



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

SILVERWOOD HOUSE, 129 BARLOW MOOR ROAD, DIDSBURY, MANCHESTER

RESIDENTIAL (10 no. APARTMENTS & 7 no. HOUSES)

FOR: CLEARSCRIPT LTD.

VERSION A: 10/03/16

REFERENCE:2016/0123/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Silverwood House, 129 Barlow Moor Road, Didsbury, Manchester

2016/0123/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor design changes/security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- General boundary treatments – including secure enclosure of private spaces of the houses, defensible space to the front elevations of apartments/houses, defensive planting along the gable end of Plot 5 and symbolic barriers at site access points.
- Consideration should be given to re-orientating the front entrance of Plot 2 so that it fronts onto the shared space/access road (where surveillance opportunities are maximised), allowing the side elevation to be securely enclosed. Definition/treatment of boundaries if the layout remains as proposed.
- Secure access controls and postal delivery arrangements to apartment building.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart *MTCP*

Design for Security Consultant

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
1 Visual Audit

The site lies at the junction of Barlow Moor Road and Palatine Road in Didsbury. It is occupied by an extended large Victorian Villa in use as a day nursery, with mature vegetation to the perimeter and areas of hard standing.

The site frontages are formed by low walls and high hedging/mature trees – limiting views of the site from the street. There are two vehicular/pedestrian access points to the site off Barlow Moor Road and Palatine Road – both of which are routes busy with vehicular traffic.

The site is connected to the Moor Allerton Preparatory School to the immediate west of the site, also fronting onto Barlow Moor Road. On the opposite side Barlow Moor Road is a parade of retail/commercial premises, which provide activity and surveillance opportunities to the street and the site itself. The residential properties on the opposite side of Palatine Road from the site provide little overlooking/natural surveillance over the street given the high boundary fencing, gates and mature vegetation along their frontages.

To the south of the site is a large residential property fronting onto Palatine Road, beyond which is a care home currently under redevelopment.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The following information has been produced to give an insight into the types and volume of, crime experienced across the South Manchester division and Greater Manchester as a whole. Particular attention is paid to the area surrounding Barlow Moor Road and to crimes which research shows can be affected by the built environment. All data is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2015 and 31st January 2016.

2.1 Crime Overview

2.1.1 Over the previous 12 months there have been 223,276 crimes reported across the Greater Manchester Police force area. Of these, 27,669 incidents (12%) have occurred on the South Manchester division with 24,728 (89%) of these victim based crimes (i.e. crimes with a specific identifiable victim).

2.1.2 When looking at the figures in more detail, the number of crimes recorded within a Km² centred on the development site over the previous 12 months is as follows:

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km ² Centred on Site									
Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
50	<20	26	56	<20	<20	<20	61	<20	<20

2.1.3 Over the last 12 months, the most frequently occurring offences in the local area have been theft from motor vehicle, less serious wounding and burglary dwelling.

2.1.4 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will look at residential burglary and vehicle crime.


2.2 Residential Burglary: Risk Analysis

2.2.1 Residential burglary accounts for 12% (3,089 offences) of victim based crimes recorded within South Manchester; a figure which has decreased compared to the previous year (February 2014 – January 2015). The graph below shows how the rate of residential burglary committed within a Km² centred on the site compares to that of the Local Planning Authority area and Greater Manchester.



The rate (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) of burglary dwelling in the local area is **lower** than the average rate for Manchester and **higher** than the average rate for Greater Manchester as a whole.

- 2.2.2 **Point of Entry:** Where offenders have targeted residential properties within a Km² centred on the site, they have used the following points of entry:



- 2.2.3 The majority of residential burglaries in the local area have been committed through patio, front and rear doors. Offenders have typically gained unauthorised access through front doors using bodily pressure and/or tools. In a number of cases, offenders have gained access via a communal entrance by tailgating or posing as legitimate residents/visitors, before targeting individual apartment entrance doors. Doors have also been targeted when they have been left insecure and, in some instances, the glazing in patio doors has been smashed to gain entry. Windows have typically been prised open or the glazing within them smashed by offenders to gain unauthorised access – but at a lesser rate than doors have been targeted.
- 2.2.4 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of residential burglary in the local area is greatest on Wednesday.
- 2.2.5 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary is concentrated in the afternoon and the early evening. Offenders often target residential properties at these times when residents are likely to be out of the house, at work or otherwise, and they can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed. When it gets dark, it is also often easier for residents to observe which residents are away from home.

2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

- 2.3.1 Vehicle crime accounts for 12% (2,997 offences) of victim based crimes recorded within South Manchester]; a figure which has increased compared to the previous year (February 2014 – January 2015). The graph below shows how the rate of vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site compares to that of the Local Planning Authority area and Greater Manchester.



The rate (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) of vehicle crime in the local area is **higher** than the average rate for Manchester and **higher** than the average rate for Greater Manchester as a whole.

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- 2.3.2 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area is greatest on Tuesday.
- 2.3.3 **Time Range:** In the local area, the risk of vehicle crime rises during the day (peaking around midday) and in the evening/early hours of the morning. Vehicles parked on streets or within open car parks, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within secure parking facilities or within the curtilages/garages of individual properties.

2.4 General Risk Factors

2.4.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Crime Summary

Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, commonly used M.O's (modus operandi) and possible solutions/recommendations to help reduce the likelihood of them being used on/in future developments are as follows:

- Doors have been forced open using bodily pressure and/or tools

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1 & 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All private spaces to the sides/rears of the dwellings should be robustly enclosed (see Sections 4.6), particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of the dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.7).

- Offenders gaining unauthorised access through communal entrances to target individual apartments entrance doors

A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the building before allowing them access (see Section 4.2). The main communal entrance should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset, to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

-
- Windows have either been prised open by offenders and the glazing in doors and windows have been smashed to gain entry

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.3), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Windows to accessible elevations should be protected by some defensible space, to define them as entirely separate from the street/parking areas and protect them from attack and nuisance/anti-social behaviour. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.4). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.



Rosanna Johnstone MSc
Design for Security Analyst

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to convert and extend the existing building to form 10 no. apartments and 7 no. houses, with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The development will be centred around a courtyard/shared space, with an in/out access route off Barlow Moor Road and Palatine Road. The existing Victorian Villa will house 10 no. apartments, served by 4 no. external entrances to the northern and eastern elevations and 14 no. parking space to the north and east of the building. Along the eastern edge of the site will be 4 no. 6 bed houses with private gardens and parking for 3 no. vehicles (including 1 within an integral garage.), with an addition house adjoin the rear of the villa. To the north and south of the site (adjacent to the site access/egress points) will be 2 no. small 'gatehouses', with 1 no. vehicle parking space per dwelling.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal


The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed houses and apartment building will front onto the proposed shared space/parking areas, resulting in good levels of surveillance of and from dwellings and parked vehicles.
- 3.2.2 The houses and apartments will have habitable room windows to their front elevations (at ground floor level), maximising surveillance opportunities over the access road, parked vehicles and between dwellings.
- 3.2.3 The design of the houses has been kept simple, with no front doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).
- 3.2.4 The proposed houses will be served by in-curtilage off-road parking spaces, allowing residents to secure/overlook their own vehicles and limiting opportunities to criminals. The communal parking areas serving the apartments will be located off-street and will be well-overlooked from the building itself.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development will bring a currently vacant site into use and provide additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The boundary treatments to the proposed houses and apartment building are vitally important to secure them, any parked vehicles and prevent unauthorised access to private spaces (see opposite for illustration and Section 4.6 for more details). The sides and rears of the houses should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access, particularly robustly where adjacent to publicly accessible space (hedging is not



-
- considered adequate for securing private spaces). The front elevations of all of the houses and the apartment building should be protected and defined by some defensible space (defined by low-level railings and/or low-level, dense hedging) - creating small areas in front of each property entirely separate from the shared space and in ownership/control of the residents themselves, providing protection to accessible windows from unauthorised access, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (see Section 4.6). All basement lightwells should also be enclosed with railings to prevent unauthorised access and there should be no external doors at basement level that are publicly accessible.
- 3.3.2 Consideration should be given to re-orientating the front entrance of Plot 2 so that it fronts onto the shared space/access road, where visitors to the property would be better overlooked, allowing the sides and rear of the property to be enclosed and defined as private space (where partially hidden windows/doors could be attacked unseen). If it is to remain as currently proposed, the boundaries should be defined as shown above and consideration should be given to lowering/thinning the existing vegetation and tree foliage to the frontage of the site in front of the dwelling (as well in front of the apartment building/parking area to the west) to allow views of and from the dwelling frontages and the street.
- 3.3.3 As proposed, the gable end wall of Plot 5 (adjacent to the site entrance) will not be protected by any defensible space. As such, it may be vulnerable to loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour. It is highly recommended that, if possible, the gable wall is incorporated into either the front or the rear garden spaces of the dwelling. If this is unachievable, the gable wall should be protected by a defensive planting bed (as shown above) to deter casual access. It is also highly recommended that there is a symbolic barrier at the access/egress points off Barlow Moor Road/Palatine Road (e.g. brick pillars, change of road surface texture/colour etc.) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents, psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate purpose from entering.
- 3.3.4 Any communal entrances to the apartments building, as with all external doors to the houses and apartment building, must be security-certified to an appropriate standard. They should be single-leaf, which are easier to secure with an electrically operated multi-point lock, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. There should also be a robust access control system for visitors and a secure system for the delivery of post that ensures access to all floors of the building is not required (see Section 4.2 for more information).
- 3.3.5 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors (Houses)

- ☐ Front and rear doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. Any external french/double doors or sliding doors (at ground and first floor level) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key. Full instructions should be provided to residents to ensure that they understand that the key must be used to fully lock/secure the door.
- ☐ Front doors should also have either fixed sidelights or door viewers. Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential. Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Doors (Apartments)

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. Any external french/double doors at first floor level should also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Any external entrances serving individual apartments should be secured as the house entrance doors described above. Any external communal entrances serving more than one apartment should be secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. They should be single-leaf, self-closing and controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ Postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. Postboxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrances.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ All new 'accessible' windows (i.e. up to a height of 2400mm above external ground level or if otherwise accessible via climbing aids) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ If any existing windows at basement/ground floor levels are to be retained, internal secondary glazing units should be installed certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR1 (e.g. <http://www.selectaglaze.co.uk/benefits/security-secondary-glazing>), which should incorporate laminated glazing (see below).
- ☐ All basement/ground floor or easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarms

- ☐ Each apartment and house should have an intruder alarm fitted to comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems, or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.
- ☐ Alarms should be linked to contacts on all external entrances, any internal apartment entrances and PIR detectors should cover all basement/ground floor rooms with windows.

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ The sides and rears of the houses and apartment blocks should generally be enclosed with 2100mm high walls, robust close-boarded timber fencing (with the top 300mm consisting of robust integral trellis if required) or railings (see Section 3.3 for illustration). Boundaries to private space that are adjacent to publicly accessible space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and fencing/railings should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. Sub-divisional rear boundaries should be 1500-1800mm high.
- ☐ Any side/rear pedestrian gates to the private space of houses should be 2100mm high and should be fitted with either a pad-lockable bolt (to the mid-point of the internal face) or a key operable deadlock.
- ☐ The fronts of houses and the apartment building should be demarcated by low-level railings and/or low-level dense hedging to an approximate height or maintained to an approximate height of 1000-1200mm. Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
- ☐ The basement lightwells to the apartment building must be secured with railings to prevent unauthorised access to where partially hidden windows could be attacked unseen.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to the proposed shared space and all communal parking areas should be to adoptable standards (to comply with BS 5489).
- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as building frontages/entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

-
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of houses only and not in the private areas, or should be read remotely, in order to deter bogus callers.
- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Any communal external cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures. They should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/downloads>
- ☐ Any communal external bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (e.g. lighting, signage, access controls etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as gable walls, boundaries to private space or parking bays).

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
11 th February 2016	Nigel Baxter	Receipt of CIS instruction from & plans
11 th February 2016	Nigel Baxter	Confirmation of instruction & fee
16 th February 2016	GMP Finance Dept.	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
NMB/MAS/100	Existing Floor Plans	02/02/16	-
NMB/MAS/101	Existing Elevations	02/02/16	-
NMB/MAS/102	Proposed Floor Plans Basement level	02/02/16	-
NMB/MAS/103	Proposed Elevations	02/02/16	-
NMB/MAS/015	Proposed Streetscene Elevations	02/02/16	-
NMB/MAS/020	Proposed Site Layout Plan – Ground Floor Plan	02/02/16	-
NMB/MAS/022	New Build House Type Plots 3 & 4	02/02/16	-
NMB/MAS/024	Plot 7 House Type	02/02/16	-
NMB/MAS/025	Gate House Plot 6	02/02/16	-
NMB/MAS/026	Plot 2 House Type	02/02/16	-
NMB/MAS/027	Gate House Plot 1	02/02/16	-
NMB/MAS/028	New Build House Type Plot 5	02/02/16	-
M2562_DAS_0116ec_DRAFT	Design & Access Statement	Jan 2016	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk