



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land off Edge Lane, Openshaw

181 Houses and 48 Apartments

for: Your Housing Group

version A: 30th December 2019

URN: 2019/0955/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

Land off Edge Lane, Openshaw

2019/0955/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor Design Changes Advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED) in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found acceptable in principle, but further consideration of certain aspects is required as stated in section 3.3 of this report, in order to gain our full support for this development at planning stage. These items include:-

- *Boundary treatments*
- *House type HT-116 layout*
- *parking for plots 194 & 195*
- *apartment refuse arrangements*

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Michael Craig DipLD CMLI

Design for Security Consultant

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
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1 Visual Audit

The site is located in the Openshaw district of east Manchester, just north of the district centre. Edge Lane forms the boundary between Manchester and Tameside at this point. There has recently been seen significant regeneration of the area, with extensive new commercial and residential development on neighbouring sites, including Lime Square and new housing to north and east. There are large areas of open space and undeveloped land nearby, including allotments, parks and vacant plots. A leisure centre is located on the opposite side of Fairfield Road.

The site perimeter adjoins public roads, the Lime Square public car park, gated alleyways at rear of terraced houses, the grounds of a church, and a small area of un-adopted land off Wheler Street. These are formed of a variety of boundary treatments in various states of repair, and do not form a reliably-secure boundary to the site. A bus stop is located on Edge Lane, currently served by hourly busses from Ashton to central Manchester.

The site is currently occupied by extensive industrial premises, now vacant, some in process of demolition. A section of the site boundary along Edge Lane is formed of a wall & railing and includes some established vegetation.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
19	11	55	158	44	18	<5	29	<5	10

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is low for Manchester, with an exception to woundings, which is somewhat high. Less serious woundings, theft and vehicle crime has been the highest recorded crimes. These crime types are common in residential areas within close proximity of town and city centres.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings are mostly taking place to the south of the proposed site, around Ashton Old Road and Sandwell Street. Offences have mostly involved domestic disputes as well as offences occurring between customers and staff in retail outlets. Less serious woundings have mostly involved assaults and public order offences. Theft has mostly occurred along Ashton Old Road, located to the south of the proposed site. Offenders have targeted filling stations, removing petrol/ diesel without making payment. Offenders have also targeted retail outlets in the area, removing personal good from customers and employees, as well as goods from the business. Vehicle crime has taken place around the residential estates. Theft from motor vehicles and criminal damage to a vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crimes in the area. Smashed glazing has been the most common entry point, as well as the removal of vehicle registration plates and the scratching of paint work.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.

Possible Solution - All external doors and accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Entrance doors should be positioned where they can be easily seen from neighbouring properties and passers-by. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- 2.2.2 Breaking glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution - All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high and robust fencing with lockable gates so that rear windows are only accessible to residents. Secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible, as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.

- 2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - A robust access control system is required to prevent unauthorised entry to communal areas. Communal entrance doors and all individual apartments should be provided with a security-certified entrance door set (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Apartment entrance doors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. Any ground floor doors opening onto private or communal garden space must fall within a secure boundary line.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2018.




- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **65% lower** than Manchester, **39% lower** than Greater Manchester and **6% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **11% higher** than Manchester, **73% higher** than Greater Manchester and **107% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **28% lower** than Manchester, **5% higher** than Greater Manchester and **42% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **29% lower** than Manchester, **28% higher** than Greater Manchester and **91% higher** than England & Wales.


2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry





2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks at the beginning of the week, Monday through to Wednesday during the evening (5:30pm – 7pm). Offenders often target properties in the evening when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing windows and doors using implements.
- In cases of unknown entry, doors and windows have often been left insecure.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Wednesday and Sunday during the early hours of the morning (12am – 3am and 7:30am – 9am). Offenders often target vehicles in the early hours of the morning when the vehicle is less likely to be out of the owner's sight, reducing the risk for the offender, of being witnessed or apprehended.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises demolition of the existing structures on the site and comprehensive redevelopment to provide a total of 223 dwellings, in a mix of detached, semi-detached houses and short terraces, together with apartments in three separate blocks with three levels of accommodation.
- 3.1.2 New roads off Edge Lane and Fairfield Road will provide vehicular and pedestrian access to the site, and a pedestrian-only link to Prenton Street is indicated.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will bring additional legitimate activity to a currently-vacant site which has been neglected in recent years. Redevelopment with housing and repopulation of the site should help to generate a sense of ownership and responsibility, and improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 The dwellings will have routinely-occupied rooms overlooking the adjacent communal areas and streets, which will help to increase natural surveillance of accessible areas around the properties.
- 3.2.3 The development does not appear to include any gable-end walls directly abutting streets or other public space.
- 3.2.4 Houses will have windows of routinely-occupied rooms on the front elevation (at ground floor level) which helps to maximise informal surveillance opportunities of the adjacent public realm.
- 3.2.5 Houses appear to have no deep recesses or projections in the front elevation that could otherwise provide cover for an intruder.
- 3.2.6 The principal entrance to all the houses and apartment blocks is located on the front elevation and will be clearly apparent on approaching the properties.
- 3.2.7 The layout has been designed to maximise the number of properties where private back garden spaces of the new properties lock into each other (and those of existing houses), thus reducing the extent of rear boundary exposed to publicly-accessible areas.
- 3.2.8 Alleys serving the rear gardens of mid-terraced houses will be gated in line with front elevation of properties. The gate to the rear garden of plot 168 should be aligned with the divisional boundary fence of plot 165, in order to remove a concealed passageway which is openly accessible.
- 3.2.9 Car parking provision for most properties is located within the curtilage of the premises, and accessed from the front. In some other cases, the parking space is located in front of the house allowing vehicles to be overlooked from within the owner's dwelling. Parking for apartment residents is located within a secure enclosure with controlled / gated access.
- 3.2.10 Apartment blocks are subdivided into small groups of flats where residents are more likely to recognise each other, thus any intruder would be more-easily identified. Communal internal spaces include no potential hiding places where an offender could conceal themselves.
- 3.2.11 Provision is made to store bikes within a secure enclosure within the apartment blocks. These should be accessible to residents only.
- 3.2.12 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the buildings and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Boundary treatments. No details are indicated on the plans supplied for assessment. Front and side garden boundaries should be well-defined to indicate ownership, using low walls, railings, planting and / or surface materials, and discourage intruders from approaching the dwellings and parked vehicles, or taking short cuts. Front and rear garden spaces should be separated by fencing and gates – this division should be located as close as possible to the front elevation of the dwellings. Fencing / railings or walls adjacent to public or communal space that is intended to create a secure boundary should be a minimum height of 2.1m. In places where the existing boundary treatment is required to provide a secure barrier around / within the site, the condition of the fencing / walling should be reviewed to ensure that it can provide a consistent level of security. Any sections of deficient fencing should be replaced with a robust walling or fencing system. Any additional fencing should not provide an aid to climbing or otherwise undermine the integrity of existing boundaries. Particular attention should be given to detailing wall / railing combinations, and the junctions of the different styles and heights of boundary treatment to avoid inadvertently creating a step or ladder feature which could compromise the integrity of the site boundary, and possibly require retrofitting of unsightly security features. The site boundary treatment for the perimeter between nos. 80 & 82 Wheler Street and plots 45 & 46 should be particularly robust in order to discourage informal access arising.
- 3.3.2 Protection of fencing from vehicle movement. The rear garden fencing of plots 40 and 176-183 should be protected from accidental or deliberate damage from vehicle movements, using kerbing or low barriers.
- 3.3.3 House type HT-116. The deeply-recessed, open under-croft parking bays provide some cover / concealment for potential offenders, and the presence of an intruder is likely to be further obscured by parked vehicles thus allowing them to operate for a considerable period without fear of detection. This arrangement is not acceptable in a location where general levels of criminal activity are above average for Greater Manchester.
- 3.3.4 Remote Parking. The parking spaces for plots 194 & 195 appear to be concealed behind tall fencing and will not be easily visible / overlooked from within the owners' properties, which will increase the risk to vehicles and their owners in these locations.
- 3.3.5 Sight lines along pedestrian access to / from Prenton Street. The plans indicate a landscaped buffer to prevent vehicular access along this section of road. This must not create potential hiding places, nor obscure sight lines, but at the same time must be sufficiently robust to discourage potential vehicular overrun.
- 3.3.6 Substations. These features can provide nuisance for neighbouring residents if they are not effectively enclosed. Boundary treatments should not obscure site lines or provide potential sitting / congregation areas.
- 3.3.7 Bin stores for apartment blocks. None are indicated on the supplied plans. These should be either accommodated within the building, or within the secure parking area with access restricted to residents only. Bin stores located in publicly-accessible areas are often subject to criminal damage and other abuse.
- 3.3.8 Apartment Mailbox location. Arrangements for delivery of post should not need postal delivery staff to have access to internal corridors and stairwells of the residential blocks. Mail boxes for residents should use a "through-the-wall" arrangement allowing external delivery / internal collection. All mailboxes should be obtained from a supplier approved by Secured by Design (see www.securedbydesign.com for details).
- 3.3.9 Street Design. The layout of the streets should be designed to reduce traffic speeds and include traffic-calming measures to discourage joyriding / speeding within the proposed development.
- 3.3.10 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation and parking arrangements for larger vehicles.
- 3.3.11 Communal space maintenance. The robust management of such spaces is essential as poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.

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- 3.3.12 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed in section 4 are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- Front and rear doors to houses must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- Garage doors to integral / attached garages (if there is a connecting internal door with the dwelling) must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR1. Alternatively, the internal connecting door must be to the same burglary resistant specification as the front door (normally BS PAS 24). If there is to be no internal connecting door or the garage is detached, the garage door should be of robust construction, with a multi-point locking mechanism.
- External communal access doors to apartments must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system - these features should be permitted under the scope of the security certification.
- Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- French / double doors and folding or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- Front doors to houses should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Windows

- Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems

- BS 6799 for wireless systems
- If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors in to garages and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Controls (Apartments)

- Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - Communal entrance doors to apartments and entrances to the blocks from the car parks
 - Cycle stores
 - Any bin stores
 - Car park entrance gates.

4.6 Boundaries

- Rear boundaries should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- Rear boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.
- The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
- Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
- Gates in to the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
 - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
 - A key operable deadlock
- If residents are likely to use these gates when leaving their property, then the gates must be lockable from both sides.
- Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the rear parking areas for apartment residents must be certified to one of the following standards:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
 - STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
 - Sold Secure Gold
 - PAS 68: 2013
- Consider use of gates that can open partially to allow pedestrians or cyclists to enter or exit without the need to be fully activated (this cuts down tailgating opportunities). Electronic car park exit gates should not be on an induction loop (open automatically). All gates to car parks should be fob-in and fob-out. Any internal release buttons must not be capable of being operated from outside the secure fence line.

4.7 Landscaping

- In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and

eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

- Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Lighting

- External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.
- Lighting in parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 lux with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- Lighting to pedestrian routes through the site should be in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting to public areas (footpaths and roads) should be evenly distributed and not create areas of shadowing or pooling. Any low level lighting should be positioned to avoid creating glare.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 Other

- Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas. Smart meters are acceptable.
- Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- There have been incidents involving metal theft from the area. Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and metal pipework and wiring should not be visible.
- Any garden sheds must be securely fixed to a concrete foundation and the shed door fitted with a certificated 'Sold Secure' Silver Standard padlock, hasp and staple (coach bolted through the shed structure). The shed door should be at least 44mm thick so that the door can be locked into the doorframe using either a mortise deadlock or mortise sash lock certificated to BS 3621: 2007.
- Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- Mail boxes for the apartments should be from a supplier approved by Secured by Design (see www.securedbydesign.com).

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, alarms, CCTV).
 - Regular security patrols of communal areas in and around the site.
- 5.1.3 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
05/11/2019	Edward Architecture	CIS instruction received
22/11/2019	Edward Architecture	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
09/12/2019	Nuvu Developments Ltd	Fee payment received
19/12/2019	N/A	Site visit
30/12/2019	Edward Architecture	CIS version A issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
0723-EA-A-S001	Proposed Site Layout	21/10/19	J
0723-EA-A-S002	Indicative Street Scenes	15/11/19	A
0723-EA-A-SK10	HT -121, Indicative House Plans / Elevations	09/09/19	
0723-EA-A-SK12	HT -115, Indicative House Plans / Elevations	27/09/19	A
0723-EA-A-SK13	HT -166, Indicative House Plans / Elevations	09/09/19	A
0723-EA-A-SK14	HT -128, Indicative House Plans / Elevations	09/09/19	A
0723-EA-A-SK15	Apartments Ground Floor Plan	11/19	
0723-EA-A-SK16	Apartments First Floor Plan	11/19	
0723-EA-A-SK17	Apartments Second Floor Plan	11/19	
0723-EA-A-SK18	Apartments Elevations	11/19	
0723-EA-A-SK20	HT -71, Indicative House Plans / Elevations	09/09/19	
0723-EA-A-SK21	HT -87, Indicative House Plans / Elevations	09/09/19	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/ window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door / window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French / double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk