



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

High Lane / Cross Road

29 Apartments

for: Southway Devco Ltd

version A: 6th January 2022

URN: 2021/0612/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

High Lane / Cross Road, Chorlton-cum-Hardy

2021/0612/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design Changes Advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. Overall, the proposed scheme has been found acceptable in principle, but further consideration of some aspects is required as stated in section 3.3 of this report in order to gain our full support for this development at planning stage. These include:-

- *Entrance layout to apartment clusters*
- *Boundary treatments and control of access around site*
- *Position and detail of cycle storage, refuse storage*
- *Security of ground floor French windows / doors*

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



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Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site, shown red on plan, lies in the Chorlton area of south Manchester, about 0.5km from the main district centre on Wilbraham Road. The neighbourhood is predominantly residential, with a mix of large detached properties, semi-detached housing and traditional terraces with rear alleyways.

There are various community facilities in the locality including a school and public park, together with local shops, bars and restaurants on Beech Road and Barlow Moor Road. Cross Road is a relatively quiet street serving residential properties, and links High Lane with Beech Road. On-street parking is in high demand. Events in the park and social club generate additional pressure for parking locally.

The proposed development site forms part of the car park serving Chorlton Irish Club. To the west is housing on Thornbridge Avenue, separated from the site by a tall conifer hedge. The existing fencing along the boundary with Beech Road Park does not form a secure barrier.




Site viewed from Cross Road




The site occupies part of the car park of the social club




Boundary of site with Beech Road Park



Site viewed from Beech Road Park



Beech Road Park



Car parking on Cross Road

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2020 to 30th November 2021.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
28	12	56	237	70	17	<5	28	7	28

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the local area is average for South Manchester suburbs, with an exception the violence which is high. Less serious wounding, theft and criminal damage have been the highest recorded offences taking place in the area, with a high concentration of offences occurring around the junction of Barlow Moor Road and Wilbraham Road. The reason for the increased number of offences in this area is likely that it houses a number of licenced premises and retail units, as well as a local Metrolink stop. In areas with increased bars, restaurants and retail outlets this often an increase in crime and disorder in the area.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- 2.2.2 Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution - All ground floor / accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards. All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high and robust fencing with lockable gates so that rear windows are only accessible to residents.

- 2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - A robust access control system should be in place to prevent tailgating by intruders. The main entrances should be located in a highly visible position and well-lit to deter offenders from trying to break-in. Apartment doors should not be positioned in recesses and should be readily visible along the internal corridors. Additionally, where postal deliveries are made to an internal rack of mailboxes, a double door entry system should be used and the secondary door set should also be certified to recognised security standard and include a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system (N.B it is not acceptable for postal / delivery personnel to have free access inside the block). French windows / sliding doors opening on to insecure space at ground level should be avoided.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **73% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **53% lower** than Greater Manchester and **32% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **29% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **11% higher** than Greater Manchester and **19% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **61% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **43% lower** than Greater Manchester and **16% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **78% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **60% lower** than Greater Manchester and **31% lower** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Wednesday and Sunday during the evening and early hours of the morning. Offenders often target properties during the evening and early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Entering the rear garden of the property and using bodily pressure and implements, gain access to the garden shed.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Monday and Sunday during the early hours of the morning (3am – 7am). Offenders often target vehicles during the early hours of the morning as they are often left out of sight of owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises construction of a block of 29 apartments with accommodation provided over four levels.
- 3.1.2 A communal parking area is located to the southwest of the building, with pedestrian and vehicular access off Cross Road.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 Many of the flats will have routinely-occupied rooms overlooking the communal areas and adjacent public realm, which will help to increase natural surveillance around the site and communal areas around the new block.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can appear hostile and increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Recessed entrances. The deeply recessed passageways at the entrance to each cluster of apartments is a significant risk in terms of security, as it benefits from no overlooking and an offender could be concealed from view, putting residents and their property at risk. Entrance to the apartment building should not be recessed by more than 600mm in order to remove potential cover for an intruder.
- 3.3.2 Control of Access around building. No details of proposed boundary treatments provided. The layout includes features that could provide cover for criminal and antisocial activity and these are only acceptable if enclosed within a secure boundary. Fencing / railings or walls adjacent to public or communal space that is intended to create a secure boundary should be a minimum height of 2.1m. Particular attention should be given to detailing wall / railing combinations, and the junctions of the different styles and heights of boundary treatment to avoid inadvertently creating a step or ladder feature which could compromise the integrity of the site boundary, and possibly require retrofitting of unsightly security features.
- 3.3.3 Bin and cycle stores. Cycle and bin stores located within insecure / accessible space are frequent targets for theft / criminal damage, and they can provide cover for other criminal and antisocial behaviour. If they cannot be located within the apartment building, it is advised that they are located behind a secure fence line accessible to residents only (see above). The design of the structures accommodating the cycle and bin stores should not include any potential climbing aids that could assist an offender to gain access to upper levels or cross the boundary fence. The position of any adjacent features such as fencing or gates should be detailed and installed carefully in order to avoid this possibility. Entry to the bin and bike stores should be access-controlled. Racks within the enclosure should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels, and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com for details). Loose bins should not be left in communal areas or on the street for prolonged periods or overnight. A strategy should be developed to allow refuse collection without compromising the security of the site.
- 3.3.4 Ground floor French windows. Plans indicate that ground floor apartments will have French / patio windows and doors opening on to external space, and this is only acceptable if they are within a secure private or communal garden boundary, as otherwise they are vulnerable to intruder access and also provide potential for further unauthorised entry to secure corridors inside the block.
- 3.3.5 Climbing aids to upper floors / Apartment Balconies. The cladding / facing materials should not provide external aids to climbing that could allow an intruder to gain access to any upper floor balconies. The

detailing of the façade and the relationship between the building and any other external landscape features / street furniture will need to be carefully planned to avoid inadvertently introducing this kind of vulnerability.

- 3.3.6 Post. Postal delivery staff should not have direct access to communal stairs / lifts within the building. Ideally a “through-the- wall” arrangement should be adopted, allowing external deliveries and internal collection of mail. Mailboxes should be of a standard approved by Secured by Design.
- 3.3.7 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation.
- 3.3.8 Communal facilities. The robust management of such features is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
- 3.3.9 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed in Section 4 are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrances and any inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621 / 8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- Doors within communal corridors should contain a glazed element to improve informal surveillance.
- Any internal doors / frames to cycle and refuse stores should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electronic lock controlled by resident key-fob. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place while retaining a secure development.

4.2 Windows

- Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors in to garages and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control

- Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas / doors should operate on access control:
 - Communal Entrance doors
 - Bin store
 - Cycle store

4.6 Boundaries

- Secure boundaries should be formed of 2100mm high walls / railings (with no mid-rails that could aid climbing). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps / gaps that would provide a climbing aid.

4.7 Landscaping

- In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Lighting

- External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- Lighting in the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout / lux plan.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 Other

- Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- Mail boxes should be obtained from a supplier approved by Secured by Design and installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions (see www.securedbydesign.com).
- Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.
- Inclusion of mirrors can help to improve sight lines at corners along corridors inside the building(s).

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, alarms, CCTV)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting is not impaired.
- 5.1.3 Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
- 5.1.4 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
23/11/2021	Iceni Projects	CIS instruction received
25/11/2021	Iceni Projects	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
29/11/2021	N/A	Site visit
07/12/2021	Southway Devco	Payment received
05/01/2022	Iceni Projects	Progress enquiry
06/01/2022	Iceni Projects	CIS version A issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Site Plan		
	Masterplan		
	Elevations		
	Design and Access Statement	08/11/21	
(PL)001	Proposed Site Plan	17/11/21	
	Apartment Layouts		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk