



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Extension to existing Hough End Leisure Centre to house new
changing rooms & other accommodation

AT Hough End, Princess Road, Withington, Manchester

FOR: Manchester City Council

VERSION B: 08.12.21

2013/0769/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

Sports facilities, such as those proposed tend to attract trespassers, some of whom may have criminal intent that result in damage to buildings, vehicles, and theft of equipment, bicycles and staff and customer property. Happily, because of good design and management, the existing leisure centre has not been overly affected by criminal activity. The extended facility is likely to attract further attention from offenders; however, the design team have produced a scheme which is well-considered from a crime prevention perspective. The removal of the existing changing block is particularly welcomed given its poor security and unsightly appearance.

We are happy to offer our support for the development.

There are several issues highlighted in the report which should be addressed in order to enhance security at the site, they are:

- install security-rated external doors and window frames, with glazed elements fitted with laminate glass;
- all elevations of the buildings, the cycle parking and car park should be illuminated with low intensity dusk-to-dawn lighting;
- designs for extending the existing CCTV and intruder alarm systems should be developed, and appropriate systems installed and monitored;
- install access controls to doors to limit access to the building outside of opening hours and restrict access to the changing facilities when not in use;
- a more secure cycle store should be provided in addition to the current provision; and,
- the 3G pitches should be entirely enclosed with very high welded wire mesh fencing and gates that restrict access to customers only.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will recommend that, should the Manchester Planning Committee be minded to approve the application, a condition be included to require the extension be built in accordance with the recommendations set out in this report.

Adrian Murphy MRTPI

Consultant

e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime summary	
	2.2 Burglary at leisure facilities: risk analysis	
	2.3 Theft at leisure facilities: risk analysis	
	2.4 Vehicle crime: risk analysis	
	2.5 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary and theft at leisure centres & measures to reduce risk	
	2.6 Environmental features that might influence crime patterns	
3	Development Appraisal	8
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal	
	3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development	
4	Physical Security	10
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Shutters	
	4.3 Glazing	
	4.4 Intruder alarm	
	4.5 Access controls	
	4.6 Boundary fencing	
	4.7 Lighting	
	4.8 Landscaping	
	4.9 CCTV	
	4.10 Car parking	
	4.11 Cycle stores	
5	Management & Maintenance	11
6	Construction	11
7	Secured by Design (SBD)	11

Appendix

A	Contact Register.....	12
B	Associated Documents.....	12
C	CIS Version History	12
D	Glossary	13

1 Visual Audit


The development site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The site, edged in red on the plan, Hough End Leisure Centre and playing fields, is located on the western side of Princess Road in Withington, south Manchester. Princess Road is a heavily trafficked dual carriageway with a tree-lined central reservation. Family housing lines the eastern side of Princess Road opposite the site. There is a light controlled pedestrian crossing linking the two sides of the Princess Road in front of the leisure centre. There is a city-bound bus stop also in front of the Centre, just north of the crossing, and a south-bound stop close by on the opposite side of the road. Withington Metrolink stop is situated a short walk from the Centre and next to the south-eastern corner of the playing fields; the tram line adjoins the southern boundary of the playing fields. Allotment gardens, Southern Cemetery and the Arrowfield housing estate are located to the south of the tram line. Broughton Park Rugby Club and Greater Manchester Police's Hough End Training centre is situated to the west of the application site. Mauldeth Road defines the northern boundary of the playing fields and Princess Road defines the site's eastern boundary.




Hough End Leisure Centre and extensive car park



The southern elevation of the leisure centre onto which the extension will be built



The customer entrance to the leisure centre on the southern elevation



The existing changing facilities for outdoor sports



The playing fields adjacent to the leisure centre



A view of the site of the proposed extension from the outdoor changing rooms towards the leisure centre

Hough End Leisure Centre was opened around five years ago. The centre includes two pools, a gym, dance studio and squash courts. The customer entrance to the centre is located on the southern elevation. Vehicle access to the centre is gained from Princess Road where an all movements junction serves the site. The car park currently has a capacity of 198 cars and cycle parking for around 24 bikes. The cycle parking is located immediately in front of the customer entrance. The principal pathway into the Centre for pedestrians connects the crossing on Princess Road with the customer entrance. The Centre and car park benefit from an extensive motion detection, CCTV system and lighting. There are no fences around the leisure centre and car park as such, but a beech hedge and a number of mature trees define the Princess Road boundary, which helps to direct pedestrians to appropriate entry points, whilst a series of steel posts and boulders prevent vehicles from encroaching on the playing fields. To the south of the centre, and adjacent to the south-western corner of the car park, there is a single-storey, brick building, housing the changing facilities for outdoor sports. The building is heavily fortified and has been daubed with graffiti. The extensive playing fields are situated to the west of the leisure centre and changing block.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 and 30th June 2019.



2.1 Crime summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
22	<5	26	48	9	15	<5	8	8	10

- 2.1.1 The volume of crime recorded in the area analysed (166 offences) is much lower than the average for a neighbourhood within the city of Manchester. That said much of the area is open space where few crimes tend to occur or be reported.
- 2.1.2 Crimes involving the use or threat of violence including robbery, vehicle-related crimes and criminal damage are most common. The majority of offences have taken place east of the site, along Princess Road and adjoining streets; robbery is most common on Princess Road and Whitchurch Road. There are also crime hotspots at Withington Metrolink Stop and at the Hough End Leisure Centre and playing fields. There were 29 offences recorded at Hough End, around half of which involved the theft of a bicycle.
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime is largely confined to the streets east of Princess Road but there have been several incidents at the leisure centre car park. In cases of theft from motor vehicle, smashed glazing has been a common means of entry, with personal belongings stolen and removal of number plates most common. In theft of motor vehicle offences, offenders have targeted secure vehicles parked on the street.
- 2.1.4 Offenders have mainly targeted vehicles and houses in cases of criminal damage, with a concentration of such offences around Whitchurch Road, on the opposite side of Princess Road. Smashing windows has been the most common in cases of criminal damage, as well as damage to domestic doors and scratching the bodywork of vehicles.


2.2 Burglary at leisure facilities: risk analysis

The data below relates to burglary at leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester



- 2.2.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at leisure facilities is low but increases on Thursday and Friday. The risk rises in the late afternoon and early hours of the morning.



Leisure Facilities Burglary – Point of Entry



- 2.2.2 **Point of Entry:** Forcing doors was the most common means of breaking and entering leisure facilities and was employed in just over more than half of all burglaries. Forcing windows was the next most common means of entering, followed by simply walking into the building without using force. Out-buildings were targeted on three occasions, and on one occasion entry was gained via the roof.

2.3 Theft at leisure facilities: risk analysis



The data below relates to theft at leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), in Greater Manchester



- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft is much greater than burglary and is consistently high throughout the week and rises through the day with the greatest risk in the early evening. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.4 Vehicle crime: risk analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site



- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in this neighbourhood is low but is greatest on a Friday and in the afternoon and early evening

2.5 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary and theft at leisure centres & measures to reduce risk

2.5.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- prevent entry to the site by outside of opening hours by erecting suitably high, perimeter fencing and gates;
- external doors, roller shutters, window frames and glazing/curtain walling should be security rated;
- all external doors should be illuminated with dusk-to-dawn light. Light suggests a presence of people and may deter offenders from targeting the building. Lighting will also support the CCTV system and highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being detected; and,
- CCTV should be installed to record activity within, and around, the exterior of buildings, particularly around the entrance and means of escape doors.

2.5.2 Theft of equipment, and of customer and staff property

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing property from the premises:

- provide a continuous, visible staff presence whilst the facility is open;
- access control systems should be employed within the building to prevent unauthorised persons from entering staff-only, changing and storage rooms, where sensitive information, ICT or other expensive, portable equipment, or staff belongings may be stored;
- overt signage can also assist in deterring casual entry; and,
- include space for staff and customers to store personal/valuable items securely e.g. small lockers or lockable drawers.

2.5.3 Offenders prised open windows or smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain access

In order to reduce the risk of damage to doors and windows, and breaking and entering:

- windows should be security-rated and include tamper proof opening restrictors;
- glazing in doors and windows should include both laminate and toughened layers;
- lighting should illuminate all elevations of buildings; and,
- landscaping should be managed in order to promote surveillance (natural and electronic) across the site.

2.5.4 Bikes were stolen by offenders

In order to reduce the risk of bicycle theft:

- install a secure shelter(s) for customers and staff to park their bikes;
- locate the shelter(s) in a secure area that benefits from regular supervision by staff and customers; and,
- install CCTV cameras to monitor movements in and out of the cycle shelter(s).

2.5.5 Offenders smashed glazing of buildings in acts of criminal damage

In order to reduce the risk of criminal damage to glazing;

- glazing in external doors and windows should include both laminate and toughened panes - the toughened pane on the outer side;
- install shutters or grilles to the most vulnerable openings; and,
- avoid glazed openings on the most secluded elevations.

2.6 Environmental features that might influence crime patterns

2.6.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns of criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.6.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder on the site are as follows:

- the site is located within an area with a low volume of recorded crime. Crime analysis also suggests leisure centres are rarely targeted by offenders seeking to break and enter but is commonplace
- the site is not immediately adjacent to a densely populated area. Buildings that at a distance from centres of population are unlikely to suffer from malicious damage, or from accidental damage arising as a consequence of non-threatening trespass;
- the environment around the site is well-maintained.
- the positioning of the proposed building, attached to the existing centre will benefit from the security features already employed at the site and the management knowledge of the site; and,
- there will be a degree of surveillance of the eastern fringes of the site by residents of Princess Road and passing traffic. Sites that benefit from passive surveillance are likely to deter offenders who may feel that their actions are likely to be witnessed with a greater risk of being apprehended.

2.6.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- because of limited oversight by nearby residents and users of the local footpath network, in the hours when the leisure centre is closed, offenders may feel that they can act with little prospect of being witnessed or apprehended;
- the site has a very large, open boundary. Offenders can easily approach the building to carry out crime. However, the crime analysis suggests the existing centre is not a focus for crime, other than cycle theft, which suggests that existing management and security features deter offenders; and,
- the proximity of the Metrolink stop to the south of the site attracts offenders to the neighbourhood, who may then navigate toward then centre to carry out crime.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development involves:

- the demolition of the existing changing facilities building;
- extending the existing leisure centre to accommodate replacement changing facilities;
- laying out 3G pitches on the grassed area to the west of the extension;
- remodelling the existing sports pitches;
- relocating the cycle parking; and,

- creating additional parking on the site of the current changing block and overspill parking on the land to the south.

- 3.1.2 The rectangular, two-storey extension will be built onto the southern elevation of the leisure centre. On the ground floor there will be a reception desk, office, a range of changing rooms, and storage and plant rooms. On the upper floor there will be a training room, club room, office, servery and a significant extension to the existing leisure centre gym. The upper floor has a reduced floor area so some of the roof space will be used as outdoor seating whilst the remainder will be used to be used to house plant, some of which will be covered.
- 3.1.3 The building will be of a similar design to the leisure centre with extensive areas of glazing at first floor level on the Princess Road elevation and on the elevation facing the playing fields.
- 3.1.4 A new customer entrance in the extension will serve both the changing facilities and the leisure centre. The existing cafe area in the centre will extend into the new building. There will be doors in the extension which will provide direct access to the grass pitches and another door facilitating access to the 3G pitches.
- 3.1.5 The existing vehicle and pedestrian access points into the site will remain unchanged.
- 3.1.6 The car park will be increased in capacity by 67 spaces whilst provision for 85 (relocation of 25 existing and 60 new) overspill spaces is proposed on the land south of the existing car park and changing block
- 3.1.7 The cycle parking will be roughly doubled in size and relocated to the east side of the proposed extension.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal

- 3.2.1 The proposed extension will be located in an area with a fairly low level of crime and disorder.
- 3.2.2 The existing changing block is visually very poor and does not present a secure facility for players using the facilities. Its replacement is particularly welcome.
- 3.2.3 Entrances to the site will be limited to the existing pedestrian/cyclist and vehicle entrances.
- 3.2.4 The eastern side of the site will benefit from passive surveillance of passing pedestrians and motorists as well as from residents of the nearby houses that face Princess Road.
- 3.2.5 Staff and visitor parking and extensive cycle parking will be provided within the site.
- 3.2.6 The extended gym will overlook the car and cycle parking.
- 3.2.7 With slight adjustment, the location and arrangement of the reception desk and cafe will allow staff to supervise the customer entrance at all times.
- 3.2.8 The internal layout of the proposed building is uncluttered, with straight corridors, thus simplifying surveillance and removing potential pinch points or secluded spaces.
- 3.2.9 The design and height of the extension is such that the risk of unauthorised roof/roof terrace access is minimal.
- 3.2.10 Sporting facilities such as those proposed can help to focus the attentions of young people onto healthy lifestyles and teamwork, and away from crime and anti-social behaviour. Additionally, they can help to nurture pride in a neighbourhood and help build social capital in the community.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

- 3.3.1 Security-rated, external doors should be specified, whilst laminate glass should be used in all external glazing.
- 3.3.2 Other than at the main entrance, glazed doors should be avoided, unless protected with security-certified, roller shutters when the premises are closed.
- 3.3.3 The main entrance doors should be fitted with access controls so that, outside of normal opening hours, staff can vet visitors prior to opening the doors.
- 3.3.4 Electronic locks should be fitted to the doors connecting the reception area to the changing facilities to restrict access to staff only when the facilities are not in use.

-
- 3.3.5 The reception desk should be brought forward so that staff have a better view of customers entering the building. The ground floor plan suggests that the toilets will interfere with views to and from the reception desk.
 - 3.3.6 The office should provide a secure space for, for example, a safe for cash and valuable documents, staff personal belongings, or CCTV recording equipment (if images are recorded on-site). The door to this room should be a 44mm, solid-core door, fitted with at least one key-operated, BS certified lock, and be self-closing and self-locking.
 - 3.3.7 Lockers should be available to staff and customers to securely store their belongings. Ideally, lockers should be located in an area where there is a level of activity and passive surveillance or in the securely locked changing rooms.

Cycle theft is an issue at the centre so further details of the proposed cycle parking should be developed. In addition to easily accessed weather shielded cycle stands, a secure store, with welded wire mesh walls and a robust, weatherproof roof is recommended. Access into the secure store should be controlled with self-closing, self-locking, steel gate that is fitted with a card operated, electronic lock. Cards should be available to staff and limited to members who sign up to secure cycle scheme.

4 Physical Security

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors should be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2 or PAS 24:2016.
- ☐ The office and storage room doors should be at least FD30 rated and capable of self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

4.2 Shutters

- ☐ Shutters used to enhance security to glazed doors should be tested, and certified, to LPS 1175 SR2.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing in external doors should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass, that is, glass rated as P1A or P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Intruder alarm

- ☐ The Centre's intruder alarm should be extended into the new building, with contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors in vulnerable rooms and corridors.
- ☐ The alarm system should be monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security/site management team).

4.5 Access controls

- ☐ Access controls, ideally card/fob operated electronic locks, should be installed to allow staff to vet visitors prior to allowing entry through the customer entrance door outside of normal opening hours.
- ☐ Controls should also be installed to the doors connecting the entrance lobby to the changing facilities to restrict access when the facilities are not in use.

4.6 Boundary fencing

- ☐ The 3G pitches should be entirely enclosed with 4+metre high, welded-wire mesh fencing.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn, low intensity, lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor should illuminate: all external doors; all areas of car and the cycle parking.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure trees and shrubs do not compromise the operation of CCTV cameras, and site and building lighting.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ Cameras, with movement detectors, should be capable of monitoring: the site access road; all external doors; circulation corridors; reception area; cycle store; and, all areas of the extended car park.
- ☐ A public address system should be installed to complement the cameras so that camera and alarm monitoring staff can issue a warning to would-be intruders.

4.10 Car parking

- ☐ Bays should be clearly lined.

4.11 Cycle stores

- ☐ Weather resistant, cycle shelters should be provided in a well-supervised location close to the main entrance.
- ☐ Staff and regular customers/members should have the option to park in a secure shelter, fitted with a gate that is secured with a card operated, electronic lock.
- ☐ Securely anchored, Sheffield stands should be installed within the shelter to allow cyclists to secure the wheels and frame to the stand.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as litter removal from the immediate environment around the development, grounds maintenance, and repairs to lighting, signage, vehicle gates, access controls, alarm and CCTV.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular movement in and out.
- ☐ The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved.

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and

products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
01.01.21	Rob Plant, EWA	Request for crime impact statement
25.01.21		Site visited
09.04.21	Rob Plant, EWA	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
HEV-EWA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-49040	Site Location Plan	15/12/20	P1
HEV-EWA-Z2-ZZ-SK-A-50410	Sketch Site Layout Plan	30/10/20	P5
HEV-EWA-Z1-XX-SK-A-50500	Proposed Elevations		P2
HEV-EWA-Z1-01-SK-A-50401	Sketch First Floor Plan	30/10/20	P5
HEV-EWA-Z1-00-SK-A-50400	Sketch Ground Floor Plan	30/10/20	P5
HEV-EWA-03-XX-SK-A-50411	Pitches Sketch Site Layout Plan	27/11/20	P5

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		09.04.21
B	update to existing and proposed parking numbers	08.12.21

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk