



## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

King Street

Bar (120sqm)

For: **37 KS GP Limited on behalf of 37 KS**

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: **04/08/21**

design**for**security

Reference: **2017/1115/CIS/01**

---

# King Street

2017/1115/CIS/01

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Minor security additions/design changes required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, which includes:

- Control of access into/around the bar– including access controls to main entrance out-of-hours.
- Staff back-of-house areas.
- Prevention of internal access through to landlord core areas at basement level (and vice versa), as well as the control of access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.
- External CCTV providing cover to the street entrance & Alley.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

**Please note:** Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.



**David Maher** *Dip Arch*

Design for Security Consultant

e: [david.maher@gmp.police.uk](mailto:david.maher@gmp.police.uk)

---

# Contents

|   |                                                              |    |
|---|--------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 1 | Visual Audit.....                                            | 4  |
| 2 | Crime Statistics & Analysis.....                             | 5  |
|   | 2.1 Crime Summary                                            |    |
|   | 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)               |    |
|   | 2.3 Risk Factors                                             |    |
|   | 2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis |    |
|   | 2.2 Theft (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis                 |    |
|   | 2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis                             |    |
| 3 | Layout Appraisal.....                                        | 9  |
|   | 3.1 Proposed development                                     |    |
|   | 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal                         |    |
|   | 3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations                       |    |
| 4 | Physical Security .....                                      | 11 |
|   | 4.1 Doors                                                    |    |
|   | 4.2 Shutters                                                 |    |
|   | 4.3 Internal Layout & Security                               |    |
|   | 4.4 Lighting                                                 |    |
|   | 4.5 Alarm                                                    |    |
|   | 4.6 CCTV                                                     |    |
| 5 | Management & Maintenance .....                               | 13 |
| 6 | Construction .....                                           | 14 |
| 7 | Useful References .....                                      | 14 |
|   | 7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)                                  |    |

## Appendix

|   |                           |    |
|---|---------------------------|----|
| A | Contact register .....    | 15 |
| B | Associated Documents..... | 15 |
| C | CIS Version History ..... | 15 |
| D | Glossary .....            | 16 |

# 1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.


The site lies in central Manchester within the King Street Conservation Area. The application premises forms the basement floor of an existing commercial building with proposed access from St. Ann's Alley. The main building also contains a retail unit which is separate from the upper floors of commercial office functions, both are accessed from King Street.

St. Ann's Alleyway, connects Cross St to St. Ann's church. On the corner of Cross St & St. Ann's Alley is Mr. Thomas's Chop House a popular pub and restaurant. The pub runs the length of the alleyway, has an entrance/exit at both ends and obscure lead windows facing onto the alley.


At the rear of the pub are a large number of outside drinking tables and chairs, popular across the day time.

The site is located within the long-established retail and commercial district but the nature of the area is changing with more restaurants occupying former retail spaces. This section of King Street is pedestrianised and a highly active thoroughfare for pedestrian and shoppers.


The area around the site contains a number of licensed premises. Late-night revellers leaving licensed premises and gathering on the nearby streets and spaces can cause nuisance and generate significant disorder / abuse.




1 – View along St. Ann's Alley.



2 – Office entrance off King St.



3 – St. Ann's Alley from Cross St.




7 – St. Ann's Alley from the rear of St. Ann's church.



6 – Outdoor seating to the pub at the rear of St. Ann's church.



5 – Side window from neighbouring public house along St. Ann's Alley.



4 – Entrance to proposed site.

## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1<sup>st</sup> July 2018 to 30<sup>th</sup> June 2019.

### 2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

| Domestic Burglary | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------|---------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| 20                | 381                   | 363             | 1935                  | 1486  | 437     | 59               | 338                      | 36                     | 237           |

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high for Manchester, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime being the highest reported crimes. The location of the proposed site should be taken into consideration when looking at the crime statistics as the site is located within the city centre where there is a high concentration of retail outlets, licenced premises and restaurants, leading to an increase of crime and disorder in the area.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly around Deansgate and towards the Northern Quarter. Both areas have a high volume of bars and clubs. Offences have mostly occurred over the weekend period (Friday – Sunday) during the late evening and early hours of the morning when most premises in the area are closing. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings in the local area, with offences often taking place between known associates, with alcohol often being a factor.
- 2.1.3 Thefts have taken place throughout the area, with hotspots occurring to the north east, around Piccadilly Gardens and to the north around Quay Street and Deansgate. Offenders have mostly used pick pocketing techniques and distraction methods in order to obtain personal belongings, mostly mobile phones, bags and purses/ wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (mostly mobile phones) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the local area has mostly taken place in private car parks and vehicles using on street parking facilities. Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime with offenders using implements and objects in order to smash glazing and access the interior of the vehicle. Offenders have also targeted vehicle registration plates, using tools to remove them.

### 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Opening of secured doors and windows using bodily force or implements to gain entry.

*Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.*

- 2.2.2 Smashing glazing in windows and doors to gain entry.

*Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, grilles or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.*

- 2.2.3 Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

*Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 4.4). The layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.*

- 2.2.4 Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas.

---

*Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).*


## **2.3 Risk Factors**

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery / wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

## 2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.1.1 **Day / Time Range:** In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises between Monday and Wednesday and is lowest on Friday. The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas/streets where they are typical found are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.

2.1.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure doors and windows – mostly fire doors located to the side and rear of the property are targeted – using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors/ tailgating staff into restricted areas, taking property belonging to employees and the business.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements to access the doors and windows located below.
- Broken glazing to windows and doors – located mostly to the front of the property, with glass in doors highly targeted- using bricks or implements located around the scene.

## 2.2 Theft (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.2.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses / wallets, cash and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, from bags hung on chairs/stored under tables or via pickpocketing and distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

## 2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Monday, Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon (12pm – 4:30pm) and evening (6:30pm – 11:59pm). Offenders have mostly targeted vehicles using private car parking and on street parking facilities. Vehicles are often left unsupervised for long periods of time in areas where footfall is reduced, creating perceived low risk opportunities for offenders.

---

## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is located in the basement of 39-43 King Street, in the retail & business district of Manchester City Centre.
- 3.1.2 The proposed development is for Bar use with internal performance space.
- 3.1.3 The main entrance is located on St. Ann's Alley, accessed via St. Ann's Place or Cross Street.

### 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

- 3.2.1 The proposal will provide additional activity to St. Ann's Alley, helping to provide useful natural surveillance and door presence currently lacking to this particular back-street alleyway.
- 3.2.2 The footprint of the internal space is simple, with no accessible doors/windows hidden within deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack unseen).
- 3.2.3 The development could provide the opportunity to install external lighting and CCTV which would provide much a needed visual crime deterrent and means of capturing any incidents anti-social behaviour
- 3.2.4 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the premises and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

### 3.3 Recommendations

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

- 3.3.1 Any new external doorsets (including single-leaf or double-leaf) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- 3.3.2 It is highly recommended that the main entrance at street level is covered by a CCTV system. The cameras should also provide coverage down the alleyway in both directions.
- 3.3.3 It would be beneficial to run a cashless business, with all payments taken by card – leaving the premises less vulnerable to cash robbery.
- 3.3.4 Bars: in particular if poorly managed, can generate crime:
  - 1. Large numbers of people congregating in one place generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons of bars/restaurants are stationary for long periods of time making them easier to target.
  - 2. The movement of people, noise, social interaction, and levels of intoxication mean patrons are less vigilant in the care of their personal belongings.
  - 3. Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality', i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them. This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur in the venue where there is a 'regular' clientele.
  - 4. High customer turnover bars/restaurants, with high levels of customer movement within the establishment are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.

- 
5. Valuable goods (mobile phones, wallets, purses, etc.) are very often available and on show, a particular problem on external seating areas, although that is not an issue with this proposal.
  6. Poorly arranged waste disposal can lead to arson. Unsecured bins placed on the highway or in accessible rear areas have been targeted in the city centre in the past, if the bins are very close to a building this can have very serious consequences.

3.3.5 In order to minimise the above issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles should be adhered to:

- The entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- Customers entering/leaving the premises through the entrance should be easily observed by staff. Staff should always have a clear view of the entrance door and stairs via a CCTV system.
- The back-of-house area must not be accessible to the public.
- There should be secure lockers for staff to store their belongings whilst at work located in a private room within the premises.
- A secure room, with a time delay safe, so that staff can count the takings out of public gaze and store cash overnight.
- A chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) should be located behind the bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- The design of the bar itself should ensure that it is elevated high or wide, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons, and aids surveillance of all parts of the floor.
- Tills should front customers as they enable staff to maintain vision of the serving area and beyond. (Ideally, fit tills below the bar or protect with screening to prevent snatches).
- Casual access to the rear of service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch).
- The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding pinch points. A clear pathway to and from the entrance/exit and the toilets to the seating areas is required.
- Service areas should be secured at all times.

3.3.6 With the above in mind, an 'operating policy' should be drawn up which includes:

- security (door policy; door staff; staff training; CCTV cameras - monitoring and recording facilities, and their locations; and cash storage/management);
- fire safety, including clearing the designated escape route of all obstacles;
- dispersal procedure; and,

3.3.7 Servicing and waste management (in a secure location), avoiding the disposal of glass late at night which might disturb any nearby residents.

3.3.8 It is highly recommended that customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).

3.3.9 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

---

## 4 Physical Security

*The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.*

### 4.1 Doors

- ☐ Any new external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.

### 4.2 Shutters

- ☐ The entrance doors should be secured with shutters certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), which should be installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

### 4.3 Internal Layout & Security

#### 4.3.1 Bars and restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating in premises, generating opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent such premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

#### 4.3.2 The internal security and layout of the premises should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, in order to minimise the issues highlighted above:

- ☐ The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising. Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff. Multiple entry points should be avoided if possible, but must be individually staffed if required
- ☐ All door staff employed at the premises should be provided by an SIA ACS approved door security company and should wear easily identifiable clothing, both when inside and outside the premises.
- ☐ A smoking area should be defined and clearly demarcated and a procedure for allowing smokers to re-enter the premises should be set out in the operating procedures for the venue.
- ☐ If cash is taken at the premises, there should be a secure cash office – which should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a doorset certified to BS PAS 24 and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Consideration

---

should also be given to chute deposit safes (certified to LPS 1183) behind the bar areas, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

- ☐ Internal access doors/frames to all other offices, cellar/store rooms, package/distribution spaces, kitchens, staff facilities etc. should also be solid-core (min. 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with key operated locks (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times) to secure them when unoccupied. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to high bars/service counters, which increases the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aids surveillance of all parts of the premises. Any tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of the bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled). Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.
- ☐ Staff should have clear views of the W/Cs to monitor their use. The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

#### 4.4 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors/shutters. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be controlled from behind the bar or in a security/management room, away from public access. Zoned dimmers should be used to increase control of areas from the bar/management office. An override is recommended, within easy reach of security staff, so that if an incident occurs the lighting level can be raised. High-level house lighting is an important element of control. This will also help at the end of an event so that staff can see to clear up, and patrons have no doubt that it is closing time and they should make their way out of the premises.

#### 4.5 Alarm

- ☐ An alarm should be installed to cover the premises, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (e.g. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder).
- ☐ It is also recommended that the alarm system should incorporate personal attack buttons for the use of staff in identified locations, such as behind the bars or in any cash office (which should also contain a telephone and a mobile phone with a clear signal).

#### 4.6 CCTV

- 4.6.1 Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
  - ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
  - ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
  - ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an **acceptable standard** that will allow for **identification** of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

**Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

**Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: **the external entrances to the premises, all bars and alcohol storage areas, any cash office and customer circulation/seating areas.**

## 5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. An operating/maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:
  - Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
  - Any cash management within the premises;
  - Any cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
  - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
  - Details of staff security training;
  - Location and management of any smoking areas;
  - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
  - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
  - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 5.1.2 There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.3 The opening hours of the premises should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Service of drinks should end approximately 30 minutes before the premises closes, in order to aid effective dispersal of customers.
- 5.1.4 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, flat screen monitors/televisions etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.5 It is highly recommended that customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



#### 5.1.6 Toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.
- Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas

## 6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

## 7 Useful References

### 7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

## A Contact register

| Date        | Contact With        | Summary of Contact       |
|-------------|---------------------|--------------------------|
| 09/07/2021  | Sixteen real estate | CIS instruction received |
| 13/07/2021  | Sixteen real estate | Fee & CIS instructed     |
| 26/07/2021  | DfS                 | Site visit               |
| 16/07/20210 | DfS                 | Invoice issued           |
| 04/08/2021  | Sixteen real estate | CIS version A issued     |
|             |                     |                          |
|             |                     |                          |

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No. | Drawing Title  | Date     | Rev |
|-------------|----------------|----------|-----|
|             | 010A PrPlan A3 | 30/07/21 |     |
|             | 013 PrEle A3   | 30/07/21 |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |
|             |                |          |     |

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

## C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made | Date |
|---------|----------------|------|
| A       |                |      |
|         |                |      |

## D Glossary

### Burglary Resistance Standards

#### BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.*

#### BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.*

#### ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

**The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:**

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual **intervention**

#### LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

*This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.*

#### STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

#### STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

#### EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

*A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.*

### Commonly Used Acronyms

#### CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

#### CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

#### CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

#### INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

#### PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

#### LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

#### UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

### Useful Websites

#### Design for Security

[www.designforsecurity.org](http://www.designforsecurity.org)

#### Secured by Design

[www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com)

#### RIBA Product Selector

[www.ribaproductselector.com](http://www.ribaproductselector.com)

#### LPCB – Red Book Live

[www.redbooklive.com](http://www.redbooklive.com)

#### Crime Reduction (Home Office)

[www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk)

#### DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

[www.designagainstcrime.org](http://www.designagainstcrime.org)

#### Building for Life

[www.buildingforlife.org](http://www.buildingforlife.org)

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

