



SECTION 73

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

SEPTEMBER 2021

This statement was submitted with the original planning application, as revised in November 2017, and was resubmitted as part of the section 73 application in November 2019. It has not been altered as part of the Section 73 planning application as the report remains valid. Further, a condition attached to the current planning consent requires further details regarding secure design to be submitted. It is expected that this condition will be replicated should the Section 73 application be approved.



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Jackson's Row / Bootle Street / Southmill
Street, Manchester

Mixed-use development

Zerum Ltd

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

VERSION A: 9th November 2017

URN:2016/0827/CIS/02

**Jackson's Row / Bootle Street / Southmill Street,
Manchester, M2 5GU**

2016/0827/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Major Design Changes Not Required

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. In general the proposed scheme has been found acceptable, but further consideration of some minor aspects is advised, as stated in section 3.3 of this report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Michael Craig', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Michael Craig *DipLD CMLI*

DfS Consultant

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1 Visual Audit


The site is in central Manchester, within the Deansgate Conservation Area and close to Albert Square. The city centre has well above average rates of crime due to the high levels of activity and large numbers of people living, working and visiting central Manchester. Nearby concert venues generate significant activity around the site.

Levels of activity are relatively low on the streets at the side of the site. Bootle Street is effectively a narrow service road providing access to the rear of premises facing Peter Street. Jackson's Row has similar characteristics, but with some premises facing it, creating "back to front" confusion. Both streets lack natural surveillance and there are various recesses along building facades that provide cover for antisocial / criminal behaviour. Commercial waste bins are often present in the street providing further cover for potential offenders. Parked vehicles have been subject to criminal damage and theft.

The area around the site contains a number of licensed premises. Late-night revellers leaving licensed premises and gathering on the nearby streets and spaces can cause nuisance and generate significant disorder. Recessed doorways and concealed passageways can provide cover for antisocial and criminal activity – some nearby doorways have been subjected to unpleasant abuse.



Southmill Street elevation of the site



Jackson's Row elevation showing pavement level windows



Marron Place connects to Peter Street




Bootle Street provides service access to premises fronting Peter Street



Licensed premises on Bootle Street to be refurbished



Recessed doorways on Bootle Street have been subject to abuse



Western boundary of the site showing passage alongside neighbouring building

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2016 to 31st October 2017

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
15	201	217	877	738	102	45	217	44	239

- 2.1.1 The general volume of criminal activity in the local area is high, particularly the levels of violence and theft, reflecting the site's location in the city centre. Other frequently-occurring offences have been criminal damage and commercial burglary, all of which are typical crimes experienced in or within close proximity of city centres, where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Incidents of violence have most commonly occurred across the weekend, predominantly taking place on Whitworth Street and Deansgate but also at and around premises on Bootle Street and Peter Street in close proximity to the site. Where there have been incidents of theft, these have often occurred in licensed premises, when people have been consuming alcohol and are less vigilant, making them and their personal possessions more vulnerable.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Residential:** Doors were forced open with bodily pressure and locks broken to gain access. Offenders often posed as visitors or contractors to gain access to apartments / flats.

Possible Solution – A robust access control system is required to prevent unauthorised entry to communal areas. Communal entrance doors should be self-closing and lock automatically on closure. Communal entrance doors and all individual apartments should be provided with a security-certified entrance door set (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Apartment entrance doors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

- 2.2.2 **Offices:** Doors were targeted when left insecure or forced open with tools / bodily pressure, and offenders often posed as legitimate customers to gain access to the premises before tailgating.

Possible Solution - There should be a robust access control system in place (see section 5.8) to ensure that callers to the building are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed further entry into the building. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour. Doors for emergency egress should be alarmed so that building managers are alerted if they are used, and staff discouraged from using them informally, e.g. for smoking breaks.

- 2.2.3 **Places of Worship:** Rear points of entry (doors and windows) were targeted, using tools or bodily pressure to gain entry.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All private spaces to the sides / rears of buildings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible areas, to deter unauthorised access. Lighting to the front and rear of premises can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 5.10).

All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within / directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Secure boundary treatments should be provided to prevent unauthorised access to vulnerable windows.

- 2.2.4 **Restaurants / Cafes:** Offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access before targeting insecure doors and restricted areas. Locks have been broken on doors or forced open with bodily pressure.

Possible Solution – Staff-only areas should be effectively separated, both visually and physically, so that customers cannot readily gain entry either accidentally or deliberately. This can be achieved by the use of access-controlled doors or barriers, but they should create a clear distinction so that any intruder can be more easily identified. All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- 2.2.5 **Retail premises:** Shutters (front and rear) were forced upwards with tools to gain entry; similarly, doors (front and rear) were forced open with bodily pressure.

Possible Solution – A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.3) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering / attack. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines around the entrances.

- 2.2.6 **Hotel:** Offenders, posing as guests, accessing staff only / restricted areas to steal property

Possible Solution – Access controls and secure lobbies help to prevent unauthorised entry. Staff presence, such as at reception, will also help to identify irregular behaviour and unauthorised entrants. Locating reception areas to overlook the public entrance will help to discourage / detect unauthorised entry to the premises. Entry to staff only areas should be managed using access controls. Secure lockers should be provided for staff to store personal belongings while at work.




2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft of customer and staff property
- Cycle security
- Criminal damage to dwellings, vehicles and commercial properties
- Theft of, or from, parked cars
- Cash robbery of premises and people
- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Neighbour disputes
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups & other antisocial behaviour
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Shoplifting
- Burglary of commercial and domestic premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period.

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in North Manchester and Greater Manchester


The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **lower** than North Manchester and **lower** than Greater Manchester.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **higher** than North Manchester and **higher** than Greater Manchester.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwelling is **lower** than North Manchester and **higher** than Greater Manchester.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **higher** than North Manchester and **higher** than Greater Manchester.

2.5 Burglary (Residential): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to domestic burglary offences committed within a 500m radius of the site



- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** The risk of domestic burglary is spread throughout the week with no clear pattern evident, suggesting that the offences are opportunistic.
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** The risk of residential burglary is greatest in the early hours of the morning, approximately between 2-3am. Offenders often target residential properties at night when it is dark, or they perceive residents to be out socialising, footfall in the area is generally low and they perceive the risk of being caught or identified as low.
- 2.5.3 **Point of Entry:** In the neighbourhood, the point of entry in a large proportion of burglaries was through doors (all kinds). Offenders forced open doors with bodily pressure or by breaking the locks. When upstairs doors were targeted or the entry point was unknown, offenders had often posed as legitimate users of apartments / flats to gain access to the premises before tailgating or targeting insecure doors.

2.6 Burglary Other (Restaurants / Cafes): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to burglary other offences within / against restaurants and cafes, recorded in the central Manchester area.



- 2.6.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants and cafes is greatest over the weekend; offenders may target premises on these days when they are at their busiest and they perceive it to be a cash-rich target.
- 2.6.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary is concentrated in the early hours of morning.
- 2.6.3 **Point of Entry:** The most common point of entry is unknown, where it is likely that offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors and accessing restricted areas. Where entry points are known, locks have been broken on doors to gain access or they've been forced open with bodily pressure, and tools have been used to smash the glazing in windows to gain access.

2.7 Theft (Restaurant / Café) Risk Analysis




The data below relates to thefts within / against restaurant/cafes recorded in the central Manchester area.



- 2.7.1 **Day & Time Range:** Levels of theft are greatest over the weekend, from Friday to Sunday. On these days, many premises within the city centre experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Restaurant and café premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend, and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater. During the day, the risk peaks in the late afternoon and early evening.

2.8 Non-Domestic Burglary – Offices - Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against offices recorded in the Manchester area.




- 2.8.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises is greatest on Mondays.
- 2.8.2 **Time Range:** The risk is concentrated in the early hours of the morning and the evening, with a drop in the middle of the day. Offenders often target premises at this time when they are closed, it is dark, the streets are quieter - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being detected and identified.
- 2.8.3 **Point of Entry:** Offenders have most frequently targeted doors (primarily front and fire doors) to gain access to office premises, particularly those left insecure by staff. They used tools and bodily pressure to force the doors or locks.

In a number of cases, offenders posed as legitimate customers / employees to gain entry before tailgating and accessing unauthorised areas.

2.9 Theft – Offices - Risk Analysis




The data below relates to thefts within / against offices recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.9.1 **Day and Time Range:** Miscellaneous theft is highest on weekdays, with a noticeable drop in rates occurring at the weekend, and the greatest risk concentrated in the middle of the day. On these days and times, office premises are at their busiest with staff movements in and out, therefore the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater.

2.10 Non-Domestic Burglary – Places of Worship - Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against places of worship recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.10.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Places of Worship across Manchester fluctuates greatly, with the highest risk on a Friday.
- 2.10.2 **Time Range:** These premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed, it is dark, and the surrounding area / streets in which they are typically located are quiet, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.
- 2.10.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries have been committed through rear doors and windows; rear points of entry are often targeted as offenders can conceal themselves from view. Offenders forced open doors with tools and bodily pressure to gain access.

2.11 Theft – Places of worship - Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against offices recorded in the Manchester area.






2.11.1 **Day Range:** Overall, there was a relatively low crime count of theft at Places of Worship in Manchester. During the week, the greatest risk of theft is on Fridays and Saturdays when such premises are often at their busiest with worshippers or community events, therefore the opportunity for theft is greater.

Time Range: It can be seen from the graph that there is not one specific time used by offenders when targeting Manchester Places of Worship, with events occurring around midday, early afternoon and evening.

2.12 Non-Domestic Burglary – Retail - Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.12.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in the city centre remains high throughout the week, with little deviation on a day-to-day basis.
- 2.12.2 **Time Range:** It can be seen from the graph that the greatest risk of burglary is in the early hours of the morning, approximately between midnight-2am
- 2.12.3 **Point of Entry:** Doors (predominantly front and rear) were often forced open with bodily pressure, and implements were also used to break through walls and roofs in a number of incidents to gain access.

2.13 Theft – Retail - Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against offices recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.13.1 **Day Range:** The risk of miscellaneous theft similarly remains high across the week with a slightly lower risk on a Sunday when many retail premises either closed or operate on reduced opening hours; therefore there is less opportunity to offend.
- Time Range:** During the day, the highest risk is concentrated between 1pm and 7pm, peaking between 3pm and 4pm, again corresponding to opening hours of retail premises.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises demolition of some of the existing buildings on the site and construction of a mixed use development comprising residential, office, retail, hotels, place of worship, bar and restaurant premises together with public open space and car parking. The existing licensed premises on Bootle Street and part of the former police station building fronting Southmill Street will be retained and refurbished.
- 3.1.2 Pedestrian entrances to the apartments, the new-build hotel and place of worship are taken off Jackson's Row Retail / café / bar premises will front the public elevations and new area of amenity space within the site.
- 3.1.3 Car and cycle parking is accommodated on the lower two levels of the proposed development.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

Residential

- 3.2.1 The apartments will be provided well above street level, reducing the potential impacts of noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.2 The layout of upper floor corridors is free of projections or recesses that could impede sight lines. Doors within communal corridors should contain a glazed element to improve informal surveillance.
- 3.2.3 Individual apartment entrance doors appear to be flush with the corridor walls.
- 3.2.4 Secure car park. Residents have access to a secured parking area in the basement, accessed by a ramp of Bootle Street which is gated, with fob-activated access controls allowing entry / exit for legitimate users only.
- 3.2.5 Cycle storage for residents' use is provided within the basement area of the building. Entry to the stores must be restricted to genuine cyclists only, on application to the managers of the building. Racks within the enclosures should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels, and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com for details).
- 3.2.6 Concierge presence. Provision has been made for a permanent concierge presence on the site, with reception / offices located within the main entrance lobbies. This should be staffed at all times and should provide clear views of people entering / leaving the buildings. All visitors to the apartments should be directed via the concierge.

Hotel (new-build)

- 3.2.7 The hotel bedrooms will be provided well above street level, reducing the potential impacts of noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.8 The layout of bedroom floor corridors contains no potential hiding places and bedroom doors are not located in deep recesses where a potential intruder could linger without being witnessed.
- 3.2.9 The back of house areas are well defined and access to these areas can be easily controlled.
- 3.2.10 A dedicated secure room is provided for storage of residents' luggage in the back of house area behind the main hotel reception.

Hotel (Southmill Street)

- 3.2.11 The majority of the hotel bedrooms will be provided well above street level, reducing the potential impacts of noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour outside the building, particularly at night (see also item 3.3.7).

Offices

- 3.2.12 The main pedestrian entrance to the office building is located in a prominent location and is readily apparent on approaching from the new area of public space.

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- 3.2.13 The arrangement of the lobby area and location of the reception desk enables staff to monitor people entering and leaving the building. Further access to upper floors appears to be controlled by turnstiles and visitors will be required to report to the reception before being admitted.
 - 3.2.14 The internal layout of the building appears to be relatively simple, avoiding any hidden areas and pinch points in circulation, especially where high footfall is expected. Public areas are free of hidden / concealed places.
 - 3.2.15 Cycle store. Long stay cycle parking for staff is located within a secure enclosure within the building where entry can be restricted to legitimate cyclists only, using access controls for entrance and exit to the facility. Cycle stands / racks should allow bikes to be secured by the frame and both wheels. There should be sufficient secure storage lockers provided for cyclists to store “day wear”.
 - 3.2.16 Subdivision of Floor Space. Where the upper floor office areas are subdivided into smaller individual units, each suite of offices will be capable of separation with their own individual secure entrances and access controls.

Retail / Restaurant / Café / Bar

- 3.2.17 These premises add activity to façades of the building and will include large glazed elements overlooking the adjacent public areas and streets that will help to provide useful natural surveillance of these areas.
- 3.2.18 The retail / leisure premises will help to generate legitimate activity in the public spaces within and around the site which should increase informal policing of the area.

Place of Worship

- 3.2.19 The proposed place of worship is contained entirely within the overall development and the principal entrance is focused on a single location, allowing security to be concentrated in this area. There are no exposed windows or roof areas that could be vulnerable to attack or abuse. The connections with the other parts of the building will be for emergency egress only and should be connected to the site-wide alarm system and covered by CCTV.
- 3.2.20 There is a dedicated parking area for users of the place of worship, with access-controlled entrance gates / shutters off Bootle Street. The car park includes a door providing direct access into the place of worship which can be effectively monitored by managers of the premises.

Public Realm

- 3.2.21 The proposed layout includes a high-quality landscape treatment which is designed to create an attractive space that would draw in legitimate activity to the public realm.
- 3.2.22 The site will benefit from being part of the development's private estate and its integrated security protocols. There will be regular monitoring of the public areas together with frequent patrols of the area.
- 3.2.23 Most areas of the open space are well-overlooked from adjacent premises.

General Items

- 3.2.24 The proposed development will bring vitality to a currently underused site. The proposed layout of buildings and landscape should generate increased footfall which will assist with informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.25 The buildings will present an active frontage to most of the public elevations around the site, which will help to enliven the street scene and help to provide useful natural surveillance of the public realm. The uses of ground floor premises have been designed to accommodate activities that require routine occupation, such as offices, reception areas, café and retail uses, whilst also having potential to provide additional incidental lighting into public areas. Premises facing the public realm have been designed with large glazed elements so that the visual connection between the indoor and external areas is maximised.
- 3.2.26 The site will have a security presence at all times, which will help to discourage antisocial and criminal activity.
- 3.2.27 Separation of functions. The ground floor retail / leisure units are kept separate from each other and the office / residential / hotel functions. There should be no shared facilities that could compromise security.
- 3.2.28 The exterior of the building has a relatively simple footprint containing few recesses that could be exploited by potential offenders.

-
- 3.2.29 Storage and servicing functions, including refuse stores, appear to be contained within secure enclosures within the footprint of the building.
 - 3.2.30 The design of the buildings includes no large overhangs in secluded places that could provide attractive sheltered gathering places for antisocial groups.
 - 3.2.31 The car parking layouts are relatively uncomplicated, with bays and directional markings clearly demarcated. Pedestrian routes / directions must be clearly signed.
 - 3.2.32 Car park entrances will be secured using access-controlled gates / shutters that restrict access to legitimate users. Further entry to the building from the parking levels is also controlled.
 - 3.2.33 Access to external spaces. The upper levels of amenity space will have access controls and entry to these areas can be managed so that they are not accessible from public areas.
 - 3.2.34 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the buildings and avoids the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Residential

- 3.3.1 Entrance Lobby. This should be defined as separate from the hotel entrance to avoid potential tailgating by intruders. In order to discourage tailgating, the residents' entrances should be laid out with a double door entry system, creating a secure lobby area and inner access-controlled doors to allow further entry to the stair well or lifts. The buildings opposite the proposed entrance include some recesses that could provide cover for a potential offender, in close proximity to the communal doors, which increases opportunities for tailgating.
- 3.3.2 Postal delivery should not require delivery staff to have access to communal corridors inside the building. More secure options for postal delivery include "through the wall" letter boxes, located on the outer face of the building with internal collection, a rack of letterboxes in the secure lobby area should be provided (see above), or distribution of post by concierge.
- 3.3.3 Access controls. The scale of the proposed development requires subdivision so that occupiers only have access to the zone where they live and do not have unrestricted entry to all residential floors.
- 3.3.4 Emergency egress. Doors leading off emergency stairs should not allow residents or intruders to gain access to floors other than their own.

Hotel (new-build)

- 3.3.5 Access controls. The hotel entrance lobby should be separate from the residential entry to avoid confusion between residents, guests and visitors, which could provide opportunities for intruders to access restricted parts of the building. Access controls must be included to restrict movement of non-residents attending events or using hotel facilities in order to prevent unauthorised entry to bedroom corridors.
- 3.3.6 Personal Belongings. Sufficient space should be provided to accommodate secure lockers for people using the hotel facilities (e.g. gym / spa etc.).

Hotel (Southmill Street)

- 3.3.7 Ground floor window protection. Where the ground floor windows are at pavement level, they must include measures to reinforce or protect them from accidental damage and deliberate attack. The design of any external window guards should not form a ladder or climbing aid that would create step up to upper floor windows. It may be appropriate to include a strip of deterrent paving to discourage people from approaching these windows.
- 3.3.8 Access controls. Arrangements for admission into and through the building need to be carefully considered to avoid intruder access. Either a staffed reception or secure double-door lobby arrangement should be introduced. The entry arrangements for people with mobility issues should not compromise this arrangement.

Public Realm

- 3.3.9 Landscape generally. Any landscape features (hard or soft) should not impede natural surveillance of / from the buildings or reduce the effectiveness of any lighting or CCTV system. Future soft landscaping growth and vegetation maintenance must be taken into account at the design stage. The positioning of temporary structures (such as market stalls) within the public realm should be carefully considered in order to avoid creating blind spots that cannot easily be monitored.
- 3.3.10 The proposed under-croft space linking Jackson's Row with the public space in the centre of the site should not include any obstacles to vision or potential hiding places where an offender could be concealed or surprise a potential victim.
- 3.3.11 Street scene. Roads at the side of the site contain relatively narrow paving and carriageways, exacerbated by car parking along Jackson's Row. Introduction of a shared surface along these lightly-used routes (as implemented in area such as Ancoats) could improve the ambience of the public realm and generate more legitimate pedestrian use.
- 3.3.12 The landscape layout should be designed in order to prevent vehicular incursion onto the plaza area off Bootle Street and Jackson's Row. Design of the approach routes requires careful consideration in order to discourage vehicles from entering the pedestrian area. Measures to control the speed of bicycles / motorcycles should also be provided in order to reduce potential hazards to pedestrians.
- 3.3.13 All short-stay cycle parking should be located where it does not obstruct circulation but yet is well overlooked from surrounding buildings and by passing pedestrians, and covered by any CCTV system.
- 3.3.14 Graffiti on surfaces. Expanses of blank wall exposed to public areas should be formed of a graffiti-resistant surface or have a resistant coating applied to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings.

General Items

- 3.3.15 Western boundary. The interface of the proposed building with the neighbouring development should not create potential hiding places along the site boundary. The position of the lockable gates to prevent access to the separating passageway should be adjusted to be aligned as closely as possible to the street ends.
- 3.3.16 The shutters / gates at the entrance to the car park should be aligned with the façade of the building facing Bootle Street, or as close as possible. Consider including separate entrances for cyclists / pedestrians so that they do not need to fully activate the vehicular gates.
- 3.3.17 The loading bays along Bootle Street should be capable of being enclosed, with shutters / doors / gates, aligned with the outer face of the building.
- 3.3.18 Cycle store layout. Plans indicate that access to the cycle storage adjacent to the pub cellar is via another cycle store – these should be separated in order to reduce the number of people with legitimate access to these enclosures.
- 3.3.19 Arrangements for storage and disposal of refuse should not compromise the security of the development. Entry to refuse stores should be strictly controlled. Collection of waste should not require or allow external operatives to enter restricted areas within the site. Waste bins must not be stored on the streets.
- 3.3.20 The development should take into account the security of guests, visitors and staff approaching and leaving the building, particularly at quiet times and late at night. The areas outside the premises should be well-illuminated without creating areas of shadow or pooling. A monitored CCTV system covering all elevations of the premises should be included.
- 3.3.21 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed in sections 4 & 5 are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

Physical Security

The proposed development partly comprises adaptation of existing buildings, and in order to preserve their architectural character, the potential to make alterations and upgrade the physical security of these elements of the scheme is constrained. It is appreciated that any changes need to be sensitive to the architecture, and the following recommendations are made on this understanding. However, the following standards should be the minimum applicable to all new-build elements of the scheme. If the identified security risks cannot be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the buildings and their occupants will be more dependent on effective management and deployment of an on-site security presence.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ All other external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. The internal entrance door off the basement parking area to the residential stair / lift core should also be self-closing and security-certified, operated by resident key-fob only.
- ☐ The main entrance door and doors off the lobby area should be controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ The communal cycle stores within the basement of the building should be enclosed within secure rooms or rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fenced enclosures. Internal doors / frames to the basement plant room and the communal cycle stores should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), self-closing, with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by resident key-fob. If the cycle stores are to be secured within fencing enclosures, they should be fitted with self-closing, 'slam to lock' gates (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortise latch, key operated from both sides) that cannot be left unlocked when shut. They should include SBD-approved racks that allow cyclists to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable).

4.2 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas / doors should operate on access control:
 - Main Communal Entrance doors
 - Secondary entrance doors off internal lobby (or access to lifts and stairs)
 - Access to residential levels
 - Entrance off car park level to residential stair / lift core
 - Car park entrance gates / shutters

- Bin store(s)
- Cycle stores

4.3 Car Parking

4.3.1 See section 5.11

4.4 CCTV

4.4.1 See section 5.12

4.5 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.

5 Physical Security (Non-residential)

5.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Sliding or revolving doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ All individual hotel bedroom doors must be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), have multipoint locking and a minimum of 3 hinges with a door viewer, operable by Vingcard or similar.
- ☐ All doors / frames to staff areas / stores / offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys / passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ☐ All individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled solid-core doors (minimum 44mm thick), operated by staff swipe cards / fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and any rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. The doors into the emergency escape cores at each level should be fitted with electromagnetic locks, connected to the fire alarm, so that people at one level cannot access other levels. Once an emergency escape core is accessed, the only means of egress should be at ground floor level.

5.2 Windows

- ☐ Any louvres to the ground floor car park or servicing areas should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows.

5.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass. It is recommended that glazing to elevations adjoining public areas or evacuation routes should also be laminated.
- ☐ Any secondary glazing installed should utilise a product approved by Secured by Design (see www.securedbydesign.com for details of suppliers / installers).
- ☐ Glazing Film. The film acts rather like the PVB interlayer in laminated glass and holds the glass together when it's broken. The film should be accredited to BS EN 12600, Class 2B and needs to be applied *behind* the glazing beads or bars to be fully effective which is likely to require removal of the glazing panel in order to do this (if there is a gap between the film and edge of the glass / frame, this significantly reduces the security performance of the film) - professional installation is therefore recommended. In this location any film should have a thickness of 300microns.
- ☐ Wall Construction Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

Roller shutters and grilles

- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
 - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1
- ☐ Security ratings higher than those listed above may be required dependant on:
 - type of risk,
 - level of crime risk,
 - location of building *or*
 - security level of the door or window to be protected.

5.4 Curtain Walling

Glazed curtain walling and window walls

- ☐ Secured by Design recognises four distinct types of glazed wall systems. These are:
 - Large glazed units connected by 'spider clamp' system.
 - Glazed units directly retained within a framing system (usually aluminium)
 - Framed windows installed within a separate framing system.
 - Framed windows connected to other framed windows to create a window wall.
- ☐ Glazed curtain walling must be installed using a secure glazing retention system. The method of retaining glass must include one or more of the following:
 - Security glazing tape
 - Dedicated security sealant or gasket
 - A secure mechanical fixing system (Evidence will be required to prove the system is secure. This may be achieved by utilising the specific glazing retention test within PAS 24:2012 or by indicative test on the retention system to LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR1 or STS 202: Issue 3, BR1)

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- ☐ Framed windows (3 and 4 above) used within the construction of a window wall must be certified to one of the following requirements:
 - BS PAS 24:2016
 - STS 204 Issue 3: 2012
 - LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 Security Rating 1

5.5 Wall Construction

- ☐ Wall construction should be of a robust nature enough to withstand physical attack through the material.
- ☐ Where a lightweight wall construction is being considered a reinforced lining such as welded steel mesh will need to be incorporated.
- ☐ The construction of the roof to the single storey elements should be carefully considered to prevent criminal intrusion. Certificated lightweight roof systems are available to LPS 1175 SR1. Alternatively, expanded metal or welded mesh should be incorporated between the skins of double-skinned roof coverings or within the roof space. Roof lights should incorporate laminated glazing/polycarbonate and internally fixed security bars/grilles.

5.6 Safes and strong rooms

- ☐ Commercial safes must be certified to:
 - LPS 1183: Issue 4.2
 - BS EN 1143-1 :2012
- ☐ Internal doors that are identified as a security risk must be installed to the following standards:
 - PAS 24: 2012
 - STS 201
- ☐ High risk internal doors must be installed to the following standards:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR 2
 - STS 202: Issue 3, BR 2
- ☐ Wall construction should be of a robust nature enough to withstand physical attack through the material.
- ☐ Where a lightweight wall construction is being considered a reinforced lining such as welded steel mesh will need to be incorporated.

5.7 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all buildings on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

5.8 Access Controls

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Offices - The side entrance doors to lobbies (out-of-hours and if reception is not staffed).
 - Offices - Turnstile access to the lifts and stair cores from reception lobbies.

- Doors from basement parking areas to office stair / lift cores.
- Offices - Doors to each individually let office suites/floors.
- Cycle stores.
- Shower / changing rooms
- Shutters / gates to vehicular access ramp and basement parking area.
- Plant / service / storage areas including loading bays
- Entrance(s) to hotel
- Access to hotel lifts and bedroom levels
- Shutters / gates to basement parking areas
- Doors from car park into place of worship

5.9 Landscaping



Security Bollards

- Fixed and raising bollards should be successfully tested to PAS 68-1:2013
- Bollards providing passive protection should be successfully tested to BS 170-1



Vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.



Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).



Skateboarding. The design of street furniture, steps and retaining walls should take account of possible abuse from skateboarders, and it should be planned to withstand or discourage this potential mistreatment. The shape and position of the furnishings relative to other features can reduce its attractiveness in this respect. In the detailed design, deterrent features to interrupt runs of ramps or grinding surfaces should be included at the outset in order to avoid the need to retrofit with unsightly additions (see example below).



Street furniture should be designed to withstand casual acts of vandalism. When selecting or designing street furniture, consider how easily and quickly items can be repaired or replaced following damage. When commissioning bespoke street furniture and public artworks it is also important to be mindful of the potential for attack and ease of repair. These features are best positioned where there is plenty of formal and informal surveillance, so any criminal acts are more likely to be witnessed.

5.10 Lighting

- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.
- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Lighting to the basement parking levels should be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%. Light-coloured walls and ceilings can help achieve this.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

5.11 Basement Car Park

- ☐ Inward opening automatic gates, roller shutters or grilles must be certified to one of the following standards:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
 - STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
 - Sold Secure Gold
 - PAS 68: 2013
- ☐ Gates / shutters should operate by key fob/proximity reader, with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles and escape. If there is to be an emergency override mechanism for the shutter, it should be alarmed and signed as such to deter casual use/unauthorised use by criminals.
- ☐ Any cycle / pedestrian side gates in to car parks should also be fob in and fob out only.
- ☐ The pedestrian entrance door to the building off the basement car park should be security-certified and fob-controlled on access and egress, preventing any visitors accessing the residential parking area through the building and ensuring that if a criminal does gain access to the parking area, further access is prevented into the block (see Section 4.1).
- ☐ The basement plant room and cycle stores should be fitted with fob-controlled doors/gates to prevent unauthorised access/theft (see Section 4.1).
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion/conflict and aid surveillance.

5.12 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are '[Overview](#)' and '[Recognition](#)', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations should include: [The entrance lobbies](#), [lift lobbies](#), [public lifts](#), [public stairs](#), [car park entrances](#), [cycle store entrances](#), [entrances from car park into building](#), [external faces of the building](#).

5.13 Fit Out of Retail / Commercial Units

- ☐ Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-user's requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:

- Internal access control
- Internal doors in to premises
- Alarm systems
- ATMs
- Cash offices
- External Seating

- ☐ The above features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5.14 Other

- ☐ Toilets intended for public use can give rise to crime and anti-social behaviour issues and the following issues should be considered:

- Avoid areas where items such as drug paraphernalia can be hidden (e.g. suspended ceilings). Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work, etc. should be used. Services where possible should be accessed from outside the facility.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Cubicle doors should have a 20cm gap at the base.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.

- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction and concealment / securing of cabling.

☐ Directions and signage. Visitors to the site should be clearly directed to appropriate entrances and exits. Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people to and through the buildings, but also to deter unauthorised access to restricted areas. Lack of orientation can provide legitimacy to an intruder.

6 Further Guidance on Internal Layout of Café / Bars

6.1.1 Licensed premises and restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating bars / restaurants generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent bars / restaurants means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys, MP3 players etc.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- 6.1.2 The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access / egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- 6.1.3 Customers entering / leaving the premises through the main entrance should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any WCs to monitor their use.
- 6.1.4 The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility. Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public highway, i.e. large promotional signs and menus should not obstruct views.
- 6.1.5 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars / service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled).
- 6.1.6 All back-of-house / staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 4.1) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- 6.1.7 Locate toilet facilities away from public entrances to discourage bilking and use / abuse from non-customers.

7 Management & Maintenance

- 7.1.1 The designer must ensure that this report is included within the BIM management model so that all parties are aware of the requirements for construction and management.
- 7.1.2 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews / exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 7.1.3 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.
- 7.1.4 Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
- 7.1.5 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.
- 7.1.6 The hotel management teams should consider membership of the Manchester Hoteliers Association (MHA), who share best practice in security management and recruitment.

8 Construction

- 8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 8.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
23/08/2017	Zerum	Public Consultation Event, Royal Exchange
18/10/2017	Zerum	Meeting with planning consultant
24/10/2017	Zerum	Request to update CIS report
25/10/2017	Zerum	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
31/10/2017	Jackson's Row Development Ltd	Payment received
08/11/2017	N/A	Site visit
09/11/2017	Zerum	CIS version A issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
(--)00M	Level 0M GA Plan	20/10/2017	
(--)0B1	Basement B1 GA Plan	20/10/2017	
(--)0RB	Retail Basement GA Plan	20/10/2017	
(--)0UG	Ground Floor GA Plan	20/10/2017	
(--)001	Level 01 GA Plan	20/10/2017	
(--)002	Level 02 GA Plan	20/10/2017	
(--)003	Level 03 GA Plan	20/10/2017	
(--)004	Level 04 GA Plan	20/10/2017	
(--)005	Level 05 GA Plan	20/10/2017	
(--)006	Level 06 GA Plan	20/10/2017	
(--)006M	Level 06M GA Plan	20/10/2017	
(--)007	Level 07 GA Plan	20/10/2017	
(--)008	Level 08 GA Plan	20/10/2017	
(--)009	Level 09 GA Plan	20/10/2017	
(--)010	Level 10 GA Plan	20/10/2017	
(--)011	Level 11 GA Plan	20/10/2017	
(SK)007	Hotel	18/10/2017	
(SK)008	Hotel Suites	20/10/2017	
(SK)019	Residential Typical	20/10/2017	
(SK)037	Laterals	20/10/2017	
(SK)039	Residential Penthouse	20/10/2017	
(SK)1001	Plan Summary - L00 to L18	20/10/2017	
(SK)1002	Plan Summary - L19 to L40	20/10/2017	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk