



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Castlefield Viaduct

Park / Visitor Attraction (2,100m²)

for: National Trust Supplier Invoices

version A: 7th September 2021

URN: 2021/0347/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Castlefield Viaduct

2021/0347/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Major Design Changes Not Required

As the proposal involves an interim adaptation of the site and use of temporary facilities, the scope to introduce additional physical security interventions is limited. However, all proposed alterations and temporary installations should take account of the recommendations contained within this report.

The success of this proposal will be largely dependent on the adoption of effective management practices, as highlighted in section 5 of this report, together with continuing liaison with local police and other partners.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Michael Craig', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Michael Craig *DipLD CMLI*

DfS Consultant

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


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1 Visual Audit

The site, shown red on plan, is located in the Castlefield area of central Manchester. The location is intersected by transport routes and watercourses and includes substantial engineering structures, with active rail / tram lines and canals. The area has been regenerated in recent years and includes a mix of residential and commercial premises, providing bar / restaurant and leisure facilities. The nearby Castlefield Bowl hosts periodic outdoor concerts that attract large crowds to the area.

There is level access to the site from the west end of a public car park accessed off Trafford Street. A staircase (and non-operational lift) creates a pedestrian link down to Beaufort Street. The area around the site entrance sees relatively little legitimate pedestrian activity.

The site is part of an elevated viaduct structure which has been relatively undisturbed since closure in the late 1960s. Naturalised vegetation has established and there is evidence of criminal damage and use of the area by rough sleepers.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
19	28	71	172	96	46	6	153	6	30

- 2.1.1 The crime rate in the local area is low for Manchester, with an exception to vehicle crime, which is high. The proposed site is located on the edge of the City Centre, where there is a high volume of retail outlets and licenced premises which accounts for an increase in crime and disorder within the area. Less serious wounding theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded offences within the local area, with hotspots occurring to the north and east of the proposed site, around Liverpool Road and Bridgewater Street, around the Deansgate / Castlefield Metrolink stop. The violent offense taking place in the area, have mostly occurred in the late evening and early hours of the morning, over the weekend period when licenced premises in the area have a greater footfall. Vehicle crime in the area is high; however, this is likely because of the large car parks located in the area. Vehicles parked within close proximity of the City Centre are mostly used by commuters leaving vehicles unattended for long periods of the day.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Criminal damage carried out against buildings and landmarks by means of graffiti

Possible Solution - A protective coating should be applied to any areas that may be vulnerable to graffiti (such as large expanses of blank walls and inside toilets) in order to facilitate rapid removal. Any proposed street furniture should be robust and vandal resistant. Flame retardant timber should be used where possible.

- 2.2.2 Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed

Possible Solution – Any windows should be protected with external shutters, integral to the structure. All shutters should be certified to a recognised burglary-resistant standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR 2). Shutters certified to this standard can resist most attempts by offenders to gain access with the use of force. In high risk situations, shutters rated to a higher standard of resistance should be installed.

- 2.2.3 Theft of personal property in the local area by means of pickpocketing and distraction methods.

Possible Solution – Footpaths / viewing areas should be as wide as possible so that unsupervised pedestrians do not have to pass too closely by others which could leave them vulnerable to thieves. The entrance to the facility and approaches should be illuminated to a high standard and CCTV should be provided.

2.3 Risk Factors


The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Personal robbery
- Theft of personal belongings
- Criminal damage to adjoining properties
- Arson
- Violence towards the public and staff
- Unauthorised access to buildings / private spaces
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Antisocial behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Alcohol and drug misuse
- Alcohol related disorder
- Rough sleeping

2.4 Criminal Damage (Parks): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to criminal damage offences within / against parks, recorded in the Manchester area.

2.4.1





2.4.2 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of criminal damage peaks on a Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon and into the evening, peaking between 8pm – 9:30pm. Offenders often carry out criminal damage in the evening when there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be identified. Offenders also use the cover of darkness in order to enter the area and exit the area unseen.

2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Graffiti on park statues and walls.
- Using implements in order to set fire to bins in public spaces.
- Damaging out houses by means of bodily pressure and implements, damaging doors/walls.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure and implements in order to damage fencing / netting surrounding the park.
- Using off road vehicles or cars to cause damage to grass fields within the park.

2.5 Theft (Parks): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against parks, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft at parks in Manchester peak on a Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon and into the evening. Offenders have targeted properties located within the park, climbing on roofs and removing lead from the building. Offenders have also targeted insecure bikes, scooters, phones and bags, grabbing the property and making off out of the area.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis


The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Saturday during the Morning and into the evening 11am - 11pm). Vehicles targeted have mostly been parked on streets and private car parks. Offenders often target vehicles within the city centre as they are left unattended in low footfall areas, for long periods of time, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught.

2.7 Misc Theft (Event Venues): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous theft offences within / against event venues, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.7.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft is highest in the evenings, in particular during the week on Tuesdays. These times are likely to be when event venues are busiest, providing offenders with a greater opportunity to commit thefts.
- 2.7.2 The most prevalent offence at event venues has been violence, occurring late in the evening, which is when the risk of alcohol-related violence is at its greatest. This also links in with the risk of theft at event venues, which are all predominantly licensed premises, therefore opportunities for theft can increase when victims have been drinking alcohol too. Handbags, purses and phones were the most frequently targeted items.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises development of a visitor attraction using part of the elevated section of former railway viaduct west of Deansgate-Castlefield tram stop.
- 3.1.2 A pavilion / meeting room will be provided for particular events at the west end of the site, and other visitor facilities will be provided close to the entrance, and potentially these may include visitor & staff toilets / bin stores / staff kiosk / retail and mobile cafe. Other features within the site will be influenced by consultation with visitors, and features will be installed / removed as appropriate.
- 3.1.3 The facility will be accessed from the end of the car park, and visitors will be admitted in groups of up to 20 and escorted along the viaduct.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will bring additional legitimate activity to a currently-vacant site which has been subject to some abuse. Use of the site should help to create a sense of ownership and responsibility, and improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 Most of the site is relatively inaccessible, with its entrance in one place at the eastern end of the viaduct so security measures can be concentrated on this location.
- 3.2.3 Visitors will be admitted in groups escorted by staff, allowing customer behaviour to be easily monitored. The facility will be locked down at night and as the majority of violent crime in the local area has happened late in the evening or early hours of the morning, if the facility is closed at these times it is unlikely to be impacted by these incidents.
- 3.2.4 The linear layout has a relatively uncomplicated arrangement with good sight lines along the pathways with no pinch points or potential hiding places which could be exploited by offenders. The choice of trees and other plant species should allow some visible permeability through the canopies and foliage so that people cannot be concealed within the public spaces.
- 3.2.5 Cycle parking. Short-stay cycle parking for visitors will be positioned where it can be readily overlooked from the entrance kiosk. Cycle stands should enable users to secure their bikes in three places (both wheels and the frame). Cycle stands should be specifically covered by any CCTV system in place.
- 3.2.6 A row of bollards will be installed to control vehicular access to the area around the entrance and will help to protect the fencing from deliberate or accidental ramming.
- 3.2.7 The operation will generate relatively few cash transactions on the site. Parking for security vehicles can be located where the distance between the vehicle and collection point is minimised.

3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The location is not well overlooked from adjacent premises, so any antisocial or criminal behaviour is unlikely to be witnessed which can give offenders confidence to operate for extended periods without fear of detection.
- 3.3.2 Fencing at Entrance. If the existing fencing is to be retained, it should be carefully evaluated to ensure that it can provide an effective barrier with a consistent level of security. Any changes to entrance to make it more welcoming must not compromise security of the fencing. The proximity of bushes and trees to the fence line can undermine the security of the boundary by creating cover for an intruder, or providing potential climbing aids. Overhanging branches and dense vegetation should be removed where it could be exploited in this way. Care must be taken to ensure the landscaping to the perimeter of the site is maintained at an appropriate height in order to prevent it impeding views to and from the site, and avoid the creation of hiding places that could be exploited by offenders. Any new / replacement fencing should be formed of a weld-mesh system with a minimum height of 3m (see section 4). There

should be minimal ground clearance beneath the gate, to reduce the potential for crawling into the secure area. Check the junctions of different types of fencing to ensure they don't form a potential ladder feature.

- 3.3.3 The development proposal should take into account the security of visitors and staff approaching and leaving the site. The area outside the premises needs to be well illuminated without creating areas of shadow or pooling. CCTV covering the frontage of the premises is also essential. The developer should engage with partners to improve the ambience of the local area, such as lighting, and the stairs / lift leading to Beaufort Street (lifts for public use should include glazed doors to allow users to see and be seen).
- 3.3.4 A CCTV system should be included to monitor entrance point, and if possible, the stairs and lift as well.
- 3.3.5 The temporary / interim nature of the proposal will involve extensive use of portable features that could be vulnerable to theft. Where possible, features (such as benches / tables) should be fixed down or to each other to reduce the ease of removal.
- 3.3.6 Graffiti / criminal damage. External finishes and cladding should be formed of a graffiti-resistant surface, or have a resistant coating added to enable any unauthorised markings to be removed easily without leaving evidence. Structures should be made of fire-resistant materials to reduce the potential impact of arson attacks.
- 3.3.7 Position of Temporary facilities, including waste receptacles. The position of ancillary structures and temporary facilities, external storage and vehicle parking areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:-
 - Potential to block sight lines and create hiding places
 - Potential to obscure CCTV and lighting
 - Potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit / entry to the premises.
 - Potential to mask damage to perimeter fencing
- 3.3.8 Car Parking Provision. Levels of vehicle crime in the area around the site are above the average for Greater Manchester, and any provision of vehicle parking for staff and visitors should not put their security at risk. Any arrangements made for off-site parking should utilise nearby car parks which are accredited with the "Park Mark" safer parking award (see www.parkmark.co.uk for details).
- 3.3.9 Management. The security of the site and its users will be dependent on implementation of management practises to ensure that entry to the site and accessibility within it can be effectively monitored and controlled (see section 5).

4 Physical Security

All new-build elements of the proposed development should be constructed in accordance with the following standards to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

4.1 Building construction

- Timber building features must be robust and fire-resistant. A reinforced lining such as welded steel mesh can enhance the security of the building fabric.
- Shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.
- All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.

4.2 Alarms

- Alarms should be linked to contacts on all external doors.
- PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

- It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

4.3 Boundaries

- Any replacement fencing should be rigid-panel welded-wire mesh fencing (with no mid-rails that would aid climbing) and gates, minimum height of 3m. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels / gates. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures / locking points to gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding / protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The fencing / gates should also be located away from any other climbing aids, such as lighting columns, trees, junction boxes etc.
- The site boundary treatments should be positioned on hard standing ground.
- Where exposed, the perimeter fencing should be protected on the inner side from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary. The condition of fencing along the perimeter of the site should be regularly inspected for damage / attack.



4.4 Landscaping

- In vulnerable locations, such as around entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.
- Security Bollards
 - Fixed and raising bollards should be successfully tested to PAS 68-1:2013
 - Bollards providing passive protection should be successfully tested to BS 170-1

4.5 Lighting

- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- External lighting should be provided in accordance with BS 5489. The spread of lighting should be evenly distributed with no areas of shadowing or pooling. Levels should be sufficient to support the CCTV systems in operation in the area.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.6 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to complement the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Entrance\(s\) to site, communal facilities & cycle parking, sales counters.](#)

4.7 Other

- Surfaces that could be vulnerable to graffiti should be formed of a resistant material or have a resistant coating applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal, e.g. 'easy-on' (see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).
- Property marking. All high value equipment (e.g. computers, dj equipment etc.) should be property-marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- Directions and signage. Routes leading to and from various facilities in and around the site should be obvious to site users and visitors. Disorientation can provide legitimacy for an offender to be present in a restricted area. Clear signage should be provided throughout the site which will help to direct people to where they need to go, and discourage entry to restricted areas.
- Any bin stores / containers should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. Waste receptacles should not be left unattended outside the boundary fence, and internally bin should not be positioned adjacent to the fence. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential unauthorised access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the operation and management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews / exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and tenants should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.
 - Procedures for handling cash on the site.
 - Opening up the premises and closing down / securing the site at the end of business.
- 5.1.3 Ensure that the site management is for which the building / site was designed able to cope with the remains in place.
- 5.1.4 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.
- 5.1.5 As a new facility in a relatively quiet location, it will inevitably attract the attention of potential offenders, and an out-of-hours security presence should be considered during the initial period, which can be reviewed and adapted as experience of operation builds up. The developer should liaise with the local policing team, and the site should be included in the patrols of the neighbourhood officers.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
20/07/2021	National Trust	Meeting with developer / designer / CTU / NPT
22/07/2021	National Trust	CIS instruction received
28/07/2021	National Trust	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
31/08/2021	National Trust	Site visit
03/09/2021	National Trust	Progress enquiry
07/09/2021	National Trust	Progress update / CIS version A issued.

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
PL 100	Masterplan	23/07/21	A
DIA 004	Security Measures Diagram	25/05/21	
	Various descriptive / illustrative documents		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door / window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk