



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

A development of 4 light industrial units with a combined floorspace of 1,438m², and associated parking and landscaping

AT Longstone Road, Heald Green, Manchester

FOR: Pochin Quorum Ventures Ltd

VERSION A: 21.10.21

2012/0580/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

Industrial and commercial premises in urban areas where there is little supervision by security personnel, or by local residents or the passing public tend to attract a degree of criminal activity, including: breaking and entering, theft of plant and materials from external storage areas, and criminal damage. However, crime analysis indicates that similar premises in the adjoining Ashbrook Office Park have not been targeted by criminals; a reflection of the good management of the Park and installation of reasonable security measures, such as: robust perimeter fencing, site lighting, intruder alarms and monitored CCTV.

Design for Security welcome the investment in this site and are happy support the scheme. Our support is subject to the developer making reasonable endeavours to comply with the recommendations and security specification set out in sections 3.3 and 4 of the report, the main points being:

- Ensure the design, height and material used in the construction of the boundary fencing and entry gates minimises the risk of trespassers gaining entry or damaging the fence
- Constructing the units using brick or blockwork walls (up to a height of approximately 2 metres from ground level) to reduce the risk of breaking and entering
- Installing security-rated doors, glazing and service shutters (garage doors)
- Use of access controls to regulate movements into and through each unit, where appropriate
- Installing appropriate lighting, CCTV and intruder alarm systems
- Providing weatherproof motorcycle/cycle parking in a secure location
- Limiting business hours to respect the amenity of residents of the neighbouring houses

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require adherence to the security recommendations set out in the report and inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.

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Consultant

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
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1 Visual Audit

The development site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The site, edged in red on the plan, is located at the northern end of Longstone Road in Heald Green, south Manchester about two miles east of Manchester Airport. Longstone Road serves a mix of modern houses and apartments and the Ashbrook Office Park, a complex of contemporary, two-storey office buildings on both sides of the road each with on-site parking, landscaping and a secure perimeter. The northern end of Longstone Road is a cul-de-sac, terminating at the gated entrance to Willstream House, which is occupied by 'Train Heald Green'. Willstream House is a modern, two-storey, industrial-style building that has a brick base, a curtain walling corner feature and grey cladding system finish to the upper walls. To the north of the site, there is a two-storey, hotel and associated pub-restaurant, together with car parking which wraps around the complex of buildings. There is also a beer garden to the front (north side) of the pub-restaurant and refuse store and enclosed yard at the rear, adjacent to the development site boundary. The rear gardens of a small group of houses that face Irvin Drive adjoin the site's western boundary. A public footpath that connects Longstone Road to Irvin Drive separates the site from the neighbouring Ashbrook Office Park. This footpath also continues eastward connecting Longstone Road to Heald Green station.



Situated immediately west of Willstream House, the 0.33 hectare, irregularly-shaped, though generally flat, development site comprises a plot of vacant, scrub land, overgrown with a mixture of 'pioneer' grasses and shrubs. Much of the site's perimeter is lined with larger shrubs and mature trees. Access into the site is gained from Longstone Road, via the gated entrance to Willstream House. During the construction of Willstream House, a spur was constructed on the eastern edge of the site to facilitate access. A narrow, earth, embankment has been formed at the access point, thought to be to restrict unauthorised vehicles gaining access whilst the site remains undeveloped. Temporary fencing has also been erected along this eastern boundary. Elsewhere, the site is enclosed by: a 1500-1800mm high, welded-wire, mesh fence at the boundary with the gym; a chain-link fence, about 1300mm high and in a poor state of repair, defines the northern boundary with the hotel and pub-restaurant; and a minor watercourse, Gatley Brook, defines both the southern and western boundaries. In 2013, outline planning permission was granted for the erection of a crèche and an office building on the site, but it was never progressed.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 and 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

The data below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site.

General crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
14	6	15	27	9	<5	<5	19	5	<5

2.1.1 There were 129 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is around one third of the average for a typical neighbourhood within Manchester.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded (10% or more) were:

- the use, or threat, of violence - 33%
- vehicle crime, i.e., theft of, theft from and criminal damage to a vehicle - 33%
- burglary - 16%
- theft (including robbery and bicycle theft) - 10%.

2.1.3 The most common place for a crime to be committed was at a domestic property (36% of the total), followed by the street (21%), car parks 15%, licensed premises 13% and shops 11%).

2.1.4 The streets where 10 or more crimes were recorded were:

- Finney Lane - 31
- Styal Road - 24
- Outwood Drive - 12



2.1.5 In the immediate vicinity of the site there were 7 crimes on Longstone Road, all of which were recorded as having taken place at the public house at the southern end of the road and, 2 on Irvin Drive, both vehicle related offences.

2.1.6 The principal crime hotspots in the neighbourhood were the commercial premises on Finney Lane, the airport car parks on Styal Road and at licensed premises.

Crime at industrial premises

2.1.7 There were two crimes recorded at office premises but none at industrial premises. A reflection of the lack of such premises in the neighbourhood.

Vehicle crime



2.1.8 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is greatest on a Monday and Saturday and during the early hours of the morning.


2.2 Crime at industrial & warehouse premises in Manchester

- 2.2.1 There were 219 crimes recorded at industrial and warehouse premises in the City of Manchester during the period analysed. The most commonly recorded crime was burglary (58% of the total), followed by theft (13%), crimes involving the use or threat of violence (11%), and vehicle-related crimes (10%).


Burglary

- 2.2.2 There were 128 incidents of burglary across the city in the period analysed.

The data below relates to burglary at industrial and warehouse premises recorded in Manchester.



- 2.2.3 **Day/Time Range:** The risk remains high through the week with the greatest risk on Sunday and Monday. The most common times for burglary to be committed are in the late evening and the early hours of the morning.




- 2.2.4 **Point of Entry:** Forcing shutters was the most common method of gaining entry during a burglary. Doors were forced in around a quarter of all burglaries carried out, and in one third of incidents. Offenders entered premises via a window on 10 occasions, whilst the walls and a roof of premises were breached 18 times. There were 6 incidents that involved offenders gaining entry without using force before committing burglary, suggesting doors or windows were not secure or the offender was in a building for legitimate reasons before committing the crime.

Theft

- 2.2.5 There were 29 incidents of theft (including bicycle theft and robbery) across the city in the period analysed.

The data below relates to theft at industrial and warehouse premises recorded in Manchester



- 2.2.6 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft is small but is a little more common on a Saturday and the most common time for theft to occur is around mid-day and later in the afternoon. The two more common occurrences of theft are theft of personal property, from within buildings (e.g. cash, bags, wallets/purses etc.), and the theft of tools, materials and plant, stolen from service yards.

2.3 Modus operandi used in burglary, theft and damage at business premises in Manchester and measures to reduce risk

2.3.1 Ram-raiding walls, gates and shutters and penetrating walls and the roof with tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing walls, roofs shutters and gates:

- security-certified roller shutters and fencing/gates (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible - sliding gates tend to be more secure than hinged gates;
- steel frame buildings clad in profiled metal sheet should include a 2000mm high brick or blockwork base or a suitably robust inner layer of attack resistant material, e.g. expanded metal panels;
- roofs should be high enough that they are not easily accessible, comprise of a security-rated roofing system or include a sandwich of materials which makes them difficult to penetrate; and,
- anti-ram bollards or vehicle barriers (ideally, that meet the PAS 68 standard) should be installed in front of gates and shutters.

2.3.2 Shutters have been forced upwards by offenders

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;
- where size limits the availability of certified shutters, intruder alarms, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings; and,
- anti-ram bollards or barriers should be deployed to help secure the most vulnerable shutters.

2.3.3 Doors have been forced open with tools and locks have been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 sr2 standard – security rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- external doors should be placed where they can be readily observed by staff or monitored readily by CCTV and fitted with alarm contacts; and,
- the deployment of visible security patrols, appropriately high boundary fencing to control access to a site, CCTV and lighting can also deter offenders.

2.3.4 Entering a building via unsecured doors and windows.

To minimise the risk of offenders committing rime by entering via unsecured windows or doors

- external doors should be self-closing and lock upon closure; and,
- windows should have opening restrictors and key operated locks fitted:

2.3.5 Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via windows:

- windows should be avoided on secluded elevations;
- window and glazed doors should be fitted with laminate glass, which, because of its structural properties, is extremely difficult to break and penetrate sufficiently to reach in and open locks; and,
- security shutters or grilles, certified to the LPS 1175 sr2 standard, should be fitted to all windows.

2.3.6 Theft of employee and company property

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing personal property from the business premises:

- tall, robust, fencing and gates (preferably fitted with access controls) should be used to secure the perimeter of a development

- access control systems should be employed to prevent unauthorised personnel from entering buildings - especially offices and staff rooms, where sensitive information, expensive equipment, or staff belongings may be stored;
- if external storage of materials is necessary, consideration should be given to storing valuable plant or machinery in suitably secure containers or hoppers e.g. steel containers
- overt signage should be used to warn against casual entry, referring visitors to appropriately located, visible reception areas; and,
- include space for employees to store personal/valuable items securely e.g. lockers or lockable drawers.

2.3.7 Theft of bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing bicycles from business premises:

- there should be a limited number of well-supervised, entry points into the site;
- the perimeter should be secured with tall fencing and gates;
- secure, weatherproof cycle parking should be available to employees and visitors;
- cycle parking should be located in well-supervised places; generally, some distance from the site perimeter and, ideally, out of view of passers-by.

2.3.8 Committing criminal damage to buildings and fencing

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via windows:

- access onto the site outside of business hours should be restricted by robust perimeter fencing and gates, i.e., steel railings or welded wire mesh; and,
- unprotected windows should be avoided on secluded elevations.

2.4 Environmental features that can influence patterns of crime and anti-social behaviour

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood where crimes that directly affect affecting industrial and business premises are not common;
- the site is in a secluded location with little vehicle or foot traffic. Most offenders are unlikely to be aware of the presence of the development;
- the proposed development will be adjacent to a gym, which is open early until late each day, and close to several office buildings and residential properties (on Longstone Road, approaching the site and on Irvin Drive overlooking the western boundary). The passive surveillance of residents, staff and customers/members may help to deter criminal activity;
- the site is only accessible to vehicles from Longstone Road, a cul-de-sac, where a tall weld-mesh fence and gates secure the site;

- the other site boundaries are, to a greater or lesser degree, secured with adequate fencing or, in the case of the northern boundary, difficult to access because of the proximity of the brook and dense thorny shrubs; and,
- there are no obvious indicators of neglect or deterioration in the immediate vicinity of the site. The houses, apartments, offices and other premises in the neighbourhood appear to be well-maintained. Neighbourhoods where there are clear signs of physical deterioration and neglect tend to increase an offenders' perception that their anti-social or criminal actions will go unchallenged.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the secluded right of way adjacent to the southern boundary of the site brings footpath users in close proximity to the development. Buildings and fencing along this route may be targeted by offenders intent on committing crime, criminal damage in particular;
- because the site is secluded, any offenders who target the development at night are unlikely to be witnessed;
- when visiting the site there were cars parked on the pavement on Longstone Road, close to the entrance gates to the site, which might cause problems for larger vehicles accessing the development during construction as well as when the development is occupied. Unless addressed this could lead to damage to vehicles and disputes between drivers;
- the vehicle gate at the gym entrance appears to be damaged and may not operate properly, compromising the security of the site;
- the security of the northern boundary of the site is somewhat compromised by the unrestricted access to the rear of the Premier Inn; and,
- the chain-link fence defining the northern boundary does not provide a sufficiently secure boundary to this part of the site.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

3.1.1 The applicant seeks planning consent to construct 4 new units, for light industry and office use.

3.1.2 The proposed development comprises the following elements:

- retention of perimeter trees;
- removal of the earth embankment;
- the construction of four light industrial buildings - a terrace of three units (units 1-3) and a stand along unit(unit 4), with a combined floorspace of 1,438m², which includes 372m² office space;
- laying out an access road to serve the development; and,
- associated parking and landscaping.

Units 1-3

3.1.3 The building containing units 1-3 will be located on the northern-most part of the site, with the front elevation facing the centre of the site. It will have a height of around 10 metres with a concealed, shallow pitch roof, be of portal frame construction creating largely open plan areas for a variety of light industrial and storage options.

3.1.4 External walls will be finished with insulated, louvre-profile, cladding panels. Each unit will have a glazed, personnel door and a roller shutter/vehicle entrance door of the front elevation. The only other doors will be for means of escape with each unit having a single door on the rear elevation. Internally, there will be: an entrance lobby; w.c's; staircase to a mezzanine floor for office use, occupying the front part of the building; and a largely, full height workshop space predominantly at the rear of the unit. Windows are proposed at first floor level on the front elevation only, for the benefit of staff in the mezzanine office space. Roof lights will be installed to allow light to penetrate the workshop space.

Unit 4

Unit 4 will be located towards the southern boundary of the site, facing the centre. It will be of the same appearance and construction as units 1-3, and have a similar arrangement of door, windows and office space and set out in the way as units 1-3.

External works

- 3.1.5 The access into will be gained from Longstone Road via the entrance gates and to the Train Heald Green gym. Parking for 40 cars will be laid out on either side of the central service road.
- 3.1.6 A cycle store is included, located adjacent to the site entrance.
- 3.1.7 Two bin stores are also proposed one adjacent to the cycle store and the other adjacent to the south-east corner of unit 4.
- 3.1.8 Landscaping is restricted to peripheral areas, but the trees and bushes that lie just outside of the site's northern, southern and western boundaries substantially screen the development from neighbouring houses and offices and from users of the public footpath.
- 3.1.9 There is no indication on the plans or Design and Access Statement that boundary will be enhanced.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal from a crime prevention perspective

- 3.2.1 Investment in new business premises is welcomed, particularly when security is integral to the design of the scheme.
- 3.2.2 The development site is located in a neighbourhood where crimes directly affecting business premises are not common.
- 3.2.3 The proposals will result in the redevelopment of a vacant site which, if it remains undeveloped, could be prone to acts of crime (criminal damage to fencing) or anti-social behaviour (fly-tipping and trespass leading to health and safety concerns). A reduction in environmental standards brought about by fly-tipping or vandalism can affect the amenity of nearby residents and businesses. In addition, sites that attract offenders can have a set in motion a chain of events that can result in other property in the locality being targeted.
- 3.2.4 Businesses operating from the site will promote activity and supervision of other premises and of Longstone Road and the public right of way throughout the day.
- 3.2.5 The proposed units are sufficiently tall as to make breaking and entering via the roof lights or roof extremely unlikely.
- 3.2.6 The regular shape of the units makes them easier to monitor by staff during business hours and CCTV when the premises are closed.
- 3.2.7 The units are orientated in such a way as to focus activity and supervision over the access road and car parking.
- 3.2.8 Doors into each unit are limited to a personnel door, a means of escape door and a garage door.
- 3.2.9 There is a limited amount of external glazing in each unit and what there is confined to the upper floor.
- 3.2.10 Staff and visitor parking will be provided within the site.
- 3.2.11 A place for staff and visitor to park bicycles is included in the proposals.
- 3.2.12 Dedicated bin stores have been included on the site.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

Given the risks highlighted in section 2.3 and features of the local environment that might facilitate crime or anti-social behaviour in section 2.4, I recommend the following measures are included in the design of the development:

The buildings

- 3.3.1 The units should have solid brick, or blockwork, walls (external or internal), up to a height of around 2000mm - it is not unusual for offenders to attempt to gain entry by prising open cladding panels, particularly on businesses storing high value, readily disposable, equipment.
- 3.3.2 Security-rated doors, glazed screens and garage doors/roller shutters should be specified, whilst laminate glass should be used in all external glazing, including within external doors.
- 3.3.3 Consider fitting anti-ram bars or bollards in front of the garage doors.
- 3.3.4 Glazed doors and ground level glazing should be avoided unless protected with security-certified, roller shutters when the premises are closed or the perimeter of the site made secure with appropriate fencing.
- 3.3.5 The entrance door to each unit should be fitted with controls to restrict unauthorised entry. Staff in the office or workshop should be able to vet visitors prior to allowing entry via an audio link and a remote door lock release. This is particularly important when there may be only one or two members of staff present.
- 3.3.6 In order to prevent unauthorised access into the workshop space from the lobby, the door connecting the lobby to the workshop space should be fitted with an electronic or key-code lock.
- 3.3.7 Consider creating a secure office within each unit. The office should contain a safe for cash and valuable documents, and the CCTV recording equipment (if images are recorded on-site). The door to this room should be certified to BS PAS 24, or be a 44mm solid core door with at least one key-operated, BS certified lock, preferably two, and be self-closing and self-locking. Ideally, the walls to this office should be constructed using blockwork or a similarly robust material.
- 3.3.8 Lockers should be available to staff in each unit to securely store their belongings whilst at work.

Monitored intruder alarm & CCTV

- 3.3.9 A monitored, intruder alarm should be fitted to each unit.
- 3.3.10 A monitored CCTV system should be installed with cameras capable of monitoring the site entrance, service road, and the car and cycle parking. The CCTV system should include a public address system, allowing security staff to issue an audible warning to alert to intruders that they have been detected and a response generated.
- 3.3.11 A CCTV system should be installed in each unit, with cameras capable of monitoring: the external walls and doors; all vehicle and pedestrian movements in and out; and the entrance lobby.

Fencing & gates

- 3.3.12 Like the rest of the Ashbrook Office Park, I recommend the perimeter of the site be secured with a 2000mm high, steel mesh, fence, or railings, and matching pedestrian and vehicle entrance gates. The gates should be fitted with robust locks.
- 3.3.13 The existing prickly planting around the perimeter of the site should be maintained to enhance security of the perimeter whilst softening the appearance of the fencing.
- 3.3.14 Access to the sides and rear of units 1-3 should be restricted. 2000mm high fencing and secure gates (fitted with panic hardware) should be installed between the site boundary fencing and the front building line. Similarly, access to the rear of unit 4 should be restricted with similar fencing and gates; the fencing should be installed between the site boundary fence and the two rear corners of the unit.

Lighting

- 3.3.15 Dusk-to-dawn lighting should be installed to illuminate the entrance to the site, the service road, all external doors of each unit, car and cycle parking.
- 3.3.16 For pedestrian and vehicle safety, and for security reasons (including to support the CCTV system), low intensity, dusk-to-dawn-lighting should be fitted to the exterior of the buildings and to the car park.

Signage

- 3.3.17 Clear signage should be used to indicate: the name of the development; the names of the companies occupying each unit; that CCTV is in operation; the parking spaces allocated to each unit; the location of visitor parking spaces; and, sanctions for motorists who infringe the parking rules.

External area

- 3.3.18 In order to reduce the risk of accidental damage caused by vehicles turning or reversing against the units or the perimeter fencing, I recommend the installation of Armco™ barriers at the western edge of car park and bollards on either side of the garage doors.
- 3.3.19 The position of any ancillary structures within the service yards, including the bin and cycle stores, should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
- Creating blind spots that might reduce the effectiveness of supervision of the site, the approach to the site along Longstone Road and of the public footpath
 - Creating areas which CCTV cameras cannot monitor
 - Reducing the efficiency and effectiveness of site lighting
 - Creating a fire risk
 - Providing a climbing aid that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
- 3.3.20 If fuel is stored at any of the units, a fuel management system that allows only authorised users to dispense fuel, as well as only allowing authorised vehicles to be refuelled, should be installed.
- 3.3.21 Plant, machinery and vehicles should be fitted with tracking devices and stored overnight within the units rather than in the car park.

Cycle parking

- 3.3.22 The cycle parking should be located within a weather-resistant shelter. The shelter should include 'Sheffield' style stands to allow cyclist to secure the wheels and frame, and ground anchors so that motorcyclists are able to secure their bikes.
- 3.3.23 I also suggest re-siting the cycle parking to a more central location, where it can be observed more readily by staff in the offices or as staff and customer s come and go from the various units.

Residential amenity

- 3.3.24 If excessive noise and disturbance is created by tenants or visitors to the development, residents may call on the assistance of the Police to intervene. Consequently, in the interests of the amenity, the hours of business should be restricted to those which do not impinge unduly of the quality of life of neighbouring residents. Securing the site outside of business hours will also restrict access to others who might create a nuisance.

Parking on Longstone Road

- 3.3.25 In order to limit the effects of anti-social parking on Longstone Road in the vicinity of the site, parking controls should be considered

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Building structure

- ☐ The external walls and sub-dividing walls between units should include block or brickwork wall (or other suitably robust combination of materials) up to a height of 2000mm from ground level.

4.2 Doors

- ☐ All external entrance and means of escape doors should be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The entrance door, means of escape door, door to the office space and the door connecting the lobby to the workshop should be capable of self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

4.3 Shutters

- ☐ The garage door/shutter should be tested, and certified, to LPS 1175 SR2.

4.4 Window frames

- ☐ Window frames should meet the LPS 1175 or PAS 24 standard, be fitted with key-operated locks and restrictors that limit opening to 100mm.

4.5 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing in the entrance door and all windows should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass, that is, glass rated as P1A or P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.6 Intruder alarm

- ☐ An intruder alarm should be with contacts on all external doors including the garage door/shutter and PIR detectors in all work spaces should be fitted to each unit.
- ☐ The alarm systems should be monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security/site management team).

4.7 Access controls

- ☐ In all units, access controls, ideally card/fob operated electronic locks, should be installed to prevent unauthorised access through the entrance door, the lobby to workshop door, and the office entrance door.

4.8 Boundary fencing

- ☐ The boundary should be secured with 2000mm high, welded-wire mesh fencing or railings and similarly styled vehicle and pedestrian gates. Ideally, the fencing should meet the LP1175 standard.
- ☐ Gates and fencing must not include horizontal elements that allow an intruder to scale the fence or gate, and be designed to prevent an offender from crawling under the entry gates or perimeter fence.
- ☐ Access to the rear of the units should be restricted with the installation of 2000mm high fencing and gates. The gates should be with panic hardware that cannot be operated from the 'outer' side of the gate.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ Cameras should be capable of monitoring: the entrance gates, service road, each unit and all areas of the car and motorcycle/cycle parking.
- ☐ A public address system should be installed to complement the cameras so that camera and alarm monitoring staff can issue a warning to would-be intruders. A mobile response team should be deployed to address any issues arising.

4.10 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn, low intensity, lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor should illuminate: all external doors and shutter openings; all areas of car and cycle parking; and, the entrance gates.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.11 Landscaping

- ☐ Trees and shrubs should be regularly pruned to ensure that growth does not compromise the security of the perimeter fencing nor interfere with the effectiveness of site lighting or the range of view of the CCTV cameras.

4.12 Car parking

- ☐ Bays should be clearly lined, with visitor bays indicated.

4.13 Motorcycle/cycle store

- ☐ A weather-resistant, cycle shelter should be provided.
- ☐ Securely anchored, Sheffield stands and ground anchors should be installed within the shelter to allow cyclists to secure the wheels and frame to the stand and for motorcyclists to securely park their bikes.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as: securing the site at the close of business; litter removal from the immediate environment around the development; grounds maintenance; and, repairs to lighting, signage, fencing, gates, access controls, alarms and CCTV.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular movement in and out.
- ☐ The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved.

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of contact
07.09.21	Chris Parks, Calderpeel Architects	Request for Crime Impact Statement
22.09.21		Site visited
21.10.21	Chris Parks, Calderpeel Architects	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and documents:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
21044-PL-001	Location Plan	18/06/21	
21044-PL-010	Existing Site Plan	18/06/21	A
21044-PL-020	Proposed Site Plan	18/06/21	H
21044-PL-110	Proposed Floor Plans - Unit 4	21/07/21	B
21044-PL-120	Proposed Floor Plans - Unit 1-3	21/07/21	B
21044-PL-200	Proposed Elevations	18/06/21	A
21044-PL-210	Proposed Elevations - Unit 4	18/06/21	B
21044-PL-DAS	Design and Access Statement	Aug 21	

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations in this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		21.10.21

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- Resistance of glazing
- Performance of hardware
- Resistance to static loading
- Resistance to dynamic loading
- Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk