



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land bound by John Dalton Street, Ridgefield, Bow Street and South King Street, Manchester

Offices & Flexible Ground Floor Use

FOR: Island Site (General Partner) Ltd

VERSION B: 29th April 2021

REFERENCE: 2019/1089/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Land bound by John Dalton Street, Ridgefield, Bow Street and South King Street, Manchester

2019/1089/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The development is broadly acceptable, in terms of designing out crime; however, the recommendations made in section 3.3 should be addressed, including but not limited to:

- Illumination and surveillance of the main entrance area
- Access control into and around the building

If the recommendations contained within section 3.3 are implemented we would be supportive of the planning application.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



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Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
	2.3 Risk Factors	
	2.4 Offices - Burglary Risk Analysis	
	2.5 Offices - Theft Risk Analysis	
	2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	8
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security	9
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Windows & Shutters	
	4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	4.4 Alarms	
	4.5 Access control	
	4.6 Lighting	
	4.7 CCTV	
5	Management & Maintenance	10
6	Construction	11
7	Useful References	11
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix



A	Contact register	12
B	Associated Documents.....	12
C	CIS Version History	12

1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The development site is located in the city centre area of Manchester close to Deansgate, Spinningfields and Albert Square/Town Hall. The site currently comprises the following existing buildings; Old Colony House, 5 Ridgefield and Grange House

The site is roughly square in shape and it is bound by South King Street to the North, Bow Street to the East, John Dalton Street to the South, and Ridgefield to the West.

The site is occupied by an existing office building with ground floor commercial units. The building is currently vacant. The main entrance to the building is taken from John Dalton Street; commercial units at ground floor are also typically entered from the front elevation. There has been some graffiti to the side and rear of the building where there are blank facades and a lack of opportunities for natural surveillance from surrounding streets and buildings.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 2018 and 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
12	250	226	1101	928	232	34	298	34	158

- 2.1.1 The volume of crime in the local area is extremely high – with the most prevalent types of crime being violence, theft, vehicle crime, non-domestic burglary, criminal damage and robbery. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening/during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people tend to visit the city centre and attend licensed premises, often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts. Thefts have taken place throughout the licenced premises and retail outlets within the local area. Offenders have targeted insecure items left on tables, as well as pickpocketing in high footfall areas.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Opening secure doors (all door types) using bodily pressure and implements to access the premises.

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4.2) which are designed to withstand a prolonged attempt to gain entry.

- 2.2.2 Breaking glazing in doors and windows, mainly to the front of the premises, using implements to gain access.

Possible Solution – Any ground floor or easily accessible glazing should contain a pane of laminate glazing, which cannot be easily smashed or shattered to gain entry.

- 2.2.3 Entering premises as legitimate customer and tailgating staff/ exploiting insecure doors to access staff only areas.

Possible Solution – Personnel gates or turnstiles should restrict access from the office foyer into the circulation core of the building. Any external doors should operate on an access control system.

- 2.2.4 Forcing open shutters using implements and bodily force to gain access.

Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to a recognised security standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR2). Shutters certified to a burglary resistant standard are able to withstand prolonged, opportunist, attacks by criminals.


2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft

2.4 Offices - Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night / into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries committed in Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors and windows behind them.

2.5 Offices - Theft Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest during the working week, when the opportunities to offend are greater, and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours / staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks over the weekend period from the morning and into the evening. Offences increase over the weekend period when foot fall increases within the city centre. Vehicles are often left unattended for long periods of time in secluded areas, creating low risk opportunities for the offender.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Demolition of the existing buildings and structures and the erection of a 10-storey plus basement office building (Use Class E(g)), with flexible ground floor and basement uses (Use Class E) and a rooftop garden, works to facilitate the pedestrianisation of the southern part of Ridgefield and other associated works

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The main reception desk at the lobby to the offices on first floor and above will be located in close proximity to the main entrance, allowing reception staff to vet those entering the building and accommodate visitors.
- 3.2.2 The ground floor plans indicate that access into the main circulation core will be restricted with turnstiles/speed gates, preventing members gaining further access into the building.
- 3.2.3 The main entrance is positioned on John Dalton Street which experiences high levels of footfall during the day and in the evening – allowing for passive surveillance opportunities of the building.
- 3.2.4 The ground floor units will provide an active frontage to the building at ground floor level and does not have large expanses of blank facades at ground floor. The existing building has been defaced in a number of places where there are blank facades and there is a lack of activity both on the existing building and surrounding buildings.
- 3.2.5 There will be a large cycle parking area with changing and shower facilities. This will allow staff to securely store their bicycles whilst they are at work where they are unlikely to be targeted by thieves. Staff will be able to store personal items whilst showering - reducing the potential for opportunist thefts.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The office reception should be staffed during standard office hours (i.e. 8am-6pm) to allow visitors to be vetted before being permitted access in to the building. There should be a video/audio intercom on the main entrance to allow staff to vet visitors to the building when the main reception is not staffed.
- 3.3.2 The main entrance into the building is recessed and this could potentially provide some concealment from view, or shelter from the elements, which could generate antisocial behaviour such as loitering, vagrancy, alcohol/drug consumption, and public urination. It is highly recommended that sightlines into the entrance area are maximised, the area should be highly visible to reception staff, illuminated to a high standard, and covered by CCTV. If the ground floor units are open in the evening (i.e. food & beverage type usage) this will also deter misuse of this area.
- 3.3.3 Access into and around the office building should be governed with an auditable access control system.
- 3.3.4 Access in to the proposed bicycle store should operate on an access control system, with access restricted to genuine users. Cycle stands should be Sheffield style, or similar, allowing both wheels and the frame to be locked.
- 3.3.5 All ground floor external doors should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting. Recessed entrances should be particularly illuminated to a high standard to deter antisocial behaviour (such as loitering and congregation).
- 3.3.6 The building should be covered by a monitored intruder alarm (see section 4.4 for more details).
- 3.3.7 Individual office suites should have a secure door set (i.e. BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR 2). Individual offices and ground floor/basement commercial units should have the infrastructure so that any tenants can easily install an intruder alarm.

- 3.3.8 A comprehensive CCTV system should be installed to monitor all external doors and elevations, the reception area, circulation cores, all plant/back-of-house functions, and the cycle store. Individual offices and ground floor/basement commercial units should have the infrastructure so that any tenants can easily install a CCTV system if required.
- 3.3.9 Any blank facades should be treated with an anti-graffiti coating, to an approximate height of 2000mm, so that graffiti can easily be cleaned.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doorsets including the main entrance pass door, cycle access door, bin store doors and escape doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. All of these doors should be self-closing and self-locking.
- ☐ The revolving entrance doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Entrance doors to individual office suites should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ Where feasible, any ground level, opening windows should be certificated to LPS1175 or BS PAS 24, fitted with opening restrictors and with key operated locks.
- ☐ Curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any security shutters or grilles must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required).

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All accessible glazing (i.e. below a height of 2000mm from external ground level) must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any louvres at ground floor level to plant areas/refuge stores should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed or damaged. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required (see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for SBD approved suppliers).

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored intruder alarm system should be installed. Alarms should have contacts on all external doors or shutters, and PIR in rooms with windows. The alarm should include a signal terminating at the security control room/patrol team. The alarms should have two secure signalling paths (one being GSM radio back-up), so that if either signalling path is tampered with by an intruder, or is faulty, the other continues to monitor for any further alarms and transmits them as 'confirmed activations' – extra confirmation that an intruder is on the premises and that the alarm isn't false.
- ☐ Individual office suites/floors should also consider having an intruder alarm should the buildings be open but some office remain closed. As a minimum individual offices or floorplates should have the infrastructure so that an alarm can be installed by future tenants.

4.5 Access control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The revolving entrance door and any pass doors.
 - Turnstiles/speed gates and/or lifts
 - Staff only areas
 - Plant areas and areas restricted to maintenance staff
 - External cycle access doors, cycle store, and changing rooms.
- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should ideally be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff key-fobs/cards should be capable of being quickly activated or disabled when required, to ensure they are not misused. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work.
- ☐ Lockers should be provided in the changing rooms for staff to store personal items whilst changing/showering.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, and producing 'white' light, should be installed to all external doors of each building.

4.7 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV camera system should be installed. Cameras should be capable of monitoring all building elevations - with particular emphasis on external doors (cameras should be able to observe people coming and going), and the entrance lobbies.
- ☐ Recording equipment should be located within a secure room or images may be recorded off-site at a suitable monitoring facility.
- ☐ CCTV monitoring screens should be located at the reception desk and or security office.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security and maintenance regime for the management of the units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing the offices, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc;
 - Refuse collection arrangements.

-
- 5.1.2 All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
 - 5.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
11/02/2021	Georgina Blackburn	CIS application confirmed
08/03/2021	Georgina Blackburn	Drawings received
15/03/2021	Georgina Blackburn	Progress update
24/03/2021	Georgina Blackburn	Draft issued
26/03/2021	Alice Routledge	Comments received & updated plans

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Site Location Plan		
TIS-CPA-ZA-01-DR-A-2000	GA Plan - Basement Level	06/26/20	P8
TIS-CPA-ZA-01-DR-A-2001	GA Plan - Level 00	01/21/20	P7
TIS-CPA-ZA-01-DR-A-2002	GA Plan - Level 01	01/21/20	P6
TIS-CPA-ZA-01-DR-A-2003	GA Plan - Level 02	03/30/20	P6
TIS-CPA-ZA-01-DR-A-2004	GA Plan - Level 03	08/01/20	P4
TIS-CPA-ZA-01-DR-A-2005	GA Plan - Level 04	17/12/19	P3
TIS-CPA-ZA-01-DR-A-2006	GA Plan - Level 05	08/01/20	P4
TIS-CPA-ZA-01-DR-A-2007	GA Plan - Level 06	08/01/20	P5
TIS-CPA-ZA-01-DR-A-2008	GA Plan - Level 07	08/01/20	P4
TIS-CPA-ZA-01-DR-A-2009	GA Plan - Level 08	08/01/20	P3
TIS-CPA-ZA-01-DR-A-2010	GA Plan - Level 09	08/01/20	P3
TIS-CPA-ZA-01-DR-A-2011	GA Plan - Level 10	08/01/20	P3
TIS-CPA-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-2600	GA Elevation - North	09/01/20	P4
TIS-CPA-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-2601	GA Elevation - East	09/01/20	P4
TIS-CPA-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-2602	GA Elevation - South	09/01/20	P4
TIS-CPA-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-2603	GA Elevation - West	09/01/20	P4

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Access control	30/04/2021