



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Grey Mare Lane, Manchester

Our League Life National Training Centre

FOR: Rugby Football League

VERSION A: 16th November 2021

REFERENCE: 2021/0478/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Grey Mare Lane

2021/0478/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The development is broadly acceptable, in terms of designing out crime; however, the recommendations made in section 3.3 should be addressed, including but not limited to:

- Illumination and CCTV coverage of the sides of the building accessible to the public.
- Planting and illumination in the landscaped areas.
- Physical security, access control into and around the building.

If the recommendations contained within section 3.3 are implemented we would be supportive of the planning application.



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Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
	2.3 Risk Factors	
	2.4 Burglary Risk Analysis	
	2.5 Theft Risk Analysis	
	2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	9
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security	10
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Windows & Shutters	
	4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	4.4 Alarm	
	4.5 Access control	
	4.6 Lighting	
	4.7 Landscaping	
	4.8 CCTV	
5	Management & Maintenance	12
6	Construction	13
7	Useful References	13
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix


A	Contact register	14
B	Associated Documents.....	14
C	CIS Version History	14

1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent site, edged in red. The site is located in the Beswick area within the City of Manchester, in close proximity to the Manchester City football stadium, the Etihad Campus, and other notable sporting developments in the local area.

The site is roughly rectangular and it is bound by a high school (East Manchester Academy) to the North, to the West by Grey Mare Lane, to the South by Bell Crescent, and to the East by the playing fields of the adjacent school.

The site is presently occupied by the vacant Beswick shopping centre and an existing school playing field that will be used as a rugby pitch as part of the development.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 2018 and 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
29	8	55	91	12	7	5	10	7	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is low for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and vehicle crime being the highest recorded offences taking place in the area. The majority of crime is concentrated around Grey Mare Lane to the north and Wilson Street to the east where housing estates are located.
- 2.1.2 Violence in the area is mostly concentrated around the housing estates and educational facilities located to the north and east of the site, where public order and assault offences have been recorded. Crimes have mostly involved domestic disputes and incidents between known associates.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage offences have taken place throughout the area, with a hotspot of offences occurring to the north around Howarth Lane and Grey Mare Lane. Offenders have targeted dwellings and vehicles, with offences often occurring as a result of a domestic dispute. Glazing in windows and doors have been targeted, with internal features of the dwelling and front doors damaged, as well as scratched/damaged paint work.
- 2.1.4 Theft from a vehicles and criminal damage to a vehicle have been the highest recorded vehicle offences taking place in the area. Offenders have smashed glazing in vehicles in order to gain access and remove items from within, as well as forcing open van doors and removing tools stored within.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Opening secure doors (all door types) using bodily pressure and implements to access the premises.
Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4.2) which are designed to withstand a prolonged attempt to gain entry.
- 2.2.2 Breaking glazing in doors and windows, mainly to the front of the premises, using implements to gain access.
Possible Solution – Any ground floor or easily accessible glazing should contain a pane of laminate glazing, which cannot be easily smashed or shattered to gain entry.
- 2.2.3 Entering premises as legitimate customer and tailgating staff/ exploiting insecure doors to access staff only areas.
Possible Solution – Personnel gates or turnstiles should restrict access from the office foyer into the circulation core of the building. Any external doors should operate on an access control system.
- 2.2.4 Forcing open shutters using implements and bodily force to gain access.
Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to a recognised security standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR2). Shutters certified to a burglary resistant standard are able to withstand prolonged, opportunist, attacks by criminals.
- 2.2.5 Theft of valuable items such as phones, wallets and laptops from changing rooms that have been left insecure.
- 2.2.6 *Possible Solution – Lockers should be provided to allow staff to secure their property whilst at work.*


2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of user/staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Uncontrolled access
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Cash robbery/attacks on vending machines
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at leisure facilities in the Greater Manchester area peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday.



2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon/early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

2.5 Theft Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at leisure facilities within the Greater Manchester area peaks on Tuesday, but remains consistently high throughout the week.
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Thursday and Saturday during the late evening (10pm – 11:59pm). Offenders often target vehicles in the early hours of the morning when it is dark, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be detected.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is of a skills, education and training facility for use by the local community, and by a range of sports including Rugby League. The proposals include a two-storey building to be used by staff, athletes, and the local community. The development includes a small 900-seat stand attached to the building and associated pitch.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 Down lighting will be provided on soffits, which will illuminate the front elevation of the building and landscaped areas below which will improve natural surveillance opportunities and reduce potential for antisocial behaviour, crime and fear of crime.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will create an active frontage onto the existing car parking area and the proposed landscaping, allowing those inside the building to view this area and deter those antisocially, or criminally, minded from operating in the area.
- 3.2.3 Secure bicycle shelters will be provided for staff and visitors to the building to secure their bicycles. Sheffield stands will also be provided at the front of the building and these will be adjacent the glazed façade allowing for them to be viewed from inside.
- 3.2.4 Bin stores will be lockable enclosures, reducing the potential for misuse.
- 3.2.5 The proposed building and pitches will be used into the evening, increasing legitimate activity in this area which can deter offenders from operating in the area.
- 3.2.6 The boundary between the car park and the landscaped area to the front of the building will be defined with bollards, restricting vehicular access at this point and preventing vehicles from misusing the landscaped area or approaching the building.
- 3.2.7 The vacant shopping centre on the site shows obvious signs of misuse. On the day of visiting the site the rear of the shopping centre was littered with drug paraphernalia, alcohol containers, and general waste; additionally, there were signs of vagrancy with a mattress positioned where the building overhand and recessed entrance provided shelter from the rain. Redevelopment of vacant sites often reduces or eliminates these behaviours.



3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Access to the sides of the building should, ideally, be restricted to staff and legitimate users to prevent these areas from being misused when the building is closed. Given that the building is open relatively late (i.e. 21:00 on most days) and there are good sightlines of these area, the securing of these areas is not essential if the following mitigating measures are included:

- The sides of the building should be illuminated to a high standard to deter offenders and those antisocially minded from operating in these areas.
 - CCTV cameras should cover the sides of the building.
 - Bin stores should be secure and robust enclosures to prevent misuse.
 - Hard landscaping (i.e. seating) should not be included in these areas and any soft landscaping should not impede sightlines.
- 3.3.2 The landscaped area to the front of the building and all pedestrian routes should be illuminated to a high standard to reduce the potential for misuse and to foster a safe environment for users of the building. External lighting must be provided to the landscaped area and vehicular/pedestrian routes, in accordance with BS 5489.
- 3.3.3 The proposed and retained boundaries are acceptable for the purpose of securing the sight. It is recommended that the gates to the sides of the building area of robust construction and should not be easily climbed, these gates should be either metal railings or a close-knit weldmesh construction. There should be no features of the gate that could assist climbing such as exposed hinges or locking apertures. Ground clearance should be minimised so that crawling underneath to gain access is not possible.
- 3.3.4 Landscaping to the front of the building should be carefully considered so that good sightlines can be maintained, and to avoid creating areas that could generate loitering or antisocial behaviour. Low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- 3.3.5 The landscaped areas, and in particular any pedestrian routes or seating areas, should be illuminated to a high standard.
- 3.3.6 The physical security of the building should be compliant with Secured by Design standards, to reduce the potential for offenders to gain access to the building using force.
- 3.3.7 The office reception should be staffed to allow visitors to be vetted before being permitted access in to the building. There should be a video/audio intercom on the main entrance to allow staff to vet visitors to the building when the main reception is not staffed. The main entrance into the building, all external doors, and access around the building should be governed with an auditable access control system.
- 3.3.8 Access in to the proposed bicycle store should operate on an access control system, with access restricted to genuine users. Cycle stands should be Sheffield style, or similar, allowing both wheels and the frame to be locked. If a rack system is used it should still allow both wheels and the frame to be secured.
- 3.3.9 A comprehensive CCTV system should be installed to monitor all external doors and elevations, the reception area, circulation cores, all plant/back-of-house functions, and the cycle store. Individual offices and ground floor/basement commercial units should have the infrastructure so that any tenants can easily install a CCTV system if required.
- 3.3.10 Any blank facades should be treated with an anti-graffiti coating, to an approximate height of 2000mm, so that graffiti can easily be cleaned.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security

certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery, with signage to deter casual use.

- ☐ Any revolving doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 or BS ENV 1627 (RC2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ Entrance doors to office suites should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ Any ground floor and other easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any security shutters or grilles must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required).

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All accessible glazing (i.e. below a height of 2000mm from external ground level) must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any louvres at ground floor level to plant areas/refuge stores should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed or damaged. If onward access into the building can be achieved from these spaces then expanded metal or weld mesh should be installed to the inner face of the louvers.

4.4 Alarm

- ☐ A monitored intruder alarm system should cover the building, with a keyholder or security team response.

4.5 Access control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The main entrance into the office building
 - Staff only areas
 - External doors
 - Plant areas and areas restricted to maintenance staff
 - External cycle access doors
 - Access into the service area
- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should ideally be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff key-fobs/cards should be capable of being quickly activated or disabled when

required, to ensure they are not misused. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the landscaped area and vehicular/pedestrian routes, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ External lighting must also be provided to all external doors, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ Publically accessible elevations of the building should be illuminated.
- ☐ The sides of the building should be illuminated to a high standard.
- ☐ Landscaping Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or up to upper floor windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV camera system should be installed. Cameras should be capable of monitoring all building elevations - with particular emphasis on external doors (cameras should be able to observe people coming and going), and the entrance lobbies.
- ☐ Recording equipment should be located within a secure room or images may be recorded off-site at a suitable monitoring facility.
- ☐ CCTV monitoring screens should be located at the reception desk and or security office.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security and maintenance regime for the management of the units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing the offices, including staff arrival and departure;

-
- Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc;
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 5.1.2 All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
17/09/2021	Rob Rimmer	CIS application received
09/11/2021	Rob Rimmer	Meeting

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
4740-HML-01-ZZ-DR-A-10005	Location Plan		P02
4740-HML-01-00-DR-A-10100	Floor Plan - Level 00		P06
4740-HML-01-01-DR-A-10101	Floor Plan - Level 01		P05

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		