



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

48 Store Street, Manchester

54 No. Apartments

FOR: M1 Piccadilly Ltd

VERSION A: 30th June 2021

REFERENCE: 2021/0139/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

48 Store Street, Manchester

2021/0139/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The following areas have been identified as a concern and should be addressed (see section 3.3 for more details).

- Access control into/around the building and external areas.
- Physical security of the building.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development, and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



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
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The site itself is roughly rectangular and it is bound to the by Store Street, to the East the site is bound by an adjacent apartment (at a higher level), to the South the site is bound by the rear of an apartment development located off Chapeltown Street, and to the West the site is bound by an industrial estate.

A photograph showing a residential scene. In the background, a large red brick building with multiple windows sits on a hill. In front of it is a low stone wall topped with a dense row of purple flowering shrubs. A dark metal fence runs along the top of the wall. To the right, a large tree with bright green leaves is partially visible. In the foreground, a dark-colored SUV is parked on a paved street. The sky is clear and blue.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 2018 and 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
38	74	104	303	190	96	17	327	55	45

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is 5% lower than the average of crime for the Manchester district, with an exception to vehicle crime which is high for Manchester. Less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded crimes.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding have mostly taken place to the west of the proposed site, around the Northern Quarter area and Piccadilly area of the city. There are high concentrations of licenced premises in this area. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious wounding, with the majority of offences taking place over the weekend period, during the late evening and early hours of the morning.
- 2.1.3 Thefts have also taken place to the west, around the Northern Quarter and Piccadilly Train Station. Offenders have used pick pocketing and distraction methods in order to obtain personal belongings. Offenders have targeted victims in restaurants/ bars as well as those on public transport.
- 2.1.4 Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime in the area, with offences taking place throughout. Offenders are targeting vehicles parked securely in car parks, as well as those using on street parking facilities. Offenders have smashed glazing in order to remove goods from within the vehicle as well as the removal of vehicle parts and vehicle registration plates.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.
Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.
- 2.2.2 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
Possible Solution - Any ground floor opening lights should be restricted in opening to 100mm to prevent them being left vulnerable if unlocked. All external doors should be self-closing to prevent them being left in an insecure position and any external apartment doors should have a split-spindle or fixed handle to prevent these doors from being left insecure.
- 2.2.3 Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see section 4.2 & 5.2). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

2.3 Possible Solution – Risk Factors





The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles

- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **73% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **54% lower** than Greater Manchester and **34% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **16% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **32% higher** than Greater Manchester and **41% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **48% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **24% lower** than Greater Manchester and **13% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **117% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **295% higher** than Greater Manchester and **588% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on a Tuesday and Sunday during the early hours of the morning (2:30am – 6am) and into the afternoon (10am – 1pm). Offenders often target properties during the early hours when it is often dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught. Offenders also target properties during the afternoon period when residents are more likely to be away from the property, reducing the likelihood of the offender being identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Posing as a legitimate resident and tailgating residents/ exploiting insecure doors in order to gain access to communal areas.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Saturday during the afternoon and into the evening (12pm – 6pm). The proposed development is situated within close proximity of the city centre. The city centre experiences a higher visitor rate over the weekend period, with people attending for longer periods of time. Unsupervised car parks are situated in the local area. These car parks are not over looked, reducing the risk for the offender, giving the perception that they are unlikely to be apprehended.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is of 54 no. apartments in a single block.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development site is presently vacant. The development of the site will increase residential activity in this area to the benefit of existing residential developments.
- 3.2.2 There are on-street parking bays in the local area allowing visitors to park in close proximity to the building.
- 3.2.3 The main entrance to the building is taken from the principal elevation on Store Street.
- 3.2.4 There will be a secure bicycle store within the building for residents to use. Bicycles parked inside secure internal stores are less likely to be targeted compared to those parked on the street or within external stores.
- 3.2.5 The main communal entrance to the building is taken from the front elevation where it can be overlooked from Store Street and the apartment building opposite.
- 3.2.6 The sides and rear of the building will be enclosed with gates, restricting these areas to residents and staff.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Access to the first floor space residents space should be restricted to residents and legitimate visitors.

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- 3.3.2 The vehicular gate restricting access to the side of the building should be an automated gate, operated with remote/fob or similar, to ensure that this area remains secure. The operating speed of the gate should not be too slow that it allows opportunities to tailgate.
 - 3.3.3 Pedestrian and vehicular gate designs should be carefully considered so that opportunities to climb are not designed-in. Gates should not have exposed hinges, locking apertures, or mid-rails that could be used as footholds. It is recommended that gates are a minimum of 2100mm high and of robust construction (see section 4.7 for more details).
 - 3.3.4 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
 - 3.3.5 Access in to the buildings should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access in to the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access in to the building.
 - 3.3.6 To prevent tailgating into the building there should be a secure lobby with residents/visitors passing through a second access control security rated door before they can enter the stair/lift core of the building.
 - 3.3.7 Postal workers should not be allowed unfettered access throughout the development. Postal workers should be granted access only to the post rooms only or mail/parcels should be delivered directly to the concierge.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access in to the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access in to the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access in to the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

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- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Communal entrances
 - Communal areas
 - Bicycle parking areas
 - Circulation cores
 - Amenity space

4.6 Bicycle Parking Areas

- ☐ Doors in to the cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners)..
- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.7 Boundaries

- ☐ The gate restricting access into the car park should be 2100mm high. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing, the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, and the gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ The pedestrian pass-gate (if applicable) should be of a similar height (i.e. 2100mm) and of robust construction (i.e. metal railings) and it should operate on access control (i.e. secured with a maglock), the gate should be self-closing and self-locking so that the gate closes automatically behind residents and cannot be left insecure.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ The proposed car parking spaces should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting.

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk-til-dawn lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
11/03/2021	Diane Ellis	CIS application received
10/06/2021	Diane Ellis	Revised plans received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
05868_B1_02_2200	Proposed General Arrangement Plans Ground Floor	05/03/21	F
05868_B1_02_2201	Proposed General Arrangement Plans First Floor	22/10/20	D
05868_B1_02_2202	Proposed General Arrangement Plans 2 nd -12 th Floor	22/10/20	D
05868_B1_02_2213	Proposed General Arrangement Plans 13 th - 16 th Floor	01/06/21	0

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		