



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Trinity Islands

1950 No. Apartments, 2 No. GF Commercial
Units & Residents Amenity

FOR: Renaker Build Limited

VERSION B: 27th October 2021

REFERENCE: 2015/0590/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Trinity Islands

2015/0590/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The following areas have been identified as a concern and should be addressed (see section 3.3 for more details).

- The landscaped areas should be carefully designed so that areas of concealment or hard landscaping that could generate antisocial behaviour, or criminality, are avoided.
- The riverside walk should be illuminated to a high standard to foster a safe environment for pedestrians at night.
- Access control and physical security of the buildings should be carefully considered.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development, and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



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
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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The development site is located on both sides of the inner ring road and are known as sites C & D.

The sites are roughly bound by the River Irwell to the North and West, to the East the site is bound by Liverpool Road, and to the South the site is bound by Water Street and Regent Road.

The sites are currently both being used as surface car parking area and have previously been used as site offices for adjacent developments such as the Ordsall Chord. The sites are connected with an access road that passes under the inner ring road at the river edge of the River Irwell.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 2018 and 2019.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
16	23	53	151	77	21	6	96	<5	34

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is 63% below the average rate of crime for Manchester, with the most prevalent types of crime being less serious wounding, as well as vehicle crime, criminal damage and theft. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings, have taken place throughout the local area - with particular hotspots occurring to the east of the site along Liverpool Road and to the west around Regent Road. Assaults and public order offences have been the most commonly occurring, with domestic incidents largely to the south (where the majority of residential properties are located) and incidents between intoxicated individuals or groups largely to the east and south (where the majority of licensed premises are located) during the late evening and early morning.
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime in the area is high; however, this is likely because of the large car parks located in the area. Vehicles parked within close proximity of the City Centre are mostly used by commuters leaving vehicles unattended for long periods of the day.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to apartments

Possible Solution - All apartment entrance doorsets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24).

- 2.2.2 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.

Possible Solution - There should be access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.

- 2.2.3 Posing as a legitimate customer and gaining access to staff only areas by means of tailgating staff and exploitation of insecure doors.

Possible Solution – Any staff-only areas should operate on an access control system with access restricted to authorised personnel.

- 2.2.4 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors to gain access into communal areas and apartments

Possible Solution – All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publically accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, to prevent them from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Any accessible windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.

- 2.2.5 Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the doors/windows behind

Possible Solution - Any shutters should conform to a recognised security standard such as LPS 1175 SR 2.





2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **89% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **80% lower** than Greater Manchester and **72% lower** than England & Wales.

- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **52% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **25% lower** than Greater Manchester and **19% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwelling is **74% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **63% lower** than Greater Manchester and **44% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **37% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **15% higher** than Greater Manchester and **100% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.




- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on a Saturday and Sunday during the morning and into the afternoon (9am – 3pm) and early hours of the morning (12am - 6am). Offenders often target properties during the day when residents are likely to be away from the property, attending work / socialising, leaving the property unoccupied, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified. Offenders also target properties in the early hours of the morning when it is often dark with less footfall in the area.
- 2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
 - Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
 - Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

- Posing as a legitimate visitor / resident and entering communal areas of apartment buildings (car parks, mail rooms, bike storage and corridors).

2.6 Burglary Risk Analysis (Retail Uses)

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.7 Theft Risk Analysis (Retail Uses)



The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.7.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses and bags.

2.8 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon and into the evening. Offenders have targeted vehicles using on street parking facilities and private car parks, where they are often left unattended for long periods of time, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is of four no. apartment buildings across the two proposed sites, dissected by Trinity Way. The apartment buildings will comprise of a total of 1950 no. apartments, basement car/bicycle parking, amenity space, and associated landscaping; additionally, commercial units positioned at the ground floor level of two of the buildings. The proposals include a riverside walk that connects the two sites under Trinity Way and at either side between Regents Road and Water Street (adjacent the Ordsall Chord).

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 Opposing apartment buildings entrances will overlook each other, allowing for mutual surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.2 Underground parking areas will provide a secure location for residents to park their vehicles.
- 3.2.3 There will be a large amount of secure bicycle parking in each underground parking facility, allowing residents to secure their bicycles.
- 3.2.4 The proposed commercial unit at the ground floor of block C1 will overlook the proposed riverside way, allowing staff and customers to view this area - allowing for natural surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.5 The residents amenity space on the lower floors of the apartment buildings overlook the surrounding landscaped areas of the development, allowing residents using these spaces to observe the surrounding areas and detect any inappropriate use. The amenity space is highly visible and will potentially deter offenders from operating in the area if they feel that they are being watched.
- 3.2.6 There will be a secondary access control doorset between the main communal entrance to the building and the circulation core.
- 3.2.7 Resident's amenity space will operate on an access control system, restricting access to residents and staff.
- 3.2.8 Post boxes/parcel stores will be located in the ground floor lobby area, allowing postal deliveries to take place without the need for further access into the residential areas of the building.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The proposed riverside walkway should be illuminated to a high standard to foster a safe environment and deter those antisocially or criminally minded from misusing this route. Where the route passes under Trinity Way it should be illuminated to a very high standard with multiple lighting sources; this area should be covered by CCTV that can be monitored by concierge/security staff.
- 3.3.2 Planting and hard landscaping in the grounds surrounding the apartment buildings should be carefully considered so that it does not generate antisocial behaviour, to the detriment of legitimate users. Low planting should not exceed heights of 1000mm and tree canopies should not fall lower than 3000mm to allow good sightlines. Seating areas should be positioned where they can be easily seen from the buildings or from the public highway/footway.



- 3.3.3 On the opposite side of the river to the proposed development there are numerous areas where planting and weeds are overgrown and in some areas this significantly narrows the path. It is recommended that planting near the proposed riverside walk is avoided or strictly maintained to avoid areas becoming overgrown and potentially facilitating criminal or antisocial behaviour.
- 3.3.4 There are numerous areas in the local area where walls adjacent to canal towpaths or riverside paths have been defaced with graffiti. It is recommended that any retaining walls, or similar structures, are minimised in height to reduce the potential for graffiti and that surfaces should be difficult to deface (i.e. with an uneven texture) or be treated with a product that allows the graffiti to be easily removed.
- 3.3.5 The car park escape cores that surface in the landscaped areas should be clad/screened with materials that area difficult to deface, or be treated with an anti-graffiti coating so that any graffiti can easily be

cleaned. The escape core structures should be sufficiently high to prevent them from being easily climbed by offenders or those anti-socially minded.

- 3.3.6 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing, and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating with an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- 3.3.7 Access in to the buildings should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access in to the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access in to the building.
- 3.3.8 Doors into cycle stores should operate on an access control system, operated with resident's key card/fob. Access into cycle stores should be restricted to genuine users rather than every residents of the building/block.
- 3.3.9 All residents amenity spaces and staff only areas should operate on an audible access control system.
- 3.3.10 High speed, automated shutters, opening on a key fob or remote should restrict access to the basement parking areas to residents.
- 3.3.11 Basement car parking and bicycle parking areas should be illuminated in accordance with BS 5489 - see table L1 for more details.

Table L1: Lighting requirements for multi-storey/enclosed car parks

Areas	Av. lux	Min. lux	Uniformity
Parking bays and lanes	75	50	0.6
Ramps, corners and junctions	150	75	0.5
Vehicular entrances/exits	75 (night) 300 (day)	n/a	n/a
Pedestrian areas (stairs, lobbies etc)	100	50	0.5
Open roof level	30	10	0.33

Please Note:

- The Av (average) lux is the maintained average horizontal illuminance on the floor
- The Min (minimum) lux is the minimum horizontal illuminance at any location
- Reference should be made to BS 5489 part 9, for further information and guidance
- There may be scope for compromise on the above levels due to external factors

4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access in to the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access in to the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access in to the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.

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- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Communal entrances
 - Communal areas
 - Bicycle stores
 - Circulation cores
 - Amenity space
 - Staff only areas
 - Car parking areas
 - Parcel rooms

4.6 Basement Car Parking

- ☐ Access to the parking areas should be restricted with a secure high speed shutter or gate operated using a key fob/proximity reader system, with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out') so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles and escape.
- ☐ The car parking area should be illuminated to BS 5489 – see table L1.

4.7 Bicycle Parking Areas

- ☐ Doors in to the cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners)..
- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.
- ☐ It is essential that good sightlines are maintained throughout the development to allow residents and visitors to actively survey the area for potential threats. Low level planting should not be in excess of 1000mm in height and tree crowns should fall no less than 2400mm to aid sightlines and natural surveillance.

4.9 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Doors within the basement parking area should be illuminated with a dedicated lighting source.
- ☐ Elevations of the building should be illuminated.

4.10 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

Table L1: Lighting requirements for multi-storey/enclosed car parks

Areas	Av. lux	Min. lux	Uniformity
Parking bays and lanes	75	50	0.6
Ramps, corners and junctions	150	75	0.5
Vehicular entrances/exits	75 (night) 300 (day)	n/a	n/a
Pedestrian areas (stairs, lobbies etc)	100	50	0.5
Open roof level	30	10	0.33

Please Note:

- The Av (average) lux is the maintained average horizontal illuminance on the floor
- The Min (minimum) lux is the minimum horizontal illuminance at any location
- Reference should be made to BS 5489 part 9, for further information and guidance
- There may be scope for compromise on the above levels due to external factors

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.
- ☐ Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
04/08/2021	Frances Hampson	CIS application received
18/08/2021	Frances Hampson, Simon Critchley, Cameron Radford, & James Sidlow.	Meeting
03/09/2021	Simon Critchley	Plans received
15/09/2021	Dafydd Jones	Progress update

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Date	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
03/09/2021	C2-SHP-G200-PL-03-0001.pdf		
20/08/2021	C2-SHP-G200-PL-14-0001.pdf		
20/08/2021	C2-SHP-G200-PL-15-0001.pdf		
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03/09/2021	D2-SHP-G200-PL-01-0001.pdf		
03/09/2021	D2-SHP-G200-PL-02-0001.pdf		

03/09/2021	D2-SHP-G200-PL-03-0001.pdf		
03/09/2021	D2-SHP-G200-PL-GRD-0001.pdf		
17/08/2021	Z1-SHP-G100-PL-GRD-0001.pdf		
02/09/2021	ZC-SHP-G100-PL-B1-0001.pdf		
02/09/2021	ZC-SHP-G100-PL-B2-0001.pdf		
03/09/2021	ZD-SHP-G100-PL-B1-0001.pdf		
03/09/2021	ZD-SHP-G100-PL-B2-0001.pdf		
03/09/2021	C1-SHP-G200-PL-01-0001.pdf		
03/09/2021	C1-SHP-G200-PL-02-0001.pdf		
03/09/2021	C1-SHP-G200-PL-03-0001.pdf		
03/09/2021	C1-SHP-G200-PL-GRD-0001.pdf		
03/09/2021	C2-SHP-G200-PL-01-0001.pdf		
03/09/2021	C2-SHP-G200-PL-02-0001.pdf		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Revised apartment numbers	27/10/2021