




CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Swan Street, Manchester
Restaurant Premises (1,353m²)

for: Swan St Firehouse Ltd

version A: 14th October 2020

URN: 2020/0576/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

Swan Street, Manchester

2020/0576/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Major changes not required

The nature and level of disorder in the immediate area could make the development vulnerable to abuse, and it is therefore essential that the scheme does not incorporate features that would increase crime or raise the fear of crime in and around the site.

The adaptation of sites for interim / temporary use can provide significant challenges to the developer, and given these constraints the proposals appear to include reasonable consideration for the security of staff, customers and their property.

Our support for the proposed development is subject to inclusion of the recommendations relating to on-going management and maintenance of the premises, as stated in section 5 of this report.



Michael Craig *DipLD CMLI*
Consultant

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
1 Visual Audit

The site shown red on plan is located in the New Cross district on the northern edge of central Manchester.


The area contains a mix of development types, comprising residential, commercial, entertainment venues and hotel buildings. There are a number of nearby vacant plots used for surface car parking pending redevelopment under the wider New Cross Masterplan and adjacent NOMA masterplan, much of which is currently under transition. Some nearby sites have been or are in the process of being redeveloped into multi storey apartments and hotel premises.

Swan Street forms part of the central Manchester ring road and carries high volumes of vehicular traffic in normal times. It separates the neighbourhood from the Northern Quarter. Other streets around the site are quiet, particularly outside peak times. The lack of overlooking premises and low levels of off peak activity allow criminal and antisocial incidents to occur unwitnessed.

The site is currently occupied by a vehicle repair business, vacant areas and former industrial buildings with a small car park adjacent




Site viewed from Swan Street looking northwest



The site has been subject to acts of criminal damage



The site contains vacant areas and a vehicle repair business




Swan Street looking east towards the site.



Cross Keys Street elevation



New hotel opposite the site



Cable Street boundary looking northwest



Parking are at the corner of Swan Street and Cross Keys Street next to site

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
41	166	216	945	514	173	41	394	46	85

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high for Manchester; however the location of the site should be taken into consideration. The site is located in the city centre where there is a high concentration of retail outlets and licenced premises which leads a higher rate of crime and disorder. Less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded crimes in the area.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings are taking place throughout the local area with most offences taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning over the weekend period when there is a greater volume of foot fall occurring within these premise types. The site is located within the Northern Quarter where there is a high number licenced premises. Offences have mostly consisted of assaults and public order offences.
- 2.1.3 Thefts are again taking place throughout the Northern Quarter, with offenders targeting victims in bars and restaurants and removing insecure items – mostly mobile phones and bags. Offenders are also using pickpocketing and distraction methods in order to obtain personal items.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the area is high, with offenders mostly targeting vehicles using private car parks and on street parking facilities. Theft from motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime taking place with smashed glazing being the most common entry point, removing goods from within the vehicle. Offenders are also removing vehicle registration plates using implements. Town and City Centres often experience a higher number of vehicle offences due to the number of vehicles parked for extended periods of time.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see below) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also increase surveillance opportunities and help deter offenders. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.



2.2.2 Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas.

Possible Solution – Staff-only areas should be effectively separated, both visually and physically, so that customers cannot readily gain entry. This can be achieved by the use of access-controlled doors or barriers, but they should create a clear distinction so that any intruder can be more easily identified. There should be provision within the staff only areas for the secure storage of personal belongings while at work.

2.2.3 Smashing glazing in windows and doors to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All new ground floor / accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within / directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

2.2.4 Opening of secured doors and windows using bodily force or implements to gain entry.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. The most vulnerable doors and windows should be protected with shutters or internal security blinds, together with alarms and CCTV.




2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area.




2.1.1 **Day / Time Range:** In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises between Monday and Wednesday and is lowest on Friday. The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas / streets where they are typical found are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.

2.1.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure doors and windows – mostly fire doors located to the side and rear of the property are targeted – using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors / tailgating staff into restricted areas, taking property belonging to employees and the business.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements to access the doors and windows located below.
- Broken glazing to windows and doors – located mostly to the front of the property, with glass in doors highly targeted- using bricks or implements located around the scene.

2.2 Theft (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis




The data below relates to thefts within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.2.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses / wallets, cash and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, from bags hung on chairs / stored under tables or via pickpocketing and distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary (Restaurants / Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.3.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafes in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday. The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.

2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the premises.
- Breaking glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the windows and doors located underneath.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors, accessing restricted areas and removing goods belonging to staff and the company.

2.4 Theft (Restaurants / Cafés): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants / cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants / cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses / wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

2.5 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks over the weekend period, particularly to on a Saturday during the late morning and into the evening. Offenders often target vehicles during the day when they are left unattended for long periods of time, reducing the likelihood of an offender being seen or identified.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development will create two restaurant premises using existing buildings on the site, with addition of temporary features including canvas structures and shipping containers.
- 3.1.2 External seating is proposed along the frontage facing Swan Street and within internal courtyard areas.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development makes a positive use of a currently vacant building that has previously been subject to minor acts of criminal damage. Regular use of the proposed facility will bring additional vitality and should help to improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 The site benefits from a well-defined boundary, marking an obvious distinction between public realm and private space. The condition of the boundary should be evaluated to ensure that it can provide a consistent level of security around the site (see also section 3.3.5).
- 3.2.3 The main entrances to the two units are located facing Swan Street and are readily apparent on approaching the site. There are no other customer access or egress points for regular use, which allows more effective monitoring of people entering and leaving the premises. Emergency egress / service entrances must be covered by CCTV and alarms.

3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Any external seating for the restaurant / bar premises should be located where staff can easily monitor customer behaviour. Seats should have sloping backs (to discourage customers from hanging bags over them), and tables should be equipped with "Chelsea clips".
- 3.3.2 There should be no features of the structures (existing or proposed) which may facilitate unauthorised climbing up to higher levels / roof. The position of street furniture, tables and chairs should be carefully considered in relation to this issue.
- 3.3.3 Arrangement of facilities – any secluded space between structures should be accessible to staff only, with customers prevented from gaining access. The more remote areas must not be publicly-accessible, with robust barriers to prevent unauthorised access. The division between public and staff-only areas should be readily obvious so that people know where they should and shouldn't have access to.
- 3.3.4 Cash storage. The position of any safes / tills should be out of public reach, and securely fixed to other structures to prevent easy removal. Arrangements for cash handling should be considered so that the distances that large amounts of cash are carried is minimised. If cash is to be stored overnight on the premises, a safe should be provided adequate capacity, with a deposit facility, certified to LPS 1183. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs.
- 3.3.5 Evaluation of boundaries. Evaluation of the security capability of the existing construction should be undertaken, to ensure that any potential weakness in the building fabric and boundary fencing is identified and appropriately addressed. The proposal will make use of facilities that have been neglected for a number of years, and these may not now form a reliably-secure perimeter to the site.
- 3.3.6 Position of Temporary facilities, including waste receptacles. The position of ancillary structures and temporary facilities, external storage and vehicle parking areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:-
 - Potential to block sight lines and create hiding places
 - Potential to obscure CCTV and lighting

- Potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit / entry to upper levels.

3.3.7 Management. The proposal involves no major changes to the existing fabric, and thus the security of the site and its users will be dependent on implementation of management practises to ensure that entry to the site and accessibility within it can be effectively monitored and controlled (see section 5).

4 Physical Security

The proposed development comprises interim conversion of existing buildings which involves only minor changes to the existing structure, thus the capacity to make alterations and upgrade the physical security of the buildings is constrained. The following recommendations are made on this understanding, but should apply to any new installations. If the identified security risks cannot be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the building and its occupants / users will be dependent on effective management and deployment of an on-site security presence and / or monitored alarms / CCTV.

4.1 Doors

- External doors including French Windows and folding doors, must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts.
- Doors to storage, staff-only or office space should be solid core, with multi point locking.

4.2 Windows and Shutters

- Any new windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950, must be key-lockable, and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- Any shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Shutters should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage)
- Doors used for deliveries, and any shutters that may be used to protect these entrances when not in use, should include a vision panel or door viewer to enable staff to identify visitors prior to allowing entry.

4.3 Glazing

- Any new external glazing must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- An intruder alarm should be installed linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors should cover any rooms with windows.
- It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

4.5 Lighting

- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.6 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [external doors](#), [till points / bar areas](#), [the entrance / waiting areas / external seating](#).

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The application does not involve major physical changes to the buildings. As such the success of the proposal will be dependent on effective management of the premises and a zero tolerance policy should be adopted with customers who behave inappropriately.
- 5.1.2 Café / Bar / Restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:
- **Opportunities** - Patrons of restaurants are stationary for extended periods of time making them easier to target.
 - **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction, and other factors mean patrons are easily distracted.
 - **Customer turnover** – High customer turnover with high levels of customer movement within the establishment offer greater anonymity and allow more opportunities for offenders to operate unnoticed.
 - **Valuable goods** – These are often available and likely to be on show, (a particular problem on any external seating areas). Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, portable goods – mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys, etc. and people often make use of these items when sitting in a restaurant.
 - **Stealth** - Busy venues can provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences
- 5.1.3 In order to minimise these and other security issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:
- Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrances should be easily observed by staff.
 - All back-of-house / staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
 - Large amounts of cash should not be stored in the premises and signage should be installed to indicate this. Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
 - Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach. Casual access to the rear of service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled). No tills should be kept outside.
 - The internal layout of the premises should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding pinch points.
 - There should be no places for concealment in public areas to allow staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation. Installation of mirrors in strategic locations can assist staff in monitoring areas outside their direct line of sight.
- 5.1.4 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. A maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras, lighting, doors and locks etc.
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti;
 - Opening and closing of premises including staff arrival and departure, with particular attention to lone members of staff.
 - Cash management within the premises
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices
 - Management of stock deliveries.

5.1.5 Outdoor Seating

- The outdoor seating areas should be supervised and a duty of care exercised to ensure seating does not stray outside the permitted area and cause obstruction to pedestrians.
- No seating or tables should be left in accessible areas outside the premises overnight. Seating must be stacked and secured outside the permitted hours of use.

5.1.6 Toilets should be clearly signed so that there is no excuse for customers finding their way to the back of house.

5.1.7 A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development, and should not require bins to be left on the street for extended periods. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

5.1.8 Permitted opening hours should be the same as similar nearby premises.

5.1.9 High customer turnover in cafe / bars, with high levels of customer movement within the establishment are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed – staff must be able to easily monitor people arriving or leaving the premises from any potential access point.

5.1.10 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers, music equipment, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5.1.11 Opening hours should be in accordance with other similar premises in the area, taking account of the potential for noise nuisance to occupiers of nearby residential / hotel premises.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
11/09/2020	Savills	CIS instruction received
14/10/2020	Savills	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
23/09/2020	Swan St Fire House Ltd	Payment received
06/10/2020	Savills	Progress enquiry / update
09/10/2020	N/A	Site visit
14/10/2020	Savills	CIS version A issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
320-100	Existing Site Plans	Aug 20	
320-200	Proposed Site Plan	Aug 20	
	Design and Access Statement	Sept 20	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French / double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglary resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk