CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land Bounded by Blackfriars Street, Deansgate, Victoria Bridge Street and River Irwell

Offices (35,000sqm)

FOR: Deansgate SOF Alliance Leaseco Limited

Version A: 7th June 2021

REFERENCE: 2021/0194/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

Land Bounded by Blackfriars Street, Deansgate, Victoria Bridge Street and River Irwell

2021/0194/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The development is broadly acceptable, in terms of designing out crime; however, the recommendations made in section 3.3 should be addressed, including but not limited to:

- Illumination of the building overhang
- Physical security, access control into and around the building

If the recommendations contained within section 3.3 are implemented we would be supportive of the planning application.

Patrick Babb

Consultant

e: patrick.babb@designforsecurity.org

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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the city centre area of Manchester. The site is roughly triangular and it is bound to the North by Victoria Bridge Street, to the East by Deansgate, to the South by Blackfriars Street, and to the West by the River Irwell.

The site is currently developed and it is occupied by NCP Deansgate Car Park on the basement, and lower levels, and the ground floor and upper levels are a hotel - previously occupied by the Renaissance Hotel and Premier House; with a restaurant at ground floor on the corner of Deansgate and Blackfriars Street.

The development which is the focus of this report can be seen outlined in blue opposite. The existing development does not have much of an active frontage to either Blackfriars Street or Deansgate and does little to enliven the street scene.



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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 2018 and 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
25	200	184	877	525	188	25	227	27	97

2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is 74% higher than the average rate of crime for the Manchester Division, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime being the highest reported crimes. The location of the proposed site should be taken into consideration when looking at the crime statistics as the site is located within the city centre where there is a high concentration of retail outlets, licenced premises and restaurants, leading to an increase of crime and disorder in the area.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly to the east and south of the proposed site, around Deansgate and Market Street which has a high volume of bars and retail facilities located along it. Offences have mostly occurred over the weekend period (Friday – Sunday) during the late evening and early hours of the morning when most premises in the area are closing. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded violence in the area, accounting for 71% of all less serious wounding crimes, with offences often taking place between known associates, with alcohol often being a factor.

2.1.3 Thefts have taken place throughout the area, with hotspots occurring to the south of the proposed site, around Deansgate and Market Street. These areas have a high volume of foot fall due to public transport links, retail outlets and bars / restaurants. Offenders have mostly used pick pocketing techniques and distraction methods in order to obtain personal belongings, mostly mobile phones, bags and purses / wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (mostly mobile phones) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.

2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the local area has mostly taken place in private car parks and vehicles using on street parking facilities. Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime, accounting for 70% of all vehicle crime occurring in the area with offenders using implements and objects in order to smash glazing and access the interior of the vehicle. Offenders have also targeted vehicle registration plates, using tools to remove them.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Opening secure doors (all door types) using bodily pressure and implements to access the premises.

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4.2) which are designed to withstand a prolonged attempt to gain entry.

2.2.2 Breaking glazing in doors and windows, mainly to the front of the premises, using implements to gain access.

Possible Solution – Any ground floor or easily accessible glazing should contain a pane of laminate glazing, which cannot be easily smashed or shattered to gain entry.

2.2.3 Entering premises as legitimate customer and tailgating staff/ exploiting insecure doors to access staff only areas.

Possible Solution – Personnel gates or turnstiles should restrict access from the office foyer into the circulation core of the building. Any external doors should operate on an access control system.

2.2.4 Forcing open shutters using implements and bodily force to gain access.

Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to a recognised security standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR2). Shutters certified to a burglary resistant standard are able to withstand prolonged, opportunist, attacks by criminals.

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2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft

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2.4 Burglary Risk Analysis - Offices

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.

Office Burglary – Day Range



Office Burglary – Time Range



Office Burglary – Point of Entry



2.4.1 Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night / into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.4.2 Point of Entry: In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries committed in Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors and windows behind them.

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2.5 Theft Risk Analysis - Offices

The data below relates to thefts within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.

Office Theft – Day Range



Office Theft – Time Range



2.5.1 Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest during the working week, when the opportunities to offend are greater, and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours / staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Thursday and Saturday during the Morning and into the evening (8am - 8pm). Vehicles targeted have mostly been parked on streets and private car parks. Offenders often target vehicles within the city centre as they are left unattended in low foot fall areas, for long periods of time, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development is of a three storey building (with mezzanine level) with commercial/retail units at ground floor and offices above. At lower ground floor level there will be bicycle storage for staff.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 There will be a cycle store located at lower ground floor level for office staff allowing them to securely store bicycles rather than having to rely on street parking.

3.2.2 The present development has little active frontage to Deansgate. The proposed development will create an active frontage onto Deansgate and the junction of Deansgate and Blackfriars Street, enlivening the street scene in these areas.

3.2.3 Access into the service area will be restricted with gates.

3.2.4 The entrances to the ground floor retail units will be taken from Deansgate where they be subject to high levels of natural and passive surveillance.

3.2.5 The main entrance into the offices will be taken from the prominent corner of the building on Deansgate/Blackfriars Street.

3.2.6 Deansgate is one of the main vehicular and pedestrian routes through the city centre during the day and at night allowing for surveillance of the building from those passing by.

3.2.7 The proposed commercial/retail units are self-contained with no shared access.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Down lighting should be provided on overhangs to illuminate the building elevations and the streets below to improve natural surveillance opportunities and reduce potential for antisocial behaviour, crime and fear of crime.

3.3.2 The office reception should be staffed during standard office hours (i.e.8am-6pm) to allow visitors to be vetted before being permitted access in to the building. There should be a video/audio intercom on the main entrance to allow staff to vet visitors to the building when the main reception is not staffed.

3.3.3 Access controlled speed gates, turnstiles, or similar, should restrict access from the reception into the circulation core of the building.

3.3.4 Access into and around the office building should be governed with an auditable access control system.

3.3.5 Access in to the proposed bicycle store should operate on an access control system, with access restricted to genuine users. Cycle stands should be Sheffield style, or similar, allowing both wheels and the frame to be locked. If a rack system is used it should still allow both wheels and the frame to be secured. The external bicycle store door should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 S2.

3.3.6 If the bicycle store has showering/changing facilities then it is highly recommended that lockers are provided for staff.

3.3.7 The office building should be covered by a monitored intruder alarm (see section 4.4 for more details). Individual office suites and the ground floor commercial units should have the infrastructure provided for the easy installation of an alarm system by the tenant during fit-out.

3.3.8 Individual office suites should have a secure door set (i.e. BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR 2) and operate on an access control system.

3.3.9 A comprehensive CCTV system should be installed to monitor all external doors and elevations, the reception area, circulation cores, all plant/back-of-house functions, and the cycle store. Individual offices

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and ground floor/basement commercial units should have the infrastructure so that any tenants can easily install a CCTV system if required.

3.3.10 Any blank facades should be treated with an anti-graffiti coating, to an approximate height of 2000mm, so that graffiti can easily be cleaned.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doorsets including the main entrance pass door, cycle access door, bin store doors and escape doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. All of these doors should be self-closing and self-locking.
- ☐ Any revolving entrance doors should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 or EN1627-30:2011.
- ☐ Automatic sliding doors should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Entrance doors to individual office suites should compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ External doorset to the cycle store should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ Where feasible, any ground level, opening windows should be certificated to LPS1175 or BS PAS 24, fitted with opening restrictors and with key operated locks.
- ☐ Curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any security shutters or grilles must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required).

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All accessible glazing (i.e. below a height of 2000mm from external ground level) must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any louvres at ground floor level to plant areas/refuge stores should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed or damaged. If onward access into the building can be achieved from these spaces then expanded metal or weld mesh should be installed to the inner face of the louvers.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored intruder alarm system should cover the building. Alarms should have contacts on all external doors or shutters, and PIR in rooms with windows. The alarm should include a signal terminating at the security control room/patrol team.
- ☐ Individual office suites/floors should also consider having an intruder alarm should the buildings be open whilst some offices are closed. As a minimum individual offices or floorplates should have the infrastructure so that an alarm can be installed by future tenants.

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☐ The ground floor commercial units should have monitored intruder alarms or the infrastructure for one to be installed easily at fit-out stage by the tenant.

4.5 Access control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- The main entrance into the office building
- Turnstiles/speed gates and/or lifts into the circulation core of the office building
- Staff only areas (commercial units & offices)
- External doors (commercial units)
- Plant areas and areas restricted to maintenance staff
- External cycle access doors
- Access into the service area

☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should ideally be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff key-fobs/cards should be capable of being quickly activated or disabled when required, to ensure they are not misused. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work.

☐ If changing/showering facilities are included in the cycle store then lockers should be provided for staff to use.

4.6 Lighting

☐ Dusk-to-dawn lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, and producing 'white' light, should be installed to all external doors of each building.

☐ Publically accessible elevations of the building should be illuminated.

☐ The service route to the rear of the building should be illuminated - including the pedestrian route to the bicycle store.

4.7 CCTV

☐ A CCTV camera system should be installed. Cameras should be capable of monitoring all building elevations - with particular emphasis on external doors (cameras should be able to observe people coming and going), and the entrance lobbies.

☐ Recording equipment should be located within a secure room or images may be recorded off-site at a suitable monitoring facility.

☐ CCTV monitoring screens should be located at the reception desk and or security office.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 A comprehensive security and maintenance regime for the management of the units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing the offfices, including staff arrival and departure;

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- Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
- Details of staff security training;
- Location and management of any smoking areas;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc;
- Refuse collection arrangements.

5.1.2 All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
01/04/2021	Will Clarke	CIS application confirmed
07/06/2021	Emily McKiernan	Progress update & revised drawings

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Masterplan DTM Workbook	26/05/2021	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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