



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

BRUNSWICK STREET, ARDWICK, MANCHESTER
RESIDENTIAL (16 no. APARTMENTS)

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

FOR: Brunswick Living Ltd.

VERSION A: 14/04/2021

REFERENCE: 2016/1003/CIS/02

Brunswick Street, Ardwick, Manchester

URN: 2016/1003/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Secure enclosure of the sides and rear of the building, particularly robustly where publicly accessible from the adjacent Tesco Express car park (where the existing tree and any parked vehicles could form climbing aids). Any potentially accessible first floor windows and balcony doors should be to the same physical security specification as those at ground level.
- Robust access controls to the communal entrance and restricted access gates to either side of the building, including a secure system for the delivery of post. Consideration of defensible space along building frontage.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit


The site lies on the north-west side of Brunswick Street in Ardwick, close to the busy roundabout where Brunswick Street meets Ardwick Green South, Higher Ardwick, Hyde Road and Stockport Road. It is currently a vacant site (partially excavated) between The Vallance Centre and an Esso/Tesco Express petrol station and convenience store, enclosed with high timber hoardings, railings and walls.

The petrol station to the immediate north-east is separated from the site by a high wall. The petrol station/store building lies towards the rear of the site, with a parking area along the majority of the boundary. Low walls, an adjacent tree and parked vehicles themselves could provide aids to climbing over the boundary into the site.

To the south-west of the site is the Vallance NHS Centre – a medical centre offering a number of GP services and clinics. Between the building and the site itself is an access road serving the staff car park at the rear of the building. The access road is fitted with access-controlled pedestrian and vehicular gates that were operational at the time the site visit was carried out, but remained open for long periods of time after operating – leaving the hidden rear elevations of the building, parked vehicles and the south-eastern elevation of the site potentially accessible and vulnerable.

The surrounding area is mixed-use, including primarily residential to the south (as well as a housing office/commercial units fronting onto Brunswick Street/Polygon Street), a primary school to the north-west and greenspace, employment and residential uses to the north and east. The site on the opposite side of Brunswick Street from the site is currently under construction. The O2 Apollo Manchester lies just to the east of the development site.

In terms of the wider area, Manchester city centre lies to the north-west and the University campuses and Manchester Royal Infirmary lie to the south/south-west.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.





2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
27	19	43	120	42	26	5	126	16	6

- 2.1.1 The general volume of recorded crime in the local area is high, with the overall local crime rate 20% above the average rate for Manchester as a whole. The most prevalent types of crime have been vehicle crime, less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft (including of fuel and of personal items, such as mobile phones, bank cards etc.).
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will focus on residential burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **41% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **3% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **48% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **4% higher** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **63% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **74% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **32% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **1% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **47% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **147% higher** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **349% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **683% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks Thursday and is lowest on Friday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late at night. Offenders frequently target residential premises at night when it is dark and streets generally benefit from less activity, footfall, surveillance and overlooking than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have either been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure (particularly front doors).
- Windows have also been prised open or targeted when left insecure.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to cause damage/gain access.

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime peaks on Thursday. During the day, the risk peaks in the evening/at night - when it is dark, streets are typically quieter and offenders perceive a lower risk of being witnessed/identified.

2.4.2 Theft from motor vehicle have been the most common type, accounting for 72% of all vehicle crime in the area. Offenders have particularly targeted glazing - using implements to smash vehicle windows to gain access to the vehicles and steal items within them. Vehicle parts and registration plates have also been stolen.

2.4.3 Vehicles parked within open communal areas/car parks or on-street, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within the curtilages of individual properties, within secure garages or within securely enclosed car parks directly overlooked from the buildings they serve.

2.5 General Risk Factors

2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have either been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure (particularly front doors).

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the apartment block before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed. All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

All private spaces to the sides/rear of buildings should be robustly enclosed (see Section 4.5), particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of the dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.6).

- Windows have also been prised open or targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors.

Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' can provide a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties. Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour. Again, unauthorised access to the rear of properties should be deterred by robust boundaries and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes/publicly accessible areas to their rear where possible. Lighting to the front and rear of dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.6).

- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to cause damage/gain access.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around accessible doors should ideally be small and set well-away from locking points.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a 6 storey block of 16 no.1 and 2 bed apartments, with associated landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The building will be accessed off Brunswick Street and will include a communal residents lounge, cycle store, bin store and plant at ground floor level, as well as a DDA compliant apartment with it's own private garden space to the rear of the building. The upper floors of the building will house the remainder of the apartments, with external balconies to the rear of the building and 'wedge' shaped windows along the side elevations of the building to provide views/light without overlooking neighbouring sites. There will also be a communal garden area on the roof of the building.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will provide additional activity, overlooking and natural surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The building will present an active frontage to Brunswick Street - enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.3 The design of the block has been kept simple, with doors or windows hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack unseen).
- 3.2.4 The communal entrance to the building will be located in a prominent position and will be capable of being clearly seen from the public realm. The approaches to the entrance for pedestrians are along routes that have good sightlines.
- 3.2.5 The majority of the proposed apartments will be provided above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively prevented. This also reduces the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the scheme and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The sides and rear of the building must be securely enclosed to prevent unauthorised access - particularly robustly where publicly accessible, such as from the adjacent Tesco Express car park, where the existing tree and any parked vehicles could form climbing aids over the boundary wall. The gates to either side of the building should be of steel construction, self-closing and self-locking - operated by resident or Royal Mail key-fob. See Section 4.5 for more information relating to boundaries/gates.
- 3.3.2 The main communal entrance to the building, as with all external doors, must be security-certified to an appropriate standard (see Section 4.1). It should be self-closing, single-leaf and secured with an electrically operated multi-point lock, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. There should also be a robust access control system for visitors and a secure system for the delivery of post that ensures access to all floors of the building is not required (see Section 4.1 for more information). Consideration should be given to the provision of defensible space along the building frontage (e.g. formed by 1200-1400mm high railings or dense, low-level planting/hedging), providing some protection to the full-height resident's lounge windows from kicking/damage and funnelling pedestrian movement along the street away from them.

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- 3.3.3 There should be no features of the building (such as projecting window cills or brickwork features, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundary walls, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to first floor windows or balconies. Given that the first floor windows and balcony could potentially be accessible from the perimeter wall along the adjacent Tesco Express car park, the first floor windows/doors should be to the same physical security specification as those at ground floor level (see Sections 4.1, 4.2 & 4.3).
- 3.3.4 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted for use under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main communal entrance doorset must also be security-certified to one of the above standards, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. It should be single-leaf, self-closing/locking and controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ Ideally, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. If the postboxes are to be located along the northern side elevation of the building, a key-fob for the access gate should be allocated to the Royal Mail (see Section 4.5 for more information re: the gate). Alternatively, there could be a 'secure lobby' arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door to allow for deliveries within the resident's lounge area without providing access to all floors of the building. Postboxes in this location would be less vulnerable to damage and theft. In any case, the postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ All patio doors to ground and first floor apartment balconies should also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ In addition to being security-certified, the external doorsets to the bin store and cycle stores should be operated by resident key-fob. The internal doors/frames to the cycle store and bin store should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), self-closing, with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by resident key-fob (see Section 4.7 for more information relating to the cycle store).

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground and first floor windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground and first floor opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any ground floor/easily accessible curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground and first floor glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

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- ☐ There should be no other features of the building (such as projecting canopies/window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting brickwork/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, handrails, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows/balconies.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Each apartment should have an intruder alarm to comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems; or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.
- ☐ Alarms should be linked to contacts on all internal/external doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The sides and rear of the building should be enclosed and defined as private space by 2100-2400mm high walls or railings. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railing panels should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ☐ If at all possible (given its location outside of the boundary of the site), the tree within the adjacent Tesco Express car park should be removed or pruned to ensure it does not form an easy climbing aid for offenders to utilise - both to gain access over to boundary wall of the site itself or up to first floor windows/balconies. If problems are experienced with offenders gaining access, anti-climb measures could be used along the perimeter wall if absolutely necessary (such as <https://www.defendastrap.com/>).
- ☐ The access gates to either side of the building should also be 2100-2400mm, of steel construction, self-closing/locking and operated by resident key-fob. If the postboxes for the building are to be located along the north side of the building, a key-fob for the access gate should be issued to the Royal Mail.
- ☐ The gates to the private garden at the rear of the building should be 1800-2100mm high timber gates, fitted with either a pad-lockable bolt (to the mid-point of the internal face) or a key operable deadlock.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all external doorsets and the access routes to either side of the building, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Other

- ☐ The secure cycle store should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>
- ☐ A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place while retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (i.e. access controls, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as gable walls, boundaries to private space or parking bays).

5.2 Construction

- 5.2.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 5.2.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

6 Useful References

6.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 6.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
11 th March 2021	Generation Ltd.	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
11 th March 2021	Generation Ltd.	Confirmation of instruction/fee
30 th March 2021	GMP Finance Dept.	Confirmation of payment
12 th to 13 th April 2021	Generation Ltd.	Receipt of draft D&A Statement and email correspondence re: timescales

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A1324(02)000	Proposed Apartment Schedules	08/03/21	D
A1324(02)001	Proposed Site Plan	08/03/21	D
A1324(02)002	Proposed Ground Floor	08/03/21	D
A1324(02)003	Proposed First and Second Floor Plans	08/03/21	D
A1324(02)004	Proposed Third and Fourth Floor Plans	08/03/21	D
A1324(02)005	Proposed Fifth and Sixth Floor Plans	08/03/21	D
A1324(02)006	Proposed South Elevation	08/03/21	D
A1324(02)007	Proposed East Elevation	08/03/21	D
A1324(02)008	Proposed West Elevation	08/03/21	D
A1324(02)009	Proposed North Elevation	08/03/21	D
A1324(02)010	Proposed Street View	08/03/21	D
A1324(02)011	Proposed 3D View	08/03/21	D
-	Brunswick Street Apartments Design & Access Statement	02/04/21	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk