



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Plot F, Great Jackson Street Framework Area

988 No. Apartments

FOR: Renaker Build Limited

DRAFT: 15th July 2021

REFERENCE: 2021/0264/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Plot F, Great Jackson Street Framework Area

2021/0264/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The following areas have been identified as a concern and should be addressed (see section 3.3 for more details).

- The areas of concern identified in section 3.3.1 should be addressed.
- The basement parking entrance structure should be of a height that is not easily climbable and treated with an anti-graffiti treatment.
- Access control and physical security of the buildings should be carefully considered.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development, and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



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
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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Great Jackson Street Framework Area (Plot F) which is located to the South of the Manchester City Centre area.

The site is presently undeveloped but it is being occupied as the site compound for the Deansgate Square development to the North of the site. Residential developments at River Street and Crown Street are also in close proximity.

The site is roughly bound by Owen Street/Pond Street to the North, to the East the site is bound by The Boatmans (apartment building), to the South the site is bound by Great Jackson Street, and to the East the site is bound by industrial/commercial units. Opposite the site on Great Jackson Street is a SIP car park, and the Mancunian Way lies beyond.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 2018 and 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
39	45	98	393	218	121	21	165	20	36

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is relatively high, with less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft being the highest recorded crimes. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings are mostly taking place to the north and south of the proposed site, around Deansgate metrolink stop and Royce Road. The assaults in the area are mostly taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning over the weekend period, which is when licenced premises have a larger attendance and are open for longer periods. The assaults are mostly carried out by unknown offenders.
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime in the local area is mostly taking place around Great Jackson Street and Bridgewater Viaduct. Theft from a Motor vehicle is the highest occurring vehicle crime with smashed glazing being the most common entry point to the vehicle. The area in which vehicle crime has occurred has a large number of car parking facilities and on street parking, which increases the number of opportunities for offenders.
- 2.1.4 Thefts have occurred around the north and east of the proposed site, around Deansgate/ Castleford Metrolink stop and to the north around Liverpool Road, where pickpocketing has been most commonly used to obtain goods. Thefts have also occurred around the licenced premises in the area, with mobile phones and purses/ wallets being taken.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.

Possible Solution - To prevent tailgating into the building there should be a secure lobby with residents/visitors passing through a second access control security rated door before they can enter the stair/lift core of the building.

- 2.2.2 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

- 2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - Any ground floor opening lights should be restricted in opening to 100mm to prevent them being left vulnerable if unlocked. All external doors should be self-closing to prevent them being left in an insecure position and any external apartment doors should have a split-spindle or fixed handle to prevent these doors from being left insecure.

- 2.2.4 Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see section 4.2 & 5.2). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.




- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **80% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **65% lower** than Greater Manchester and **50% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **18% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **29% higher** than Greater Manchester and **38% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **64% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **48% lower** than Greater Manchester and **23% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **15% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **55% higher** than Greater Manchester and **169% higher** than England & Wales.


2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Tuesday and Thursday during the afternoon (1pm - 5pm). Offenders often target properties during the day when residents are likely to be away at work, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Offenders posing as legitimate residents/visitors and entering restricted areas through insecure doors or tailgating residents.
- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as unknown, offenders have typically targeted insecure windows and doors.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Saturday during the evening (6pm – 11:59pm.) Vehicles targeted have mostly been parked on streets and private car parks. During the evening it is often dark with less footfall in the area, the offender perceives that there is less of a risk of being caught/ identified.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is of two apartment buildings totalling 988 no. apartments on Plot F of the Great Jackson Street Framework Area. Between the apartment buildings there will be a landscaped area and pedestrian route through the site. Both buildings will have basement car and cycle parking areas.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal


The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 There are a number of large residential developments in close vicinity to the proposed development site, including the developments at Deansgate Square, River Street, and Crown Street. These developments and the proposed development will significantly increase residential activity in the area which can foster a safer environment, and reduce the potential for crime, fear of crime, and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.2 Apartments are positioned at second floor and above where they are less likely to experience noise disturbance by those passing through the development late at night or in the early hours of the morning.
- 3.2.3 The landscaped area between the apartment buildings is well overlooked by reception areas of the apartment buildings.
- 3.2.4 The main entrances to the buildings are in prominent locations where they can easily be seen by residents and visitors from the road.
- 3.2.5 Residents garden areas will be secured with an appropriately secure boundary and access will be restricted to residents, staff, and legitimate visitors.
- 3.2.6 Access control will restrict access into the circulation core at ground floor level, restricting access to the upper floors to residents and providing a secondary barrier against tailgating into residents-only areas.
- 3.2.7 Amenity space on the first floors of the buildings will be restricted to residents.
- 3.2.8 Cycle stores in the basement of the building will operate on an access control system. These should be restricted to legitimate users of these facilities.

- 3.2.9 Basement parking will be provided for residents, which will allow them to park their vehicles securely. Vehicles parked in secure parking areas are less likely to be targeted than those parked on the street or surface car parks. The provision of car parking will also potentially reduce the demand of on-street parking in the area. Access into the basement parking areas will be restricted with a high-speed roller shutter operating on an access control system.
- 3.2.10 The proposed access road will be restricted with automatic bollards, restricting access to authorised vehicles, reducing the potential for misuse of the access road serving this building and Deansgate Square.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.



- 3.3.1 The two areas circled above (Block F1) are of concern for the following reasons and measures should be incorporated to mitigate the potential risk.
- A. This area between the building and the residents garden could potentially be a concealed area / blind spot and allow facilitate, or generate antisocial and criminal behaviour, such as loitering, alcohol/drug consumption, or target the door in this area without being easily seen. Consideration should be given to incorporating some visually permeable screening to the resident's garden to allow this area to be viewed by those using the garden space. This area should be illuminated to a high standard, particularly the area under the building above, and be covered by CCTV. Any security patrols of the development should cover this area.
 - B. Consideration should be given to ensure that this area is not obscured from view and become an area concealed from view that could generate antisocial behaviour to the detriment of residents and staff.
- 3.3.2 The basement car park entrance ramp for Block F2 is a separate structure from the building itself and there are two main concerns for this structure:
- The height of the structure should not be so low that it could be easily climbed by offenders. It is recommended that the minimum height should be 3000mm. It is recommended that any trees screening the structure should not be positioned so close that they could facilitate climbing onto the roof. The façade of this building should be carefully considered so that it is not climbable.
 - There is a large amount of graffiti in the local area, and whilst residential buildings are not normally targeted, ancillary structures (i.e. substations) often are. It is recommended that this structure is treated with an anti-graffiti treatment and that the surface is difficult to deface.
- 3.3.3 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing, and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating with an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- 3.3.4 Access in to the buildings should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access in to the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access in to the building.

- 3.3.5 High speed, automated shutters, opening on a key fob or remote should restrict access to the basement parking areas to residents.
- 3.3.6 Doors into cycle stores should operate on an access control system, operated with resident's key card/fob. Access into cycle stores should be restricted to genuine users rather than every residents of the building/block.
- 3.3.7 The design of landscaped areas should be carefully considered to allow good sightlines and to avoid creating any potential areas for concealment that could be misused. Landscaping should not impede natural surveillance opportunities of the public realm areas from within the buildings. The landscaped area, and pedestrian routes should be illuminated to a high standard to deter offenders, or those anti-socially minded, from operating in these areas.
- 3.3.8 Basement car parking and bicycle parking areas should be illuminated in accordance with BS 5489 - see table L1 for more details. Doors within the basement areas should be illuminated with a dedicated lighting source.
- 3.3.9

Table L1: Lighting requirements for multi-storey/enclosed car parks

Areas	Av. lux	Min. lux	Uniformity
Parking bays and lanes	75	50	0.6
Ramps, corners and junctions	150	75	0.5
Vehicular entrances/exits	75 (night) 300 (day)	n/a	n/a
Pedestrian areas (stairs, lobbies etc)	100	50	0.5
Open roof level	30	10	0.33

Please Note:

- The Av (average) lux is the maintained average horizontal illuminance on the floor
- The Min (minimum) lux is the minimum horizontal illuminance at any location
- Reference should be made to BS 5489 part 9, for further information and guidance
- There may be scope for compromise on the above levels due to external factors

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access in to the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access in to the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access in to the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Communal entrances
 - Communal areas
 - Bicycle stores
 - Circulation cores
 - Amenity space
 - Parcel room

4.6 Basement Car Parking

- ☐ Access to the parking areas should be restricted with a secure high speed shutter or gate operated using a key fob/proximity reader system, with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out') so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles and escape.
- ☐ The car parking area should be illuminated to BS 5489 – see table L1.

Table L1: Lighting requirements for multi-storey/enclosed car parks

Areas	Av. lux	Min. lux	Uniformity
Parking bays and lanes	75	50	0.6
Ramps, corners and junctions	150	75	0.5
Vehicular entrances/exits	75 (night) 300 (day)	n/a	n/a
Pedestrian areas (stairs, lobbies etc)	100	50	0.5
Open roof level	30	10	0.33

Please Note:

- The Av (average) lux is the maintained average horizontal illuminance on the floor
- The Min (minimum) lux is the minimum horizontal illuminance at any location
- Reference should be made to BS 5489 part 9, for further information and guidance
- There may be scope for compromise on the above levels due to external factors

4.7 Bicycle Parking Areas

- ☐ Doors in to the cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners)..
- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.
- ☐ It is essential that good sightlines are maintained throughout the development to allow residents and visitors to actively survey the area for potential threats. Low level planting should not be in excess of 1000mm in height and tree crowns should fall no less than 2400mm to aid sightlines and natural surveillance.

4.9 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Doors within the basement parking area should be illuminated with a dedicated lighting source.
- ☐ Elevations of the building should be illuminated.

4.10 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- Resistance of glazing
- Performance of hardware
- Resistance to static loading
- Resistance to dynamic loading
- Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk