



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

LAND AT JUNCTION OF PORT STREET & GREAT ANCOATS STREET,
MANCHESTER

RESIDENTIAL (485 no. APARTMENTS) & RETAIL (595sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Manchester (Port Street) Limited

VERSION B: 04/02/2022

REFERENCE: 2021/0513/CIS/01

Land at Junction of Port Street & Great Ancoats Street, Manchester

URN: 2021/0513/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable if the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed. The Planning Consultant for the scheme has confirmed that the following highlighted issues have been addressed through design development:

- Secure enclosure of all landscaped areas to the sides/rear of the building, in order to define them as private resident-only spaces, prevent unauthorised access and limited all public access to where surveillance opportunities are maximised from Great Ancoats Street and Port Street. The boundary definitions abutting the surface car parks to the west and south should be particularly robustly defined.
- Robust control of access into/around the building - including to the communal residential entrance off Port Street (which should be single-leaf if the lobby is not staffed with a 24/7 concierge) and the entrances off the basement car park, as well as an automatic vehicular shutter to the basement car park (and ideally automatic gates along Port Street, to secure the partially hidden access ramp). There should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that does not require access to all floors of the building.
- It should not be possible to gain internal access between the commercial and residential uses within the building or vice versa, which could provide opportunities for offenders to exploit.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies at the junction of Great Ancoats Street (A665) to the north-east and Port Street to the north-west, on the north-eastern edge of Manchester city centre.

It is currently occupied by a temporary play & display car park accessed off Port Street. Part of the surface car park is at street level (along Port Street) and part is at a lower ground level, accessed via a ramp within the site. As a result, parts of the site are somewhat hidden from the street.

The street frontages of the site are currently formed by timber post and rail fencing and low walls. The south-east and south-western boundaries of the site are formed by high walls (formerly the external walls of the commercial building/s which used to occupy the site), which have been heavily graffitied.


To the north-west, west and south of the site are similar temporary pay & display car parks on currently vacant sites (accessed off Port Street and Tariff Street) serving commuters and shoppers, as well as those attending attractions/events in the city centre. There are numerous such facilities around the edges of the city centre, which generally lack activity/footfall/surveillance and have poor lighting levels. The informal nature of such facilities (which often have a lack of formal surveillance/capable guardians such as patrolling guards, monitored CCTV, no formalised bays/clear directional routes, loose surface material that can be used to commit crime/cause damage) mean that vehicle crime is often prevalent. Offenders know that vehicles are often left unattended for long periods at such facilities, leaving them vulnerable.

To the north-west of the site, on the opposite side of Port Street, is a large residential block of apartments, with ground floor commercial uses fronting onto Great Ancoats Street.

To the immediate west is a small two-storey commercial building (Sam's Yard) with a gated central courtyard space, which has been heavily graffitied and is secured with window grilles.

To the immediate east is Avro - a converted mill building providing residential apartments, beyond which is the Rochdale canal. The building is accessed through access-controlled gates off Great Ancoats Street, with an enclosed area of landscaping to the rear (south-west) adjacent to the canal. There is a narrow footbridge over the canal, which formerly linked the rear of the building to the retail park on the opposite side, which has now been fitted with timber gates on either side to prevent access.

Great Ancoats Street itself is a very wide route, busy with vehicular traffic and pedestrian footfall – providing good levels of natural surveillance over the site from this direction.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All crime data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2020 to 31st October 2021. It is accurate to a margin of +/- 8%, due to recent updates to GMP IT systems.

2.1 Crime Summary





Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
63	91	180	1099	473	100	30	260	29	79

- 2.1.1 In the local area, the general volume of recorded crime is very high, particularly the levels of violence, theft and vehicle crime, reflecting the site's location within the city centre. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed mixed-use development, the more detailed analysis below will focus on local residential burglary, local vehicle crime and retail burglary/theft.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **76% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **58% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **41% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **25% higher** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **95% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **109% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **55% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **35% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **4% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area **11% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **61% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **181% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Tuesday, Thursday and Friday and is lowest on Saturday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of domestic burglary fluctuates, peaking during the early hours of the morning, around midday and late at night. Offenders often target residential properties at night when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and they perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected. During the day, residents are more likely to be away from home (at work or otherwise), meaning offenders can attempt to gain access without being disturbed.

2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed.
- Doors have been frequently targeted (a common M.O. when apartments are burgled) and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.




2.4.1 **Day Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area remains consistently high through the week, peaking slightly on Monday.

2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk rises in the afternoon and into the evening. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at these times when people park on streets and in temporary/informal car parks in the area for long periods of time, while working in the area/in the city, shopping or attending nearby events/attractions. Vehicles parked on streets or within the numerous temporary car parks on vacant site sites around the edges of the city centre (particularly when they are not staffed, have poor lighting levels and poor surface/boundary treatments), where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within secure car parks/basement parking facilities. Offenders also often target vehicles in the evening when it is dark, streets/car parks are quiet and they perceive the risk of being observed and identified as low.


2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



2.5.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester peaks slightly on Wednesday, but remains relatively consistently high across the week.

- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late and night and during in the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target commercial premises at these times when they are closed, it is dark and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being observed or detected.



- 2.5.3 **Point of Entry:** In burglaries at Manchester retail premises, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.
- Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.
- Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.
- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

2.6 Theft (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



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- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester retail premises remains consistently high across the week. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and early evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or of/from the handbags of shoppers (such as mobile phones, purses etc.). Theft of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.

2.7 General Risk Factors

- 2.7.1 **Residential:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

- 2.7.2 **Retail:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.8 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.8.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting local dwellings, vehicles and Manchester retail premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Local Residential:** Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed.

Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to apartment blocks before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to ‘airlock’ lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

- **Local Residential:** Doors have been frequently targeted (a common M.O. when apartments are burgled) and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (also see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. There should be no balconies that would be publicly accessible from street level.

- **Local Residential:** Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- **Local Vehicle Crime:** Vehicles have been targeted for theft of, theft from and criminal damage when parked on-street or within open car parks

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that any resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving apartments or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured with automatic gates/shutters to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

- **Manchester Retail:** A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

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- **Manchester Retail:** Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 5.6 & 5.7) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by. Advice on glazed panels can be found below.

- **Manchester Retail:** Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.

Possible Solution - All windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.2) where possible, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 5.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Vulnerable shopfronts should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours (see Section 5.2).

- **Manchester Retail:** A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.4).

- **Manchester Retail:** Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a part 33 storey, part 9 storey building comprising of 485 no. residential apartments and 595sqm. retail space at ground level, with associated parking and landscaped amenity space.
- 3.1.2 The basement of the building will house 47 no. parking spaces accessed via a ramp off Port Street, as well as a large cycle store (for 485 no. cycles) and 2 no. plant areas. At ground floor level, the proposed retail units will front onto Great Ancoats Street and Port Street (with rear B.O.H corridors and bin stores) and the main entrance serving the apartments will be accessed off Port Street, leading to a reception/entrance hall, snug and lounge. The ground floor will also house a gym, a management suite, a bin store, plant areas, a sub-station and LV room. The upper floors of the building will house 1 to 3 bedroom apartments, as well as an amenity space at Level 7.
- 3.1.3 External amenity areas are proposed within a central courtyard space (including a sheltered space underneath the overhanging upper floors of the building) enclosed on three sides by the building itself and to the east and south of the site, including hard landscaped areas, steps and benches with lawned areas and tree/shrub planting.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will provide additional activity, overlooking and natural surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The building will present active frontages to Great Ancoats Street and Port Street, enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.3 The residential and commercial elements of the scheme will have their own dedicated external entrances, preventing confusion/conflicts and opportunities for criminals to exploit.
- 3.2.4 The principal residential entrance to the building will be located in a prominent position and will be capable of being clearly seen from the public realm.
- 3.2.5 The proposed apartments will be provided well above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively prevented. This also reduces the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.6 The basement residential parking area will be capable of being secured with an access-controlled shutter to prevent unauthorised access to the building and to the parked vehicles themselves. It will also include a secure cycle storage area.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points were identified for further consideration within Version A of the CIS report, which the Planning Consultant has confirmed have since been addressed through design development.

- 3.3.1 The proposed landscaped courtyard in the centre of the building, as well as the landscaped areas to the east and south of the building, will be partially hidden areas that cannot be clearly seen from the street. The areas will include a large sheltered space underneath the projecting upper floors of the building, steps, benches and tables/seating - all features that could foster loitering/gathering, nuisance, anti-social behaviour and mis-use (such as rough sleeping) if left publicly accessible. For these reasons, all of the landscaped areas to the sides and rear of the building must be securely enclosed and defined as private, resident-only spaces in order to prevent unauthorised access and limited all public access to the more visible elevations of the scheme, where surveillance opportunities are maximised (see Section 4.5 for more information). Particular care must be taken with the boundary definitions along the western and southern boundaries of the site, adjacent to the existing temporary surface car parks - where the boundaries will not be well-overlooked (particularly at night) and parked vehicles could be used to scale the boundaries.
- 3.3.2 Ideally, the main communal entrance to the residential portion of the building (off Port Street) should be formed by a single-leaf, self-closing doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the security-certification, which is easier to secure and operate remotely via an access control system. A double-leaf communal entrance doorset is only appropriate where the entrance lobby is staffed by a 24 hour concierge, who can oversee, control and direct all visitor access/egress to/from the building at all times. There should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that does not require access to all floors of the building (see Section 4.1 for more information).
- 3.3.3 Given the high levels of vehicle crime in the local area, access to the proposed basement level car park must also be robustly secured, controlled and maintained, in order to prevent unauthorised access. The vehicular entrance to the car park should be fitted with a high-speed automatic shutter (to reduce the potential for tailgating), operated by resident key fob/proximity reader with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out') so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles and escape (see Section 4.6). Given the surrounding car parks and commercial premises (which benefit from lower levels of activity and passive surveillance at night) and the basement/ground floor back-of-house functions immediately adjacent to it, the proposed partially hidden access ramp could be vulnerable fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance, anti-social behaviour and mis-use (particularly at night). Consideration should be given to securing it with automatic vehicular gates along Port Street (also see Section 4.6) and the provision of CCTV coverage monitored by reception staff (see Section 5.7), ensuring there can be an immediate response to any issues recorded. The internal pedestrian entrances off the car park should be security-certified and access-controlled (see Section 4.1) to ensure that if unauthorised access is gained to this area (e.g. via tailgating, forcing open gates/shutters etc.), further access to the upper floors of the building is prevented.
- 3.3.4 It should not be possible to gain internal access between the retail units and residential use within the building or vice versa, which could provide opportunities for offenders to exploit. Ideally, the residential and commercial uses, including any access to back-of-house areas/bin stores or fire escapes, should be entirely separate. This will prevent any residents/visitors gaining unauthorised access to the ground floor commercial areas and any commercial staff/patrons gaining access to upper floor residential levels. Where this is not possible, any internal doors between uses (e.g. to allow emergency egress) should be security-certified (see Section 5.1) and alarmed, with signage to prevent mis-use. Internal walls between uses should also be robust enough to withstand penetration (see Section 5.3).
- 3.3.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

The following checklist (Sections 4 & 5) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve the Secured by Design award.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ If the entrance lobby is not to be staffed by a 24/7 concierge, the main communal entrance to the building should be formed by a single-leaf, self-closing doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, which is easier to secure and operate remotely via an access control system. A double-leaf communal entrance doorset is only appropriate where the entrance lobby is staffed by a full-time concierge, who can oversee, control and direct all visitor access/egress to/from the building at all times. The main entrance should be security-certified (see above), self-closing/locking and capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that so that in the absence of a concierge, residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ There should be a secure system for the delivery of post without needing to provide access to all floors of the building. Ideally, postal deliveries should be made directly to postboxes within the main entrance lobby under the supervision of the concierge. If there is not to be a concierge present at all times within the entrance lobby, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries to postboxes within a secure postal lobby without providing access to other areas/floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to the concierge or residents via the access control system.
- ☐ The communal entrance doorsets taken off the basement parking area, as well as any communal entrances off the private landscaped areas to the sides/rear of the building, should also be security-certified to one of the above standards, self-closing/locking and operated by resident key-fob only (on access and egress).
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ Given the size of the proposed basement cycle store, the internal doorsets to it should be self-closing and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2, operated by resident key-fob on access and egress. Further information relating to the cycle store can be found within Section 4.9. Internal doors/frames to the resident's amenity area and gym, the management suite and all bin stores and plant rooms should be solid-core (FD30 or higher), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by resident/staff key-fob. Any external doorsets to such areas should be security-certified (see above) and operated by resident/staff key fob. Security-certified louvered doorsets are also available if required to plant rooms or refuse stores (see www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search for SBD-compliant products).

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All accessible windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

- ☐ Any ground floor, first floor or any other easily accessible opening lights must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground and first floor glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh or expamet mesh) behind any basement/ground floor cladding to the building, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ Any louvres to plant areas/refuse stores should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid.
- ☐ There should be no features of the building (such as projecting canopies/window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting brickwork/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, trees, handrails, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows or over boundaries.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Each apartment should have an intruder alarm to comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems; or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.

Alarms should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ All communal landscaped areas to the sides and rear of the building should be defined and enclosed as private, resident-only spaces with 2100mm high walls and/or railings and lockable gates (2400mm high where adjacent to the public car parks along the western and southern boundaries of the site). Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and there should be no immediately adjacent climbing aids, such as low walls, projecting elements of the building, lighting columns, junction boxes etc, which may form a climbing aid. Any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ☐ Any pedestrian gates to private space should also be 2100mm high, self-closing and self-locking, operated by staff/resident key or fob on access and egress. They should also be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, planters/street furniture, lighting columns etc. Mid-point horizontal elements, exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds (see illustration opposite).
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.



4.6 Basement Car Park

- ☐ The vehicular entrance to the basement car park should be fitted with a high-speed shutter certified to LPS 1175 SR1/2, operated by key fob/proximity reader, with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), so that criminals cannot gain access to the areas, attack the vehicles and escape. The length of time the shutter stays open after a vehicle has passed through should be reduced as much as is safe to do so, in order to reduce the opportunity for tailgating. If there is to be an emergency override mechanism for the shutter, it should be alarmed and signed as such to deter casual use/use by criminals.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to securing the partially hidden access ramp with 2100mm high railings and an automatic vehicular gate/s (ideally a sliding gate) operated in the same way, in order to deter loitering/gathering, nuisance, anti-social behaviour and mis-use. If double gates are used, they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open. Exposed hinges and large apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds. The hinges should also not provide footholds and the gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ The pedestrian entrance doors to the building off the car park should be security-certified and fob-controlled on access and egress, preventing any visitors from accessing the basement car park through the building and ensuring that if a criminal does gain access to the parking area, further access is prevented into the blocks (see Section 4.1).
- ☐ Lighting to the basement parking level should be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%. Light-coloured walls and ceilings can help achieve this.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion/conflict and aid surveillance.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the access ramp and all pedestrian routes within/surrounding the site, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and shutters.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundaries or up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ The communal landscaped areas to the side/rear of the building should be well-lit and designed to maximise surveillance opportunities and eliminate hiding places. Any pedestrian steps or should be as wide as possible, with any adjacent landscaping containing only low-level vegetation or high tree foliage (see below), in order to maximise surveillance over them and allow clear views of, from and along pedestrian routes.
- ☐ Any landscape features (hard or soft) to the public realm areas should not impede natural surveillance off/from the building or reduce the effectiveness of lighting or any CCTV system. In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, building frontages and along pedestrian routes, low planting should not exceed approx. 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than approx. 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to. Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of

ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

- ☐ The design of any hard landscaping features or street furniture, in particular any steps or benches, should be designed to withstand and discourage the potential for mistreatment or damage. Any such features should be located where surveillance and overlooking opportunities are maximised from within the building.
- ☐ The robust management and maintenance of the communal landscaping areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur (see Section 7).

4.9 Other

- ☐ The secure residential cycle store should include either secure lockers or stands that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Physical Security (Retail Units)

5.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Any internal doors/frames to dedicated bin stores or plant areas should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), self-closing, with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by staff swipe card/key-fob. Door into any shared back-of-house corridors/areas should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, in order to prevent internal access. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ Ideally, there should be no doors to provide access between the residential and commercial uses within the building. Where this is absolutely unachievable (e.g. required to allow emergency egress), any internal doors between uses should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. Any escape ironmongery should be permitted under the security certification of the product and they should be alarmed (and signed as such) to deter casual use.

5.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than just to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Shutters should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage).

5.3 Glazing

- ☐ All glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.4 Internal Security

- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to storage rooms, staff rooms or offices should be solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys. Any cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a certified doorset to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ☐ Any electric locking system to be used throughout the premises should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Any staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented.

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- ☐ Internal walls between the residential and commercial portions of the building (as well as between the units themselves) should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

5.5 Alarm

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover the units linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder or a security patrol team).

5.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the exterior of the units, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light, and fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

5.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are [overview](#) and [recognition](#), which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [all retail unit facades](#), [the main entrance to each unit](#), [internal circulation areas](#) and [all sales counters/till positions and any external seating area](#).
In addition, it is highly recommended that the [basement parking access ramp and gates providing access to the side/rear landscaped areas](#) are covered by CCTV, monitored by the residential concierge - ensuring there can be an immediate response to any issues recorded.

6 Retail Unit Internal Layout Guidance

6.1.1 The internal layout of any retail units should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their unit once complete, and therefore, the end-users requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

- Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public realm, i.e. large promotional signs should not obstruct views.
- Careful consideration should be given to the location of paypoints to ensure that staff have full surveillance over the entrance to the unit.
- Internal aisles and product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrance of the unit.
- Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 5.4) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

7 Management & Maintenance

- 7.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the retail units must be prepared and remain in place for their day-to-day running. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash management within the premises, as well as cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 7.1.2 The opening hours of retail units should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses.
- 7.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 7.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site, but also to deter unauthorised access to resident or staff-only areas.
- 7.1.5 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.
- 7.1.6 The upkeep of any residential development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Repairs to communal areas (such as access controls, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Litter/graffiti removal
 - Trimming of trees and shrubs
- 7.1.7 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as gable walls, boundaries or hidden corners/recesses).

8 Construction

- 8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 8.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
12 th October 2021	Deloitte	Receipt of CIS instruction & plans
13 th October	Deloitte	Quote issued & request for additional information
26 th October 2021	Deloitte	Confirmation of instruction/fee & receipt of additional info
3 rd November 2021	Deloitte	Email correspondence re: timescales
18 th to 19 th November 2021	Deloitte	Email correspondence re: letter of comfort & request for additional information
22 nd November 2021	Deloitte	Email sent re: request for additional information
25 th November 2021	Deloitte	Email sent re: report completion & payment
1 st February 2022	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment & issue of Version A of CIS
3 rd February 2022	Deloitte	Request received to update quantum in the report

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
-	Draft Location Plan	-	-
10376-SHP-Z0-A-F900-SC-XX-001	Area Schedule Site Wide	23/09/21	P04
10376-SHP-Z0-A-G200-PL-00-001	General Arrangement Plan Level 00	23/09/21	P07
10376-SHP-Z0-A-G200-PL-01-001	General Arrangement Plan Level 01-06	23/09/21	P06
10376-SHP-Z0-A-G200-PL-07-001	General Arrangement Plan Level 07	23/09/21	P06
10376-SHP-Z0-A-G200-PL-08-001	General Arrangement Plan Level 08	23/09/21	P05
10376-SHP-Z0-A-G200-PL-09-001	General Arrangement Plan Level 09	23/09/21	P06
10376-SHP-Z0-A-G200-PL-10-001	General Arrangement Plan Level 10	23/09/21	P06
10376-SHP-Z0-A-G200-PL-11-001	General Arrangement Plan Level 11-28	23/09/21	P01
10376-SHP-Z0-A-G200-PL-29-001	General Arrangement Plan Level 29-30	23/09/21	P05
10376-SHP-Z0-A-G200-PL-B1-001	General Arrangement Plan Level B1	23/09/21	P07
10376-SHP-Z0-A-G200-PL-RF-001	General Arrangement Plan Level RF	23/09/21	P06
RF21-894-PS-04	Illustrative Masterplan (with Key)	-	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Updated quantum	04/02/22

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk