



## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

60 OLDHAM STREET, MANCHESTER  
GROUND FLOOR & BASEMENT BAR (205sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police  
**designforsecurity**

FOR: Mr. Stewart Dean  
VERSION A: 08/07/2021  
REFERENCE: 2014/0891/CIS/04

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60 Oldham Street, Manchester

URN: 2014/0891/CIS/04


## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Design changes not required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The proposal will not achieve Secured by Design (SBD) accreditation without the replacement of all existing external building elements (such as glazing, windows and doors) to SBD standards. Nevertheless, we are happy to endorse this development, subject to all other measures being incorporated into the proposed scope of works (see Section 3).

The overall security of the development will be heavily reliant on the continuous effective management of the premises, rather than just the physical measures recommended in the report.



**Bradley Hart** MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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# Contents

|     |                                                          |    |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 1   | Visual Audit.....                                        | 4  |
| 2   | Crime Statistics & Analysis.....                         | 5  |
| 2.1 | Crime Summary                                            |    |
| 2.1 | Non-Domestic Burglary (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis |    |
| 2.2 | Theft (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis                 |    |
| 2.3 | Non-Domestic Burglary (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis |    |
| 2.4 | Theft (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis                 |    |
| 2.5 | General Risk Factors                                     |    |
| 2.6 | Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)               |    |
| 3   | Scheme Appraisal .....                                   | 10 |
| 3.1 | Proposed Development                                     |    |
| 3.2 | Any External Alterations                                 |    |
| 3.3 | Internal Layout & Security                               |    |
| 3.4 | Alarm                                                    |    |
| 3.5 | Any External Seating Area                                |    |
| 3.6 | Lighting                                                 |    |
| 3.7 | CCTV                                                     |    |
| 4   | Management & Maintenance .....                           | 14 |
| 5   | Construction .....                                       | 15 |
| 6   | Useful References .....                                  | 15 |
| 6.1 | Secured by Design (SBD)                                  |    |

## Appendix

|   |                           |    |
|---|---------------------------|----|
| A | Contact Register .....    | 16 |
| B | Associated Documents..... | 16 |
| C | CIS Version History ..... | 16 |
| D | Glossary .....            | 17 |

# 1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the east side of Oldham Street in Manchester city centre. It is currently occupied by a vacant ground floor/basement commercial unit (formerly a hairdressing academy) fronting onto Oldham Street. The upper floors of the building are occupied by residential apartments, also accessed off Oldham Street.



The rear of the unit can be accessed off the narrow alleyway of Back Spear Street, through a metal door/gate.

The site lies within the Northern Quarter district of the city, which houses a concentration of independent retail units, bars, cafés/restaurants and office premises, as well as some residential units and budget hotels.

Oldham Street is a wide thoroughfare, busy with vehicular traffic and pedestrian movement – as a result, it benefits from good levels of natural surveillance and overlooking.

In contrast, Spear Street is a much narrower street which has more limited levels of activity, pedestrian footfall and vehicular movement - leaving buildings potentially vulnerable to unauthorised access or damage unseen. Many of the properties along this stretch of Spear Street back onto the route itself, leaving numerous blank facades or window and door openings that have either been secured (with grilles or shutters) or have been bricked up. The Hive, an office development with ground floor commercial units, lies on the opposite side of Spear Street from the site. It has ground floor units with glazed frontages onto Spear Street, although many of them are partially obscured along the street and front onto the arcade running through the building – meaning they provide limited levels of natural surveillance over the street itself. Back Spear Street is an even narrower, hidden space that benefits from very little activity, footfall, passive surveillance or direct overlooking.

The site is surrounded by buildings that have been fortified with high fencing/gates, barbed wire, anti-climb rota spikes, shutters and grilles/bars (at ground and first floor level) – indicating they have suffered from crime and disorder issues. Such overt, retro-fitted features can be visually intrusive and can increase the fear of crime.



## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1<sup>st</sup> July 2018 to 30<sup>th</sup> June 2019.

### 2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site



| Domestic Burglary | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------|---------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| 43                | 219                   | 288             | 1732                  | 969   | 419     | 70               | 386                      | 47                     | 163           |

2.1.1 The level of crime in this area is extremely high, with the most frequently occurring offences being less serious wounding and theft. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises (often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts).

2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed bar/restaurant, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.

### 2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area.



2.1.1 **Day Range:** In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises between Monday and Wednesday and is lowest on Friday.

2.1.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas/streets where they are typical found are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.

Licensed Premises Burglary – Point of Entry




- 2.1.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered licensed premises through external doors. Most commonly, doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and hand tools/implements. In a number of cases, glazing in doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to gain unauthorised access. Where the point of entry was legitimate/unknown, this is likely to have been when offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas.


## 2.2 Theft (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area.

Licensed Premises Theft – Day Range






Licensed Premises Theft – Time Range



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets, cash and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, from bags hung on chairs/stored under tables or via pickpocketing and distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

## 2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafes in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafes through external doors. Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements and glazing within doors/windows has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.

## 2.4 Theft (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

## 2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

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## 2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting licensed premises and restaurants/cafes are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have been forced open with tools/implements and bodily pressure

*Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 3.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.*

- Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access

*Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 3.2), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.*

- Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas to steal items

*Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 3.3).*

- Theft of personal property, particularly from table tops, from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

*Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 3.3). The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.*

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## 3 Scheme Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The commercial unit is to be split to form 2 no. units, with the adjacent ground floor demise to be a beauty salon. The proposed ground floor and basement unit will be a bar (which will serve bar food) with proposed opening hours of 17:00 to 03:00 Friday & Saturday.
- 3.1.2 The ground floor of the premises will include a bar area, a W/C, a cellar/store and a kitchen. The basement of the premises will include an additional bar, W/Cs and a fire exit corridor.

### 3.2 Any External Alterations

*It is strongly recommended that if any external alterations to be carried out, either as part of the proposed scope of works or in the future, the following physical security specifications are adhered to:*

- ☐ Any new external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Any new windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ Any new glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any new shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.
- ☐ The rear access to the premises (off Back Spear Street) should continue to be secured with a lockable steel door or gate, in order to prevent unseen, unauthorised access.

### 3.3 Internal Layout & Security

- 3.3.1 Bars/restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:
- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating in premises, generating opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
  - **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
  - **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
  - **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
  - **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses/wallets, keys etc.
  - **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

3.3.2 The internal security and layout of the premises should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, in order to minimise the issues highlighted above:

- ☐ The entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising. Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff.
- ☐ The basement of the premises should only be used when the basement bar is staffed and customers can be directly observed. At quieter times (i.e. when the basement bar is not staffed), the basement of the premises should be secured and customers should use ground floor seating areas only. Staff should also ideally have clear views of the W/Cs to monitor their use. The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. Ideally, there should also be a secure cash office – which should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a doorset certified to BS PAS 24 and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. Consideration should also be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind bar areas, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in the till during busy periods.
- ☐ Internal access doors/frames to all other cellar/storage rooms and kitchens should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick) and self-closing, fitted with either automatic locks controlled by auditable access controls (i.e. staff proximity readers or swipe cards) or key operated locks (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times) to secure them when unoccupied. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to high and wide bars/serveries, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of the bars should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled). Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.
- ☐ It is highly recommended that customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- ☐ Internal walls between adjacent units should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

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### 3.4 Alarm

- ☐ An alarm should be installed to cover the premises, linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (e.g. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre or security control room, who will alert the key holder).
- ☐ It is also recommended that the alarm system should incorporate personal attack buttons for the use of staff in identified locations, such as behind bars/serveries or in any cash office (which should also contain a telephone and a mobile phone with a clear signal).

### 3.5 Any External Seating Area

- ☐ Any external seating area should be clearly defined as separate from the pedestrian footway/street by screens, barriers or planters. The overall width of any proposed external seating areas (including all tables/chairs and screens/barriers/planters) should be no wider than 50% of the total width of the route. Tables directly adjacent to the pinch points, such as around lighting columns or signage posts, should be avoided.
- ☐ Tables and chairs, as well as any removable canopies/umbrellas, heaters or screens/barriers should be stored within the premises out-of-hours, in order to prevent damage or mis-use and prevent the space from fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour when the premises are closed. Any awnings should also be retracted out-of-hours.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see above) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats.
- ☐ The layout of any external tables/chairs should be configured so that, as much as possible, they are not located directly adjacent to barriers where it would be easy reach over and steal any items of value. All external seating areas should be capable of being clearly overlooked from internal staff positions.
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that any advertising A-boards signs do not inadvertently provide additional features that may narrow the footway and funnel pedestrians into close proximity of any proposed external seating areas.
- ☐ The success of any external seating areas is largely dependent on the effective management of the space, particularly at peak times. Staff should closely monitor customer use/behaviour and should regularly clear away used glasses, crockery and cutlery to prevent theft or mis-use.

### 3.6 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors. Any external seating areas should also be adequately and uniformly lit, with no areas of pooling or shadowing that may affect CCTV coverage. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light.

### 3.7 CCTV

- 3.7.1 Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
  - ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
  - ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

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- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

*Acceptable Standard* - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

*Identification* – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *the entrance to the premises, all bars/serveries and till positions, all customer circulation/seating areas (including any external seating area) and any cash office.*

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## 4 Management & Maintenance

- 4.1.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. An operating/maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
  - Any cash management within the premises;
  - Any cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
  - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
  - Details of staff security training;
  - Location and management of any smoking areas;
  - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
  - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
  - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 4.1.2 There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 4.1.3 The opening hours of the premises should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Service of drinks should end approximately 30 minutes before the premises closes, in order to aid effective dispersal of customers.
- 4.1.4 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, flat screen monitors/televisions etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 4.1.5 Toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:
- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
  - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
  - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
  - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
  - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
  - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.
- 4.1.6 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas.
- 4.1.7 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

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## 5 Construction

- 5.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 5.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

## 6 Useful References

### 6.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 6.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

## A Contact Register

| Date                                                      | Contact With     | Summary of Contact                                                          |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 7 <sup>th</sup> June 2021                                 | Stuart Dean      | Receipt of CIS instruction form                                             |
| 9 <sup>th</sup> to 10 <sup>th</sup> June 2021             | Stuart Dean      | Email correspondence re: additional information & receipt of proposed plans |
| 11 <sup>th</sup> June 2021                                | Stuart Dean      | Quote issued & request for additional information                           |
| 15 <sup>th</sup> June 2021                                | Stuart Dean      | Confirmation of instruction/fee                                             |
| 17 <sup>th</sup> June 2021                                | Stuart Dean      | Request for additional information                                          |
| 22 <sup>nd</sup> June 2021                                | Stuart Dean      | Receipt of additional information                                           |
| 8 <sup>th</sup> July 2021                                 | Stuart Dean      | Email sent re: report completion & payment                                  |
| 24 <sup>th</sup> August to 1 <sup>st</sup> September 2021 | Stuart Dean      | Email correspondence re: invoice                                            |
| 6 <sup>th</sup> to 7 <sup>th</sup> September              | Stuart Dean      | Email correspondence re: payment                                            |
| 8 <sup>th</sup> September 2021                            | GMP Finance Dept | Confirmation of payment clear                                               |

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No.    | Drawing Title                                   | Date     | Rev |
|----------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------|-----|
| 600S/COU - 001 | Site Location Plan                              | 14/08/20 | -   |
| -              | Bar & Restaurant Conversion Proposed Floor Plan | 07/06/21 | B   |

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

## C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made | Date |
|---------|----------------|------|
| A       |                |      |
|         |                |      |

## D Glossary

### Burglary Resistance Standards

#### BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.*

#### BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

*The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:*

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

#### LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

*This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.*

#### STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

#### STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

### BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

*A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.*

### Commonly Used Acronyms

#### CIT

*Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).*

#### CPTED

*Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*

#### CRS

*Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)*

#### INPT

*Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.*

#### PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

*A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.*

#### LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

*A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.*

#### UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

*The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.*

### Useful Websites

#### Design for Security

[www.designforsecurity.org](http://www.designforsecurity.org)

#### Secured by Design

[www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com)

#### RIBA Product Selector

[www.ribaproductselector.com](http://www.ribaproductselector.com)

#### LPCB – Red Book Live

[www.redbooklive.com](http://www.redbooklive.com)

#### Crime Reduction (Home Office)

[www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk)

#### DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

[www.designagainstdesign.org](http://www.designagainstdesign.org)

#### Building for Life

[www.buildingforlife.org](http://www.buildingforlife.org)

#### CLG (Communities and Local Government)

[www.communities.gov.uk](http://www.communities.gov.uk)