




CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Units 1 and 2, Spinningfields Square

Change of Use to Restaurant

FOR: Caprice Holdings Ltd

VERSION A: 30th November 2021

REFERENCE: 2007/0857/CIS/03

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Units 1 and 2, Spinningfields Square

2007/0857/CIS/03

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The development is broadly acceptable, in terms of designing out crime; however, the recommendations made in section 3.3 should be addressed, including but not limited to:

- The construction of the ground floor extension should be in keeping with Secured by Design standards.
- The provision of robust access control and CCTV should be carefully considered.

If the recommendations contained within section 3.3 are implemented we would be supportive of the planning application.



Patrick Babb

Consultant

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



1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Spinningfields area within the city centre of Manchester.

The building is bound by public realm on all sides, with Spinningfields Square to the North and The Avenue to the South of the site.

The site of the proposed development is Units 1 & 2 Spinningfields Square, which was formerly occupied by Emporium Armani before becoming vacant for a number of years. The existing unit has a mezzanine level which will be removed as part of the proposed development and to the South of the building there will be a small ground floor extension to incorporate additional floor space.

The development in the area is a variety of different uses with the majority of ground floor units in the Spinningfields area being occupied by F&B outlets, typically with offices above. Deansgate and Peter Street which are in the immediate vicinity of the site and these areas are dominated by restaurants and licensed premises, as well as retail.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2020 and 31st October 2021.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
37	173	194	1072	885	96	17	286	36	116

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high for Manchester, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime being the highest reported crimes. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to an increase of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly to the north and east of the proposed site, around Quay Street and Deansgate, which has a high volume of bars and retail facilities located along it. Offences have mostly occurred over the weekend period (Friday – Sunday) during the late evening and early hours of the morning when most premises in the area are closing. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings in the local area, with offences often taking place between known associates, with alcohol often being a factor.
- 2.1.3 Thefts have taken place throughout the area, with hotspots occurring to the north and south of the proposed site, around Quay Street and Watson Street junction, as well as St Peters Square Metrolink stop. Both areas have a high volume of footfall due to public transport links, retail outlets and bars / restaurants. Offenders have mostly used pick pocketing techniques and distraction methods in order to obtain personal belongings, mostly mobile phones, bags and purses / wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (mostly mobile phones) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the local area has mostly taken place in private car parks and vehicles using on street parking facilities. Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime with offenders using implements and objects in order to smash glazing and access the interior of the vehicle. Offenders have also targeted vehicle registration plates, using tools to remove them.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Customers posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas

Possible Solution - There should be a secure area for staff to leave their belongings while at work and access to all staff areas should be restricted with auditable access controls.

- 2.2.2 Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

Possible Solution - A particular issue in drinking establishments within the Manchester city centre area is the theft of personal effects; handbag and mobile phone theft is a particular issue. Consideration should be given to fixing 'Chelsea Clips' (see image), Grippa clips, or simple hooks to the underside of tables to allow customers to secure bags or jackets to the table while keeping it in view; a more secure option than, for example, table tops or back of chairs, where belongings can be liable to theft.



The internal layout of the premises can also help deter theft by promoting surveillance and creating an uncluttered, environment, avoiding pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

2.2.3 Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to the relevant security standards (see section 4).

2.2.4 Glazing in windows has been smashed

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see section 4 for more details).




2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary Restaurants / Cafés: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.1.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafes in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday. The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.

2.1.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the premises.
- Breaking glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the windows and doors located underneath.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors, accessing restricted areas and removing goods belonging to staff and the company.

2.2 Theft Restaurants / Cafés: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.2.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants / cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants / cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses / wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks over the weekend period on a Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon and into the late evening. Offender often target vehicles parked within close proximity of the city centre as they are often left unattended and not overlooked for long periods of time, creating a low risk opportunity for offenders.

All data used within the report is correct, give or take 8%, due to updates with our I.T systems

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is a change of use to restaurant with a small ground floor extension to the building to create a lobby and additional seating areas.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The extension of the building into The Avenue will not significantly narrow this thoroughfare in a way that could potentially allow offenders to operate.
- 3.2.2 The proposed building extension is uncomplicated. There are no recessed areas or similar features that could conceal an offender or generate antisocial behaviour.
- 3.2.3 The proposed use is in keeping with the uses in the existing area and is appropriate for the proposed development.
- 3.2.4 There are two entrance doors before patrons can access the restaurant, which will help limit access at busy periods.
- 3.2.5 The main entrance to the building is well overlooked and the glass façade will provide an active frontage to the surrounding public realm.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The main entrance into the building should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- 3.3.2 Glazing to the building extension should include a pane of laminate glass rated to P4A under EN 356 and sliding windows must be certified to BS PAS 24.
- 3.3.3 Tables should not be positioned so close to the proposed sliding windows that an offender could reach through and take customers property from table or chairs.
- 3.3.4 The premises should be covered with a comprehensive CCTV system to deter criminal/antisocial behaviour and so that footage can be reviewed in the event of an incident. As a minimum the following areas should be subject to coverage:
- Bar/service areas
 - Internal/external seating areas
 - Main entrance
 - Toilet lobby
 - Cloakroom
- 3.3.5 Access to staff/storage areas should be restricted to staff. It is recommended that doors in to areas restricted to staff operate on an access control system (i.e. fob or swipe card) or that they are lockable by key, a door closer should be installed to ensure the door locks as staff enter/leave this area. Signage should indicate which areas are only for members of staff.
- 3.3.6 Theft of personal property is a common occurrence in licensed premises in the city centre. It is recommended that 'Chelsea Clips' or simple hooks are fitted to the underside of tables to allow customers to secure bags or jackets to the table while keeping it in view; a more secure option than, for example, table tops or back of chairs, where belongings can be liable to theft.
- 3.3.7 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any till/bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods. Cash should be stored securely in a safe within a secure back office.
- 3.3.8 The building should be covered with a monitored alarm system (with keyholder/security team response).

3.3.9 In order to minimise criminal opportunities the following elements are recommended:

- Tables should be spaced so that it is easy for staff and customers to negotiate their way through the premises.
- Consideration should be given to high/wide bar areas, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of the service counter should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled).
- The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding pinch points. A clear pathway to and from the toilets to the seating areas is desirable.

3.3.10 An operating policy should be drawn up, which includes:

- Location and management of any smoking areas.
- Details of waste management provision (bins should be securely stored within the premises).
- A procedure for making the premises secure after customers have left so that counting and securing the takings can be carried out in a secure environment, and a procedure for staff leaving and securing the premises so that staff safety is not compromised.
- Details of staff security training.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation. The recommendations typically apply to new build elements of the development and not the exst

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doorsets should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. All of these doors should be self-closing and self-locking.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ Where feasible, any ground level, opening windows should be certificated to LPS1175 or BS PAS 24, fitted with opening restrictors and with key operated locks.
- ☐ Curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any security shutters or grilles must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required).

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All accessible glazing (i.e. below a height of 2000mm from external ground level) must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any louvres at ground floor level to plant areas/refuge stores should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed or damaged. Security-certified louvered doorsets are also available if required (see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for SBD approved suppliers).

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored intruder alarm system should be installed. Alarms should have contacts on all external doors or shutters, and PIR in rooms with windows. The alarm should include a signal terminating at the security control room/patrol team.

4.5 Access control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - External doors
 - Staff only areas
 - Plant areas and areas restricted to maintenance staff
- ☐ Lockers should be provided for staff to securely store their property while working.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, and producing 'white' light, should be installed to all external doors and the building elevation.

4.7 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV camera system should be installed. Cameras should be capable of monitoring all building elevations - with particular emphasis on external doors (cameras should be able to observe people coming and going), and the entrance lobbies.
- ☐ Recording equipment should be located within a secure room or images may be recorded off-site at a suitable monitoring facility.
- ☐ CCTV monitoring screens should be located at the service areas and back-of-house.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. An operating/maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:
 - Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Any cash management within the premises;
 - Any cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.

-
- 5.1.2 There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.3 The opening hours of the premises should be consistent with other such premises in the local area and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Service of drinks should end approximately 30 minutes before the premises closes, in order to aid effective dispersal of customers.
- 5.1.4 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, flat screen monitors/televisions etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.5 Toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:
- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.
- 5.1.6 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas.
- 5.1.7 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
03/11/2021	Kate Roberts	CIS application confirmed
24/11/2021	Kate Roberts	Progress update

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
020-058-03	HVAC Layout Roof Level	22/04/21	
464-101	Existing Basement Plan	19/06/21	A
464-102	Existing Ground Floor Plan	Mar 20	
464-103	Existing Mezzanine Floor Plan	Mar 20	
464-104	Existing External Elevation	April 21	
464-201	Proposed GA Plan - Ground Floor and Mezzanine	Mar 20	S
464-203	Proposed GA Plans - Basement	Mar 20	C
464-205	Proposed External Elevations	26/10/21	D
464-206	Proposed External Elevations	April 21	
464-206	Proposed External Signage Details	Oct 21	
464-901	Proposed External Structure	Oct 21	B
464-LBP	Location Block Plan	Nov 20	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		