



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Manchester International Office Centre

Café Development (240m²)

for: Infinity (MIOC) Ltd

version A: 5th August 2021

URN: 2020/0522/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

**Manchester International Office Centre, Styal Road,
Wythenshawe M22 5WB**

2020/0522/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Major Design Changes Not Required

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. In general the proposed scheme has been found acceptable, although further consideration of some aspects is advised, as stated in section 3.3 of this report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Michael Craig', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Michael Craig *DipLD CMLI*

DfS Consultant

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


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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site, shown red on plan, lies in an urban fringe location, about 2km east of the Manchester Airport terminals. The neighbourhood contains a mix of commercial and residential properties, together with open fields, transport infrastructure and long-stay car parks.

Styal Road passes the western side of the site. This remains a busy route linking the airport to some southern and eastern suburbs of Manchester & Stockport, although its importance has been reduced with opening of the A555 road further south.

MIOC consists of office buildings tenanted by a variety of businesses. There is extensive parking provision between the buildings, together with some amenity space including lawns and shrubbery where the proposed building is to be located. The MIOC site is openly accessible for pedestrians and vehicles at all times. A CCTV system assists site managers in monitoring activity around the site



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 31st January 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	<5	13	10	<5	<5	<5	11	5	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is low for Manchester; however the location of the proposed site should be taken into consideration. The proposed site is located in an area which mostly consists of undeveloped land and a boundary between Greater Manchester Police and Cheshire Police force, which doesn't capture the crimes taking place within the other force. The majority of crime has taken place to the north of the proposed site, where a small residential area is situated. Vehicle crimes have been the highest recorded offences, which is common in an area which has a low rate of foot fall. Criminal damage and theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle offences taking place within the local area. Offenders have likely targeted this area due to the residential estate being situated near a main through road, making it easy for offenders to escape the area.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. External doors should be alarmed and covered by CCTV.

- 2.2.2 Posing as a legitimate customer and gaining access to staff only areas by means of tailgating staff and exploitation of insecure doors.

Possible Solution - Staff-only areas should be effectively separated, both visually and physically, so that customers cannot readily gain entry. This can be achieved by the use of access-controlled doors or barriers, but they should create a clear distinction so that any intruder can be more easily identified. There should be provision within the staff only areas for the secure storage of personal belongings while at work.

- 2.2.3 Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

Possible Solution - All ground floor / accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within / directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.


- 2.2.4 Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the doors located below.

Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2. Shutters should be mounted integrally, so that boxes are less vulnerable to tampering. Use of shutters in more concealed areas, where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed or detected, should be of a higher security certification, or consider use of additional protection such as internal security blinds or grilles.

- 2.2.5 Theft of personal property, e.g. mobile phones, cash and bags, from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

Possible Solution - Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see below) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also increase surveillance opportunities and help deter offenders. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any

pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.



2.3 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property




2.4 Risk Factors – Restaurant / Cafe

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence / conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery / wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.6 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses and bags.

2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary Restaurants / Cafés: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.1.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants / cafes in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday. The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.

2.1.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the premises.
- Breaking glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the windows and doors located underneath.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors, accessing restricted areas and removing goods belonging to staff and the company.

2.2 Theft Restaurants / Cafés: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.2.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants / cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants / cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses / wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.3.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Monday during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target vehicles during the early hours when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, also the vehicle owner is likely to be asleep, leaving the vehicle unattended, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught and apprehended.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises clearance of most of the existing features on the site and construction of a single storey retail / café building with associated car parking and landscape works.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The site benefits from being located in a neighbourhood where the surrounding area currently has relatively low levels of reported disorder incidents.
- 3.2.2 The site falls within the boundary of the Manchester International Office Centre, where the administrators of the site have experience of operating it over a number of years, and the site management practices have been largely successful in excluding intruders and preventing disorder in and around the premises. There are established security protocols which will be extended to cover the proposed development.
- 3.2.3 The proposal involves thinning of vegetation areas of dense vegetation along the boundary with Styal Road, which will improve sight lines into / within the site, and remove potential hiding places which have provided cover for antisocial behaviour.
- 3.2.4 The proposed building will have a relatively simple footprint that will provide few potential places of concealment and facilitate efficient surveillance of external areas.
- 3.2.5 The building façade will include large areas of glazing which allows good natural surveillance of and from the premises, and provides overlooking of the external seating area. The proposed parking area will be easily visible from within the building and surrounding space, increasing natural surveillance opportunities. The parking areas will also be laid out in straight rows, with relatively few obstacles to views across them, further aiding surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.6 The layout of vehicular routes around the proposed building will help to control speeds and reduce potential for ram-raid type attacks.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Toilet location. The position of the customer toilets is very close to the external door shown as “secondary”, and at a distance from the server, so staff will not easily be able to monitor customer activity in this area. To avoid potential abuse, the external door should not be for customer access / egress and should only be used by staff or in emergency. It should include appropriate signage and have an alarm to alert staff to any unofficial use.
- 3.3.2 Car Park. The reopening of the exit route on to Styal Road may provide a more rapid escape for route for potential offenders, reducing the opportunity for them to be witnessed. The vehicle entrances / exits to the site should be secured with a lockable vehicle arm barrier or retractable bollards at night or when not in use, preventing vehicles from getting close to the building and misuse of the car park out-of-hours. To improve the security of the cars within the car park, and to prevent ‘desire lines’ forming through it, the outer edges should be defined with a robust, 1200mm high railing. Pedestrian routes should be clear and avoid passing between parked cars.
- 3.3.3 Review of CCTV / lighting. The lighting and CCTV systems on the office park should be adapted to reflect the changes to the layout. CCTV cameras should be capable of identifying all vehicle and pedestrian movements into and out of the site as well as the building entrances, elevations and parking areas. To facilitate the CCTV system, dusk until dawn lighting should be provided, particularly around

the access doors / gates and any loading bays. Signage should be located at the site entrance to inform visitors that their movements will be monitored and recorded.

- 3.3.4 Customer Cycle parking spaces. Any short-stay cycle parking should be positioned when it can be overlooked from routinely-occupied rooms within the building. It should also be covered by CCTV.
- 3.3.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in customers and staff.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to escape only doors is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts.

4.2 Windows

- Where feasible, opening windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950 or PAS 24.
- Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- If shutters are used, they should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required).
- Drive-thru windows should be fitted with restrictors to prevent people climbing or reaching in.

4.3 Glazing

- Curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- Glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any cladding in order to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable.
- Roofing systems should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.

4.4 Alarms

- Panic alarms buttons should be located at serving / till points, manager's office, service windows to the drive-through and other inconspicuous locations, such as in the food preparation area, for example.
- An intruder alarm should be installed to each unit and it should be linked to contacts on all external doors. PIR detectors should cover all rooms with windows.

-
- Alarm systems should be monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team). Panic alarm monitoring should include the ability to remotely monitor CCTV images and initiate an appropriate response.

4.5 Access controls

- Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob (best option). The following areas / doors should operate on access control:
 - entrance doors (for limiting access outside of standard business hours)
 - doors into the back of house areas

4.6 Landscaping

- In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.7 Lighting

- External lighting must be provided to all areas of the site, and be in accordance with BS 5489.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

4.8 Car parking

- Lighting to car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout / lux plan.
- Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes / directions clearly signed.

4.9 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to complement the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations should include: Entrances to building, service counter / tills, external faces of the building, car and cycle parking areas.

4.10 Other

- Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house / staff-only areas.

5 Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of the premises should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and clients may not always know who will be occupying their units once complete, and therefore, the end-users requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5.1.1 Restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating in cafes/coffee shops generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent cafes / coffee shops means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

5.1.2 In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- Customers entering / leaving the premises through the main entrance should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any WCs to monitor their use.
- The area in front of the service counter should be clearly defined to provide an easy queuing system to help prevent against queue jumping, which can lead to conflict. Consideration should be given to Internal floor demarcations (such as different coloured floor tiles) to direct people and

encourage efficient circulation within the premises (i.e. defining separate queuing/waiting and seating areas). Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.

- The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility. Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public highway, i.e. large promotional signs and menus should not obstruct views.
- There should be high / wide service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).
- There should be chute deposit safes (certified to LPS 1183) behind any service/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- It is highly recommended that customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft.
- Toilets can often give rise to crime and anti-social issues and the following measures should be considered:
 - Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Provide 'Chelsea Clip' / karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited / checked chart should be provided.

6 Management & Maintenance

6.1.1 Active, continuous management and maintenance of the development can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. An operating / maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the development, this plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
- Cash management within the premises;
- Cash-in-transit collections / deliveries;
- Management of stock deliveries;
- Details of staff security training;
- Location and management of any smoking areas;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras & lighting;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti and litter; and

-
- Refuse collection arrangements.

6.1.2 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

7 Construction

7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
24/06/2021	Pozzoni	CIS instruction received
28/06/2021	Pozzoni	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
05/07/2021	Infinity (MIOC) LLP	Payment received
14/07/2021	MIOP	Site visit
03/08/2021	Pozzoni	Progress Update
05/08/2021	Pozzoni	CIS version A issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
P5759_1000	Site Location Plan	03/03/21	
P5759_1200	Proposed GA Site Plan	28/05/21	5

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door / window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk