



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

First Street (Plot 9a)

Commercial office

For: First Street (developments) Limited

Greater Manchester Police

Version G: **17/12/21**

designforsecurity

Ref: **2018/0533/CIS/02**

First Street (Plot 9a)

2018/0533/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported with minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access to back-of-house areas.
- Access controls through the building

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design (SBD), accreditation. Should the recommendations as listed within Section 4 of this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.

David Maher *Dip Arch*
Consultant

e: david.maher@gmp.police.uk

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1 Visual Audit




The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is on the southern edge of central Manchester. It forms part of the First Street neighbourhood, a regeneration area between Whitworth Street West and the Mancunian Way. Proposals for the area include a mix of leisure, commercial, retail and residential developments, currently at various stages of implementation, set within high quality public realm.

The site has recently been used as a contractor's compound for projects on neighbouring sites. The area is likely to remain busy with construction-related activity while nearby developments are in progress. The relatively transient workforce provides anonymity for potential offenders.

To the south of the site on Medlock Street is an entrance to a pedestrian subway under the Mancunian Way roundabout. The subway walls contain a high level of proficient graffiti and a large amount of drug taking litter and paraphernalia, including discarded needles. The subway system is currently closed off and is being redeveloped.

The site is well served with public transport services; bus routes on Medlock St/Whitworth St/Oxford St, Deansgate train station & Metrolink stop all within walking distance.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2020 to 30th November 2021.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
32	27	70	433	367	40	8	183	21	97

- 2.1.1 The volume of recorded crime in this in the neighbourhood is very high, with less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft being the most common offences committed. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in, or within close proximity, of the city centre.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding and theft are prevalent around Oxford Road and Deansgate Locks. Assaults are mostly taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning over the weekend period, at time when licenced premises are at their busiest and open very late.
- 2.1.3 Theft is common in licenced premises in the area, with mobile phones and purses/ wallets being taken. Offenders have targeted insecure property stored on the back of seats and table tops, as well as employees personal property.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime is concentrated in the car parks around Chester Street and Hulme Street. Theft from a motor vehicle is the most common form of vehicle crime, with smashed glazing being the most common entry point to the vehicle.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Offices:** Doors (all kinds) have been forced open using implements, targeting locks, and glazing smashed in door windows.

Possible Solution – All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Ensure that rubbish and loose material is removed from the areas around the site. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- 2.2.2 **Offices:** Offenders posed as legitimate staff/visitors to access offices before targeting insecure doors or tailgating to restricted areas.

Possible Solution – Monitoring of people entering and leaving the building helps to discourage intruders. Additionally, CCTV and regular staff patrols will deter potential offenders from attempting to steal personal property. Doors for emergency egress should be alarmed so that building managers are alerted if they are used, and staff discouraged from using them informally, e.g. for smoking breaks and robust access controls to separate visitor/staff only areas.

- 2.2.3 **Offices:** Front and rear doors were forced open using implements and glazing smashed in door windows

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- 2.2.4 **Offices:** Offenders used implements to force shutters upwards.

Possible Solution – Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Avoid locating shutters in

concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

2.2.5 Offices: Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

Possible Solution - Secure store rooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove, and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Portable equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular visitor access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.

2.2.6 Offices: Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.

Possible Solution - All ground floor or otherwise accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Windows in secluded locations may require additional protection from criminal damage, such as shutters or grilles.


2.3 Risk Factors - Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Cycle theft

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary Offices: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night/into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries against Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors. Windows behind them.

2.5 Theft Offices: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day/ Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest during the working week, when the opportunities to offend are greater, and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours/staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Monday and Saturday during the afternoon (12pm -5pm) and evening (8pm – 11:59pm.) Vehicles targeted have mostly been parked on streets and private car parks. During the evening it is often dark with less footfall in the area, the offender perceives that there is less of a risk of being caught/ identified. Offenders also target vehicles during the afternoon as they are likely to be left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

All data used within the report is correct, give or take 8%, due to updates with our I.T systems

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Erection of a nine-storey building with basement comprising office accommodation (Use Class E(c)), car parking, cycle parking and associated facilities, landscaping, and associated works.
- 3.1.2 The site is 0.5ha and is bound by River Street and the Number 8 First Street office building to the north, a future development site known as Plot 10 to the east, Hulme Street to the south, and Medlock Street to the west. The site currently consists of an area of hard standing that has previously been used as a surface car park.
- 3.1.3 The wider area is characterised by a mix of uses including primarily office and leisure uses to the north, residential to the east and west, and student residential to the south.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The building footprints at ground floor level are relatively simple and contain no areas of potential concealment.
- 3.2.2 The main pedestrian entrance to the building is located in a prominent location and is readily apparent on approaching from the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.3 All doors and shutters appear to be flush with the external elevations of the buildings, removing areas of potential concealment that could be subject to abuse. The main entrance doors into the office reception are accessed via two revolving doors.
- 3.2.4 Glazed elevations to most of the public elevations will help to enliven the street scene and enhance natural surveillance of and from the building.
- 3.2.5 The reception lobby has been laid out to allow staff at the desk to effectively monitor personnel entering or leaving the building through the main entrance. Reception staff will also have a good view of the area immediately in front of the building allowing activity in this area to be easily supervised.
- 3.2.6 Further staff access to upper floors appears to be controlled by turnstiles and visitors would be required to report to the reception desk before being admitted.
- 3.2.7 Cycle storage for building users is provided in a designated room at the ground floor. Entry to this area must be restricted to genuine cyclists only and requires access-controlled doors.
- 3.2.8 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Landscape generally. Any landscape features (hard or soft) should not impede natural surveillance off/from the adjacent buildings or reduce the effectiveness of lighting or any CCTV systems. Future soft landscaping growth and maintenance must be taken into account at the design stage. Hard landscape features should be designed to withstand casual acts of vandalism, and the potential impact of skateboarding on street furniture should be taken into account. Consideration should be given to the level of maintenance likely to be carried out when selecting landscape materials, in particular robustness and ease of repair or replacement following damage.
- 3.3.2 Ground floor glazed elevations to the building should be protected from ram-raid type attacks by creative use of hard landscape features in the adjacent public realm.
- 3.3.3 Collection of refuse waste should not involve leaving bins on the street for long periods of time following a waste collection and should be integrated into the management & Maintenance document.

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- 3.3.4 Access beyond the reception lobby should be controlled so that intruders cannot easily reach restricted parts of the building. Access to the stair core and lifts from the entrance lobby should require passage through access-controlled turnstiles or doors. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required, to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobbies.
 - 3.3.5 Access control strategies should be considered for the spiral staircase to the mezzanine level, removing opportunist access to areas beyond reception.
 - 3.3.6 It should not be possible for the staff/visitors of one office floor/suite to access another. All individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and all rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. Access to plant/service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only).
 - 3.3.7 Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required, to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobbies. If the building is to be open at any time without a concierge or security presence in the lobby area, the main entrance doors should be secured and one of the single-leaf entrance doors should be controlled by means of a video access control system linked to each individual office suite (allowing staff to vet callers before allowing them entry).
 - 3.3.8 Subdivision of Floor Space. Where the upper floor office areas are subdivided into smaller individual units, each suite of offices should be capable of separation with their own individual access controls.
 - 3.3.9 Any short-stay cycle parking should be located within sight of entrances and overlooked by reception staff and CCTV.
 - 3.3.10 Post. Reception and distribution of post within the building should be considered. Incoming post and deliveries should be processed at one single point, in an area that can be easily isolated. Post rooms should not be located close to main exit routes as this could affect prompt evacuation.
 - 3.3.11 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Revolving doors (if used), should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ If the building is to be occupied by multiple tenants, all individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled solid-core doors (minimum 44mm thick), operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and any rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. The doors into the emergency escape cores at each level should be fitted with electromagnetic locks, connected to the fire alarm, so that people at one level cannot access other levels. Once an emergency escape core is accessed, the only means of egress should be at ground floor level.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.

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- ☐ Ideally, the vehicular gates should be sliding. If not, any double gates should overlap when closed and should be capable of being forced open. They should operate as quickly as is safely possible, in order to reduce the opportunities for tailgating/unauthorised access.

4.2 Shutters

- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:
- LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
 - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
- All external doors where regular staff access is required.
 - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
 - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)
 - Cycle store

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
08/07/2019	Deloitte LLP / JMA	Meeting with architect
25/06/2019	Deloitte LLP	CIS instruction received
24/10/2019	N/A	Site visit
31/10/2019	Deloitte LLP / JMA	Revised drawings received
14/11/2019	Deloitte LLP	CIS version A issued
22/11/19	Deloitte LLP	CIS version B issued
11/10/21	Deloitte LLP	CIS version E issued
21/10/21	Deloitte LLP	CIS version F issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
PL1471.1-SK-0001	Architect Layout Option C	13/6/2019	
_MP_00_1250	Site Plan	2/7/2019	
_B1_02_2199	Basement Plan	27/06/2019	
_B1_02_2200	Ground Floor Plan	27/06/2019	
_B1_02_2200_M	Mezzanine Plan	05/07/2019	
_B1_02_2201	First Floor Plan	05/07/2019	
_B1_02_2203	3 rd & 5 th Floor Plan	27/06/2019	
_B1_02_2207	7 th Floor	27/06/2019	
_B1_02_2209	9 th Floor	27/06/2019	
_B1_02_2212	12 th Floor	27/06/2019	
	05662_Plot 9a_WIP 210927	30/09/2021	
	05662_Plans & Area Schedule 210924	30/09/2021	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
D	Applicant name revised	12/12/19
E	Revised scheme – CIS amended to reflect changes.	11/10/21
F	Red Line boundary & site area revised.	21/10/21
G	Proposed scheme amended.	17/12/21

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk