



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Development of 9 houses, 3 apartments and 156m² office space
AT The Greenfinch Public House, Palatine Road, West Didsbury, Manchester

FOR: Wren Properties Ltd

VERSION B: 11.06.21

2020/0781/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

We welcome the redevelopment of the site and consider a mixed office and residential scheme most appropriate.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include: an appropriate balance of types and size of properties; a suitable amount of defensible space around each building; with appropriate fencing, there will be a clear distinction between public, semi-private and private space; and, car parking has been included in appropriately secure locations.

There are several recommendations included in the report which we consider will enhance security of the development and these are set out in section 3.3. The principal recommendations are summarised as follows:

- installation of appropriate boundary fencing and fencing to restrict inappropriate movement through the development;
- environmental enhancements to the streetscape;
- providing secure, cycle parking; and,
- the development being built to Secured by Design standards.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed houses to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, Gold accreditation and the office apartment building achieve SBD Bronze accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve these awards and the condition met.



Adrian Murphy MRTPI

Consultant

e: adran.murphy@designforsecurity.org

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
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1 Visual Audit

The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. This, 0.29 hectare site, edged in red on the plan, is located at the junction of Palatine Road and Lapwing Lane in West Didsbury, south Manchester. It is also located within the Albert Park Conservation Area. Palatine Road, B5167, is a heavily trafficked arterial route which, *inter alia*, connects Withington and West Didsbury to Northenden and the other southern suburbs of Manchester. Lapwing Lane is also a busy, local route, which connects Didsbury with West Didsbury. The junction of these two roads is significant; it is light controlled, includes pedestrian phases, has pedestrian refuges within the carriageways and double yellow lines restrict parking on all approaches. There are several commercial premises on the north-eastern side of the junction, whilst the West Didsbury Metrolink station is located opposite the site, on the south-eastern side of the junction. The Metrolink line passes under the junction and emerges in a cutting on the north-western side of the junction; the proximity of the line to Lapwing Lane restricts development on the land opposite the site. Next to the entrance to the vehicle entrance to the site on Lapwing Lane, there is a modest commercial building. A development of modern houses and flats occupies the land west of the site. Finally, south of the site, there is a large residential property, number 114 Palatine Road, which is set well back from the road in extensive grounds.



The Palatine Road elevation of the Greenfinch public house



A view of the Greenfinch from the car park



A view along Lapwing Lane with the site on the left



Looking across the car park to housing west of the site on Raleigh Close



A view into the pub car park from Lapwing Lane



N° 114 Palatine Road adjoins the southern boundary of the site

Originally a Victorian residence, with accommodation set out over 4 floors (including cellar), the property has long since been converted to a public house, known under different names but lastly as The Greenfinch. The pub has now permanently closed. The building is located at the north-eastern corner of the site and occupies around a quarter of the site area. It has been extended extensively on all four elevations to provide a kitchen, new entrance from the car park, and an expanded lounge and dining area in conjunction with its use as a pub. The original entrance to the property remains on the Palatine Road façade, with the newer, customer, entrance and means of escape door on the southern elevation, facing the car park. There is an entrance door to the upper floors residential accommodation as well as means of escape and servicing doors on the Lapwing Lane elevation. The exterior of the pub comprises of an extensive car park with capacity for 64 vehicles. Access to the car park is gained from Lapwing Lane at the north-western corner of the site. The external area also includes peripheral hard and soft landscaping, including numerous mature trees, with a beer garden and children's play area alongside the Palatine Road boundary. As well as temporary, mesh fencing used to secure the site, the Palatine Road and Lapwing Lane boundaries includes the original stone boundary wall embellished with a modern railing, to enclose the play area, with dense hedges elsewhere. There is a former pedestrian access on the Palatine Road boundary which allows a direct connection between the street and the original entrance. The south-west and western boundaries are characterised by mature vegetation and high walls, and concrete post and panel or timber fencing between the site and neighbouring residential properties.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 and 30th June 2019.



2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

Recorded crime within 500m of the site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
106	11	47	52	26	22	<5	80	13	28



- 2.1.1 In the period analysed, there were 445 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood in which the site is located. When compared with other areas within Manchester, this number is higher than the average.
- 2.1.2 The stand-out crimes in this part of West Didsbury are burglary, vehicle crime and robbery. Comparing all streets in the area analysed, there were three streets with 30 or more crimes, and they were: Burton Road (75 crimes), Palatine Road (49) and Lapwing Lane (37). Each of these is amongst the longest streets in the area, each having a diverse range of residential and commercial properties.
- 2.1.3 West Didsbury is a densely populated neighbourhood with a mix of housing, including a large number of modern purpose-built apartments, as well as apartments in converted large, older properties. Whilst the number of burglaries in this area is very high (106, 27% of the total crime), the burglary rate is similar to that of the City of Manchester. However, the burglary rate is, as it is across the City, much higher than in the other boroughs of Greater Manchester and in England and Wales. There were hotspots of burglary at Northern Grove, Clyde Road and Cresswell Grove, and at Central Road and Goulden Road. Houses were four times more likely to be targeted than apartments; garages and garden sheds were targeted on seven occasions. Crimes affecting residential property (but excluding violent crimes), i.e., damage to property, and theft, of parcels and other mail, from cars, burglary, and, theft from gardens, garages, and garden sheds, account for about 38% of the total.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle related crime is most common in this neighbourhood; just under of third of all crimes involve theft of, theft from or damage to a vehicle. The most common place for vehicle crime to occur was on Burton Road, Lapwing Lane and Old Lansdowne Road.
- 2.1.5 Unusually, only 19% of all recorded crimes in this neighbourhood involve the use, or threat, of violence (including robbery); this is unusually low for a neighbourhood within Greater Manchester, particularly one with a number of licensed premises. However, the frequency of robbery is a concern. Lapwing Lane was a hotspot for robbery, particularly Metrolink station.
- 2.1.6 Theft makes up 12% of crimes in the area. The most common item stolen was a bicycle followed by cash and personal belongings (including wallets, phones and other electronic devices). The two Metrolink stations in the area were the most common place for a bicycle to be stolen. Licensed premises were the most common venue for the theft of personal belongings.
- 2.1.7 Criminal damage makes up 11% of the recorded crime. Cars are much more likely to be damaged than buildings. There is a particular issue with criminal damage to cars on the terraced streets close to the junction of Burton Road and Nell Lane.

2.2 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2019.




- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **3% lower** than the rate for Manchester, **70% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **115% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of wounding per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **78% lower** than the rate for Manchester, **65% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **60% lower** than the rate across England & Wales.




- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **69% lower** than the Manchester rate, **55% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **35% lower** than the rate across England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **19% lower** than the Manchester rate, **48% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **134% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Domestic burglary in the neighbourhood

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.




- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary fluctuates through the week with the greatest risk on Mondays and the lowest risk on Wednesday. By far the most common time for burglary to be committed is in the middle of the night.



- 2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** In around half of the cases of burglary, offenders entered the property by forcing a door, principally rear doors. In some cases the offenders simply walked in through an unsecured door. Entry was gained via a window on 35 occasions.

2.4 Vehicle crime in the neighbourhood


The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.




- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is consistent throughout the week. The most common time for offences to be committed was during the evening and into the early hours of the morning.

2.5 Burglary at offices

The data below relates to burglary of office premises in Manchester.




- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** Of the 284 burglaries recorded at offices, the majority occurred at buildings within the city centre or neighbourhoods bordering the city centre. Only one offence took place within the neighbourhood in which this development site is located. Across the city, the risk of burglary at office premises is consistent throughout the week. The risk rises significantly at the end of the traditional working day into the late evening.



- 2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** More than half of the incidents of burglary involved the offender forcing a door. The next most common means of entry was 'unknown', which are likely to have involved offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees gaining access to staff-only areas through insecure doors or by tail-gating. The one burglary that occurred in the neighbourhood involved the offender smashing the glazing within a door before entering.

2.6 Theft at offices

The data below relates to theft at office premises in Manchester.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** There were 116 incidents of theft at offices across Manchester, none of which occurred in West Didsbury. There was an appreciable drop in the number of incidents of theft at the weekend. Offences tend to occur during the standard working day from 09:00 until 18:00, with a significant rise in risk around lunchtime.

2.7 Modus operandi used in committing burglary and theft at office and residential property in Manchester and measures to reduce risk

2.7.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates, so that rear doors and windows are only accessible to residents;
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.
- defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the street, i.e. a small front garden, ideally enclosed with a 1000-1200mm fence or hedge; and,
- all external doors should be illuminated by dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests a property is occupied, and the light will also highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed.

2.7.2 Doors and windows have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in/climb-in' burglaries:

- front doors to houses should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- windows should be certified to the PAS 24 standard, and be fitted with key operated locks and tamper proof, opening restrictors; and,
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors.

2.7.3 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and windows on the ground floor of the houses; and,
- access to rear gardens should be restricted using high fences and locking gates.

2.7.4 Offenders posing as legitimate visitors/customers, gaining access to staff-only areas of commercial premises

To minimise the risk of offenders gaining access to the offices:

- an access control system should be considered in order to limit access into and through the building;
- staff should be required to wear an appropriate form of clearly visible ID;
- all doors separating public areas, from staff only areas should be monitored by CCTV; and
- lockers should be provided for staff to secure their personal belongings.

2.7.5 Breaking into sheds at the rear of properties using force to gain entry.

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing entry into garden sheds:

- sheds should be fitted with a Sold Secure™ hasp and staple, which is coach-bolted through the frame of the shed, and secured with a Sold Secure™ padlock.

2.7.1 Bikes were stolen from cycle stores and gardens

To minimise the risk of bicycle theft:

- provide convenient, secure cycle parking in a secure store within the apartment building, or in an external store, which has self-closing, self-locking doors or gates, and is only accessible to residents; and,
- provide a cycle parking space within a secure garden shed, fit a Sold Secure™ ground or wall anchor to which bikes may be secured or install a Secured by Design accredited cycle locker/box.

2.7.2 Cars stolen, parts and property stolen from a vehicle, and bodywork damaged

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting resident, staff or visitor cars:

- ample parking space should be provided within, or adjacent to, the curtilage of each property where they can be supervised by residents or staff.

2.7.3 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol or visit during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged so as to prevent forced access onto the site; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with tracking devices.

2.8 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.8.1 Features of the physical environment can influence criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.8.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the adjacent residential streets, apartments and houses appear to be well-maintained. Neighbourhoods where there are clear signs of physical deterioration and neglect tends to increase an offenders' perception that areas are vulnerable to crime and their actions will go unchallenged;
- together with the volume of vehicle traffic, the pedestrian activity resulting from the location of pedestrian crossings, West Didsbury Metrolink station and the mix of neighbouring leisure and commercial businesses generate a consistent level of passive surveillance of the fringes of the site throughout the day; and,
- the site's shared boundaries with neighbouring housing to the south and to a lesser extent to the west is considered secure.

2.8.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood with a high volume of crime;
- the site is highly visible at a very prominent at the junction of two busy streets, Palatine Road and Lapwing Lane. Well-trafficked routes such as these can act as conduits for crime, with criminals identifying opportunities for crime and committing crime opportunities as they travel along them; and,
- the proximity of the Metrolink station may increase the pressure for commuter parking spaces. This can lead to anti-social parking, for example of pavements and in areas designated for residents use only. Offenders may be attracted to the neighbourhood to target cars belonging to commuters and others.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development involves a) the retention and remodelling of the Greenfinch pub and its conversion to residential and office use, and b) the construction of nine houses within the grounds and car park of the pub.

Conversion of the Greenfinch

- 3.1.2 Following demolition of single storey elements of the building and backfill of space within the basement, the ground and basement first floor of the pub will be converted to an office use with a floorspace of 156m². The ground floor will include: the retention of the existing entrance door on the Palatine Road; opening a new entrance at the south-western corner of the remodelled building; an entrance lobby; reception area with desk and seating area; private and open plan offices; a meeting room; a key safe room; and, a DDA compliant w.c.
- 3.1.3 The basement floor will house the staff room, archive room, plant and store rooms and w.c's. As well as the internal stair connecting the basement to the ground floor, there will be a means of escape stair and door on the Lapwing Lane elevation.
- 3.1.4 The upper floors will be converted to residential use. There will be two one-bedroom apartments on the 1st floor and a three bedroom apartment on the 2nd floor. The two existing doors on the Lapwing Lane elevation will be retained; one will facilitate access to the first floor apartments and the other to the top floor apartment.
- 3.1.5 Externally, there will be a bin store located at the north-western corner of the building and a single parking bay adjacent to the south-western corner. A further five grasscrete parking bays will be located in the centre of the site on the opposite site of the proposed site access road to the pub.

Houses

- 3.1.6 Nine houses are proposed, a mixture of three detached and three pairs of semi-detached properties. The houses will have either three or five bedrooms, with accommodation set out over three floors in the five bedroom houses and two floors in the three bedroom houses. Houses will each have garage and/or driveway parking, two spaces per property. Each house will have a front and rear garden. The houses will be arranged around a new cul-de-sac, an extension of the existing access from Lapwing Lane, with front doors facing the cul-de-sac.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals

- 3.2.1 A residential development is an appropriate use for the site given the surrounding land uses.
- 3.2.2 The proposals result in the redevelopment of a site which, if it remains vacant, is very likely to attract anti-social and criminal behaviour, resulting in damage to, and theft from, the pub building and affecting the quality of life of nearby residents and security of their property.
- 3.2.3 There is only point of entry to the housing development, and it is overlooked by several of the houses.
- 3.2.4 There will be an adequate number of houses and apartments within the development, which increases the likelihood of residents of some of the houses and apartments being present throughout the day. The presence of residents or even just visible signs of people present - cars on driveways, lights on in houses, external lighting on at entrance doors, for example - will help to deter offenders.

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- 3.2.5 The presence of office staff and visitors coming and going from the offices will add to the sense that the houses will be supervised through the day, and the presence of residents during the evening and at night will provide a level of passive supervision of the offices.
 - 3.2.6 The development includes family housing. Family housing is more likely to retain a presence on the street throughout the day, particularly families with younger children.
 - 3.2.7 Houses are arranged with defensible to the front and rear of each dwelling, those at the southern fringe of the site will add to the security of the existing properties adjoining the site.
 - 3.2.8 Front doors and principal room windows face the 'street', which helps to promote street activity and natural surveillance.
 - 3.2.9 Rear gardens will be secured with fencing and gates.
 - 3.2.10 The garage and driveway parking spaces for each house will reduce the risk of vehicles being targeted by offenders.
 - 3.2.11 The office and apartment building is in the most suitable location on the site and includes complementary uses. The proposed locations of the entrance and means of escape doors are appropriate.
 - 3.2.12 'Defensible space' is provided around the office/apartment building.
 - 3.2.13 A secure building can be created during the working day with the installation of access controls to the entrance doors.
 - 3.2.14 The reception desk is suitably located so as to allow staff to observe the entrance doors and intercept and greet any visitors.
 - 3.2.15 Landscaping of the modest front gardens of the houses and the proposed peripheral planting around the site will help to maintain the quality of the local environment. Well-maintained verdant environments tend to attract less crime and anti-social behaviour.
 - 3.2.16 A refuse store is provided adjacent to the office/apartment building.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the scheme

Streetscape

- 3.3.1 In order to emphasise ownership, and encourage maintenance of, and play/socialising in, the street, the application of a high quality surfacing of the proposed cul-de-sac is recommended. The creation of a shared surface/'Home-zone' design for the 'street', rather than a standard engineering solution will emphasise 'territoriality', promote 'ownership' of the 'street' amongst residents, and encourage play/socialising – all of which adds to the overall supervision of the public space and deters crime. The inclusion of such measures as a rumble strip, ornate blockwork or a coloured/textured tarmac and distinctive signs, identifying the houses served by the cul-de-sac suggests that a threshold has been crossed into a space that is more private, where one's actions may be under greater scrutiny.
- 3.3.2 Signage should indicate the intended users of the grasscrete parking bays.
- 3.3.3 Measures should be installed to prevent parking anti-social parking on verges and footpaths.

Boundary treatments

- 3.3.4 The existing boundary walls, railings and fences should be retained as much as is feasible.
- 3.3.5 Adjustments to perimeter boundaries should be made early in the construction of the development so that hedges mature prior to residents moving in to the houses.

Front garden boundaries to houses

- 3.3.6 Ownership/management responsibility between plots should be clearly defined with a low railing, change of surfacing or hedge.
- 3.3.7 In order to differentiate parking bays where they adjoin those of the neighbouring house, railings or stone setts should be used to form a dividing line.

Rear garden fencing and gates

- 3.3.8 To allow cyclists to come and go, garden entry gates should be fitted with a lock that allows entry and exit with the use of a key.

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- 3.3.9 Gates securing access to rear gardens should be as close to the front building line as is feasible.
- 3.3.10 Rear gardens should be secured with 2000mm high hedges, walls, railings or robust fences, or a combination of these. A more sympathetic form of boundary should be considered for the Palatine Road and Lapwing Lane boundaries to the houses, i.e. retaining the existing walls and railings and introducing a hedge (maintained at 2000mm) that will provide privacy and security to residents whilst not negatively impacting on the streetscene.
- 3.3.11 Fencing between neighbouring houses should include an 1800mm high, close-boarded fencing panel (acting as a privacy screen, generally erected perpendicular to the back of the house, before it may be lowered to 1200mm or 1500mm of close-boarded fencing with 600mm or 300mm sections of trellis to create a secure boundary whilst also allowing neighbours to interact. The proposed 900mm high fence is not considered adequate.

Office/apartment building

- 3.3.12 The existing planting around the Palatine Road and Lapwing Lane frontage to the building should be managed such that the ground floor of the building is more visible from the street, especially the entrance doors to the apartments.
- 3.3.13 A 2000mm high fence (or railings) should be introduced to restrict movement around the building. It should be installed between the southern elevation and the high, rear garden fence of the detached house to the south, and between the bin store and the north-western corner of the building. Any gates in this fencing should include access controls for the use of apartment residents or office staff only. The gates should be self-closing and self-locking.

Cycle storage

- 3.3.14 For each house, fit a Sold SecureTM ground or wall anchor to which bikes may be secured or install a Secured by Design accredited cycle locker/box.
- 3.3.15 For each apartment a secure cycle store should be provided in a suitably secure part of the development, out of view of the passing public, e.g. behind the bin store and fence separating the front of the building from the rear. The store must be a robust, weatherproof structure with a self-closing, self-locking door or gate.
- 3.3.16 Cycle parking, in the form of ground anchored hoops or, ideally, a weatherproof shelter, should be provided for the office staff. It should be located adjacent to the rear entrance.

House security

- 3.3.17 Secured by Design standard doors, window frames and glazing should be installed within each house. Garage doors should also carry a security rating. An intruder alarm is advised.

Apartment security

- 3.3.18 Secured by Design standard entrance doors should be installed to each apartment. The communal entrance door serving the first floor apartments should be security rated, self-closing and self-locking. An intruder alarm is advised.

Office security

- 3.3.19 The new entrance and the basement-to-ground level, means of escape should be secured with Secured by Design standard doors.
- 3.3.20 The retained entrance door on the Palatine Road elevation should include at least two locks compliant with the Secured by Design/British Standards.
- 3.3.21 Both entrance doors should be fitted with an electronic lock so that the premises can remain secure during the working day at times when staff are not present at the reception desk.
- 3.3.22 Lockers should be provided for staff to secure their personal belongings whilst working.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

Houses

- ☐ External front, side and rear doors, including multi-folding doors, must all be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS 202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Front doors should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key when closed.
- ☐ Front doors should have fixed sidelights or a door viewer, as well as an opening limiter fitted, so that residents can identify visitors prior to opening the door fully.
- ☐ Chain or similar opening limiters should be fitted to the front doors.
- ☐ Letter plates should meet the Door Hardware Federation's Technical Standard 008 (TS 008), be fitted with deflector plate, and be located a minimum of 400mm away from the internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Each house should be clearly numbered with the number visible from the street.
- ☐ Garage doors must all be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR1/2.
- ☐ Internal doors connecting the garage to the house must all be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS 202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2.

Apartments

- ☐ The communal entrance door (first floor apartments) and each apartment entrance door should be:
 - compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2; and,
 - be self-closing and lock automatically on closure.
- ☐ An audio, and ideally visual, unit should be located at the external entrance doors to allow visitors to communicate with residents.
- ☐ Residents should have a handset in their apartment to speak to (and view) visitors.
- ☐ Residents should be able to operate the entry door locking mechanism remotely from within their apartments to allow bona fide visitors entry.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must include a door viewer.
- ☐ Chain or similar opening limiters should be fitted to apartment entrance doors.

Offices

- ☐ The front and rear entrance doors, and the means of escape door must be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2. All doors should be self-closing and self-locking. The two entrance doors should be fitted with an LPS1175/SBD complaint electronic lock.
- ☐ If retained, the Palatine Road entrance door should be fitted with two SBD/British Standard complaint mechanical locks and an electronic lock (to control access during the working day).
- ☐ For use at times when the reception desk is not manned or there are a limited number of staff present, an intercom should be fitted at each entrance door to allow visitors to communicate with staff prior to entry.

4.2 Window frames

- ☐ Ground floor windows of houses must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.
- ☐ Key-operated locks, and fixed/lockable opening restrictors (limiting opening to 100mm) should be fitted to any opening windows on the ground floor of the offices.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within, and surrounding, all external doors and all ground floor windows of the houses must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356.
- ☐ New or replacement glazing with the windows or external doors of the offices must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356.

4.4 Intruder alarm

- ☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each house, apartment and the offices. Alarms should be linked to contacts on all external doors, with PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms that have windows.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such hedges, walls or railings to height of around 1000mm.
- ☐ Sub-divisional boundaries to the front of houses should be defined with railings, fencing or hedges.
- ☐ To allow cyclists to come and go, garden entry gates should be fitted with a lock that allows entry and exit with the use of a key. Security will be enhanced if the gates are self-closing and lock upon closure.
- ☐ The 2000mm high, timber gates securing access to rear gardens, should be as close to the front building line as is feasible.
- ☐ Rear gardens should be secured with 2000mm high walls, railings or fences.
- ☐ Fencing between neighbouring houses should include an 1800mm high, privacy panel and 1200mm or 1500mm of close-boarded fencing with 600mm or 300mm sections of trellis.

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In order to facilitate natural surveillance across the development, any shrub planting within front gardens or around the office/apartment building, should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies throughout the public realm of the site should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External, dusk-to-dawn lighting must be provided to all front, rear and garage doors of all houses, and to the entrance and means of escape doors, and the cycle store at the office/apartment building.
- ☐ Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light.

4.8 Meter cupboards

- ☐ Unless smart meters are installed, meters should be located in ground level boxes to the front of each house, not with the secure area at the side or rear of the properties.

4.9 Downpipes

- ☐ Wherever possible, downpipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the brickwork to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A plan should be drawn up to address maintenance of the communal areas of the development.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.
- ☐ The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme' and the Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved.

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
17.12.20	Tom Flanagan, Paul Butler Associates	Request for Crime Impact Statement
25.01.21		Site visited
29.04.21	Tom Flanagan, Paul Butler Associates	Revised plans received
02.06.21	Tom Flanagan, Paul Butler Associates	Report issued
10.06.21	Tom Flanagan, Paul Butler Associates	Comments on version A received
11.06.21	Tom Flanagan, Paul Butler Associates	Report re-issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
AXI-100	Site plan & house types as proposed	23/09/20	11
AXI-120	Proposed public house general arrangements	23/09/20	03
AXI-130	Detached house plans as proposed	23/09/20	03
AXI-131	Semi-detached house type plans as proposed	23/09/20	03
AXI-132	Small semi-detached house plans as proposed	23/09/20	01
AXI-134	Detached house plans as proposed external garage	23/09/20	03
AXI-160	Detached house type elevations as proposed	23/09/20	03
AXI-161	Semi-detached house type elevations as proposed	23/09/20	03
AXI-162	Small semi-detached house elevations as proposed	23/09/20	00
AXI-164	Detached house external garage elevations as proposed	23/09/20	00

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary to review the recommendations within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		02.06.21
B	Area of the site amended	11.06.21

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk