



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Units 12 & 13 Piccadilly Trading Estate

Leisure (1,024m²)

for: Cloudwater Brew Co

version A: 14th July 2021

URN: 2020/0199/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Units 12 & 13 Piccadilly Trading Estate

2020/0199/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Major Design Changes Not Required

The nature and level of disorder in the immediate area could make the development vulnerable to abuse, and it is therefore essential that the scheme does not incorporate features that would increase crime or raise the fear of crime in and around the site.

The adaptation of the site for different uses provide significant challenges to the developer, and given these constraints the proposals appear to include reasonable consideration for the security of staff, customers and their property.

Our support for the proposed development is subject to inclusion of the recommendations relating to on-going management and maintenance of the premises, as stated in section 5 of this report.



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1 Visual Audit


The site is located at the south eastern edge of Manchester city centre, close to Piccadilly railway station, New Islington & the Mayfield regeneration area. The neighbourhood is predominantly commercial and industrial in character but with some nearby plots in process of regeneration into residential, leisure and commercial uses. There are some areas of unmanaged open space and vacant plots in the vicinity.

Legitimate activity in the area is highest during the working day. Generally the area is very quiet at night with little passing traffic. A caravan providing takeaway food is parked outside the site on Adair Street, popular with local and passing customers, particularly site staff working on nearby construction projects.

Commuter car parking. The proximity of the city centre and Piccadilly railway stations means that quiet neighbouring streets and local car parks are frequently used for long-term commuter car parking, an attractive target for criminals. Any available / accessible space off St Andrews Square adjacent to the site is used informally for this purpose.




Unit 12 viewed from Gidding Road



Existing storage and service yard



Area of service yard to rear of units 12 & 13 showing boundary with St Andrews Square



Parking at the back of the site



Protection for the rear shutters



Vegetation along boundary fence, Adair Street

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	27	53	97	39	28	<5	278	43	17

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is about average for the city of Manchester, with exception to vehicle crime which is high. The proposed site is located within close proximity to Manchester city centre where there is a high volume of retail outlets and licenced premises which often increases the amount of crime and disorder within an area. Less serious woundings, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded offences taking place.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have mostly taken place to the north of the proposed site, around Great Ancoats Street and New Islington Metrolink stop. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings in the local area. Offences have often involved unknown associates targeting members of the public, often vulnerable victims. Offences involving domestic incidents and incidents between known associates are also common in the local area.
- 2.1.3 Offences of theft have occurred throughout the local area, with a particular hotspot occurring around the proposed site area and along Fairfield Street. The majority of thefts have involved the removal of mobile phones, either when left insecure on a table or from a bag by means of pick pocketing. Offenders have also targeted businesses within the area, either removing items from the yard outside and making off, or entering the business, posing as a customer and removing items from within. Theft from hotel rooms have also been common within the area.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime is high within the local area; however there are a large number of car parking facilities and on street parking facilities. Vehicle crime offences have mostly occurred to the south and west of the proposed site. Theft from motor vehicle and criminal damage to vehicles has been the highest recorded vehicle crime offences taking place. Offenders are breaking glazing within windows using implements in order to remove times from within the vehicle as well as cause damage. Offenders are also removing vehicle registration plates and vehicle parts as well as causing damage to the vehicle by means of scratching paint work and damaging bodywork.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- 2.2.2 Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution - All new ground floor / accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within / directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- 2.2.3 Posing as legitimate customers and entering employee only areas through insecure doors or tailgating staff members

Possible Solution – Staff-only areas should be effectively separated, both visually and physically, so that customers cannot readily gain entry. This can be achieved by the use of access-controlled doors or barriers, but they should create a clear distinction so that any intruder can be more easily identified.

There should be provision within the staff only areas for the secure storage of personal belongings while at work.

2.2.4 Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see below) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags / coats. The internal layout of the premises can also increase surveillance opportunities and help deter offenders. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.




2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of user / staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of / from parked cars
- Uncontrolled access
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Cash robbery / attacks on vending machines
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at leisure facilities in the Greater Manchester area peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday.



2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon / early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

2.5 Theft (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at leisure facilities within the Greater Manchester area peaks on Tuesday, but remains consistently high throughout the week.
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing / locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Thursday and Saturday during the morning and into the evening, with an increase of offences occurring during the afternoon (12pm – 3pm). Offenders often target vehicles within the City Centre as they are left unattended for long periods of time, reducing the likelihood that the offender will be caught or identified.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is to create an external bar area within the existing service yard, and an off-sales facility at the rear of unit 12, with customer access off St Andrew's Square.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The site benefits from a well-defined boundary, marking an obvious distinction between public realm and private space. The condition of the boundary should be evaluated to ensure that it can provide a consistent level of security around the site (see also section 3.3.1).
- 3.2.2 The building footprint is relatively simple and free of recessed areas that could provide cover for criminal or antisocial activity. The structure contains no aids to climbing that would facilitate unauthorised access the roof space.
- 3.2.3 The existing site management practices have been largely successful in excluding intruders and preventing disorder at the premises. There are well-established security protocols which will be adapted / extended to cover the new development.

3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to fully support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Existing boundaries. Evaluation of the security capability of the existing boundary should be undertaken, to ensure that any potential weakness in the boundary fencing is identified and appropriately addressed to provide a consistent level of security around the site. Overhanging vegetation and tree trunks close to the fence line can provide climbing aids that could assist offenders to gain access to the premises.
- 3.3.2 Review of CCTV / lighting. The site-wide lighting and CCTV systems should be adapted to reflect the proposed introduction of new facilities and changes to the layout. CCTV cameras should be capable of identifying all vehicle and pedestrian movements into and out of the site as well as the entrances, elevations and boundary fencing. To facilitate the CCTV system, dusk until dawn lighting should be provided, particularly around the access doors / gates and any loading bays. Signage should be located at the site entrance to inform visitors that their movements will be monitored and recorded.
- 3.3.3 Position of portable facilities, including waste receptacles. The position of ancillary structures and portable facilities, external storage and vehicle parking areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:-
- Potential to block sight lines and create hiding places
 - Potential to obscure CCTV and lighting
 - Potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit / entry to upper levels.
 - Their potential to obscure damage to fence lines.
- 3.3.4 Management. The proposal involves no major changes to the existing fabric, and thus the security of the site and its users will be dependent on implementation of management practises to ensure that entry to the site and accessibility within it can be effectively monitored and controlled (see section 5).
- 3.3.5 Arrangement of facilities – any secluded space between structures should be accessible to staff only, with customers prevented from gaining access. The more remote areas, such as space behind neighbouring units, must not be publicly-accessible, with robust barriers to prevent unauthorised access. The division between public and staff-only areas should be readily obvious so that people know where they should and shouldn't have access to. Refuse disposal arrangements. As above, bins must not be left in accessible areas where they could be subject to abuse or provide climbing aids.

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- 3.3.6 Cash storage. The position of any safes / tills should be out of public reach, and securely fixed to other structures to prevent easy removal. Arrangements for cash handling should be considered so that the distances that large amounts of cash are carried is minimised. If cash is to be stored overnight on the premises, a safe should be provided adequate capacity, with a deposit facility, certified to LPS 1183. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs.
- 3.3.7 Boundary protection from potential vehicle damage. In parts of the site where the secure boundary fence line is close or immediately adjacent to the vehicle movement zones and parking spaces, fencing in these locations can be susceptible to accidental damage which can undermine the security of the site perimeter, and damage can also be masked by stationary trailers. In vulnerable locations the fencing should be protected with high kerbing or crash barriers.
- 3.3.8 Lighting should be evenly distributed with no areas of shadowing or pooling. The position of light sources must not create glare or be dazzling at eye level, not shine directly into CCTV cameras.

4 Physical Security

The proposal comprises little physical change to the existing buildings on the site, and thus the Secured by Design (SBD) award is not applicable to this development. The following recommendations are made on this understanding, but should apply to any new installations. Where the identified security risks will not be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the site and its occupants / users will be dependent on effective management and deployment of an on-site security presence together with monitored alarms / CCTV.

4.1 Doors

- External doors including French Windows and folding doors, must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts.
- Doors to storage, staff-only or office space should be solid core, with multi point locking.

4.2 Windows and Shutters

- Any new windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950, must be key-lockable, and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- Any shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Shutters should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage)
- Doors used for deliveries, and any shutters that may be used to protect these entrances when not in use, should include a vision panel or door viewer to enable staff to identify visitors prior to allowing entry.

4.3 Glazing

- Any new external glazing must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- An intruder alarm should be installed linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors should cover any rooms with windows.
- It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

4.5 Lighting

- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.6 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [external doors](#), [till points / bar areas](#), [the entrance / waiting areas / external seating](#).

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The application does not involve major physical changes to the buildings. As such the success of the proposal will be dependent on effective management of the premises and a zero tolerance policy should be adopted with customers who behave inappropriately.
- 5.1.2 Café / Bar / Restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:
 - **Opportunities** - Patrons of restaurants are stationary for extended periods of time making them easier to target.

- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction, and other factors mean patrons are easily distracted.
- **Customer turnover** – High customer turnover with high levels of customer movement within the establishment offer greater anonymity and allow more opportunities for offenders to operate unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – These are often available and likely to be on show, (a particular problem on any external seating areas). Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, portable goods – mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys, etc. and people often make use of these items when sitting in a restaurant.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues can provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences

5.1.3 In order to minimise these and other security issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrances should be easily observed by staff.
- All back-of-house / staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- Large amounts of cash should not be stored in the premises and signage should be installed to indicate this. Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach. Casual access to the rear of service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled). No tills should be kept outside.
- There should be no places for concealment in public areas to allow staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of furnishings should aid circulation.

5.1.4 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. A maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:

- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras, lighting, doors and locks etc.
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti;
- Opening and closing of premises including staff arrival and departure, with particular attention to lone members of staff.
- Cash management within the premises
- Cash-in-transit collections / deliveries and banking practices
- Management of stock deliveries.

5.1.5 Toilets should be clearly signed so that there is no excuse for customers finding their way to the back of house.

5.1.6 A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development, and should not require bins to be left on the street for extended periods. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

5.1.7 Permitted opening hours should be mindful of the proximity of any residential development in the neighbourhood. Procedures should be put in place to ensure the safety of staff for closing / opening the premises, including transport to and from the premises.

5.1.8 High customer turnover in cafe / bars, with high levels of customer movement within the establishment are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed – staff must be able to easily monitor people arriving or leaving the premises from any potential access point.

-
- 5.1.9 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers, music equipment, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
 - 5.1.10 Access through the main customer entrance to the site should be capable of being controlled by staff, to ensure all visitors are vetted or are greeted / escorted before being allowed access.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
09/06/2021	Cloudwater Brew Co.	CIS instruction received
10/06/2021	Cloudwater Brew Co.	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
23/06/2021	Cloudwater Brew Co.	Payment received
08/07/2021	Cloudwater Brew Co.	Site visit
14/07/2021	Cloudwater Brew Co.	CIS version A issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Site Plan	14/05/21	
	General Arrangement Plan - Ground Floor	14/05/21	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door / window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk