



Crime Impact Statement

Site/Project:	Vertical Extension for a Third Floor Rooftop Bar and Terrace
Location:	46 Canal Street, Manchester. M1 3WD
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Contents

1. Introduction	2
2. Executive Summary	2
3. Proposal Overview	3
4. Site Analysis.....	4
5. Crime Analysis	7
6. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design	10
7. Conclusion and Recommendations.....	12
8. Appendices.....	14
1. Standards	14
2. References	14

1: Introduction

This Crime Impact Statement:

- Has been produced by Dobson Owens Security Consultants Limited, an independent consultancy who have not been involved in the design process prior to this instruction.
- Analyses the existing crime and disorder in the surrounding areas to the site and any potential impacting factors.
- Assesses the proposed development against the principles of CPTED (Crime Prevention through Environment Design) to offer proposals to reduce opportunities and the negative perception or fear of crime.
- Provides recommendations to reduce the proposed development's and the surrounding area's vulnerability to crime.
- Provides physical security standards based upon the Secured by Design test standards and British Standards/PAS.
- Will assist in reducing resistance to the development from the local communities and help maintain positive links between the developer and the affected stakeholders.

2: Executive Summary

This application has been assessed against the existing crime environment and the potential concerns created by the proposed activity. It is concluded that every effort has been made to negate such concerns through thoughtful design and a commitment to robust policy and procedures to reduce opportunities for crime and fear of crime.


A crime analysis in the immediate vicinity of the proposed site and broader neighbourhood area has been conducted in line with the anticipated use and controls from the proposal. Based on this intelligence, comparable facilities in the area and the existing and established use of the site, it is determined that there are no enhanced crime risks presented and the project will not negatively impact the likelihood or fear of crime. Indeed, the development, activity and commitment to enhance the building appearance and services to the LBGTQ+ community may likely have a positive impact on crime in the immediate area.

3: Proposal Overview

The proposal is for the development of an external terrace on the roof of the existing three storey building at 46 Canal Street, Manchester, M1 3WD. This will provide an extension to the already established ON Bar and night club operation. The modifications will be minimal from an interior layout perspective and will simply facilitate the introduction of access stairwells. The main access and egress points for clients will remain the same.

The below image represents the land ownership of the site; a three-storey brick-built building that is terraced on the north east elevation. To the rear of the building there is a narrow passageway that leads out of a gate on the south west elevation of the building and also down a gated road onto Richmond Street.

The subsequent map image demonstrates its proximity to Manchester city centre and the supporting local amenities and transport links.





4: Site Analysis

The proposed site is located on Canal Street in central Manchester which is a vibrant and cosmopolitan area of the city that is lined by bars and night clubs. It is an extremely popular leisure destination at all times of the day and throughout the week. The road network and public transport links are excellent which makes the area fully accessible from all parts of the city. Whilst this may provide easy and multiple escape routes for adversaries, the lively nature of the area that carries on well into the early hours of the morning offers increased casual surveillance and detection capabilities.

At night vehicular access to the street is restricted with automated rising bollards to create a pedestrian zone.

The surrounding area is largely commercial and very densely populated with buildings. These are largely brick built and vary in height and the number of storeys, which is very typical for a city centre location. This creates an equal mix of blind spots from elevation as well as naturally overlooked space. Indeed, the provision of the proposed roof terrace would create additional visibility and natural surveillance of the surrounding street and adjacent buildings. For such a vibrant, city centre location, the frontage of the buildings in the area appears in a good state of repair and suitably cared for by the owners. This is a deterrent to crime that will be discussed later in the CPTED section. However, the buildings running parallel and to the rear on Richmond Street have markings of vandalism and graffiti and most windows and doors are grilled.



To the east and south east there are some green areas and parks which provides relief from the city bustle.

Other influences in the vicinity are university buildings for both Manchester Metropolitan University and University of Manchester. This will provide seasonal spikes in student activity and potential customers to the venue. Manchester College is also in very close proximity to the venue.

General operating times based on licensing are as follows:

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
1000-0330	1000-0330	1000-0330	1000-0330	1000-0530	1000-0530	1000-0330

Operating such extensive opening hours where the site is only closed for a maximum of 6.5 hours limits the amount of inactivity and opportunity for crime such as burglary. However, this could potentially elevate the value of cash taking and which may attract internal theft or robbery.

4.1 Site Perimeter


The building shell creates the perimeter of the building and the ground floor frontage is predominantly glass. Customer access is via a northern and southern door along this elevation which are of solid construction with the exception of a narrow glass viewing panel that extends the length of the door.

To the first floor there is a balcony that encompasses the width of the frontage and this is again predominantly glazed with full glass doors providing access. This offers a potential climbing aid to a more vulnerable access point, especially with the planters and other external furniture offering facilitation.

The rear of the building is predominantly brick built with two double leaf, solid construction emergency exits that are secured from the inside to allow free egress in an emergency, but restrict access from the outside.

There is a narrow passageway down the western side of the building that is blocked via a gate. Whilst this is easily accessible from the outside, there are limited opportunities for crime in this area due to the security design of the rear of the building.



There is extensive public CCTV in the area as well as on site and internal monitoring.




4.2 Building Design and Footprints

As previously highlighted, the application is for the development of a roof terrace for ON Bar that is proposed to be built at the third-floor level. This will create an impressive feature and views of the surrounding areas as well as a valuable external space should there be a requirement to increase COVID-19/pandemic protocols in the future.

The lower floors and their external façade and access arrangements will remain largely unchanged with the glass frontage described above, balcony and the secured rear of the building with emergency exits. The proposed roof terrace will obviously be visible and will arguably enhance the aesthetics of the building.




Internally, there will be a vertical extension built to facilitate the roof terrace and this will include also extending the north and south stairwells to provide two access points (circled in red below) and a mirrored floor plan throughout the building. There will be a bar, seating area and toilets all facilitated at this level. The sides and front of the balcony will be reinforced glass balustrades to enable full views out and into the area of adjacent properties. Whilst this will not only enrich the customer experience, it will also enable the natural and casual surveillance discussed earlier and in the CPTED section of this report.



5: Crime Analysis

5.1 Crime Statistics – Immediate site vicinity



A crime analysis of a 1.5 kilometre radius around the Canal Street site has been completed. The above map demonstrates the area captured within this.

The statistics have been compared from July to June 2017-18 and 2018-19. More up to date and suitably representative crime statistics are unavailable from Greater Manchester Police. However, the crime rates are very consistent by crime over the two periods and the dynamic provided by the COVID-19 pandemic for the last 18 months, especially for the night club industry, and extended lockdown durations may provide unrealistic trends for the area.

Crime Type	Total No. Crimes July 2018- June 2019	Total No. Crimes July 2017- June 2018	+/- %
Anti-social behaviour	5,464	5,409	+1%
Burglary	1,120	1,296	-14%
Robbery	1,320	1,224	+7%
Vehicle	3,059	2,426	+26%
Violent/sexual	6,005	7,079	-15%
Shoplifting	1,864	2,025	-8%
Criminal damage and arson	1,334	1,480	-10%
Other theft	3,575	3,559	+1%
Drugs	890	560	+59%
Cycle theft	737	928	-21%
Theft from person	4,267	3,374	+26%
Weapons	259	212	+22%
Public order	3,091	4,166	-26%
Other	157	189	-17%
Total	33,142	33,927	-2.3%

(Other crime includes crimes such fraud, forgery, going equipped and other Home Office notifiable crimes. Other theft includes theft from building and handling crimes). Statistics obtained from www.crimestats.co.uk

The above crime rates are quite high, but this is due to the site in the centre of Manchester city centre. This is indicative of the crime rates for large cities. There is an overall decrease of 2.3% between the two reporting periods (equating to 785 incidents), although there is an equal mix of crime categories showing increased and decreased prevalence. The statistics highlight violent crime, anti-social behaviour and theft from person as the most predominant crimes in the area. This is not unusual for a city centre location, although it would be expected for public order to also feature as one of the most common crimes. In actuality, public order has seen the largest decrease of all the crime categories.

Violent and sexual crime is the highest, although positively, this has fallen by 15% from the previous reporting period. Whilst this appears concerning, it should be noted that this is a broad category and covers a variety of offences ranging from common assault to murder. This means that the offence does not necessarily need to be physically violent and can be threatening language or gestures that make another person afraid that they may be about to be attacked.

Anti-social behaviour is the second most prevalent crime in the area and remains at a fairly constant level from the prior year. Anti-social behaviours are actions that harm or demonstrate a lack consideration for the well-being of others, any type of conduct that violates the basic rights of another person or are considered to be disruptive to others in society. This is more of a community-based offence and given the densely populated location, this is a logical statistic.

It should also be noted that anti-social behaviour (and public order) is often a precursor to the commission of other offences. For example, they could lead to or involve an assault, unlawful possession of a weapon or the causing of criminal damage.

The next highest crime rate is for theft from person and other theft.

Theft from person relates to stealing property that is being held or carried by another person. This differs from robbery as it does not include violence or the threat of violence. It includes offences such as pickpocketing and bag snatching which are common in densely populated areas.

The biggest increase seen is for drug related crimes (up 59% - 330 incidents) which include supply and personal use offences. This is concerning as these

crimes often lead to others such as violence, theft or anti-social behaviour.

Vehicle crime has also seen an increase of 26%, which is the equivalent 633 incidents. The other significant increase is Incidents involving weapons has increased by 22% or 47 incidents.

5.2 Analysis of Impact of Proposed site on Crime

Violent/Sexual Crime

As previously discussed, this is the most prevalent crime by a considerable margin, albeit falling by 15% from the previous reporting period. Due to the presence of alcohol, which can affect emotional state and reasoning ability, there is the potential for users of the venue to become emotive and resort to violent acts for a number of reasons. Within this category, violence against staff should also not be disregarded.

Hate crime should also be considered in this category given that this is in the Gay Village area of Manchester. ON Bar is an inclusive LGBTQ+ community venue which may attract such violence, although the venue takes an active role in local community activity including the Village Business Association.

However, the installation of the roof terrace on an existing and well-established club will be unlikely to impact this statistic. Whilst the footfall and capacity of the building will increase, this will be negligible when considering the expanse of similar facilities in the immediate area of the club.

Anti-social Behaviour/Public order

Again, usually due to alcohol consumption, customers leaving the venue late at night may create excessive noise and commit other anti-social/public order offences such as public urination or littering. Such behaviour and large groups of people can also create concern and fear of crime with other users or people travelling home.

The external area could potentially create additional noise pollution, although again, the proximity of similar facilities nearby, other external drinking and dining areas as well as the general bustle of a vibrant night spot, it is unlikely to have a significant impact.

The ON Bar also has a robust policy in place for smoking and al fresco dining where noise and behaviour are monitored and addressed as required.

There is a similarly robust dispersal policy which will gradually empty the building with the aim to minimise the impact of the venue on the surrounding area and neighbours.

Theft from Person

As outlined in the crime statistics, this is the third most prevalent crime and has shown the second highest increase in the area. This is a relatively low-level crime, but could have a significant impact if someone's wallet, purse or phone were stolen late at night limiting their ability to get home safely.

Whilst the venue could potentially impact this statistic, its prevalence is more likely to derive from the shopping centres and other facilities that draw crowds in a city centre (e.g., football matches, universities). The roof terrace extension is unlikely to negatively impact theft from person given the prevalence of other similar venues throughout the area.

Drug Offences

Drug offences is the highest growing incident in the area of the proposed building and recreational drug use whilst in a night club will account for a considerable number of these offences.

Given the vibrant nature of the area and numerous similar facilities, the roof terrace extension will again, likely have minimal impact on this statistic. However, whilst the ON Bar policy states that persons who appear under the influence of drugs will not be provided entry and trained SIA Door Supervisors are in use, a more robust and clearly communicated zero tolerance policy may be appropriate.

There is a CCTV system of a suitable quality which could also be used to deter and detect such offences.

Burglary and Robbery

Burglary and robbery are not highlighted in the overview section as they are not the most prevalent crimes in the area or see a significant increase or decrease over the reporting periods (albeit burglary has fallen by 15%). However, as a commercial building, ON Bar could be impacted by these crimes especially due to there being a considerable amount of cash on site at certain times of the day and night.

However, as the site has extensive opening hours, the risk of burglary falls slightly and management should be mindful of the at-risk periods for robbery (i.e., opening and closing). Regular cash drops from bar areas are advised as well as robbery training for staff.

5.3 Building Site

During the construction phase of the proposed site there is a risk of burglary, theft (internal and external) and potentially protest or sabotage of the site if the change of use has been disputed publicly. Care should also be taken to not leave facilitators for crime in view and accessible (e.g., tools, ladders, scaffold, pipes, bricks etc.).

6: Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

The following section will analyse the proposed site in relation to the five core principles of CPTED.

Natural Surveillance

This is about increasing visibility whether through encouraging other persons/activity in an area, by it being overlooked by buildings or by actions carried out on adjacent sites. In this instance, the extension of the roof terrace can only positively impact natural surveillance. The below image shows the existing roof and a representation of the view that it will create of the surrounding area.




The increased natural and casual surveillance that will be derived from this facility will cover both north and southwards down Canal Street and beyond to Princess Street and Whitworth Street.

As the proposed roof terrace will have a glazed frontage, this will provide reciprocal surveillance from the surrounding buildings and to a certain extent, from ground level. The adjacent buildings are apartment blocks which will provide this across a broad scope of the day and night.

The first-floor balcony further reinforces this, although this does create a shadowy area beneath and the additional alcoved access doors can create hiding places during closure hours. There is however existing illumination and CCTV in this area and ensuring that this is suitably serviced and operational at all times will help minimise the feeling that an adversary is hidden from view.

Internally the layout of the roof terrace allows the seating area to be clearly observed from the bar area, although at busy periods or when the bar stools are in use, this may be obscured. The proposed fountain may have a similar effect and observation of the access stairwells is not possible from this area. Designing the bar area to be slightly elevated will help to improve the visibility of the surrounding area and maintain staff safety.



Natural Access Control

This is the control of vehicles and pedestrians through structures such as physical barriers, lighting or landscaping. It ensures the correct channelling of users through the site to aid natural surveillance and to draw attention to anyone who is non-compliant.

In this instance the use of designated routes and stairwells should be clearly delineated and rope and pole barriers are used to assist with queue control as required. This ensures that all persons entering the building are assessed for suitability for access (e.g., under the influence of alcohol or drugs, over 25 policy etc.)

Management and Maintenance

This principle highlights the need for the physical environment to be maintained to give the impression of care. Markers such as graffiti, litter or abandoned equipment can lead to an impression that criminal behaviour is tolerated and that the proposed site is a soft target, thus encouraging further activity.

As previously discussed, the frontage of the building, the external Canal Street area and surrounding buildings are in an excellent state of repair. The buildings are tended to, have flowers, hanging baskets and external lighting. This level of pride in the community is a strong deterrent for crime.

However, Richmond Street, which runs parallel with Canal Street and is directly behind ON Bar has significant graffiti and criminal damage markers. Windows and doors are in a poor state of repair and many are grilled. This has the opposite effect and whilst not directly related to the proposed site, it has the potential to migrate into a broader problem.

ON Bar have an existing policy where waste and recycling are collected by a specialist refuse contractor. Refuse, glasses or glass bottles from the are stored in the in the building until the collection time. Clients are not permitted to take drinks, bottles or glasses out of the building or beyond the external boundaries of the site.

Natural Territorial Reinforcement

There are two parts to Natural Territorial Reinforcement:

- Creation of a sense of ownership and security culture within the site
- Create a sense of owned space where space is clearly defined and strangers stand out

The first part of this principle is largely operational, although the site is committed to providing a safe place for the LGBTQ+ community and is active within the Gay Village business sector to reinforce this. This is a powerful crime prevention tool whereby the community using the venue becomes protective and actively monitor and supervise the area, albeit sometimes subconsciously, to help maintain its integrity.

In regard to the second part of Natural Territorial Reinforcement, the perimeter of the building is clearly demarcated.

Appropriate and formal signage, both internally and externally should assist in highlighting correct access routes and the restrictions/authority of access to the different spaces to deter unauthorised access. This feeds into the Natural Access Control Principle above.

Compartmentalisation

This is a fundamental security principle that develops concentric layers of protection around assets to delay an adversary and increase the likelihood of detection. As far as possible, each layer should offer deterrent, detection, delay and response capabilities.

This is difficult to achieve with the building being a public one and areas specifically developed to service them. However, areas such as offices (particularly where a cash safe is located), cellars, storerooms etc. should remain locked at all times with clear demarcations in regard to authorised access.

This helps to minimise ‘accidental’ access and potential theft from these sensitive areas.

The rear emergency exit doors should remain secured from the inside (albeit available for egress in an emergency) and alarmed at all times so that it can be determined should there be an unmonitored access point available at any specific time.

An appropriately robust lockdown process should be in place to ensure full compartmentalisation during closure times.

7: Conclusion and Recommendations

This application has been assessed against the existing crime environment and the potential concerns created by the proposed activity. It is concluded that every effort has been made to negate such concerns through thoughtful design and a commitment to robust policy, procedures and service to the LGBTQ+ community to reduce opportunities for crime and fear of crime.

Given the immediate area that the venue is located, the established nature of the business, the numerous similar facilities in the area and the proposed roof terrace being designed sympathetically with the intention to enhance the environment and appearance of the building, it is determined that there are no existing concerns as to the impact that the extension will have on the local community or crime.

Recommendations have been made throughout this document to increase resilience to crime and compliance to the relevant Secured by Design standards where relevant.

The following recommendations have been synthesised from the prior analysis and relate generally to the building as a whole as well as the roof terrace extension:

External Areas and Building Shell

- Security lighting should be in place for elevations of the building and remain illuminated at all times during the hours of darkness, although reduced levels can be employed whilst the site is unoccupied as long as they facilitate suitable quality images from the CCTV.
- External ground floor furniture should be secured during closure times to prevent it from being stolen or used as a climbing aid to the first-floor balcony.
- Emergency exit doors into the rear external passageway adjacent to Richmond Street should be alarmed at all times through the building intrusion detection system via a 24hour group. This will assist in highlighting when they are insecure or have been misused.

Internal Areas

- Doors into store rooms, office and cellar areas should be solid core with at least one five lever or five pin single cylinder/latch lock. Secondary locks should be deadbolts. Numeric/digi-locks are not recommended.
- Bar area to be slightly elevated to help maintain staff safety and natural surveillance of roof terrace.
- Regular cash drops completed from bar areas and the installation of time delay safes that are advertised to deter robbery.

Information/Policy

- Signage to include:
 - Reinforcement of zero tolerance drugs policy
 - Awareness of personal belongings and theft for customers
- Robbery training for staff.

Construction Phase

As the proposal is for the development of a roof terrace on an existing and operational building, the construction site can be suitably secured where access is only available from inside of the building.

- Storage containers should be secured via a steel locking box and shutter padlock or a steel container lock.
- Internal hoarding should be suitably secured by robust padlock and hasp with ideally, only one point of access and egress (fire regulations permitting), especially if the site is to remain partially operational during the construction phase.
- The contractor should endeavour to maintain a tidy site that minimises loose debris at ground level that could be used as a facilitator of a crime by vandals.

8: Appendix 1: Standards

The following standards and features are recommended and are required for this development to demonstrate appropriate physical security to meet Secure by Design test standards.

Doors

- All external doors (single and double leaf) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 (2016) or LPS 2081 SRB. It is also important that the additional ironmongery on escape doors is permitted under the security certification of the door.
(BS PAS 24 (2016) supersedes PAS 24 (2012) and provides a method for testing and assessing all security performance requirements of doorsets and windows, providing an easier specification requirement for developments).
- Glazing in doorset and lower-level windows should be compliant with BS EN 356: 2000.
- All internal compartmentalising doors should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a 5 lever/pin mortice deadlock (to BS 3621/EN 12209), so that the areas can be secured when vacant.
- Classroom/single cylinder locks with overriding handle on the inside should be installed as appropriate to prevent a person being locked in an area - BS 8621: 2007+A2: 2011

Windows (including skylights)

Note that BS7950 (1997) has now been withdrawn. Where stated, BS7950 must be supported by the following performance standards relevant to the material used:

- BS 4873 (2005) Specification for aluminium windows
- BS 7412 (2007) Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.
- BS 644-1 (2003) Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows – various types.
- BWF:TWAS Timber window accreditation scheme.
- BS 6510 (2005) Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.
- LPS 1270 (2010) Burglary resistance of security glazing and glazing films. Based on LPS 1175, this standard enables specifiers to select glazing films that offer resistance to manual attack equivalent to the building products in which the glass or film is to be used.

Illumination

- External areas of the proposed site should be illuminated to BS5489.

Access Controls

- AACS should be installed in line with BN EN 60839 – 11

Building Intruder Detection System

- The building intrusion detection system should be installed in line with BS EN 50131 (wired systems – the system should not include any wireless devices).

Security Safe

- Cash safes should be in line with EN 1143-1 + LPS 1183 and should have a suitable burglary resistance grade to the maximum takings held on site at any one time.

Appendix 2: References

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| • www.ismi.org.uk | • www.googlemaps.com |
| • www.crimestats.co.uk | • www.googleearth.com |
| • www.police.uk | • www.securedbydesign.com |