
- Lighting to pedestrian routes through the site should be in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting to public areas (footpaths and roads) should be evenly distributed and not create areas of shadowing or pooling. Any low-level lighting should be positioned to avoid creating glare.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.

4.7 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to complement the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images

produced will be of an **acceptable standard** that will allow for **identification** of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are '**Overview**' and '**Recognition**', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: **the main entrances to the premises, service access points, stairs and lifts, internal lobby areas, emergency exits, concealed / sheltered spaces outside, car park entrance, cycle stores.**

4.8 Other

- Surfaces that could be vulnerable to graffiti should be formed of a resistant material or have a resistant coating applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal, e.g. 'easy-on' (see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).
- Cycle stands intended for short-stay use should enable cyclists to secure both wheels and the frame.
- Any bollards or other street furniture included specifically to prevent ram-raiding should be certified to BS PAS 68-1:2013.
- Signage and orientation. Routes leading to and from various facilities in and around the site should be obvious to site users and visitors. Disorientation can provide legitimacy for an offender to be present in a restricted area. Clear signage should be provided throughout the site which will help to direct people to where they need to go, and discourage entry to restricted areas.

4.9 Fit Out

- Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-user requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:
 - Internal doors and access controls to staff areas / offices / stores
 - Cash management offices and safes, as well as cash-in-transit arrangements
 - Internal layout - including pay-point positions, aisles and product displays, arrangement of internal furnishings etc.
 - Alarms
 - CCTV
 - ATM cash dispensers
 - External seating
- These features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide further advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews / exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up to date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.3 Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
- 5.1.4 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
21/01/2022	Deloitte	CIS instruction received
27/01/2022	Deloitte	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
08/02/2022	Deloitte / Sheppard Robson / Bruntwood	Virtual meeting
08/03/2022	Bruntwood	Payment received
05/04/2022	Deloitte / Sheppard Robson / Bruntwood	Site meeting
07/04/2022	Sheppard Robson	Drawings received
20/04/2022	Deloitte	CIS version A issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
6911-SRA-ZZ-00-DR-A-20100	Ground Floor General Arrangement	29/03/22	P11
6911-SRA-ZZ-01-DR-A-20101	First Floor General Arrangement	29/03/22	P11
6911-SRA-ZZ-02-DR-A-20102	Second Floor General Arrangement	20/03/22	P11
6911-SRA-ZZ-03-DR-A-20103	Third Floor General Arrangement	20/03/22	P11
6911-SRA-ZZ-04-DR-A-20104	Fourth Floor General Arrangement	20/03/22	P10
6911-SRA-ZZ-05-DR-A-20105	Fifth Floor General Arrangement	20/03/22	P10
6911-SRA-ZZ-06-DR-A-20106	Sixth Floor General Arrangement	20/03/22	P10
6911-SRA-ZZ-07-DR-A-20107	Seventh Floor General Arrangement	20/03/22	P10
6911-SRA-ZZ-08-DR-A-20108	Eighth Floor General Arrangement	20/03/22	P10
6911-SRA-ZZ-09-DR-A-20109	Ninth Floor General Arrangement	20/03/22	P10
6911-SRA-ZZ-10-DR-A-20110	Tenth Floor General Arrangement	20/03/22	P10
6911-SRA-ZZ-11-DR-A-20111	Eleventh Floor Roof Plan	20/03/22	P10
6911-SRA-ZZ-B1-DR-A-20098	Basement Floor General Arrangement	20/03/22	P11
6911-SRA-ZZ-LG-DR-A-20099	Lower Ground Floor General Arrangement	20/03/22	P11
N/A	Proposed Lighting Design Concepts		
N/A	Development Concept Summary	25/11/21	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door / window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French / double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk