



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

87 ROCHDALE ROAD, MANCHESTER

RESIDENTIAL (14 no. HOUSES & 223 no. APARTMENTS) & RETAIL (121sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Portwood Developments Limited

VERSION A: 20/08/2021

REFERENCE: 2010/1094/CIS/01

87 Rochdale Road, Manchester

URN: 2010/1094/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design changes/security improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is only considered acceptable if the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Secure enclosure of the landscaped courtyard and the areas to the side/rear of the blocks, as well as the private gardens/terraces of the ground floor duplex units and apartments, in order to define them as private resident-only spaces, prevent unauthorised access and limited all public access to where surveillance opportunities are maximised from the surrounding streets. The street frontages of the duplex units fronting onto Gould Street and Clive Street should also be protected by clearly defined defensible space.
- It is highly recommended that all of the duplex units within the Block 3 are accessed via individual or communal entrances off Gould Street, where surveillance opportunities from the street are maximised, allowing the sides and rear of the building to be enclosed as private space. If this is absolutely unachievable, all visitor access to Block 3 should be through the main entrance lobby serving Blocks 1 & 2, managed by a 24-hour concierge.
- The 4 no. surface parking spaces at the north-eastern end of site (which are remote from the dwellings they serve and do not allow many of the residents to directly overlook their own vehicles), will leave the parked vehicles particularly vulnerable in this high vehicle crime area - particularly at night. They should either be relocated to be within secure garages or directly in front of the properties they serve, or the spaces should be defined for short-term visitor use only.
- Robust control of access into/around the site and each of the buildings - including the communal entrances off the street/landscaped courtyard and off the basement car park, as well as an automatic vehicular shutter to the basement car park off Gould Street. There should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that does not require access to all areas of the site and all floors of the buildings.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	5
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	6
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)	
	2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis	
	2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
	2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis	
	2.6 Theft (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis	
	2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis	
	2.2 Theft (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis	
	2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis	
	2.4 Theft (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis	
	2.5 General Risk Factors	
	2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	17
	3.1 Proposed Development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Points for Further Consideration	
4	Physical Security (Residential).....	20
	4.1 Doors & Access Controls	
	4.2 Windows	
	4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	4.4 Alarms	
	4.5 Boundaries	
	4.6 Basement Car Park	
	4.7 Lighting	
	4.8 Landscaping	
	4.9 Other	
5	Physical Security (Commercial Unit).....	24
	5.1 Doors & Access Controls	
	5.2 Windows & Shutters	
	5.3 Glazing	
	5.4 Internal Security	
	5.5 Alarm	
	5.6 Any External Seating Area	
	5.7 Lighting	
	5.8 CCTV	
6	Internal Layout Guidance	27
	6.1 Restaurant/Cafe/Bar	
	6.2 Retail Unit	
7	Management & Maintenance	29
8	Construction	30

9	Useful References	30
9.1	Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact Register	31
B	Associated Documents.....	31
C	CIS Version History	32
D	Glossary	33

1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the north side of Rochdale Road/Clive Street and to the east of Gould Street on the north-eastern edge of Manchester city centre.

It is currently formed by a pay & display surface car park, accessed off Rochdale Road, as well as car servicing/tyre garages along the southern boundary (fronting towards the car park itself) and directly abutting Clive Street to the east. The street frontages of the site are formed by Palisade fencing along Rochdale Road/Clive Street and a brick wall along Gould Street.

To the immediate south-west of the site is the Marble Arch public house, with small surface parking areas to the immediate north and east of the building. Adjacent to the public house to the east is an existing off-licence retail unit.

To the south-east and east of the site are vacant sites currently in use as surface car parks, vehicle repair garages and a hand car wash. Clive Street is a narrow route that is busy with on-street parking - particularly during the working week.


To the north is another large vacant area at a lower ground level from the site, separated from it by a large brick retaining wall, which is currently occupied by scrub vegetation and a surface parking area accessed off Gould Street.

The surrounding area, as with other areas on the edge of the city centre, is characterised by on-street parking and temporary pay & display/contract car parks on vacant sites serving commuters and shoppers, as well as those attending attractions/events in the city centre. The general lack of activity/footfall/surveillance in these areas, poor lighting levels and the informal nature of the facilities themselves (i.e. lack of formal surveillance/capable guardians such as patrolling guards, monitored CCTV etc, no formalised bays/clear directional routes, loose surface material that can be used to commit crime/cause damage) mean that vehicle crime is prevalent in the area. Offenders know that vehicles are often left unattended for long periods at such facilities and on such streets without restrictions, leaving them vulnerable.

There are a number of residential blocks of apartments on the streets to the west. Many of them have ground floor windows or balconies fronting directly onto the street that are not protected by any defensible space, leaving them vulnerable to nuisance, damage, unauthorised access if left insecure and attack - particularly late in the evening/late at night when the surrounding streets are likely to be quieter than during the day. Many of the ground floor windows/balcony doors have blinds/curtains to give residents privacy, which impact upon overlooking/surveillance over the street.

There are also pedestrian gates in the locale which have been fitted with anti-climb spikes above them, indicating that issues with unauthorised access have been experienced.

Rochdale Road itself is a very wide route, busy with vehicular traffic and pedestrian footfall - providing natural surveillance over the site. However, there is a car park and commercial site on the opposite side of the road from the site, with a high brick wall along the street frontage, meaning that the site benefits from limited levels of direct overlooking from this direction.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
23	45	94	138	82	29	15	465	38	16

- 2.1.1 In the local area, the general volume of recorded crime is high, particularly the levels of vehicle crime and violence, reflecting the site's location within the city centre. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Vehicle crime in the local area is very high, with theft from a motor vehicle and criminal damage to a vehicle being the most commonly occurring types of vehicle crime. Offenders have smashed glazing to cause damage, as well as gain access to vehicles and steal items. Offenders have also removed vehicle registration plates or vehicle parts and have damaged vehicle paintwork/bodywork.
- 2.1.3 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, with particular hotspots occurring to the south-east (around/off Ring Road/Swan Street and Shudehill) and to the south (around/off Oldham Road). Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded types of less serious woundings, with offences often involving domestic disputes and incidents between known associates.
- 2.1.4 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed mixed-use development, the more detailed analysis below will focus on residential burglary, vehicle crime and retail burglary/theft.


2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2019.




- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **78% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **62% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **46% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **52% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **25% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **20% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.

Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site, Manchester, Gtr Manchester and England & Wales



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site, Manchester, Gtr Manchester and England & Wales




- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **37% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **8% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **37% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **277% higher** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **585% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **1,093% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.


2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Local Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Time Range





Local Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaking on Thursday, Saturday and Sunday and is lowest on Wednesday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of domestic burglary fluctuates, but is generally higher during the early hours of the morning and late at night. Offenders often target residential properties at night when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and they perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
- Doors have been targeted most frequently (a common M.O. when apartments are targeted) and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.
 - Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed.
 - Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis


The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area remains consistently high through the week, peaking slightly on Monday, Friday and Saturday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk rises in the afternoon and into the evening. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at these times when people park on streets and in temporary/informal car parks in the area for long periods of time, while working in the area/in the city, shopping or attending nearby events/attractions. Vehicles parked on streets or within the numerous temporary car parks on vacant site sites around the edges of the city centre (particularly when they are not staffed, have poor lighting levels and poor surface/boundary treatments), where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within secure car parks/basement parking facilities. Offenders also often target vehicles in the evening when it is dark, streets/car parks are quiet and they perceive the risk of being observed and identified as low.

2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



2.5.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester peaks slightly on Wednesday, but remains relatively consistently high across the week.


2.5.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late and night and during in the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target commercial premises at these times when they are closed, it is dark and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.5.3 **Point of Entry:** In burglaries at Manchester retail premises, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.
- Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.
- Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.
- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

2.6 Theft (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester retail premises remains consistently high across the week. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and early evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or of/from the handbags of shoppers (such as mobile phones, purses etc.). Theft of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.


2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.1.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafés in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.1.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.

Manchester Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Point of Entry




- 2.1.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafes through external doors. Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements and glazing within doors/windows has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.


2.2 Theft (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.

Manchester Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Day Range






Manchester Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Time Range



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises between Monday and Wednesday and is lowest on Friday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas/streets where they are typical found are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered licensed premises through external doors. Most commonly, doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and hand tools/implements. In a number of cases, glazing in doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to gain unauthorised access. Where the point of entry was legitimate/unknown, this is likely to have been when offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas.

2.4 Theft (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets, cash and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, from bags hung on chairs/stored under tables or via pickpocketing and distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 **Residential:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

- 2.5.2 **Retail:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles

- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5.3 **Restaurants/cafes/licensed premises:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting local dwellings, vehicles and Manchester retail premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Local Residential Burglary:** Doors have been targeted most frequently (a common M.O. when apartments are targeted) and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

The locks to the front entrance doors of houses should be fitted with split-spindles (also see Section 4.1), essentially meaning they are key only entry and are secure from the exterior of the dwelling when shut. This will ensure that they cannot be left open and accessible.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (also see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. There should be no balconies that would be publicly accessible from street level.

- **Local Residential Burglary:** Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed.

Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to apartment blocks before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to ‘airlock’ lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

-
- **Local Residential Burglary:** Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.
 - **Local Vehicle Crime:** Vehicles have been targeted for theft of, theft from and criminal damage when parked on-street or within open car parks
Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that any resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving apartments or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured with automatic gates/shutters to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.
 - **Manchester Retail:** A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them
Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.
 - **Manchester Retail/Restaurants/Cafes/Licensed Premises:** Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access
Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 5.7 & 5.8) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by. Advice on glazed panels can be found below.
 - **Manchester Retail/Restaurants/Cafes/Licensed Premises:** Windows have also been prised open and glazing within them (and doors) has been smashed by offenders
Possible Solution - All external windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.2) where possible, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 5.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Vulnerable shopfronts should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours (see Section 5.2).
 - **Manchester Retail/Restaurants/Cafes/Licensed Premises:** A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed
Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.4).

-
- **Manchester Retail:** Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration.

- **Manchester Restaurants/Cafes/Licensed Premises:** Theft of personal property, particularly from table tops, from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 6.1). The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect 4 no. 4 to 13 storey buildings comprising of 14 no. duplex houses, 223 no. apartments and a 121sqm. commercial unit, with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 Blocks 1 and 2 will be 11 and 13 storeys high, linked by a single storey structure housing a shared reception (with communal entrance off Clive Street), post lobby and residents lounge. The ground floor of the block closest to Rochdale Road will include a commercial unit fronting onto Rochdale Road, a large cycle store and a bin store, with residential apartments at upper floor level. The block to the rear of the site also house a large cycle store and bin store at ground level, as well as a resident's gym, building manager's suite, plant and 6 no. apartments with external terrace spaces. The upper floors will also be occupied by residential apartments. The blocks will be served by a small basement car park (comprising of 29 no. vehicle parking spaces and plant).
- 3.1.3 Block 3 (Coachhouse Duplexes), to the west of the site, will house 6 no. duplex houses with individual and communal entrances accessed off Gould Street and the communal landscaped courtyard to the rear. The basement car park serving Blocks 1 & 2 will be accessed off Gould Street, underneath Block 3, and the two ground floor units fronting onto Gould Street will be served by individual driveways and garages accessed off the street.
- 3.1.4 Block 4 (Townhouse Duplexes), to the east of the site, will house a further 8 no. duplex houses with individual and communal entrances accessed off Clive Street
- 3.1.5 Blocks 1, 2 & 3 will partially enclose a central landscaped courtyard, which will include benches, picnic tables and play equipment.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal


The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will provide much needed activity, overlooking and natural surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The building will present active frontages to the surrounding streets (i.e. Rochdale Road, Clive Street and Gould Street), enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.3 The residential and commercial elements of the scheme will have their own dedicated external entrances, with no internal linkages – preventing confusion/conflicts and opportunities for criminals to exploit.
- 3.2.4 Many of the principal residential entrances to the buildings will be located in prominent positions and will be capable of being clearly seen from the public realm.
- 3.2.5 The majority of the proposed apartments will be provided well above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively prevented. This also reduces the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.6 The basement residential parking area will be secured with an access-controlled shutter to prevent unauthorised access to the buildings and to the parked vehicles themselves. Blocks 1 & 2 will also include secure cycle storage areas and bin stores.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the buildings and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The proposed landscaped courtyard is partially enclosed by Block 1, 2 & 3 and is located to the side/rear of the existing off-license and public house buildings, resulting in it being a partially hidden space that cannot be clearly seen from the street. The surrounding buildings feature ground floor residential windows and patio doors/external terraces accessible from the courtyard - leaving them vulnerable to being left insecure by the residents, to damage and to being forced open and could be used by offenders to gain unauthorised access to both the apartments/duplexes themselves, as well as the rest of the buildings (by circumnavigating the access-controlled main entrances). The area also includes benches, picnic tables and play equipment, which could foster loitering/gathering, nuisance, anti-social behaviour and mis-use (such as rough sleeping) if left publicly accessible. For these reasons, it is highly recommended that the landscaped areas to the sides and rear of the buildings are securely enclosed and defined as private, resident-only spaces in order to prevent unauthorised access and limited all public access to the more visible elevations of the scheme, where surveillance opportunities are maximised (see illustration opposite & Section 4.5 for more information). The dedicated private gardens and terraces to the ground floor units within the Blocks should also be enclosed to clearly define them as in ownership/control of those residents and to limit access through any potentially insecure patio doors. The frontages of the ground floor duplex units within Blocks 3 & 4 should be protected by some defensible space, defined by low level railings and (ideally) pedestrian/vehicular gates, clearly defining them as entirely separate from the street, in ownership/control of the residents themselves. Boundary treatments to the front of units should be carefully considered to ensure they adequately define the space without impeding surveillance or providing features that could be comfortably sat on/lent against, to the nuisance and intimidation of residents (also see Section 4.5). The 'front garden' spaces should be well-lit (see Section 4.7) and the external entrance doors should be security-certified and fitted with split-spindles, essentially meaning they are key only entry and are locked from the exterior of the dwelling when shut, ensuring that they cannot be left insecure (see Section 4.1).



- 3.3.2 As proposed, Block 3 has individual and communal entrances off Gould Street and the landscaped courtyard, leaving all elevations of the building accessible and potentially vulnerable. It is highly recommended that all of the duplex units within the building are accessed via individual or communal entrances off Gould Street, where surveillance opportunities from the street are maximised, allowing the sides and rear of the building to be enclosed as private space. If it is absolutely unachievable for all of the duplex units to be accessed off the street and some must be accessed from the rear of the building, any visitors (as well as residents) should enter the site via the concierge-controlled entrance lobby between Blocks 1 & 2. Secure access controls will be critical to this strategy to ensure that visitors are not allowed to wander uncontrolled between buildings and around the private courtyard. The reception desk within the main entrance lobby should be staffed by a 24-hour concierge, who should oversee, control and direct all visitor access/egress to/from Blocks 1, 2 & 3 at all times (see Section 4.1), as well as provide formal surveillance over the public realm and the private courtyard. The concierge should greet visitors, contact residents to vet them and then remotely control access through the internal entrance doorsets off the entrance lobby into Blocks 1 & 2 and the doors through into landscaped courtyard (for visitors to Block 3). Once the visitor reaches Block 3, the communal entrance should be operated via an audio access control system, allowing residents to confirm the identity of the caller and remotely allow them access into the building. The communal entrance to Block 4 should operate via its own video access control system in the absence of a concierge. There should also be a secure system

for the delivery of post that does not require access to all areas of the site and all floors of the buildings (again, see Section 4.1).

- 3.3.3 The surrounding land to the north and east of the site is currently occupied by temporary pay & display/contract car parks on vacant sites, along the on-street parking along Clive Street. The general lack of activity/footfall/surveillance in these areas, as well as poor lighting levels and the informal nature of the facilities themselves, mean that vehicles parked for long periods of time can be vulnerable to damage and theft. Although these areas are likely to be developed in the future, in the short-term, this context must be considered. The 4 no. surface parking spaces at the north-eastern end of site will leave the parked vehicles particularly vulnerable in this high vehicle crime area. These parking spaces are remote from the dwellings they serve and do not allow many of the residents to directly overlook their own vehicles - leaving them vulnerable. Given the existing on-street parking along Clive Street, they could also be vulnerable to being mis-used or blocked during the day. Where resident's parked vehicles cannot be secured within a secure garage/parking facility, they should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve (ideally in-curtilage and separate from the street), to allow the owners themselves to act as 'capable guardians' overlooking their own immediately adjacent vehicles. If it is not possible to relocate these spaces, they should be defined for short-term visitor use only (with signage/enforcement measures) to ensure they are not be used on a long-term basis by residents - leaving their vehicles vulnerable (particularly at night).
- 3.3.4 Given the high levels of vehicle crime in the local area, access to the proposed basement level car park must also be robustly secured, controlled and maintained, in order to prevent unauthorised access. The vehicular entrance to the car park (off Gould Street) should be fitted with a high-speed automatic shutter (to reduce the potential for tailgating), operated by resident key fob/proximity reader with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out') so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles and escape (see Section 4.6). The internal pedestrian entrance off the car park should be security-certified and access-controlled (see Section 4.1) to ensure that if unauthorised access is gained to this areas (e.g. via tailgating, forcing open shutters etc.), further access to the upper floors of the building is prevented.
- 3.3.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

The following checklist (Sections 4 & 5) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve the Secured by Design award.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required to plant rooms or refuse stores (see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for SBD approved suppliers).
- ☐ Ideally, all communal entrances to the Blocks should be formed by single-leaf, self-closing doorsets secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, which are easier to secure and operate remotely via an access control system. A double-leaf communal entrance doorset is only appropriate where the entrance lobby is staffed by a 24 hour concierge, who can oversee, control and direct all visitor access/egress to/from the building at all times.
- ☐ The main entrance to Blocks 1 & 2 (and Block 3, if access through the landscaped courtyard) should be security-certified (see above), self-closing/locking and controlled by resident key-fob, by means of a video entry phone system linked to each apartment (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) or remotely by the concierge. Once the visitor has been vetted, the internal doorsets off the entrance lobby into Block 1 & 2 and the door into the landscaped courtyard/Block 3, should be operated remotely by the concierge.
- ☐ Once a visitor passes through the landscaped courtyard to reach the communal entrance of Block 3, the entrance itself should be security-certified (see above), self-closing/locking and controlled by resident key-fob or by means of an audio entry phone system, so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access.
- ☐ The main communal entrance doorset to Block 4 should be security-certified (see above), self-closing/locking and controlled by resident key-fob or by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ There should be a secure system for the delivery of post without needing to provide access to all areas of the site and all floors of the Blocks. Ideally, postal deliveries for Blocks 1 & 2 (and Block 3, if accessed through the landscaped courtyard) should be made directly to postboxes within the main entrance lobby under the supervision of the concierge. Postal delivery arrangements for Block 4 should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures. All other deliveries should be made directly to the concierge or residents via the access control systems. Where individual entrance doors to duplex units are accessible off the street, letterboxes within them must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ The communal entrance doorset taken off the basement parking area serving Blocks 1 & 2 (as well as any communal entrances off the private landscaped courtyard) should also be security-certified to one of the above standards, self-closing/locking and operated by resident key-fob only (on access and egress).
- ☐ All external entrance doorsets to individual duplex units should also be security-certified (see above) and should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key. Full instructions should be provided to residents to ensure that they understand that the key must be used to fully lock/secure the door. They should also have either fixed sidelights or door viewers. Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.

-
- ☐ Where duplexes are served by garages, garage doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR1. Alternatively, the internal connecting door between the garage and the rest of the duplex must be to the same burglary resistant specification as the front door (normally BS PAS 24).
 - ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended, but not generally essential.
 - ☐ All patio doors to apartment/duplex terraces or gardens at ground floor level, or where accessible from an upper floor terrace area, must be security-certified to one of the above standards.
 - ☐ Internal doors/frames to the resident's gym, the building manager's suite and all cycle stores, bin stores and plant rooms should be solid-core (FD30 or higher), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by resident/staff key-fob. Any external doorsets to such areas should be security-certified (see above) and operated by resident/staff key fob. Further information relating to cycle stores can be found within Section 4.9.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All basement/ground floor windows (and those accessible from upper floor terraces) should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standard, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ All basement/ground floor opening lights (and those accessible from upper floor terraces) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm. Accessible opening lights should ideally be small and high level.
- ☐ Any accessible curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than just to perimeter columns.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All basement/ground floor glazing (and all glazing accessible from upper floor terraces) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be no features of the buildings (such as projecting canopies/window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting brickwork/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, trees, handrails, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows/balconies/terraces or over boundaries.
- ☐ Any louvres to plant areas/refuse stores should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Each duplex and apartment should have an intruder alarm to comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems; or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.

Alarms should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The sides and rears of the buildings, including the landscaped courtyard, should be defined and enclosed as a private, resident-only space with 2100mm high walls or railings and lockable gates (as shown within Section 3.3). Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and there should be no immediately adjacent climbing aids, such as low walls, projecting elements of the building, lighting columns, junction boxes etc, which may form a climbing aid. Any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
 - ☐ Any pedestrian gates to private space should also be 2100mm high, self-closing and self-locking, operated by staff/resident key or fob on access and egress. They should also be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, planters/street furniture, lighting columns etc. Mid-point horizontal elements, exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds (see illustration opposite).
- 
- ☐ The private gardens/terraces to the ground floor duplex units and apartments within the 2100mm secure perimeter shown be defined with 1500-1800mm high railings or glazed balustrades and planting.
 - ☐ The frontages of the duplexes fronting onto Gould Street and Clive Street should be protected by some defensible space defined by low-level railings and ideally pedestrian/vehicular gates, to an approximate height of 1200mm (see illustration within Section 3.3), in order to provide some protection and funnel passing pedestrian movement away from residential doors and windows. Any railings should be designed to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them, which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.
 - ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

4.6 Basement Car Park

- ☐ The vehicular entrance to the basement car park should be fitted with a high-speed shutter certified to LPS 1175 SR1/2, operated by key fob/proximity reader, with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), so that criminals cannot gain access to the areas, attack the vehicles and escape. The length of time the shutter stays open after a vehicle has passed through should be reduced as much as is safe to do so, in order to reduce the opportunity for tailgating. If there is to be an emergency override mechanism for the shutter, it should be alarmed and signed as such to deter casual use/use by criminals.
- ☐ The pedestrian entrance door to the building off the car park should be security-certified and fob-controlled on access and egress, preventing any visitors from accessing the basement car park through the building and ensuring that if a criminal does gain access to the parking area, further access is prevented into the blocks (see Section 4.1).
- ☐ Lighting to the parking levels should be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%. Light-coloured walls and ceilings can help achieve this.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion/conflict and aid surveillance.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all roads and pedestrian routes within/surrounding the site, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Lighting to all surface parking areas should also be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 20, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundaries or up to high level windows/balconies. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ Any areas of public realm or communal landscaped areas should be well-lit and designed to maximise surveillance opportunities and eliminate hiding places. Any pedestrian steps or ramps within the public realm should be as wide as possible, with any adjacent landscaping containing only low with low-level vegetation or high tree foliage (see below), in order to maximise surveillance over them and allow clear views of, from and along pedestrian routes.
- ☐ Any landscape features (hard or soft) to the public realm areas should not impede natural surveillance of/from the building or reduce the effectiveness of lighting or any CCTV system. In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, building frontages and along pedestrian routes, low planting should not exceed approx. 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than approx. 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to. Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ The design of any publicly accessible hard landscaping features or street furniture, in particular any steps or benches, should be designed to withstand and discourage the potential for mistreatment or damage (e.g. from vandalism, skateboarding etc.). Any such features should be reduced in number to the minimum practicable and should be located where surveillance and overlooking opportunities are maximised from the street, set well away from residential windows.
- ☐ The robust management of the public realm is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. If signs of disorder (such as criminal damage, graffiti, littering etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse.

4.9 Other

- ☐ The secure residential cycle stores should include either secure lockers or stands that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Physical Security (Commercial Unit)

5.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Any internal doors/frames to bin stores or plant areas should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), self-closing, with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by staff swipe card/key-fob. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than just to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Shutters should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage).

5.3 Glazing

- ☐ All glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.4 Internal Security

- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas to any restaurant/cafe, bar or retail unit should not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to storage rooms, staff rooms or offices should be solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys. Any cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a certified doorset to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ☐ Any electric locking system to be used throughout the premises should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Any staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented.
- ☐ Internal walls between the residential and commercial portions of the building should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

5.5 Alarm

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover the premises, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder or a security patrol team).

5.6 Any External Seating Area

If the commercial unit is to house a restaurant/café or a bar with an external seating area, the following measures should be incorporated:

- ☐ Any external seating areas should be clearly defined as separate from the pedestrian footway by screens, barriers or planters. Any such area should also be protected by anti-ram bollards or planters along the bust route of Rochdale Road.
- ☐ The overall width of any proposed external seating areas (including all tables/chairs and screens/barriers/planters) should be no wider than 50% of the total width of the pedestrian route. Tables directly adjacent to the pinch points, such as around lighting columns or signage posts, should be avoided.
- ☐ Tables and chairs, as well as any removable canopies, heaters or screens/barriers should be stored within the premises out-of-hours, in order to prevent damage or mis-use and prevent the space from fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour when the premises are closed. Any awnings should also be retracted out-of-hours.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see Section 6) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats.
- ☐ The layout of any external tables/chairs should be configured so that, as much as possible, they are not located directly adjacent to barriers where it would be easy reach over and steal any items of value. All external seating areas should be capable of being clearly overlooked from internal staff positions.
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that any advertising A-boards signs do not inadvertently provide additional features that may narrow the footway and funnel pedestrians into close proximity of any proposed external seating areas.
- ☐ The success of any external seating area is largely dependent on the effective management of the space, particularly at peak times. Staff should closely monitor customer use/behaviour and should regularly clear away used crockery/cutlery to prevent theft or mis-use.

5.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the exterior of the unit and the surrounding public realm, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light, and fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

5.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

-
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
 - ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
 - ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *all commercial unit facades, the main entrance to the unit, internal circulation areas, all sales counters/till positions and any external seating area.*

6 Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of any restaurant/cafe, bar or retail unit should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their unit once complete, and therefore, the end-users requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

6.1 Restaurant/Cafe/Bar

6.1.1 Restaurants, cafes and licensed premises can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating in restaurants/licensed premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent restaurants/licensed premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- 6.1.2 The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- 6.1.3 Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrance should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- 6.1.4 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- 6.1.5 Consideration should be given to a high/wide bars/service counter, which increases the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counter should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled).
- 6.1.6 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 6.1.7 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 5.4) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

- 6.1.8 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- 6.1.9 Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

6.2 Retail Unit

- 6.2.1 Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public realm, i.e. large promotional signs should not obstruct views.
- 6.2.2 Careful consideration should be given to the location of paypoints to ensure that staff have full surveillance over the entrance to the unit.
- 6.2.3 Internal aisles and product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrance of the unit.
- 6.2.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 6.2.5 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 5.4) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

7 Management & Maintenance

- 7.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the commercial unit must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the unit. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 7.1.2 The opening hours of any restaurant/cafe, bar or retail unit should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.
- 7.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 7.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site, each building and the commercial unit, but also to deter unauthorised access to resident or staff-only areas.
- 7.1.5 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.
- 7.1.6 The upkeep of any residential development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Repairs to communal areas (lighting, access controls, signage etc.)
 - Litter/graffiti removal
 - Trimming of trees and shrubs
- 7.1.7 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as gable walls, boundaries or hidden corners/recesses).

8 Construction

- 8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 8.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
9 th July 2021	WSP Planning	Receipt of CIS instruction & location/site plan
12 th July 2021	WSP Planning	Quote issued & request for additional information
14 th July 2021	WSP Planning	Confirmation of instruction/fee. Receipt of additional info - landscape plans, floorplans & elevations plans to follow
10 th August 2021	WSP Planning	Receipt of landscape plans & main building floorplans
12 th August 2021	WSP Planning	Receipt of townhouse & coachhouse floorplans & elevations
20 th August 2021	WSP Planning	Email sent to Agent re: report completion & payment
??	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
136-JMA-MP-XX-P-A-001000	Existing Site Location Plan	18/06/21	-
136-JMA-MP-XX-P-A-001005	Proposed Ground Floor Site Plan (SUPERSEDED)	18/06/21	-
-	Streetview Image (View 01_Issue 03) (SUPERSEDED)	-	-
2624-PLA-XX-XX-DR-L-0002	General Arrangement	02/08/21	S1-P03
2624-PLA-XX-XX-DR-L-2000	Softworks Plan	02/08/21	S1-P02
2624-PLA-XX-XX-DR-L-3000	Levels Plan	02/08/21	S1-P04
136-JMA-MP-XX-P-A-022199	Basement Level General Arrangement Plan	09/07/21	-
136-JMA-MP-XX-P-A-022200	Ground Floor General Arrangement Plan Block 1 & Block 2	30/07/21	-
136-JMA-MP-XX-P-A-022201	1 st - 9 th Floor General Arrangement Plan Block 1 & Block 2	18/06/21	-
136-JMA-MP-XX-P-A-022210	10 th Floor General Arrangement Plan Block 1 & Block 2	18/06/21	-
136-JMA-MP-XX-P-A-022211	11 th Floor General Arrangement Plan Block 1 & Block 2	18/06/21	-
136-JMA-MP-XX-P-A-022212	12 th Floor General Arrangement Plan Block 1 & Block 2	18/06/21	-
136-JMA-MP-S-E-A-042200	Elevation AA, South (Rochdale Road) Block 1 & Block 2, GA Elevations	18/06/21	-
136-JMA-MP-E-E-A-042201	Elevation BB, East (Clive Street) Block 1 & Block 2, GA Elevations	18/06/21	-
136-JMA-MP-N-E-A-042202	Elevation CC, North (MCR Site) Block 1 & Block 2, GA Elevations	18/06/21	-
136-JMA-MP-W-E-A-042203	Elevation DD, West (Gould Street) Block 1 & Block 2, GA Elevations	18/06/21	-
136-JMA-B4-00-P-A-022229	Basement Duplex Coachhouse Plan Block 03	30/07/21	-
136-JMA-B4-00-P-A-022230	Ground Floor Duplex Coachhouse Plan Block 03	30/07/21	-
136-JMA-B4-00-P-A-022231	1 st Floor Duplex Coachhouse Plan Block 03	30/07/21	-

136-JMA-B4-00-P-A-022232	2 nd Floor Duplex Coachhouse Plan Block 03	30/07/21	-
136-JMA-B4-00-P-A-022233	3 rd Floor Duplex Coachhouse Plan Block 03	30/07/21	-
136-JMA-B4-00-N-E-A-	Elevations Block 03	30/07/21	-
136-JMA-B4-00-P-A-022240	Ground Floor Duplex Townhouse Plan Block 04	30/07/21	-
136-JMA-B4-00-P-A-022241	1 st Floor Duplex Townhouse Plan Block 04	30/07/21	-
136-JMA-B4-00-P-A-022242	2 nd Floor Duplex Townhouse Plan Block 04	30/07/21	-
136-JMA-B4-00-P-A-022243	3 rd Floor Duplex Townhouse Plan Block 04	30/07/21	-
136-JMA-B4-00-N-E-A-	Elevations Block 04	30/07/21	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstdesign.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk