



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

A development of 12 houses & 20 apartments

AT Chain Road, Blackley, Manchester

FOR: Great Places Housing Group

VERSION A: 05.10.21

2021/0325/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

We welcome the redevelopment of the site and consider a residential scheme most appropriate.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include: an appropriate balance of types and size of properties; a suitable amount of defensible space around each building; with appropriate fencing, there will be a clear distinction between public, semi-private and private space; and, car and cycle parking have been included.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in section 3.3. The principal recommendation is to encourage greater activity and supervision of the service road and avoid it becoming the sort sterile space to which offenders are attracted or, alternatively, simply to secure them with automated gates. The Recommendations are summarised as follows:

- reviewing the security and design of the service road, including considering gating the access roads;
- increasing the separation between the apartment building and the pavement on Chain Road;
- environmental enhancements to the streetscape at appropriate spaces within the development;
- promoting an alley-gating scheme to secure existing pathways along the western edge of the development
- including measures to prevent anti-social parking on the service road;
- installing appropriately secure fencing to define and secure front and rear boundaries to the houses and apartments, and the apartment residents car park;
- arrangements for mail delivery to the apartments do not compromise the security of the mail or the building; and,
- the development being built to Secured by Design standards.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.

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1 Visual Audit

The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. This 0.34 hectare, prominently located site, edged in red on the plan, is located in Blackley in north Manchester. Most of the site's southern boundary adjoins Victoria Avenue, A6104, a busy east-west route that connects Blackley to Heaton Park, to the east, and Moston, to the west. There is a neighbourhood shopping parade on the south side of Victoria Avenue, at its junction with Hill Lane, opposite the site, and a medical centre further east on Victoria Avenue, obliquely opposite the site. A pelican crossing connects the shopping parade to the very wide pavement that adjoins the site on the north side of Victoria Avenue; guard rails restrict pedestrian movements across the road on the eastern side of the crossing. Connecting pathways define the remainder of the site's southern boundary and the whole of the western boundary. These unsecured pathways facilitate access to the rear gardens of the adjoining terraces of houses that face Victoria Road and Alnwick Avenue, west of the site. Access to the pathways can be gained from Victoria Avenue, Alnwick Road and Chain Road to the north. Similar rear access pathways on the streets west of Alnwick Road estate have been secured with gates. Chain Road defines the northern boundary of the site, whilst the junction of Victoria Avenue and Chain Road marks the eastern edge of the site. Traditional family housing dominates the neighbourhood but there is also some Radburn style housing to the north and a 3-storey apartment building just east of the site, facing Victoria Avenue.





A pathway connecting Chain Road with Victoria Avenue crosses the eastern part of the site



The former car park to the demolished public house occupies the western part of the site



The site and access into the former car park at Chain Road



The site's north-western boundary & overgrown passageway at the rear of houses that face Alnwick Road



The unsecured passageway alongside number 4 Alnwick Road & secure passageway in the background



Family housing facing Victoria Avenue immediately south-west of the site

3 The site itself has a gentle gradient and was once occupied by the Lion and Lamb public house with its associated beer garden and car park. The building and other structures have long since been demolished and the site cleared. A grassed amenity space and a tarmac footpath, connecting Chain Road to the pedestrian crossing on Victoria Road, has been has been created at the eastern part of the site, on the former site of the public house itself. Along with other roadside amenity areas in the neighbourhood, the grass is well maintained. The western part of the site was once the pub car park ; the car park remains although it is breaking up and being colonised by basic vegetation following years of inactivity and neglect. Access into the car park is gained from Chain Road, although measures have been put in place to restrict vehicles entering this part of the site. The peripheral areas of the car park are all overgrown with a number of plant and mature and semi-mature tree species. The site boundaries south-western boundaries are defined with brick walls of varying height, whilst a concrete post and panel fence, largely in a poor state of repair, defines western and north-western boundaries. The eastern part of the site is not enclosed and is open to access at all points. In 2008, planning permission was granted to redevelop the site for a residential development comprising 10 houses and 20 apartments.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis



All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 and 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood


Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
21	<5	82	160	22	17	7	14	8	<5

- 2.1.1 There have been 397 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is 18% below the average rate for crime across the Manchester Division. The neighbourhood does include Withington district centre where the concentration of shops, licensed premises, car parks and people significantly affects the nature and distribution of crimes.
- 2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded were:
- crimes involving the use, or threat, of violence - 52%
 - vehicle crime, i.e., theft of, theft from and criminal damage to a vehicle - 14%.
 - criminal damage - 12%
 - robbery & theft - 10%
 - burglary - 6%
- 2.1.3 The most common place for a crime to be committed was in, or in the grounds of, a dwelling (42% of the total), followed by on the street (33%), and thirdly, at a retail or food and drink outlet (11%).
- 2.1.4 All parts of the neighbourhood were affected by crime but the principal crime hotspot was the junction of Rochdale Road and Victoria Avenue. There were other concentrations of crime on the streets west of the site between Victoria Avenue and Alworth Road, and south of Victoria Avenue at Hill Lane, Walker Road and Erskine Avenue.
- 2.1.5 The streets experiencing the greatest volume of crime (20 offences or more) were:
- Victoria Avenue - 74 offences
 - Rochdale Road - 31 offences
 - Chain Road - 25 offences
 - Alworth Road - 24 offences
 - Hill Lane - 21 offences
- 2.1.6 Rochdale Road and Victoria Avenue are main thoroughfares, with a high concentration of commercial and residential property and carry a high volume of pedestrian and vehicle traffic. Chain Road and Alworth Road are both largely residential in character but both provide access to several other streets and have a school at their western ends, both of which generate a small amount of crime. Crimes at Hill Lane are concentrated at the neighbourhood shopping parade.
- 2.1.7 Of the 169 crimes recorded at residential properties, 79 (47%) involved the use or threat of violence and 70 (41%) involved acquisitive and damage offences. Considering the acquisitive and damage offences, there were 20 house burglaries, 10 theft offences (including vehicle-related theft), and 34 incidents of criminal damage. The burglary rate is slightly lower than the national rate.

Domestic burglary committed within 500m radius of the site





2.1.8 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary fluctuates through the week and the day, but is slightly greater on a Sunday and Monday and in the evening.



2.1.9 **Point of Entry:** Houses were targeted by offenders with doors, particularly rear doors - the most common point of entry. Windows and doors at the rear of a property are generally favoured as they are often of a poorer quality than those at the front, and the offender is less likely to be witnessed in secluded, rear gardens of houses or in the grounds at the rear of an apartment building. Doors and windows were either forced open or the glazing smashed within the window or door before reaching in to unlock/open the door or window. In several cases, residents left windows open or doors open or unlocked, allowing offenders to enter without using force.

Vehicle crime committed within a 500m radius of the site

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.





2.1.10 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is greatest on Friday and Saturday. In terms of the time of the day, the risk is noticeably greater in the evening.

2.2 Crime rate comparison



Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **61% lower** than the rate for Manchester, **33% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **3% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.2.2 The rate of wounding per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **11% higher** than the rate for Manchester, **75% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **87% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.



2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **7% higher** than the Manchester rate, **56% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **132% higher** than the rate across England & Wales.

2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **31% lower** than the Manchester rate, **25% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **118% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary, theft, criminal damage and vehicle related crimes in Manchester, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3.1 Doors have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- front doors to houses should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- communal entrance doors to apartments should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closing;
- where this can be balanced with the design of a development and its ability to fit the context of the local area, defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the 'street', i.e. a

small front garden enclosed with a suitably high fence. Separation of the passing public from a property can also help to reduce the risk of criminal damage; and,

- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors.

2.3.2 Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard;
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations;
- side or rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates so that rear doors are only accessible to residents; and,
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping and damage to fencing.

2.3.3 Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry or commit criminal damage

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground floor of the development;
- windows should be fitted with locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to gardens and private amenity space should be restricted by installing high fencing and locking gates.

2.3.4 Vehicles were targeted when parked on driveways, in unsecured car parks or on the 'street'

To minimise the risk of vehicle-related crime:

- car parking should be located within the boundaries of the property, within an area that is both very secure and well overlooked by residents or monitored by an effective CCTV system. Consideration should be given to installing automatic vehicle gates and fencing around car parks.

2.3.5 Offenders have stolen bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting bicycles:

- cycle stores should be provided within a secure parts of the site;
- rear garden gates should be robust, tall, self-closing and self-locking;
- CCTV should monitor activity in and around communal cycle stores; and,
- PIR lighting should be installed to illuminate the cycle stores.

2.3.6 Offenders have damaged boundary fencing

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting fencing:

- rear garden boundaries should avoid being exposed to the public realm;
- communal pathways providing access to rear gardens should be secured with self-closing, self-locking gates; and,
- fencing should be especially robust when unavoidably exposed to the public realm.

2.4 Environmental features of the site and surroundings that may influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect a potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood with a much lower than average burglary rate and low vehicle-related crime rate compared to elsewhere in Manchester;
- the site is prominently located. The Victoria Avenue and Chain Road boundaries particularly benefit from casual supervision by occupants of passing vehicles and passing pedestrians driving or walking to and from Rochdale Road and to access the neighbourhood shops at the junction of Hill Lane;
- windows on the front and rear elevations of the houses surrounding the site facilitate surveillance over the site by local residents;
- the adjacent houses and nearby apartment building appear to be well-maintained. Neighbourhoods where there are clear signs of physical deterioration and neglect tends to increase an offenders' perception that areas are vulnerable to crime and their actions will go unchallenged; and,
- the alley-gating schemes on the streets west of the site are likely to have resulted in a decrease in crime and anti-social behaviour in the immediate vicinity of the site.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood with a high volume of crime;
- offenders, particularly those engaged in criminal damage and violent crimes are very active in this neighbourhood;
- unsecured pathways facilitate access to the rear gardens of houses that face Victoria Avenue and Alnwick Road. Such secluded, unsupervised pathways are often exploited by offenders in committing crime and anti-social behaviour, including burglary, theft from gardens, damage to fencing, fly-tipping and graffiti;
- the site is located on Victoria Avenue; well-trafficked routes often can act as conduits for crime, with criminals identifying opportunities for crime and committing crime opportunities as they travel along them; and,
- the nearby shops and takeaways on Victoria Avenue, Hall Lane and Rochdale Road attract offenders and generate crime. People and property on streets approaching crime hotspots are sometimes targeted by offenders coming and going from such places.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development includes:

- the clearance of boundary walls and shrubs from the site;
- removal of formal and informal footpaths through the site;
- construction of an apartment building;
- construction of twelve houses;
- laying out a service road, which will require relocating the existing traffic calming measures on Chain Road;
- car and cycle parking; and,
- landscaping.

Apartments

- 3.1.2 The proposed, three-storey, apartment building will be sited at the eastern fringe of the site and will contain a mix of 15no. two-bedroom and 5no. one-bedroom apartments. It will be set back from the surrounding pavement by between half a metre and four metres; the separation being more generous on the Victoria Avenue elevation.
- 3.1.3 The building's principal, communal entrance will be on the western elevation facing the Victoria Avenue and Chain Road junction. A secondary entrance is proposed on the western, rear, elevation facilitating access to a 14 space, residents' car park. Two accessible parking bays will be laid out adjacent to the rear entrance; the remaining 12 bays will be located toward the western fringe of the site. A service road, with a junction onto Chain Road located adjacent to the north0western corner of the building, will facilitate access to all parking bays. The layout plan suggests that the service road will not be secured.
- 3.1.4 As well as six apartments, the ground floor will also include front and rear entrance lobbies, plant room, refuse store and a cycle store. The upper floors will each accommodate seven apartments. The ground floor apartments will each have an external door allowing residents access to a modest, private garden or terrace. The cycle store will have an internal door only, connecting the store to the building's core. The refuse store will only be accessible from the exterior of the building.
- 3.1.5 Hedges are proposed to define the boundary between the public pavement space and semi-private gardens to the ground floor apartments, and to define the ownership of neighbouring gardens.

Houses

- 3.1.6 Twelve houses in two distinct orts of the site are also proposed - 10no. three-bedroom, and 2no. four-bedroom houses.
- 3.1.7 Plots 1-4, a terrace of four three-bedroom houses, will be erected on the southern fringe of the site, between the apartment building and existing rear access pathway. A pathway, secured with a gate at each end, will separate the apartment building from the house that will occupy plot 4. The gable end wall of the house on plot 1 will abut the adjoining alleyway. Each house will be two storeys high, face Victoria Avenue, and have a modest front garden and a larger rear garden. Front gardens will be defined with low hedges whilst rear gardens will be enclosed with a tall, timber fence. Each house will have a single parking bay located between the rear garden and the service road. A gate will allow access to the rear gardens from the adjacent parking bays. Refuse storage will be located adjacent to the parking bays.
- 3.1.8 Plots 5-12, four pairs of semi-detached houses, including both four bedroom houses, will be erected on the northern part of the site, west of the service road junction, and facing Chain Road. Again, the houses will be two storeys high and have a modest front garden and a larger rear garden. There is no indication of how the front gardens will be defined but rear gardens will be enclosed with a tall, timber fence. With two exceptions, each house will have a single parking bay located at the front of the property, allowing direct access onto Chain Road. Plots 5 and 6, those closest to the service road, will have a single bay at the side or rear of the house, with access gained to each bay from the service road. A gate at the front building line of each property will allow access to the rear gardens of plots 7-12,

whilst plots 5 and 6 will have a gate on the rear boundary fence to facilitate access to and from the parking bays. The rear access gates and associated pathways between plots 6 and 7, and between plots 8 and 9, will be shared. Refuse storage will be located within the rear gardens of houses on plots 5-12.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals

- 3.2.1 A residential development is an appropriate use for the site given the surrounding land use.
- 3.2.2 Whilst not obvious from visiting the site or analysing crime data, such sites often attract anti-social behaviour in the form of fly-tipping, fire raising or graffiti. The redevelopment of the site will restrict the ability for such activities to take place.
- 3.2.3 There are a significant number and mix of houses and apartments within the development, which increases the likelihood of residents being from a broader age range, including young singles, older residents and families with children. Such a mix increases the likelihood of some of the residents of the houses and apartments being present throughout the day. The presence of residents or even just visible signs of people present - cars on driveways, lights on in houses, external lighting on at entrance doors, for example - will help to deter offenders.
- 3.2.4 The apartment building is suitably located, and includes parking and a small area of amenity space on the site. The proposed location of the communal entrance door is appropriate and a secure lobby can be created with the installation of access controls to the inner door and rear access door.
- 3.2.5 Front doors and principal room windows of the houses face the 'street', which helps to promote street activity and promotes natural surveillance over the public realm and neighbouring houses.
- 3.2.6 'Defensible space' is provided to the front, side and rear of all of the houses and the apartment building.
- 3.2.7 Private amenity space is provided within rear gardens of the houses, which can be appropriately secured with suitably high, visually permeable (where necessary), boundary fencing and gates.
- 3.2.8 The landscaping of the modest front gardens of all properties and retention or introduction of street trees will support the quality of the local environment. Well-maintained verdant environments tend to attract less crime and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.9 The existing houses on the opposite side of Victoria Avenue and Chain Road will benefit from mutual supervision of the street and opposing houses and apartments.
- 3.2.10 The proposed in-curtilage parking arrangements for the houses will facilitate the security of vehicles. Car parking provision that is separated from the passing public, on driveways, especially gated driveways, or in secure car parks, where vehicles can be readily supervised by residents, is less likely to be targeted by offenders than cars parked on the street or within ill-defined, communal parking areas.
- 3.2.11 Secure cycle parking is provided in the apartment building.
- 3.2.12 A refuse store is provided within the apartment building.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the scheme

THE SITE

Security of the proposed rear access roads and apartment parking

- 3.3.1 Our preferred means of securing the service road, rear parking bays to plots 1-6 and the apartment parking bays is to install automated gates at the entrance to the service road. The gates should be 1800mm high and operated by residents' fob. A separate gate should be included for pedestrians and cyclists. The gates will help to secure the vehicles as well as deterring intruders approaching the rear gardens or properties intended on burglary, theft or criminal damage. They will also restrict entry to visitors, reducing the demands on the parking spaces and reducing the likelihood of drivers parking in places not set out as parking bays, potentially blocking access to and from legitimate bays.
- 3.3.2 An alternative to security gates is to create a space that promotes ownership, encourages play/socialising and reduce the risk of offenders exploiting this secluded space. The application of a high-quality treatment to the service roads is encouraged. Rather than an engineered solution, the installation of a 'home-zone' styled design for these spaces will emphasise 'territoriality' and promote 'ownership' of the space amongst residents. Supervision of the space will be enhanced with children playing or adults and families socialising, which will deter offenders. The inclusion of measures such

as: a rumble strip, ornate blockwork or a coloured/textured tarmac; additional, ideally bespoke, pedestrian-focused lighting; and, signs to indicate the private nature of the space and that children are playing, should be introduced at the entrance to the service road at Chain Road. Such measures will suggest that a threshold has been crossed into a space that is private.

- 3.3.3 The western and south-western boundaries of the site, adjacent to the apartment residents' car park, should be particularly robust. In the absence of secure pathways at the rear of the houses facing Victoria Avenue and Alnwick Road, a 2000mm high brick wall or 2000mm high steel railings rather than timber fencing would be most appropriate.
- 3.3.4 The rear boundary fencing to the houses that adjoin the shared spaces should be visually permeable, i.e. the upper half of the fencing should be trellis, so that the space will have a sense of being under the supervision of residents.
- 3.3.5 Measures to prevent anti-social parking on the service road should also be considered. Any vehicles parked in undesignated spaces, even those partially on the proposed pavement may obstruct the flow of vehicles, particularly those of the refuse contractor.

The rear access pathways at the rear of houses facing Victoria Avenue and Alnwick Road

- 3.3.6 In order to deter intruders and reduce the risk of anti-social behaviour, the rear alleyways should be secured with 2000mm high, steel-rail, fencing and locking gates similar to those used elsewhere on the estate west of the development site.

APARTMENTS

Separation between Chain Road and ground floor apartments

- 3.3.7 For privacy and security reasons, the apartment building should be redesigned/relocated to increase the separation between the windows of the ground floor apartments and the passing public. A minimum of 1000mm separation should be achieved at all points on the Chain Road elevation.

Garden boundaries

- 3.3.8 Private gardens to the ground floor apartments should be enclosed with a 1000mm high hedge and or a 1000mm high railing. Given the character of the estate to the west of the site, a hedge would be more appropriate.

Control entry into the site and building

- 3.3.9 To enhance the semi-private nature of the front of the development, a 1000mm high, steel-rail, self-closing gate should be installed entrance to the pathway that links the front communal entrance door and the street.
- 3.3.10 The front and rear communal entrance doors must be security-rated and self-closing and lock upon closure. The doors should be secured with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a programmable fob.
- 3.3.11 An audio-visual unit with a link to each apartment should be fitted at the front, communal, entrance door, so that residents can vet callers prior to allowing access to *bona fide* visitors only.
- 3.3.12 To minimise the risk of offenders 'tail-gating' legitimate residents/visitors via the front entrance door, the inner lobby door should include a fob-operated, electronic lock.
- 3.3.13 The front and rear, communal entrance doors should be particularly well lit.

3.3.14 Mail delivery

- 3.3.15 Individual, robust and lockable, postal boxes for each apartment should be located in the entrance lobby at the front of the building.

Apartment security

- 3.3.16 Each apartment should be fitted with a security-rated entrance door with door viewer and opening limiter. Garden/terrace access doors on the ground floor should also be security-rated.
- 3.3.17 Ground floor windows should be security-rated, fitted with key-operable locks and have opening restrictors fitted. Glazing in all external doors and all accessible windows should include laminate glass.

Cycle store

-
- 3.3.18 The internal door connecting the cycle store to the core should be FD30 rated, fitted with an electronic lock that controls both entry and exit, and be self-closing and self-locking.
 - 3.3.19 Sheffield stands should be securely anchored to the floor of the store to allow cyclists to secure the frame and wheels of their bikes.

Plant room and refuse store doors

- 3.3.20 The plant room door should be at least FD30 rated and secured with a SBD accredited lock, ideally a multi-point lock. The door should be self-closing and self-locking. A push/panic bar should be fitted to the inside of the door to allow contractors to exit the room.
- 3.3.21 The refuse store door should be a steel door set within a steel frame. It should be secured with a SBD accredited lock, ideally a multi-point, electronic lock. The door should be self-closing and self-locking. A push/panic bar should be fitted to the inside of the door to allow residents and contractors to exit the store.

HOUSES

Gable elevation of plot 1

- 3.3.22 The gable wall adjoins the alleyway. If the alleyway remains unsecured, there is a possibility that the gable wall will be targeted by graffiti artists. An alley-gating scheme similar to elsewhere on the estate should be promoted and installed prior to occupation of the houses.

Front garden boundaries

- 3.3.23 Private gardens to the houses on both Victoria Avenue and Chain Road should be enclosed with a 1000mm high hedge and or a 1000mm high railing. Given the character of the estate to the west of the site, hedges are more appropriate.

Rear garden fencing and gates

- 3.3.24 The rear garden fences and gates of plots 01 - 06 should be around 1200mm high to allow supervision of their cars and the service road, effectively making the houses dual fronted.
- 3.3.25 Rear garden boundaries of plots 7-9 should be enclosed with 1800mm high.
- 3.3.26 Rear gardens of plots 11 and 12 should be 2100mm high and include a 300mm section of trellis.
- 3.3.27 Rear boundary fencing of plots 7-10, which may include a significant element of trellis to allow residents to supervise the service road and apartment parking.
- 3.3.28 Rear garden access gates should include a lock that can be operated from either side of the gate to allow cyclist and drivers to enter and leave without compromising the security of the property. Ideally, the gates should be self-closing and self-locking.
- 3.3.29 Shared rear access gates should be formed of steel rail and be 1800mm high and fitted with a self-closing mechanism and a lock that secured the gate automatically upon closure.

House security

- 3.3.30 Security-certified doors, window frames and glazing should be installed within each house. An intruder alarm is advised.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

Apartments

- ☐ The communal entrance doors should be:
 - compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2;
 - include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system; and,
 - self-closing and lock automatically on closure.
- ☐ An audio, and ideally visual, unit should be located at front, communal, entrance door to allow visitors to communicate with residents. The rear entrance door should be for the use of residents only.
- ☐ Residents should have a handset in their apartment to speak to (and view) visitors arriving at the front entrance door.
- ☐ Residents should be able to remotely operate the front, communal entry door's locking mechanism from within their apartments to allow bona fide visitors entry.
- ☐ Apartment entrance and garden/terrace access doors must also be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2:
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must include a door viewer and chain, or similar opening limiter.
- ☐ Each apartment should be clearly numbered.
- ☐ The cycle store, plant room and refuse store doors must be at least FD30 rated and include SBD accredited locks, and be self-closing and self-locking. The locks fitted to the cycle and refuse store doors should be fob-activated, electronic locks

Houses

- ☐ Front doors and back doors must all be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS 202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Front doors should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key when closed.
- ☐ Front doors should have fixed sidelights or a door viewer, as well as an opening limiter fitted, so that residents can identify visitors prior to opening the door fully.
- ☐ Letter plates should meet the Door Hardware Federation's Technical Standard 008 (TS 008), be fitted with deflector plate, and be located a minimum of 400mm away from the internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Each house should be clearly numbered with the number visible from the street.

4.2 Window frames

- ☐ Ground floor windows of houses and apartments must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within, and surrounding, all external doors and all ground floor windows of the houses and apartments must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356.

4.4 Intruder alarm

- ☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each property. Alarms should be linked to contacts on all external doors, with PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms that have windows. In the absence of an alarm a 13amp fuse spur should be provided to allow future residents to fit their own alarm.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The western and south-western boundaries of the site, adjacent to the apartment residents' car park, should be particularly robust. A 2000mm high brick wall or 2000mm high steel railings would be most appropriate.
- ☐ The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as a hedge or railings to height of around 1000mm. Sub-divisional boundaries to the front of houses should be defined with a 1000mm railings or hedges.
- ☐ Pedestrian and vehicle gates into the rear gardens should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate a key operable sash or deadlock. If residents, especially drivers or cyclists, are likely to use these gates when entering or leaving their property, then the gates must be lockable from both sides. Security would be enhanced if pedestrian gates were fitted with self-closing hinges and the locked automatically upon closure.
- ☐ Sub-divisional, close-boarded, timber fencing at the rear of the houses should include a privacy screen 1800mm high, perpendicular to the house. The fencing may be reduced to 1500mm for the remainder of the boundary or include a 1200mm fence finished with a 300mm high section of trellis. The sub-divisional fencing of dual-fronted houses (plots 1-6), should be around 1200mm in height but still include the 1800mm high privacy screen.
- ☐ The pathway between the apartment building and the house on plot 4 should be secured with an 1800mm high, steel-railed gates, fitted with key-operated mechanical locks. The gates should be self-closing and self-locking.
- ☐ If vehicle gates are installed at the entrances to the service road, they should be 1800mm high, automated and activated by residents' fob. The adjacent pedestrian/cyclist gates should also be 1800mm high, be fitted with fob-operated electronic locks, be self-closing and self-locking, and be designed so that climbing is difficult.

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In order to facilitate natural surveillance across the development, any shrub planting within front gardens should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies throughout the public realm of the site should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External, dusk-to-dawn lighting must be provided to the service road, apartment residents' parking, the rear garden entrance gates of plots 1-6, all front and rear doors of all houses and the apartment building, and to the refuse store and plant room doors.
- ☐ Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor. PIR security lighting is not recommended. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives.

4.8 Garden sheds

- ☐ If garden sheds are provided to the houses, they should be fitted with Sold Secure locks, hasp and staple and a ground anchor or shed shackle, to allow residents to secure valuable equipment and/or bicycles.

4.9 Meter cupboards

- ☐ Unless smart meters are installed, meters should be located in ground level boxes to the front of each property, not with the secure area at the side or rear of the properties.

4.10 Downpipes

- ☐ Wherever possible, downpipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the brickwork to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address maintenance of the apartment building and its car park, amenity areas and the service road.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out. The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme and site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved.

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
28.06.21	Samuele Pretti, Bowker Sadler Partnership	Request for Crime Impact Statement
18.08.21		Site visited
05.10.21	Samuele Pretti, Bowker Sadler Partnership	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
001	Location Plan	28/06/21	
0100	Proposed Site Plan	18/05/21	C
0101	Street Elevations	09/06/21	A

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		05.10.21

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- Resistance of glazing
- Performance of hardware
- Resistance to static loading
- Resistance to dynamic loading
- Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk