




CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Installation of upcycled, freight container accommodation for flexible workspace (Class E), associated covered, cycle storage & parking

AT Land Between Cakebread Street and Manor Street, Ardwick, Manchester

FOR: T & Z Khalid

VERSION A: 13.05.22

2022/0148/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

The proposed development is welcomed. The proposals are likely to result in an increase footfall, activity, and passive surveillance of the surrounding public realm of the Mancunian Way footpath, Cakebread Street and Manor Street. The appearance of the site and profile of the area will be improved by the introduction of the development

From a crime and anti-social behaviour perspective, the only significant issues to address are:

- the installation of appropriately secure shutter and glazing
- restricting access to staff-only areas
- restricting access to the site outside of business hours
- preparing a management plan for the premises that includes security provision
- introducing CCTV and intruder alarm systems.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the proposals.

Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*

Consultant

e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

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1 Visual Audit

The development site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The 0.14hectare site, edged in red on the plan, is located in Ardwick, immediately south side of the Mancunian Way, A57(M), at the point where the road rises into an elevated section and the 'off-slip' to the A6 commences. The neighbourhood is largely made up of industrial and warehouse premises; the nearest residential property lies further to the west and south of the site. The Mancunian Way forms the southern part of the city centre ring road and is heavily trafficked throughout the day. Cakebread Street, a cul-de-sac adjoins the western side of the site, here, the street terminates at a series of bollards and stone setts that restrict vehicle access onto and off the Mancunian Way or the footpath that runs parallel to it. This footpath continues along the length of the northern boundary of the site. Mayfield Park, an emerging public park that should be open to the public in Autumn 2022, lies north of the Mancunian Way. Modern business premises, and their unsecured forecourts, that form part of the Downing Street Industrial Estate, face the western side of Cakebread Street opposite the site. A single-storey, triangular, building adjoins the site's southern boundary. This building has been subdivided into smaller premises with entrances facing both Cakebread street and Manor Street one of which is occupied by a car repair workshop and another by a furniture retailer; others appear to be vacant. Graphite House/Manor House, a two-storey industrial building, stands at the corner of Manor Street and Paddock Street obliquely opposite the site and there is a broad, landscaped verge between Paddock Street and the Mancunian Way. Many of the premises in the immediate vicinity of the site have been embellished with security measures, some of which are crude, and include: steel roller shutters protecting windows and doors, window bars, anti-ram bars, barbed wire, and CCTV cameras. There is some evidence of graffiti in the area but otherwise the streets are generally well maintained.


Looking north along Cakebread Street towards the site on the right and Downing Street Industrial Estate on the left



The northern end of Cakebread Street with the site on the right



Looking from west to east across the site



The western end of the site, on the right of the image, adjoins Manor Street



The site, enclosed with timber fencing on the left of the image and the Mancunian Way on the right



Looking across the site from east to west



The development site is vacant having previously been used for car parking and most recently used, for a temporary period, as an open-air bar and beer garden. The site has a tarmac finish with parking bays marked out. There are some remnants of the beer garden use, including beer barrels and steel containers used as serveries. There are also two, very large, free-standing, advertising hoardings located towards the eastern and western fringes of the site, each exploiting the high volume of passing traffic. The eastern western and southern boundaries of the site is enclosed with an 1,800mm high, timber fence topped with razor wire. Access into the site can be gained via 2,000mm high, steel gates at Cakebread Street and at Manor Street. A 5,000mm high, stained timber fence adjoins the neighbouring industrial building to the south, presumably erected for aesthetic reasons. Bulkhead and tower lighting illuminate the site. Signs indicate that CCTV cameras monitor the site, only one of which was readily visible, and mounted on the fencing on the south side of the site.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

The data below relates to crimes recorded between 1st March 2021 and 28th February 2022 committed within 500m of the site.

All crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Drug offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
17	19	74	381	289	27	27	96	19	12

2.1.1 There were 949 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is extremely high but typical for a neighbourhood on the fringe of Manchester city centre.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded were:

- the use, or threat, of violence - 40%
- theft (including bicycle theft and shoplifting) - 30%
- vehicle crime, i.e., theft of, theft from and criminal damage to a vehicle - 12%
- criminal damage – 8%
- burglary - 4%
- robbery – 3%
- drug offences 3%.

2.1.3 Crimes involving the use or threat of violence occurred throughout the area analysed, but there were concentrations at and near licensed premises on Fairfield Street, as well as in Piccadilly Station. Offences mostly occurred over the weekend period, and during the late evening and early hours of the morning, which reinforces the consumption of alcohol being a significant factor in determining when and where such crimes occur.

2.1.4 Incidents of theft have taken place throughout the area, with hotspots at Piccadilly Gardens, licensed premises on Deansgate, Peter Street and Quay Street, and at retail premises in Market Street and the Arndale Centre. As well as shoplifting, offenders used pick-pocketing and distraction techniques to steal mobile phones, bags, and purses/ wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (mostly mobile phones) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.



2.1.5 The streets where the most crimes were recorded were:

- Travis Street – 132 crimes
- Fairfield Street – 81
- Baring Street - 51
- London Road - 44
- Piccadilly Station - 42
- Ardwick Green (North and South) - 40

Crime in the immediate vicinity of the site

2.1.6 There were no crimes recorded as having taken place on Cakebread Street but there were 14 that occurred on or in premises on Charlton Place, and a further 2 crimes at Manor Street. Of these 16 incidents, 10 were burglaries, 5 involved the use or threat of violence and there was 1 theft from a vehicle.

Vehicle Crime





- 2.1.7 The risk of vehicle crime is constant through the week with a slight decrease on Wednesday and Friday. The most common period for incidents to occur is from mid-day through to the evening.


2.2 Crime at office premises in Manchester

The data below relates to crimes carried out at office premises in the City of Manchester in the year prior to the pandemic.

Burglary





- 2.2.1 Of the 284 burglaries recorded at offices, the majority occurred at buildings within the city centre or neighbourhoods bordering the city centre. Only one offence took place within the neighbourhood in which this development site is located. Across the city, the risk of burglary at office premises is consistent throughout the week. The risk rises significantly at the end of the traditional working day into the late evening.



- 2.2.2 More than half of the incidents of burglary involved the offender forcing a door. The next most common means of entry was 'unknown', which are likely to have involved offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees gaining access to staff-only areas through insecure doors or by tail-gating. The one burglary that occurred in the neighbourhood involved the offender smashing the glazing within a door before entering.

Theft



- 2.2.3 There were 116 incidents of theft at offices across Manchester, most of which occurred in the city centre. There was an appreciable drop in the number of incidents of theft at the weekend. Offences tend to occur during the standard working day from 09:00 until 18:00, with a significant rise in risk around lunchtime.

2.3 Modus operandi used in committing burglary and theft at office premises in Manchester and measures to reduce risk

2.3.1 Shutters and grilles have been forced open

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters and grilles:

- only install LPS 1175 security rated shutters or grilles; and,
- avoid placing windows or doors in accessible but secluded areas, so avoiding the need to add additional security measures, such as shutters, to secure vulnerable openings.

2.3.2 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates, so that rear doors and windows are only accessible to residents;
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping, or damage to fencing; and,
- external doors should be illuminated by dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests a property is occupied, and the light will also highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed.

2.3.3 Doors and windows have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in/climb-in' burglaries:

- entrance doors should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- windows should be certified to the PAS 24 standard, and be fitted with key operated locks and tamper proof, opening restrictors; and,
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors.

2.3.4 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and windows; and,

- grilles or shutters should be fitted to vulnerable windows.

2.3.5 Offenders posing as legitimate visitors/customers, gaining access to staff-only areas of commercial premises

To minimise the risk of offenders gaining access to the offices:

- an access control system should be considered to limit access into the premises;
- staff should be required to wear an appropriate form of clearly visible ID;
- entrance doors and doors separating public areas from staff only areas should be monitored by CCTV; and
- lockers should be provided for staff to secure their personal belongings.

2.3.6 Bicycle theft

To minimise the risk of bicycle theft:

- Secure cycle parking facilities should be provided within the premises or in a location which benefits from a high degree of supervision by staff and of the premises.

2.3.7 Cars stolen, parts and property stolen from a vehicle, and bodywork damaged

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting resident, staff, or visitor cars:

- ample parking space should be provided within, or adjacent to, the premises where they can be supervised by staff.

2.3.8 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol or visit during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with tracking devices.

2.4 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the site is very prominent being adjacent to the Mancunian Way;
- the adjacent streets and buildings appear to be well-maintained. Neighbourhoods where there are clear signs of physical deterioration and neglect tends to increase an offenders' perception that areas are vulnerable to crime and their actions will go unchallenged;

- the volume of vehicle traffic using the Mancunian Way and the mix of neighbouring commercial businesses generate a consistent level of passive surveillance of the fringes of the site throughout the day; and,
- given the current use of the site, the site's boundaries are considered adequately secure; and,
- the site is very well lit during the hours of darkness, particularly by the lighting towers that illuminate the Mancunian Way.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood with a high volume of crime and burglary of business premises in the immediate vicinity of the site is a particular issue;
- when businesses close for the day and weekend, Cakebread Street and Manor Street are largely deserted, making it easier for an offender to approach premises with little prospect of being witnessed doing so from these approaches;
- the site is at a very prominent and easily visible to passing traffic on the Mancunian Way. Well-trafficked routes can act as conduits for crime, with criminals identifying opportunities for crime and committing crime opportunities as they travel along them;
- whilst the perimeter fencing may be adequately secure for the site's current (or previous) use, a timber fence on its own may not necessarily be considered to be sufficiently secure to deter offenders for alternative uses, and the presence of barbed and razor wire is not appropriate in such a highly visible location; and,
- as the number of city centre parking spaces continues to be reduced and is expensive, the proximity of the city centre, which is expanding eastwards with the redevelopment of Mayfield, may increase the pressure for commuter parking spaces on the streets surrounding the site. This may lead to anti-social parking, for example, on roads and pavements in places that restrict access for large, commercial vehicles. Offenders may be attracted to the neighbourhood to target cars belonging to commuters and staff working at premises in the area.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development involves the erection of a wall of upcycled, freight containers the southern edge of the site. There will be 66 containers, providing 924m² of accommodation, of which 4 would be wide-fronted, 8 would be double units and 2 will provide toilet facilities. The containers stacked - 3 storeys at either end rising to 4 storeys in the middle. The office units will have a glazed façade with views out towards the Mancunian Way. They will be accessed via 2000mm wide walkways with a central staircase. A further series of part-single, part-two storey modular, food and beverage units will also be provided.

3.1.2 There will parking space for 14 cars and covered parking for 70 bikes.

3.1.3 The existing entrance gates will continue to be used with a one-way system operating with access from Cakebread Street and egress onto Manor Street. The plans indicate that the existing timber fence and advertising hoardings will be retained.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal

3.2.1 The proposed development will make use of a rather sterile space and add considerable interest to an otherwise unstimulating section of the Mancunian Way.

3.2.2 The increased activity, improved lighting and natural surveillance associated with the development will greatly enhance and animate the neighbourhood and improve the pedestrian experience on surrounding streets.

3.2.3 The development will contribute to the growing diversity of this part of the edge of the city centre, adding a 'destination venue' which is likely to generate footfall and a significant destination. Together with the improvements to Mayfield, the proposed development will enhance the quality of development in the south-eastern edge of the city centre. High quality spaces and places that are subject to ongoing management tend to attract less crime and disorder.

- 3.2.4 Car and cycle parking will be provided on the site.
- 3.2.5 Waste management has been considered with space for refuse storage on site.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

- 3.3.1 Consider replacing the existing timber boundary fence with 2500mm high steel railings.
- 3.3.2 Containers used to accommodate the businesses should meet the LPS 1175 standard (or at least adhere to the principles of LPS 1175 certification), to give businesses confidence in the security of their premises.
- 3.3.3 Avoid measures that could aid climbing onto the roofs of units.
- 3.3.4 Consider employing security staff to monitor activity at the development outside of business hours.
- 3.3.5 Install a CCTV system with re-active monitoring.
- 3.3.6 Install additional lighting illuminate the development.
- 3.3.7 We recommend tenants provide a secure place for staff to store personal property whilst working.
- 3.3.8 Cycle parking should allow the cyclist to lock the frame and wheels to a ground anchored stand and be weatherproof.

4 Physical Security

4.1 Locks

- ☐ Padlocks securing the units should meet the Secure Gold standard.

4.2 Roller Shutters

- ☐ Consider installing roller shutters or hinged steel doors across the glazed entrance to each unit. Ideally, shutters should meet the LPS 1175 standard.

4.3 Access Control

- ☐ Access into the communal facilities site should, should be controlled. The use of swipe card entry system or numeric key-pads is ideal. Doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Lamine glass should be used in all glazed openings
- ☐ Glazed openings should be protected with retractable grilles or shutters when closed for business.

4.5 Security Presence and Intruder Alarm

- ☐ A security guard presence is advised.
- ☐ Ideally, a monitored intruder alarm system should be installed to all units.

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ The entrance and exit gates should be secured at the close of business.
- ☐ Consider installing a self-closing, self-locking access controlled pedestrian gate for out of hours access.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor should be installed to all areas of the development.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ The CCTV system should be capable of monitoring the approaches to the site, entrance and exit gates, the forecourt, elevated walkways in front of the units, car, and cycle parking. Images should be monitored and recorded off site by a suitable monitoring/management company.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as litter removal, repair to lighting, signage, CCTV, and access controls.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved.

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
22.03.22	Ian Malyan, Fob Design	Request for updated Crime Impact Statement
24.05.22		Site visit
13.05.22	Ian Malyan, Fob Design	Report Issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Planning Statement		
PL-01	Location Plan		
PL-03	Elevations		

Any subsequent changes to the scheme may require Design for Security to review the recommendations made in this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		13.05.22

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock, and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- Resistance of glazing
- Performance of hardware
- Resistance to static loading
- Resistance to dynamic loading
- Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding, or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel, and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors, and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections, and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk