



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Rayburn Trading, Cheetham Hill, Manchester

Warehouse (1,085sqm)

FOR: Rayburn Trading

VERSION A: 28th September

REFERENCE: 2021/0425/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Rayburn Trading, Cheetham Hill

2021/0425/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported with Further Points for Consideration

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed industrial development is suitable for this area, has a number of similar developments in the local area. Further consideration should be given to the following points:

- Site boundaries should be evaluated and any damage should be repaired.
- Existing site security measures (i.e. lighting & CCTV) should be extended to the proposed warehouse.
- The physical security of the building should be carefully considered.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development and it is highly recommended that these are considered for the proposed units and the wider outline proposals.



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Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	5
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
	2.1 Crime Overview	
	2.2 Non-domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis	
	2.3 Miscellaneous Theft: Risk Analysis	
	2.4 Risk Factors	
	2.5 Crime Summary	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	8
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security	10
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Windows	
	4.3 Glazing	
	4.4 Alarms	
	4.5 Boundaries	
	4.6 Landscaping	
	4.7 Lighting	
	4.8 Car parking	
	4.9 CCTV	
	4.10 Other	
5	Management & Maintenance	10
6	Construction	14
7	Useful References	14
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix


A	Contact register	15
B	Associated Documents.....	15
C	CIS Version History	15
D	Glossary	16

1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Cheetham Hill area, within the city of Manchester.

The development site is located within the larger site of Rayburn Trading which is bound to the North by Rayburn Way, to the East by Collingham Street, to the South by Peel Lane, and to the West by North Street. The site boundary is defined with a 2400mm high paladin security fence. The site is presently uncluttered and there are good sightlines from the public highway across the site to the buildings and car parking areas.

The wider site and local area is typically defined by commercial and industrial uses similar to the proposed development.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 2018 and 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	57	32	89	41	16	10	67	16	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is average for Manchester, with an exception to domestic burglary which is low. However domestic burglary in the area is likely to be low due to the number of dwellings within the area. The proposed site is located within the Cheetham Hill area of Manchester, on the outskirts of the city centre, which mostly consists of retail and industrial units. Less serious wounding, non-domestic burglary and vehicle crime are the highest recorded crime types taking place within the local area.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding has taken place throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences occurring to the north of the proposed site, around Cheetham Hill Road and the Queens Road junction as well as around North Street and surrounding streets. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings in the area, with the majority of assaults occurring within dwelling and residential streets with domestic disputes most commonly reported. Public order offences have mostly taken place between unknown associates at places of work or public transport stops.
- 2.1.3 Non-domestic burglary in the local area is high, with the majority of offences occurring to the south of the proposed site, along Knowsley Street and Derby Street. Offenders have targeted offices and retail outlets, forcing open shutters and smashing glazing in order to gain entry. Offenders are targeting properties in the late evening and early hours of the morning, when the premises is closed and there are less people present in the area.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the local area is high, a hotspot of offences taking place to the south of the proposed site, around Knowsley Street and Derby Street. The south of the proposed site consists of large car parking facilities as it is within close proximity to the city centre. Vehicles within these car parks are usually left for long periods of time, unsupervised, creating low risk opportunities for offenders.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements/ tools to gain access.

Possible Solution – A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering or attack. Avoid locating openings in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed.

- 2.2.2 Opening secure doors using bodily force and implements/tools to gain entry to property.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- 2.2.3 Open access to service yards has allowed offenders to enter freely before targeting restricted areas.

Possible Solution - Robust boundary treatments will deter access to the site for offenders. The integrity of the boundary treatments should be evaluated and regularly checked for defects. Gates at the entrance to service areas should be only opened to allow passage of vehicles, once the authenticity of the driver has been confirmed. The periphery of the building should be easy to monitor, with no recesses or protrusions that could provide cover for criminal activity. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.6, 4.8 and 4.9 can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines or CCTV coverage. Storage / parking areas close to boundaries should also be avoided as they may mask any damage to perimeter fencing.

2.2.4 Theft of staff property or unattended / insecure items of personal property.

Possible Solution - There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed further access to all areas. The reception should be staffed at all times whilst the building is open and all visitors should be required to report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the site. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work.

2.2.5 Damaging fencing and gates using tools in order to access the industrial unit

Possible Solution – A robust boundary treatment should be used to define the site perimeter. The boundary treatment should be capable of withstanding opportunistic attacks with hand tools. Boundary treatments should be installed on hardstanding so that offenders cannot crawl under and of a height sufficient to deter climbing.

Gates should be of robust material and to the same height as surrounding boundaries. The gap between the gate and the ground should be minimised to reduce the potential of an offender crawling under. The design of the gate should not include any horizontal bars or exposed hinges that could assist climbing.




2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of fuel, company stock, tools and IT equipment
- Theft of employee personal belongings
- Criminal damage the buildings and vehicles
- Arson
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Bicycle and motorcycle theft
- Theft of plant and machinery and criminal damage during the construction period.

2.4 Industrial Units Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at industrial units in the Manchester area peaks on a Monday and Sunday during the evening and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target industrial properties in the evening and early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements (mostly metal bars and vehicles) in order to gain access to doors and windows located beneath.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Posing as a legitimate customer/ visitor and accessing restricted areas.
- Forcing open perimeter fencing and gates using tools and vehicles.
- Climbing onto the roof of the building and using tools in order to remove tiles and enter the property.
- Removing bricks from the wall using tools in order to gain access.

2.5 Industrial Units Theft Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft from industrial units in the Manchester area peaks on a Saturday during the morning and into the afternoon (9am – 4pm). There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property from within buildings (e.g. cash, bags, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from service yards.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Tuesday and Thursday during the morning and into the evening 9am - 8pm). Offenders often target vehicles within close proximity of the city centre as they are left unattended for long periods of time, usually by commuters, creating a perceived low risk opportunities for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is of a Herchenbach semi-permanent building to provide warehousing. The proposed building will be 1,085sq m in size and positioned on the existing trading estate.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed industrial use is in keeping with developments in the local area.
- 3.2.2 The site is located on an existing trading estate.
- 3.2.3 Businesses located on the trading estate and in the local area were operating at the time of the site visit. Having other businesses in the area allow for mutual surveillance opportunities and information sharing
- 3.2.4 North Street is a well-used route through the area and a popular vehicular route from the Cheetham Hill area to Ancoats and Manchester City Centre. The passing traffic will allow for passive surveillance opportunities throughout the day and night.
- 3.2.5 The warehouse will be located on the prominent junction of Rayburn Way and North Street where it will be highly visible.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The existing site boundary should be inspected for any damage or vulnerabilities and repaired if necessary.
- 3.3.2 Shutters and sectional overhead doors have been regularly targeted by offenders to gain access to industrial properties in the Salford area. To prevent shutters or sectional overhead doors being forced open they should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR 2).
- 3.3.3 Solid block walls, or a similar resilient layer, should be provided behind any **lightweight** cladding to a height of 2400mm to prevent attacks to the cladding to gain access to buildings.
- 3.3.4 The industrial unit should be covered with monitored alarm system.
- 3.3.5 Staff lockers should be provided so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.
- 3.3.6 Any new parking areas should be illuminated in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 10 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. Any pedestrian routes through the site should also be illuminated in accordance with BS 5489.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

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- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

4.2 Windows, Curtain Walling, Cladding & Shutters

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.
- ☐ Solid block walls, or a similar resilient layer, should be provided behind any lightweight cladding to a height of 2400mm to prevent attacks to the cladding to gain access to buildings.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the entire building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - External doors
 - Gates

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ Secure boundary treatments should generally be 2100mm high and of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in higher risk situations.
- ☐ Service yard boundary treatments should be 2400mm high and of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in higher risk situations.
- ☐ There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the fence, to reduce the potential for crawling in to secure areas.
- ☐ The site boundary treatment should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- ☐ Gates should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
 - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
 - A key operable deadlock
- ☐ Double gates should have lockable (or externally inaccessible) drop bolts to each leaf.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

4.10 Car Parks

- ☐ Lighting to car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

4.11 Other

- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Any cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/DFS_Cycles.pdf
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security and maintenance regime for the management of the units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing the units, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc;
 - A weekly physical check of all perimeter fencing to check for evidence of breaches; and
- 5.1.2 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.
- 5.1.3 All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
RTM_PP_01	Site Location Plan	July 21	
RTM_PP_02	Proposed Block Plan	July 21	
RTM_PP_03	Proposed Floor Plan	July 21	
RTM_PP_04	Proposed East and South Elevations	July 21	
RTM_PP_05	Proposed West and North Elevations	July 21	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- Resistance of glazing
- Performance of hardware
- Resistance to static loading
- Resistance to dynamic loading
- Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk