



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

SPACE STUDIOS MANCHESTER, VAUGHAN STREET, WEST GORTON,
MANCHESTER

OFFICES (1,529sqm.) & STAGES/WORKSHOPS (5,398sqm.)

FOR: Manchester Creative Digital Assets Ltd.

VERSION A: 08/06/2021

REFERENCE: 2015/1088/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Space Studios Manchester, Vaughan Street, West Gorton, Manchester

URN: 2015/1088/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements recommended

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Existing perimeter fencing retained, made good and protected where required. Consideration should be given to removing the existing vehicular gates onto Wenlock Way and Kniverton Road if they are surplus to requirements.
- Secure and robust system to control access into/around the site and the proposed building.
- Secure treatment of the proposed parking areas (including lighting & surface treatment) and extension of the existing monitored CCTV system to cover the new building and new parking areas.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site is bounded by Wenlock Way to the south, Kniveton Road to the west and Bennett Street/Vaughan Street to the north, in the West Gorton area of Manchester.

The site sits within the existing Space Studios site - a former industrial/manufacturing site being redeveloped in phases to create a purpose-built film & TV production facility for the North of England.

The site was formerly a redundant manufacturing facility for Fujitsu. Completed in 2014, the first phase of the redevelopment included 5 no. TV production stages, workshop space, production offices and support spaces, office space for companies providing services to the sector, events and communal spaces and secure parking for productions/unit base vehicles.

Completed in 2017, the second phase of the redevelopment comprised of a further large sound stage and support accommodation, adaptable workshop units for supporting businesses and associated car/unit base parking.

The site of the proposal will form Phase 3 of the redevelopment of the site. It sits in the south-west corner of the wider site and is currently formed by a gravelled surface backlot/unit base area.


The wider Space Studios site is enclosed with 3300-4500mm high 358 gauge welded-wire mesh fencing and is accessible via a controlled vehicular entrance (with a security gatehouse) off Vaughan Street to the north-east. There are also vehicular gates to the south of the site itself (off Wenlock Way), which have been secured internally with concrete blocks to prevent unauthorised vehicular access.

To the south of the site are recently developed residential properties fronting onto Wenlock Way and towards the Space Studios site.

To the west of the site is an area of open landscaping (meaning the site benefits from more limited levels of direct overlooking from this direction), beyond which is more recently constructed housing stock.

The land to the north of the Space Studios site is largely formed by industrial and commercial premises, which do not have many windows fronting onto the street – limiting overlooking and natural surveillance opportunities over the street and site. Bennett Street and Vaughan Street themselves benefit from limited levels of activity and footfall, particularly at night.

The high retaining walls/fencing, buildings with largely blank facades and landscaping to the perimeter of the Space Studios site mean that it also provides limited activity, overlooking and surveillance over the surrounding streets/public realm.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary




Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
16	18	20	49	11	6	<5	18	14	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is relatively low for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding and vehicle crime being the most prevalent types of recorded crime.
- 2.1.2 The majority of these offences have occurred around/off the residential streets to the south and west of the site. The majority of violent offences have taken place within dwellings, between known associates. Offenders have primarily targeted vehicles in theft of and theft from offences when parked on-street. Glazing has been smashed to gain entry to vehicles and to commit criminal damage to them.
- 2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed mixed-use development, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary/theft.

2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Offices): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.
- 2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.3 Theft (Offices): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut).
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.


2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Industrial): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Manchester industrial premises peaks on Thursday and is lowest on Friday.



- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks late at night/during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target industrial premises at these times when it is dark, industrial areas are typically quiet, units are closed or operate with fewer staff and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.



- 2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at Manchester industrial premises have been committed through doors, which offenders have forced open doors using tools/implements or have smashed locks to gain entry. Windows have also been targeted (predominantly by smashing the glazing) as have shutters, which offenders have damaged or forced shutters upwards to gain access to doors and windows behind. Offenders have regularly used a variety of tools to gain unauthorised access – suggesting incidents are more likely to have been planned rather than being opportunistic. In a number of cases, the point of entry was unknown. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before gaining access to ‘staff only’/unauthorised areas and stealing property unnoticed.

2.5 Theft (Industrial): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** The risk of theft at Manchester industrial premises peaks on Friday.
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft is greatest around midday and during the late evening. There are more opportunities for offenders to access buildings and private areas anonymously during the working day, before targeting the personal property of staff, as well as tools, plant and externally stored materials. External materials/equipment can often be vulnerable at night, particularly when compounds are not securely enclosed.

2.6 General Risk Factors

2.6.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery of businesses
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Employee theft
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Manchester office and industrial premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Manchester Offices & Industrial:** Doors have been forced open and locks have been broken by offenders to gain entry

Possible Solution - Although the location of doors should be considered (ideally placed where they can be readily observed, so that potential criminals would be more easily detected), it is inevitable that some will be located where they will benefit from lower levels of natural surveillance. All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 3.3, 4.5 & 4.6) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- **Manchester Offices:** Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain access

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Windows that are particularly vulnerable should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours.

- **Manchester Offices & Industrial:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers or gaining access to unauthorised back-of-house/staff areas unnoticed to commit theft

Possible Solution – There should be a robust access control system in place to ensure that callers to the units are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Section 4.1). All individual areas/rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

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- **Manchester Offices & Industrial:** Shutters have been forced upwards to gain unauthorised access or to access doors/windows behind them

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.1) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

- **Manchester Industrial:** Theft of externally stored materials, tools and plant equipment

Possible Solution - The integrity of the boundary treatments should be evaluated and regularly checked for defects. Inappropriately parked vehicles/trailers and other externally stored items can obscure the spread of lighting and CCTV coverage, creating potential areas of intense shadowing and blind spots. It is recommended that this is considered in the external arrangement, and 'no store/park' areas specifically identified to avoid inadvertently blocking surveillance. Storage/parking areas close to boundaries should also be avoided as they may mask any damage to perimeter fencing.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a large 2 storey building comprising of 2 no. large, double-height sound stages for film & TV production (Stage 06 & Stage 07). Between the new stages will be two floors of support space comprising of 2 no. ground floor workshops and first floor offices.
- 3.1.2 The building will front onto a new two-way vehicular movement route, parking area and amenity space to the north, between the Phase 1 and Phase 3 buildings, with a landscaped green buffer to the rear of the building along Wenlock Lock. The existing secure fenceline and access-controlled vehicular/pedestrian access point off Vaughan Street to the north-east will be retained.
- 3.1.3 In addition to the new building, some alterations are proposed to the existing Phase 1 building to the north including demolition of the existing enclosed circulation walkways to allow for increased car park and remodelling of floorspaces to allow for new lettable office space, a new reception layout and communal amenity/café space.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will provide additional activity and surveillance/overlooking to the existing Space Studios site.
- 3.2.2 The site lies within an existing secure perimeter fenceline, with a security gatehouse to prevent unauthorised access and monitor all access to and egress from the site.
- 3.2.3 The footprint of the building is simple, with no recesses that could provide cover for covert criminal activity and external façades that should provide little opportunity to scale the structure.
- 3.2.4 The proposed car parking areas will be located within the secure boundary of the site and will be overlooked to some degree from the Phase 1 and 3 buildings.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the stages, workshops and offices are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The existing 358 gauge welded-wire mesh fencing enclosure to the whole site must be retained. It is noted that some posts to the perimeter of the site are leaning - regular checks should be made to ensure the secure perimeter of the site is maintained and any signs of damage or attack are addressed. Where exposed, the perimeter fencing may need to be protected on the inner side from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary. Consideration should be given to removing the existing manual vehicular gates onto Wenlock Way and Kniverton Road if they are surplus to requirements and replacing them with fencing panels. The main entrance to the site (off Vaughan Street to the north of the site) should continue to be secured with arm-barriers, controlled on access and egress by gatehouse security staff or by staff proximity reader/key-fob. If the security gatehouse to the entrance to the site is not to be staffed at any point (e.g. at night/out-of-hours), the entrance should be secured with 3300mm high automatic vehicular gates, operated on access and egress by staff proximity reader/key-fob or operated remotely by reception staff via a video access control system – so that visitors can be vetted before being allowed access into the site.

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- 3.3.2 Given the site includes a number of production stages, support units/services and office spaces with multiple short-term/long-term tenants, the control of access into/around the site and the building itself is fundamental to the security of the scheme (see Section 4.1). The main reception within the existing Phase 1 building to the north of the site should be staffed to greet and direct visitors and issue cards/fobs to production staff to control access into/around the proposed Phase 3 building. There should also be an audio link to the staffed reception located at the main entrance/s of the proposed building to allow anyone who may need assistance to contact a member of staff. It should not be possible for any unauthorised personnel to gain access to the building without a card/fob or without being greeted/escorted by a member of reception staff first. The main entrances to each of the buildings should be clearly defined and signed to discourage anyone from wondering around/through the wider site, any service areas or through any insecure loading bay doors. There should be a robust system in place to ensure all access control cards/fobs are accounted for and handed back to reception staff when productions are over. Access control cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by reception staff to ensure that mis-use is prevented.
- 3.3.3 The proposed parking areas between the Phase 1 and Phase 3 buildings should be well-lit and evenly tarmacked, with clearly demarcated bays/service areas to avoid confusion and conflict (see Section 4.5).
- 3.3.4 The existing CCTV system to the site should be extended to cover the proposed building and parking areas and should be monitored by the on-site security staff, who can respond immediately to any incidents being recorded (see Section 4.6 for more information).
- 3.3.5 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- q All external doors (single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- q Any shutters or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- q Access through the main entrance doorsets to the stages and the associated supporting workshops/office space should be operated by cards/fobs issued to production staff by Space Studios reception staff. The entrances should also be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if/when required (via an audio/visual link to the main reception), to ensure that unauthorised access is prevented and that any visitors are vetted or are greeted/escorted before being allowed access into the building.
- q The doors/frames to internal offices, stores, plant areas and any other individual rooms within the workshops should be robust/solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and capable of being secured when unoccupied. Staff should be able to store their belongings in a secure area while at work.
- q Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors/gates should operate on access control;
 - The vehicular and pedestrian barriers/gates at the entrance to the Space Studios site;
 - The main entrance doors to the proposed stages and associated workshops/office space; and
 - Any internal doors to obvious risk areas (such as stores for valuable equipment, IT equipment etc. and any staff changing facilities or dressing rooms).
- q The electric locking system to be used throughout the site/building should be fully auditable (i.e. allowing the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by Space Studios reception staff to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work and keys/cards/fobs should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Windows

- q All ground floor/accessible windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- q Any ground floor/accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be key- lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- q Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- q All ground floor/accessible glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

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- q Ideally, there should be a block work wall or similar (e.g. welded-steel mesh, expanded metal or 9mm timber sheathing) behind or within any cladding system to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarm

- q Monitored alarm systems should be installed to cover the proposed stages and associated workshops/offices, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor/accessible areas with windows, with a signal terminating at the on-site security control room to allow security staff to respond immediately.

4.5 Lighting & Parking Areas

- q External lighting must be provided to all access roads, pedestrian routes and external service areas within the site, in accordance with BS 5489. Fittings should produce 'white' light, which offer superior colour rendition over alternatives, and should support the CCTV installed.
- q Lighting to all parking areas should also be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%. The surface of the parking areas should be even tarmac or similar to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime. Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions, servicing areas and speed restrictions clearly signed.
- q Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.6 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- q CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- q Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- q With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- q Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [Acceptable Standard](#) that will allow for [Identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- [Acceptable Standard](#) - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- [Identification](#) – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are [Overview](#) and [Recognition](#), which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- q The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [the entrances to the site and the proposed building, all external circulation areas and all vehicle parking areas](#). On-site security personnel should monitor the installed CCTV system to ensure there can be an immediate response to any incidents recorded.

4.7 Landscaping

- q In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow unimpeded surveillance and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- q Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage to buildings and parked vehicles).
- q Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.8 Other

- q There should be no features of the building (such as projecting window cills/cladding features, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to roof areas or up to high level windows.
- q There should be no doors or loading bay doors left insecure and unattended at any time (e.g. during servicing activities or during filming), which could allow any potential offenders to circumnavigate the access control system and gain unauthorised access to the building without being noticed.
- q The position of ancillary structures, parked trailers and any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
 - Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
 - Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.
 - Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
 - Their potential to obscure damage to fencelines.

Any proposed lighting columns, street furniture, tree/shrub planting etc. within or external to the site perimeter should also be reviewed in relation to the above issues.

- q Any proposed cycle store should be located where it can be overlooked from routinely occupied rooms and should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow staff to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>.
- q Any proposed bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 There should be a comprehensive security regime in place for the day-to-day running of the site and the proposed building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The location of stored materials and equipment in external areas can create blind spots that are difficult to survey and obscure the coverage of cameras. Good management practises will be essential and consideration should be given to the provision of ground markings to designate where storage is and is not acceptable. The condition of fencing along the perimeter of the site should be regularly inspected for damage/attack.
- 5.1.3 Any high value equipment (such as audio-visual equipment, computers, tools, plant etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site and the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to restricted areas.
- 5.1.5 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (perimeter fencing, access controls, CCTV, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
5 th May 2021	PRP Architects	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
6 th May 2021	PRP Architects	Confirmation of instruction/fee & receipt of additional info. No elevations or D&A Statement currently available
17 th May 2021	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
-	Existing Site Plan	-	-
SPC-PRP-ZZ-RF-DR-A-001010	Proposed Site Plan - Roof	Mar 2021	-
SPC-PRP-ZZ-GF-DR-A-001011	Proposed Site Plan - GF	Mar 2021	-
SPC-PRP-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001012	Sections - Section AA, BB & CC	Mar 2021	-
SPC-PRP-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001020	Layout - GF & 1F Plan	Mar 2021	-
SPC-PRP-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001021	Layout - Plant & Roof	Mar 2021	-
-	Extracts from 'RIBA Stage 1 Report - Space Studios Manchester - Phase 3'	09/04/21	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstdcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk