



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Melland High School, 50 Wembley Road

Education Development of 1,130m²

for: Bright Futures Educational Trust

version A: 26th November 2021

URN: 2005/1726/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Melland High School, 50 Wembley Road, Gorton

2005/1726/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Major Design Changes Not Required

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. In general the proposed scheme has been found acceptable, but further consideration of some aspects is advised, as stated in section 3.3 of this report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



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1 Visual Audit

The site, shown red on plan, lies in the Gorton area of east Manchester, about 1.5 km from the district centre on Hyde Road. The neighbourhood around the site is formed of established residential communities, with open fields and other educational establishments nearby.

There are public rights of way passing close by and through the wider site, requiring the parking area to be openly-accessible at all times. Individual external recreation spaces are enclosed with weld-mesh fencing.


Melland High School is part of the Gorton Education Village, and shares the wider site with Cedar Mount Academy. The proposed development will displace an area of outdoor recreation learning space and some of the existing car parking.



Car park area adjacent to proposed building



View of site from car-park looking south west



External stairs at the east end of the existing building



View of site from car park looking north west



Courtyard between wings of the existing building



Outdoor areas contain a range of play / learning spaces

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
31	9	30	100	12	7	<5	13	7	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is average for the Manchester division; with less serious wounding, domestic burglary and vehicle crime being the most prolific offences taking place in the area. The majority of offences have occurred to the north east and south west of the proposed site where housing estates are located.
- 2.1.2 The less serious wounding offences which have taken place have mostly comprised of public order offences and assaults with a concentration occurring around Holmcroft Road and the surrounding streets in Gorton. The most common M.O's have been anti-social behaviour around schools and domestic disputes taking place within the dwelling.
- 2.1.3 Domestic burglaries have mostly occurred around Wayland Road South to the north and Mount Road located to the west of the proposed site. Offenders have targeted insecure doors to the front of the property and forced entry to the back of the property.
- 2.1.4 Theft from a vehicle and criminal damage to a vehicle have been the highest recorded vehicle offences taking place in the local area. Smashed glazing in order to cause damage or gain access to the vehicle has most commonly been reported, as well as using tools in order to remove the vehicle registration plates.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Opening secure doors and windows using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the premises.

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- 2.2.2 Broken glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution - All windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor / accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, external bars or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

- 2.2.3 Theft of insecure property belonging to staff, pupils and the school.

Possible Solution – Areas restricted to staff and officials should operate using an access control system to restrict entry. Codes / fobs should be regularly updated so that only those currently with legitimate purpose should be able to gain entry to these areas. Legitimate users should be encouraged not to allow strangers to tailgate them into restricted areas of the buildings. Facilities should be provided for pupils and staff to store their belongings securely whilst at the premises.




2.3 Risk Factors - Education

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property
- Unauthorised access to buildings and private spaces
- Antisocial behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Internal theft
- Theft of staff / pupil belongings
- Staff, pupil and parent safety
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary Educational Facility: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against educational facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at education facilities in the local area peaks on a Thursday, Friday and a Sunday. The risk is relatively high throughout the day, peaking in the late evening and early hours of the morning (9pm – 5am). Offenders target educational facilities during the evening when it is dark, streets are quieter as the risk of being caught / identified lessens.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain access to the premises.
- Exploitation of insecure doors and windows to gain entry to the property.
- Climbing perimeter fencing to gain access to the grounds and approaching secure sheds use implements and bodily pressure to gain access.
- Climb onto roofing and remove tiles to gain entry to the premises.
- Force open shutters using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to the property.
- In cases where the point of entry is unknown, offenders have often posed as legitimate students/visitors and entered restricted areas by means of insecure doors.

2.5 Theft Educational Facility: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against educational facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft at educational facilities peaks on a Tuesday during the morning and into the afternoon (8am – 4pm.) The thefts carried out involve thefts of personal items, mostly mobile phones and bags, as well as equipment owned by the facility, mostly laptops and computing equipment.

2.6 The Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks during the middle of the week (Tuesday – Thursday) during the evening and early hours of the morning. Offenders often target vehicles during this time as vehicles are often left unattended for long periods of time, out of the sight of the owner, giving a perception of a low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises clearance of existing landscape features and fencing and construction of a 2 storey extension to the east of the existing building, linked by corridors. The eastern facade of the extension will directly adjoin the car park, and will include an entrance to the new facility and emergency egress.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed buildings are located within the existing school grounds. The site benefits from effective management coupled with established protocols for entry which have been largely successful in excluding potential intruders.
- 3.2.2 The proposed building has a relatively simple footprint which reduces potential hiding places and allows for easy monitoring of activity around them. (see also item 3.3.1).
- 3.2.3 The internal layout appears to be free of any potential pinch points or spaces where students could be cornered. The corridors / stairwells should provide sufficient circulation space to cope with the anticipated numbers of students, avoiding potential for bumps and collisions that can lead to more serious behavioural issues. .
- 3.2.4 The design of the building does not appear to include any external climbing aids that may allow an offender to gain access to upper levels or areas of roof. The position of adjacent features such as fencing, play equipment and storage containers should not provide a potential step up.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The layout creates a recessed area along the northern elevation between the proposed and existing buildings. As the car park is not a secure space, there is potential for offenders to be concealed here at times when the site is unoccupied. This section will need to be well illuminated and specifically covered by monitored CCTV.
- 3.3.2 The double-door entrance off the car park into the new building will be vulnerable to tailgating by intruders. This access point should therefore only be used under careful supervision of staff. An internal lobby arrangement is advised to discourage offenders entering this way. The emergency egress door at the bottom of the staircase should only be used in genuine emergencies, and should be alarmed in order to alert site management staff.
- 3.3.3 Review of CCTV and lighting. The site-wide lighting and any CCCTV systems should be adapted to reflect the proposed changes to the layout. CCTV cameras should be capable of identifying all vehicle and pedestrian movements into and out of the site as well as the building entrances, elevations and boundary fencing around it. To facilitate the CCTV system, dusk until dawn lighting should be provided, particularly around the access doors / gates. Signage should be located at the site entrance to inform visitors that their movements will be monitored and recorded.
- 3.3.4 If the school building is to be used for out-of-hours for community use then the design and layout of internal and external spaces should be capable being zoned, so that people are guided appropriately to where they need to go, and prevented from accessing other areas. There should be a robust access control system in place to prevent unauthorised access and the alarm system should be zoned so that during any community use the unused areas of the school building can still be secured.

-
- 3.3.5 Consideration should be given to the provision of secure store rooms / cages (with reinforced walls and security-certified doors / gates), where expensive I.T. and other valuable equipment could be stored out-of-hours. Any such valuable items should not be easy to remove and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system.
- 3.3.6 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- Any sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- All internal doors / frames to offices and stores should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a 5 lever mortise deadlock (to BS 3621 / EN 12209), so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.
- Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

4.2 Windows

- Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- Any shutters to protect ground floor openings must integrally-mounted and be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

4.3 Glazing

- Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Curtain Walling

Glazed curtain walling and window walls

- Secured by Design recognises four distinct types of glazed wall systems. These are:
 - Large glazed units connected by 'spider clamp' system.
 - Glazed units directly retained within a framing system (usually aluminium)
 - Framed windows installed within a separate framing system.
 - Framed windows connected to other framed windows to create a window wall.

- Glazed curtain walling must be installed using a secure glazing retention system. The method of retaining glass must include one or more of the following:
 - Security glazing tape
 - Dedicated security sealant or gasket
 - A secure mechanical fixing system (Evidence will be required to prove the system is secure. This may be achieved by utilising the specific glazing retention test within PAS 24:2012 or by indicative test on the retention system to LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR1 or STS 202: Issue 3, BR1)
- Framed windows (3 and 4 above) used within the construction of a window wall must be certified to one of the following requirements:
 - BS PAS 24:2016
 - STS 204 Issue 3: 2012
 - LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 Security Rating 1
- Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.5 Access Control

- Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - Main entrance doors
 - Internal doors off lobby
 - Doors separating internal zones within the building and doors needed to restrict access to parts of the building not in use (e.g. during evenings / weekends or community use).

4.6 Alarms

- The intruder alarm should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

4.7 Boundaries

- Boundaries intended to provide a secure barrier must be a minimum of 3m high and match the existing fencing. On undulating land, an adjusted palisade or self-levelling railing system should be adopted (in order to avoid creating voids underneath stepped panels). Secure fencing should utilise a system with a security rating of LPS 1175 SR1 (minimum). Gates should include no projecting features that would allow the fence to be easily climbed.

4.8 Landscaping

- In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

- There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.9 Lighting

- Lighting to vehicle circulation areas, service yards and car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.10 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to complement the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: **Main entrance (& lobby), building perimeters, recessed area and emergency egress point(s).**

4.11 Other

- Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

- All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors / televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- Signage and orientation. Routes leading to and from various facilities in and around the site should be obvious to site users and visitors. Disorientation can provide legitimacy for an offender to be present in a restricted area. Clear signage should be provided throughout the site which will help to direct people to where they need to go, and discourage entry to restricted areas.
- Consideration should be given to a protective coating applied to any areas that may be vulnerable to graffiti (such as large expanses of blank walls and inside toilets) - applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal (e.g. 'easy on' – see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and pupils should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.
- 5.1.3 Ensure that the site management is for which the building / site was designed able to cope with the remains in place
- 5.1.4 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.
- 5.1.5 Outside of main arriving / departing times for pupils and staff, gates should be secured to prevent unauthorised access into the school grounds (i.e. the secure perimeter of the school).

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
23/08/2021	Bowker Saddler Architecture	CIS instruction received
17/09/2021	Bowker Saddler Architecture	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
22/11/2021	Bowker Saddler Architecture	Progress enquiry
25/11/2021	Melland High School	Site visit
26/11/2021	Bowker Saddler Architecture	Progress Update

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
1000	Existing Site Plan		
1024	Proposed Site Plan		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk