



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

A development of 2 no. 11 to 27 storey buildings comprising of 445 no. residential apartments and up to 800m² ground floor commercial space

AT land bounded by Manchester College, Great Ducie Street, Travel Lodge & the remainder of the surface level car park, Manchester

FOR: Latimer Developments Limited

VERSION A: 26.11.21

2018/0114/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

We welcome the continuing investment in this part of central Manchester and support redevelopment of this site for residential and commercial purposes.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include: the scheme design is of a very high quality; the development will be secure from dusk to dawn; management staff will be present on site through the day and there will be remote monitoring of the development, via CCTV, at all other times; there will be an appropriate balance of type and size of properties; the orientation buildings will focus activity on appropriate areas of the site whilst also facilitating passive surveillance of the surrounding roads and the proposed boulevard; private and public amenity space is included in the development; and, secure cycle parking facility has been included.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in sections 3.3 and 4. The principal recommendations relate to securing the site, and the commercial and apartment buildings appropriately, and encouraging high quality in the private and public realm. The recommendations are summarised as follows:

- the private and public realm should be of a high quality, including such measures as distinctive surfacing, lighting and signage;
- include measures to prevent anti-social parking;
- secure the site's northern boundary;
- install appropriate controls at the communal entrance doors and entry gates to restrict access to residents and *bona fide* visitors;
- install external and apartment doors that meet a recognised security standard; and,
- ensure the cycle stores are appropriately secure.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.

Adrian Murphy MRTPI

Consultant

e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

Contents


1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood	
	2.2 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester, & England & Wales	
	2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary and theft in Manchester & measures to reduce vulnerabilities	
	2.4 Environmental features in the area that may influence crime patterns	
3	Development Appraisal	11
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal	
	3.3 Recommendations to enhance the security of the development and the surroundings	
4	Physical Security	14
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Glazing	
	4.3 Intruder Alarms	
	4.4 Landscaping	
	4.5 Lighting	
	4.6 CCTV	
	4.7 Signage	
	4.8 Boundary fencing	
5	Management & Maintenance	16
6	Construction	16
7	Secured by Design (SBD)	16

Appendix


A	Contact Register	16
B	Associated Documents.....	16
C	CIS Version History	16
D	Glossary	17

1 Visual Audit

The development site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The site, edged in red on the plan, is located on the west side of Bury New Road, Manchester, north of the city centre. The site was formerly part of the larger, Boddington's brewery site. A Strategic Regeneration Framework, SRF, for the wholesale redevelopment of the brewery was prepared in 2007 and updated in 2015. The SRF promoted a mixed-use development for the site, with 50% of the proposed development as residential floorspace, and the remaining uses to include commercial and other non-residential uses, including car parking, hotel, leisure and retail. An addendum to the SRF was adopted in 2019 to '...addresses the opportunity that has arisen for the Manchester College to build its new city centre campus on the site'. The proposed 5-storey, Manchester College building (and access, servicing, landscaping, and public realm works) is under construction on the land south of the site, at the junction of Great Ducie Street and New Bridge Street. The College's principal entrance will be located on the prominent south-western corner of the building, and servicing will be carried out via a newly formed, private road on the north side of the building, adjacent to this development site. On the north-western part of the former Boddington's brewery site, and consistent with the SRF, there is a 200 bedroom, 7-storey Travelodge hotel. To the north-east and west of the site there are areas of public parking. The land west of the emerging college, and west of the development site, has the benefit of planning permission to erect a 17 storey and a 23 storey towers to form 556 residential units and ground floor commercial space. It will include a north-south boulevard, to which the commercial units will be orientated. The boulevard will define the western boundaries of both the proposed development site as well as that of the college. Known as Old Brewery Gardens, the design of the development required overcoming significant differences across the site, particularly the higher land to the west, at Dutton Street, and south, at New Bridge Street.



Steel palisade fencing and a timber hoarding define the site's Bury New Road boundary



A south-westerly view across the site towards central Salford from higher land on Charter Street



A view across the site from west to east towards the higher land at Dutton Street



The Travelodge hotel looms large over the north-west corner of the site



The emerging Manchester College building under construction on land to the south of the site



Part of the proposed Old Brewery Gardens site, and proposed boulevard west of the College

The site comprises a large, regularly-shaped parcel of land that once formed part of the Boddington's Strangeways Brewery. The brewery closed a number of years ago and the buildings demolished, leaving a large expanse of hardstanding. The wider brewery site was used for public car parking for over 10 years; the areas not yet built on are still used for this purpose. Pedestrians now gain access to the car park from Great Ducie Street, A56, at the western boundary of the site, and vehicular access is now made from Francis Street, a minor cul-de-sac, to the north. Great Ducie Street is the principal north-south arterial route connecting the city centre to Bury and suburbs in between; the road is heavily trafficked route throughout the day and long into the night. The Great Ducie Street boundary of the site is defined with a steel palisade fence and timber hoardings associated with the development of the college. A simple timber trip rail fence marks the north-western boundary, marking the domain of the Travelodge hotel. As well as a hoarding, a temporary wire mesh fence has been erected to separate this development site and car park users from the construction activities at the college site fence. The land west of the site continues to be used for parking and is undefined, although further west a high retaining wall defines the edge of what was the site of the brewery.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded in a 12 month, pre-pandemic period 2018 - 2019.

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

The data below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site.



General crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
16	46	121	374	118	77	14	338	27	15


- 2.1.1 There have been 1374 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is one third higher than the average rate for crime across the Manchester Division. The neighbourhood is on the fringe of the city centre and includes a significant concentration of shops, transport facilities, the AO Arena, car parks and people, all of which significantly affect the nature and distribution of crimes.
- 2.1.2 The most commonly crimes recorded were:
- crimes involving the use, or threat, of violence - 40%
 - vehicle crime, i.e., theft of, theft from and criminal damage to a vehicle - 34%
 - robbery & theft - 15%
 - burglary - 5%
 - criminal damage - 4%
- 2.1.3 The most common place for a crime to be committed was on the street (32% of the total), in a car park (22%), followed by HMP Manchester (20%), and thirdly, at a house or apartment (5%).
- 2.1.4 The streets or places experiencing the greatest volume of crime (50 offences or more) were:
- Southall Street - 270 offences
 - Park Street - 105 offences
 - Dutton Street - 75 offences
 - Cheetham Hill Road - 67 offences
 - Victoria Station - 56 offences
 - Great Ducie Street - 55 offences.
- 2.1.5 HMP Manchester is located on Southall Street where assault-related crimes are routine. Vehicle-related crimes dominate at Park Street and Dutton Street. There are a broader range of crimes committed at Great Ducie Street and Cheetham Hill Road but, along with Cathedral Gardens, are hotspots for robbery. Crimes recorded at Victoria Station are dominated by theft, robbery and assaults.

Domestic burglary

- 2.1.6 Despite the neighbourhood having a high number of residential properties, principally at the Green Quarter east of Cheetham Hill Road and at Greengate in central Salford, there have been just 16 burglaries. Twice as many apartments were targeted as houses, a reflection of the balance of dwellings in the neighbourhood.



- 2.1.7 **Day & time range:** Whilst the risk is low throughout the week, burglary seems to be more likely to be committed on a Tuesday or a Sunday, and in the late afternoon.





- 2.1.8 **Point of Entry:** The most frequently targeted entry points were doors, often the front door of a property, which is typical of neighbourhoods dominated by apartments. There have been several incidents where the offender entered an apartment building through an unsecured, communal, entrance door before targeting a particular apartment, where entry to the apartment was also made via an unsecured door.

Crime at retail premises

- 2.1.9 There were 62 crimes at retail premises in the neighbourhood around the site. Small supermarkets in the city centre and petrol filling stations were the principal focus of criminal activity. The crimes committed reflected those that occur at retail premises across the city of Manchester, where shoplifting is the most commonly reported crime, accounting for 50% of the total recorded crime at shops and supermarkets. Crimes involving the use, or threat, of violence are the next most common (29%), followed by theft (8%), burglary (6%), and robbery and criminal damage (both 3%).
- 2.1.10 The principal method of breaking and entering retail premises is via openings in the building that are secured with security shutters, principally prising the shutters open with hand tools. In several cases, having prised open shutters, offenders then smashed the glazing in entrance doors to gain access into premises. Front and rear doors were also forced open. Burglaries have also been committed with offenders posing as legitimate customer before targeting property stored in staff-only areas.
- 2.1.11 There are no particular days of the week where burglary occurs more often than another, however, the majority of offences do occur in the early hours of the night when businesses are closed.


Vehicle crime





- 2.1.12 **Day/Time Range:** The high concentration of formal and informal parking spaces, catering for shoppers, commuters and visitors attending events at the AO Arena, some with poor security features or located on isolated, unsupervised streets with little pedestrian activity, are particularly attractive to thieves. The risk of vehicle crime in this neighbourhood is consistently high throughout the week, particularly on a Thursday and Saturday. Crimes are most commonly committed during the afternoon and into the evening.

2.2 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester, & England & Wales

England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



- 2.2.1 The rate of burglary per 1000 dwellings in this neighbourhood is **85% lower** than the Manchester rate, **74% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **63% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of wounding per 1000 dwellings in this neighbourhood is **43% higher** than the Manchester rate, **125% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **140% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.



- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in this neighbourhood is **19% lower** than the Manchester rate, **17% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **75% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in this neighbourhood is **184% higher** than the Manchester rate, **415% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **798% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary and theft in Manchester & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3.1 Communal and apartment entrance doors were targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of offenders tailgating through communal doors or entering apartments through insecure doors:

- communal entry doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure;
- install a secondary set of secure doors (air-lock/secure lobby), that are also self-closing and self-locking;
- install lifts that are operated by a fob or card access control system;
- install CCTV cameras in the entrance lobby;
- apartment doors should be self-closing with a thumb-turn lock on the inner side that meets fire regulations, with clear, yet discreet, permanent instructions on the door to inform the resident that the door is not secure until the lock is turned; and,
- employ a concierge to supervise the entrance lobby.

2.3.2 Doors have been forced open

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors and apartment entry doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- 'recess-free' entrances should be installed so that entrance doors are easily visible - offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- all external doors should be illuminated with dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests a property may be occupied and may deter offenders from targeting a premise. Lighting will also support CCTV systems and highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed; and,
- CCTV should be considered, to record activity within circulation spaces within the building and around exterior of the building.

2.3.3 Ground floor windows were prised open or the glazing smashed to gain access

To minimise the risk of offenders prising open windows or breaking glass to gain entry:

- avoid installing opening windows at street level;
- install window locks and opening restrictors to any windows that are accessible from street level; and,
- install laminate glass on street level windows and doors.

2.3.4 Offenders have entered communal cycle stores

To minimise the risk of offenders entering cycle stores:

- cycle stores should be secure rooms or stores;
- appropriate CCTV and PIR lighting should be installed within a store; and,
- doors or gates to cycle stores should be fitted with good quality locks (ideally a maglock or similar with a resistance force of around 4500N), be self-closing and lock automatically upon closure.

2.3.5 Doors, windows, shutters and grilles on commercial properties have been forced open

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing entry:

- install LPS 1175 security-rated doors, window frames, shutters or grilles on commercial units; and,
- avoid designing windows or doors on secluded, poorly supervised elevations or in deep recesses on the building.

2.3.6 Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff-only areas of commercial premises

To minimise the risk of offenders gaining access to staff-only areas:

- access control systems should be considered to secure sensitive areas of premises – e.g. stock rooms, staff rest rooms and offices ;
- staff should be required to wear an appropriate form of clearly visible ID and/or a company uniform;
- doors separating public areas, from staff-only areas should be monitored by CCTV; and
- lockers should be provided for staff to secure their personal belongings whilst at work.

2.3.7 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged so as to prevent forced access onto the site; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with a tracking device.

2.4 Environmental features in the area that may influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the high level of investment, planned and in progress, in the neighbourhood is likely to result in more pro-active management and maintenance of the private and public spaces. The public realm will be improved and street lighting, and light spilling from buildings that are likely to be occupied well into the night, should make the neighbourhood feel safer for passing pedestrians;
- the site is visible from Great Ducie Street where there is the prospect of passers-by witnessing the actions of offenders, which can act as a deterrent to criminal or anti-social activities;
- the presence of the Travelodge hotel generates activity near the site. The presence of people (staff and customers) around the entrance and lobby and guests in their rooms that overlook the site may be inclined to intervene should they witness unusual or criminal activity at the site;
- when Manchester College opens in 2022, there will be much greater level of activity in the vicinity of the site and passive surveillance over the site;
- the proposed Old Brewery Gardens development will also generate activity and surveillance over the site. The emergence of residential development in the neighbourhood will increase the

period of street activity beyond the working day and evenings when there are events at the AO Arena;

- a 24 hour staff presence at the hotel and the college may deter offenders targeting both of these premises, which may then make an offender less likely to target neighbouring properties;
- CCTV installed at the hotel and the college are likely to assist in the capture of any unlawful activity at the site;
- the limited entry points into the site and existing high walls and fencing that encloses almost all of the site provides a very secure boundary and restricts free movement in and out of the site; and,
- redevelopment of the poorly secured, car parks in the neighbourhood will greatly reduce the opportunities for car thieves to operate and the volume of vehicle-related crimes is likely to decrease markedly.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood where crime is commonplace;
- there are several crime attractors and crime generators in the neighbourhood, including HMP Manchester, Victoria Station, the Booth Centre (for homeless people) on Pimlett Street. Criminals already familiar with or active in this area may exploit any new opportunities as the site is redeveloped or target residents and visitors as they come and go from the development;
- the future success of the proposed development is very dependent on the Old Brewery Gardens scheme progressing otherwise the western side of the development will be vulnerable to crime and disorder;
- although the college will generate activity during the day and evening of the day, it is likely to be closed at the weekend and the volume of people in the immediate vicinity of the site will drop off significantly;
- the site is very visible from Great Ducie Street. Offenders are likely to observe the site as it develops and be aware of, and potentially exploit, any criminal opportunities;
- the permeability of the neighbourhood, particularly the streets into the Strangeways and Cambridge industrial area, present would-be offenders with easy and convenient routes to and from the site; and,
- there are many indicators of neglect and deterioration on and in the immediate vicinity of the site, for example, premises in a poor state of repair, over-fortification of premises, graffiti and litter, which are often indicators that crime is, or has been, a significant issue in an area. Neglected streets and spaces often attract offenders, who may have a perception that because of the poor quality of the environment their actions will go unchallenged.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 Latimer, the development arm of Clarion Housing Group, propose a development comprising:

- construction of two residential blocks containing 445 apartments - Building A and Building B
- ground floor, commercial uses in each block (up to 800m² in total)
- co-working space
- secure cycle parking
- private amenity space for residents
- a public park set within a central courtyard between the buildings
- night-time security at the site perimeter
- 24-storey (plus ground and mezzanine floors), residential tower, containing 352 apartments, with car and cycle parking, internal and external amenity spaces, and 495.31m² commercial floorspace
- works to the public realm surrounding the site.

Building A

3.1.2 Building A will be positioned at the western part of the site and will comprise an 11 and 12 storey block, containing a mix of 1, 2 and 3 bedroom apartments, all of which will be located on the upper floors. The communal entrance will face a covered walkway through the building; the walkway will connect Great Ducie Street with the central courtyard. Visitor cycle parking will be provided within the walkway adjacent to the entrance door. The outer entrance door leads to a secure lobby, where there will be a manager's office and access then into the core of the building which includes stairs and two lifts. A means of escape door will allow egress from the stair core into the courtyard.

3.1.3 Commercial units are proposed on the ground floor of building - on the Great Ducie Street, where there will be a broad, glazed shopfront, and at the south-western corner of the building, with a shopfront facing both Great Ducie Street and the private road that provides access to the Manchester College service yard and modest car park.

3.1.4 The remaining rooms of the ground floor of Building A will be used to house plant and for waste storage. With doors opening out onto either: the north side of the building (facing the Travelodge); the courtyard; the Manchester College service road; or into a pathway that connects the service road to the courtyard.

Building B

3.1.5 Building B will be positioned at the eastern part of the site and will have 17, 20 and 27 storey elements and, once again, will contain a mix of 1, 2 and 3 bedroom apartments, all of which will be located on the upper floors. There will be two communal entrance doors, obliquely facing each other across a second covered walkway through the building; this walkway will connect the boulevard with the central courtyard. The northern entrance, serving the 17 and 27 storey part of the building, opens into a large space which combines the lobby with a co-working space. A concierge will be present in the building during the day and will occupy a desk overseeing this entrance and lobby/co-working space. A post room will be located behind the concierge desk. Beyond the concierge desk, access to the stair and lift core will be controlled. A means of escape door will allow egress from the stair core into the courtyard.

3.1.6 The remainder of this part of Building B is given over to plant rooms, where external doors will open out onto the boulevard, the northern elevation facing the remaining part of the car park, or the courtyard. The southern, communal entrance to Building B is more modest. Controlled access into the stair and lift core is gained via a modest lobby. A means of escape door will allow egress from the stair core to the covered walkway. The proposed commercial space will be located on the ground floor at the corner of the proposed boulevard and the Manchester College service road. Other ground floor space is again given over to waste storage and plant rooms, with external doors opening onto the College service road on the south side of the building, or into the pathway that connects the service road to the courtyard.

Cycle stores

- 3.1.7 Buildings A and B will be connected on the northern side of the site by a single storey building, which will house three, residents' cycle stores, access to which will be gained from the courtyard.

Car parking

- 3.1.8 There will be five DDA parking spaces provided at the side of the Manchester College service road on the south side of the development.

Site entrances

- 3.1.9 The three entrances to the development - from Great Ducie Street, on the western side of the site, from the proposed boulevard, at the eastern side of the site, from the southern side of the site, off the emerging Manchester College service road - will be open to residents, visitors and the public from dusk to dawn. At night the entrances will be secured by management staff, when entry to the development will be restricted to residents and *bona fide* visitors using video intercom and electronic locking.

Amenity spaces

- 3.1.10 All residents will have access to the large lobby and co-working space on the ground floor of Building B.
- 3.1.11 All residents and the public will have access to the landscaped courtyard. The public will be excluded from this space after dusk.
- 3.1.12 A roof terrace, on level 20 of Building B, will be available for residents' use.
- 3.1.13 Residents of the apartments with an outlook over the courtyard will have a private balcony overlooking; others will have a balconette.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal

- 3.2.1 The proposals will result in the redevelopment of an underutilised site, which contributes little to the vitality and viability of the neighbourhood, indeed it adds to the general feeling of insecurity in the area and the poor quality of the local environment. The redevelopment of the site is welcomed.
- 3.2.2 A residential development is an appropriate use for the site given the surrounding land use.
- 3.2.3 The redevelopment will result in a significantly lower level of vehicle crime in the neighbourhood.
- 3.2.4 The scheme design is of a very high quality, both visually and from a crime prevention perspective.
- 3.2.5 The development will help to continue to repopulate this part of the city and create activity through the day and at weekends.
- 3.2.6 A management presence (concierge) is particularly welcome as visible staff in the development will not only discourage offender attempts to gain entry to the scheme but also gives residents a readily accessible contact to whom they may report management issues. Such provision can help to instil confidence in residents that the development is secure and that maintenance issues will be dealt with promptly.
- 3.2.7 There are a significant number and of apartments within the development, which increases the likelihood of residents being from a broader age range, including young singles, older residents and families with children.
- 3.2.8 Residents and visitors coming and going, along with residents in their apartments, particularly on the lower floors with living room windows that will overlook the boulevard, Great Ducie Street and the courtyard, as well as users of the courtyard, facilitates natural surveillance of the public realm, which can help to maintain order.
- 3.2.9 The elevated position of the apartments (none are located on the ground floor), will result in a greater degree of privacy and security to residents without unduly compromising natural surveillance of the public realm.
- 3.2.10 The landscaped courtyard will be open to the public during the day but is capable of being secured during the night, restricting entry to residents and *bona fide* visitors.
- 3.2.11 The apartment buildings are suitable positioned on the site, with active ground floor frontage on appropriate facades.

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- 3.2.12 Communal entrance doors are located within the secure area, in places that will be legible to visitors and that are likely to benefit from passive supervision of staff, residents and the public.
 - 3.2.13 A secure post room is included at the rear of the concierge desk.
 - 3.2.14 The inclusion of communal areas, such as the private terrace, commercial uses within the development, the courtyard and the residents' lounge/co-working space, provides an opportunity for residents to meet their neighbours and build relationships, which help to develop a community within the scheme, and deters crime and anti-social behaviour.
 - 3.2.15 Substantial number of cycle parking spaces in secure stores on the ground floor of the development accessible only from the semi-private courtyard. Visitor cycle provision has been included in a suitable location, where it will benefit from casual supervision by residents coming and going. Cycle stands should allow a cyclist to secure the wheels and the frame to the stand.
 - 3.2.16 There is suitably secure, refuse storage within the development.

3.3 Recommendations to enhance the security of the development and the surroundings

Streetscape

- 3.3.1 The streetscape immediately adjacent to the development must be of a suitably high environmental quality to reflect the changing nature of the area from one dominated by industrial uses and car parking to a largely residential neighbourhood.
- 3.3.2 Measures to prevent unauthorised parking on the pavement or other spaces around the building should be installed.
- 3.3.3 Signage on and around the building should display the development name and appropriate entrances for residents, visitors, and delivery staff. Additional signage should be introduced into the public realm to guide pedestrians to appropriate routes through the neighbourhood.

Control entry into the development, and into and through each building

Boundary fencing, entrance gates, communal entrance doors and means of escape doors

- 3.3.4 To restrict access along the north side of the site, the northern, north-eastern and north-western boundaries of the site should be secured with appropriately high and well-designed fencing.
- 3.3.5 The development's entry gates must be visually attractive, tall and robust to deter climbing and withstand attempts at criminal damage.
- 3.3.6 The entrance gates must be:
 - be fitted with an electronic lock with a holding force of around 4500N;
 - be self-closing and locking upon closure.
- 3.3.7 The communal entrance doors to the residential buildings must be:
 - certified to a suitable security standard;
 - be fitted with an electronic lock that forms part of the door certification;
 - be self-closing and locking upon closure.
- 3.3.8 The gates (at night) and doors (all times) should be secured and the locks activated with a programmable fob.
- 3.3.9 An intercom system should be installed at each gate (night time use) and entrance doors. There should be an audio-visual link to each apartment (and concierge), to enable residents or staff to vet visitors prior to releasing the gate or door locking mechanism and allowing *bona fide* visitors entry into the development or lobby. Residents should meet visitors in the lobby areas before being escorted to the relevant apartment.
- 3.3.10 Means of escape doors must be security-rated and be self-closing and locking upon closure.

Other external doors

- 3.3.11 The external entrance doors to cycle stores, plant and refuse rooms should be security-certified. Cycle store doors should be fitted with an electronic lock that forms part of the door certification, be self-closing and lock upon closure. The external doors to the refuse stores should also be self-closing and self-locking and include an alarm that emits an audible sound to alert the concierge that the doors are not secure. Signs should be erected within the store to indicate that these doors are to be used by contractor and management use only and not as a means to leave the buildings.

Internal doors

- 3.3.12 Doors connecting the lobbies to the respective building core must have a fob-activated, electronic lock fitted and be self-closing, locking securely upon closure.
- 3.3.13 The internal doors linking the refuse stores to the core should be fitted with an electronic lock, be self-closing and lock upon closure. A residents' fob, rather than a push button, should be required to exit the refuse store and return to the core.

Apartment security

- 3.3.14 Each apartment should be secured with a security-rated entrance door that has been fitted with a door viewer and opening limiter.

Commercial units

- 3.3.15 Shopfronts should be fitted with laminate glazing and security-certified door sets. If roller shutters are fitted they too should be security-rated.
- 3.3.16 Internal or external service or escape doors should be security-rated.
- 3.3.17 All commercial units should include provision for a CCTV system and an intruder alarm.
- 3.3.18 The hours of opening of any food and beverage outlets should be limited to respect nearby residents.

CCTV

- 3.3.19 A CCTV system should be installed, with cameras monitoring all facades of the development as well as entrance lobbies, cycle stores, and the commercial units.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

Residential

- ☐ All external, communal, entrance door sets, the cycle store doors, and external means of escape doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The communal entrance doors and external cycle store access door should include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ All communal entrance doors, cycle store doors, and refuse store doors (external and internal) and means of escape doors be self-closing and lock securely on closure.
- ☐ Residents and the concierge should be able to operate the locking mechanism of the relevant communal entrance doors and entrance gates remotely from within their apartments/desk/office to allow *bona fide* visitors entry.
- ☐ An audio-visual unit should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) from the communal entrance doors and gates to a handset in each apartment and concierge points.
- ☐ Individual apartment, entrance doors must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, include a door viewer and an opening limiter.

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- ☐ External doors to the street facing plant rooms should be certified to LPS 1175 sr 2. Internal doors to the refuse store should be fob activated to both enter and to leave. In an emergency, panic hardware is acceptable on the inside of the external doors.

Commercial

- ☐ Entrance doors, and any service or escape doors should be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2.

4.2 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within ground floor windows/curtain walling, shopfronts and entrance doors must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.3 Intruder Alarms

- ☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each apartment (but not essential for Secured by Design accreditation). If fitted, alarms should comply with BS EN 50131 for wired systems or wireless systems, and be linked to contacts on all external doors of each apartment.
- ☐ Commercial units must be fitted with an intruder alarm, although it is understood that this is likely to be a tenant item and not necessarily installed upon completion of the building.

4.4 Landscaping

- ☐ A detailed private and public realm landscape plan should be prepared, and include: surfacing of Great Ducie Street footpath, the service road and the boulevard, lighting to all areas - particularly entrance gates and doors, seating design and location, measures to prevent inappropriate parking, all visitor cycle parking, and tree and shrub planting.

4.5 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting must be provided to all entrance gates and doors to the buildings. Lights should generally be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor. PIR activated lighting is appropriate in the cycle stores and bin stores. The residential entrance doors should be particularly well lit and 'welcoming' to residents and visitors. Bollard lighting is not considered appropriate.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.6 CCTV

- ☐ Cameras should be capable of monitoring: the commercial, residential and cycle store entrances; the entrance lobbies; the 'shop floor' of the commercial units; car park; cycle store, providing clear, facial identification of individuals.
- ☐ For the residential element of the system, monitoring and recording equipment should be stored in the management office, with a screen available to the concierge staff to monitor activity.

4.7 Signage

- ☐ Signage to indicate the name of the development and the appropriate communal entrance door for visitors should be included at each entrance gate and each communal entrance.

4.8 Boundary fencing

- ☐ The space between the north-western corner of the building and the Travelodge hotel should be secured with 2000mm high railings.

- ☐ The northern boundary of the site should be secured with 2000mm high welded-wire mesh fencing or railings.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address repairs to communal areas – amenity space, social spaces, lighting, signage, access controls, and the CCTV system.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure the site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.
- ☐ The contractor should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved, (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial buildings, and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
02.09.21	Frances Hampson, Deloitte LLP	Request for crime impact statement
22.09.21		Site visited
08.10.21	Frances Hampson, Deloitte LLP & others	Meeting to explain the scheme
26.11.21	Frances Hampson, Deloitte LLP	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following document:

Document No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A3564 SBDO	GMP meeting document	08.10.21	

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		26.11.21

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk