



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Crown Street

Educational Development (534m²)

for: Renaker Build Ltd

version A: 11th March 2022

URN: 2019/0676/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

Crown Street, Manchester

2019/0676/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Major Design Changes Not Required

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. In general the proposed scheme has been found acceptable, but further consideration of some aspects is advised, as stated in section 3.3 of this report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Michael Craig DipLD CMLI

DfS Consultant

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
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1 Visual Audit

The site, shown red on plan, is located on the southwestern edge of central Manchester. The neighbourhood is undergoing major regeneration, from low-density industrial premises & surface car parks to high rise, high density residential buildings.

The southwestern boundary of the site is close to the A57(M) Mancunian Way, near to its junction with Chester Road – these are very busy routes at all times of day and are often congested. A pedestrian bridge links Crown Street to Jackson Crescent, over the A57(M) where there are other schools and a public park. The area is currently very busy with construction-related operations.

In common with neighbouring plots, the site was formerly used for long-stay commuter car parking. It is currently enclosed and forms part of the construction activity for the adjacent high rise apartment buildings.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2021 to 31st January 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
31	12	86	467	279	24	9	185	16	30

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is average for the Manchester district with the majority of crime occurring to the north east of the proposed site. The proposed site is surrounded by a major transport link into the city centre with residential apartment buildings also surrounding the proposed site. The city centre is located to the north east which is predominantly where crimes have taken place. Less serious woundings, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded crimes in the area.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings are taking place throughout the area, with a high concentration taking place around Deansgate / Castlefield Metrolink stops, which are located to the north east of the proposed site. Offences have mostly consisted of assaults and public order offences, which are mostly taking place in the evening and early hours of the morning over the weekend period. Less serious woundings taking place to the south of the proposed site have mostly involved domestic disputes and incidents between known associates, around residential properties and educational facilities.
- 2.1.3 Thefts in the local area have mostly occurred around Deansgate and Castlefield in which offenders have used pick pocketing and distraction techniques in order to obtain personal belongings – mostly mobile phones and wallets / bags. Offenders have also targeted insecure bags and mobile phones, stored on/ underneath tables and backs of chairs.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime has taken place throughout the area, particularly to the north around Liverpool Road and along Great Jackson Street. Both of these areas are within walking distance from the city centre, with large car parks situated within the area, commuters often park within these sites. Theft from a motor vehicle and criminal damage to vehicles have been the most recorded vehicle crime in the area, with smashed glazing being the most common entry point, as well as vehicle registration plates and vehicle parts removed and scratched paint work / damaged body work.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.

Possible Solution – All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified door-sets and windows are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- 2.2.2 Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution – As above, all windows should be certified to recognised security standards. All ground floor / accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within / directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, external bars, perforated protective panels or internal security blinds may be necessary to provide extra protection

- 2.2.3 Posing as a legitimate visitor / service user and by means of insecure doors/ tailgating staff and students, gain access to restricted areas.

Possible Solution - There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed access to all areas. The reception should be staffed at all times whilst the building is open and all visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the school. All individual rooms should be capable of being

secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. Students should not be encouraged to bring high value items to school, but nevertheless there should be facilities provided for secure storage as required.

2.2.4 Theft of insecure property belonging to staff, pupils and the school.

Possible Solution – Areas restricted to staff and officials should operate using an access control system to restrict entry. Codes / fobs should be regularly updated so that only those currently with legitimate purpose should be able to gain entry to these areas. Legitimate users should be encouraged not to allow strangers to tailgate them into restricted areas of the buildings. Facilities should be provided for pupils and staff to store their belongings securely whilst at the premises.




2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property
- Unauthorised access to buildings and private spaces
- Antisocial behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Internal theft
- Theft of staff / pupil belongings
- Staff, pupil and parent safety
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary Educational Facility: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against educational facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.4.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of burglary at education facilities in the local area peaks on a Thursday, Friday and a Sunday. The risk is relatively high throughout the day, peaking in the late evening and early hours of the morning (9pm – 5am). Offenders target educational facilities during the evening when it is dark, streets are quieter as the risk of being caught / identified lessens.

2.4.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain access to the premises.
- Exploitation of insecure doors and windows to gain entry to the property.
- Climbing perimeter fencing to gain access to the grounds and approaching secure sheds use implements and bodily pressure to gain access.
- Climb onto roofing and remove tiles to gain entry to the premises.
- Force open shutters using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to the property.
- In cases where the point of entry is unknown, offenders have often posed as legitimate students/ visitors and entered restricted areas by means of insecure doors.

2.5 Theft Educational Facility: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against educational facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft at educational facilities peaks on a Tuesday during the morning and into the afternoon (8am – 4pm.) The thefts carried out involve thefts of personal items, mostly mobile phones and bags, as well as equipment owned by the facility, mostly laptops and computing equipment.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Tuesday and Saturday during the afternoon (12pm – 3pm) and late evening (7pm – 9pm). There is a higher volume of people attending the city centre over the weekend period which can account for the increase in vehicle crime. Offenders have targeted vehicles parked in private car parks where vehicles are left for long periods of the day. There is little natural surveillance in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are unlikely to be apprehended.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises construction of a three-storey building to accommodate a primary school and day-care centre, with external teaching / recreation / play space at ground, first and roof levels.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed building has a relatively simple footprint which reduces potential hiding places and allows for easy monitoring of activity around the site perimeter. Doors, including emergency egress doors, should not be recessed by more than 600mm.
- 3.2.2 The principal entrance to the building is located in an obvious position facing the main access route to the site.
- 3.2.3 The reception office is located where staff will have a good view of everyone entering and leaving the building. Visitors to the school should be contained within a secure lobby area to allow staff to vet them prior to granting further admission inside the building.
- 3.2.4 The internal layout appears to be free of any potential pinch points or spaces where students could be cornered. The corridors / stairwells should provide sufficient circulation space to cope with the anticipated numbers of students, avoiding potential for bumps and collisions that can lead to more serious behavioural issues.
- 3.2.5 The design and layout of internal and external spaces appears to be capable being zoned, so that people are guided appropriately to where they need to go, and prevented from accessing other areas. The access controls and the alarm system should be adaptable so that during any community events involving the public, the unused areas of the school building can still be secured. The access controls must be designed to ensure that the school and day-care centre can operate independently without compromising the security of either facility
- 3.2.6 The design of the building does not appear to include any external climbing aids that may allow an offender to gain access to upper levels or areas of roof. The position of adjacent features such as fencing, play equipment and storage containers should not provide a potential step up.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Screening / privacy. The play areas should not be easily overlooked from adjacent premises, and measures should be included to provide appropriate privacy screening in order to reduce this potential.
- 3.3.2 Bin store. Bin stores located within the public realm are frequent targets for theft / criminal damage, and they can provide cover for other criminal and antisocial behaviour. If they cannot be located within the school building, it is advised that they should be located behind a secure fence line. Entry to the bin store should be access-controlled. Loose bins should not be left out in communal areas or on the street for prolonged periods or overnight. A strategy should be developed to allow refuse collection without compromising the security of the site.
- 3.3.3 Cycle parking. None is indicated on the supplied plans. Long-stay provision for staff (and children) should preferably be provided within a secure room within the building. External structures can be prone to criminal damage and are more vulnerable to theft unless positioned within a secure boundary line. Any short stay cycle parking should be located where it can be easily overlooked from inside the building and covered by CCTV.

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- 3.3.4 Consideration should be given to the provision of secure store rooms / cages (with reinforced walls and security-certified door / gates), where expensive I.T. equipment could be stored out-of-hours. Any such valuable items should not be easy to remove and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system.
- 3.3.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- All external doors, including at upper levels, must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- Any sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- All internal doors / frames to offices and stores should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a 5 lever mortise deadlock (to BS 3621 / EN 12209), so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.
- Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

4.2 Windows and Shutters

- Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- Any shutters to protect ground floor openings must integrally-mounted and be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.
- Any internal security grilles or blinds should be accredited to a minimum security standard of LPS1175 SR2 or equivalent.

4.3 Glazing

- Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Access Control

- Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - Main entrance doors
 - Internal doors off lobby

- Doors separating internal zones within the building and doors needed to restrict access to parts of the building not in use (e.g. during evenings / weekends or community use).
- Cycle stores

4.5 Alarms

- A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the entire building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.6 Boundaries

- Secure new boundary treatments should generally be 2400mm high and of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in higher risk situations. There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the fence, to reduce the potential for crawling in to secure areas. The site boundary treatment should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels / sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
- Gates should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
 - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
 - A key operable deadlock
- There should be no centrally-located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be positioned away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures / locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding / protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through



4.7 Landscaping

- In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.8 Lighting

- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to complement the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances \(& lobby\)](#), [building perimeters](#), [recesses in building line](#), [emergency egress point\(s\)](#), [any cycle stores / stands](#).

4.10 Other

- Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- Bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors / televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- Signage and orientation. Routes leading to and from various facilities in and around the site should be obvious to site users and visitors. Disorientation can provide legitimacy for an offender to be present in a restricted area. Clear signage should be provided throughout the site which will help to direct people to where they need to go, and discourage entry to restricted areas.
- Consideration should be given to a protective coating applied to any areas that may be vulnerable to graffiti (such as large expanses of blank walls and inside toilets) - applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal (e.g. 'easy on' – see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and pupils should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.
- 5.1.3 Ensure that the site management is for which the building / site was designed able to cope with the remains in place
- 5.1.4 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
11/02/2022	Deloitte	CIS instruction received
15/02/2022	Deloitte / Arkilab / Renaker	Meeting with architect, planning consultant & developer
17/02/2022	Deloitte	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
08/03/2021	Renaker Build Limited	Payment receipt confirmed
08/03/2022	Deloitte	Progress enquiry / update
10/03/2022	N/A	Site visit
11/03/2022	Deloitte	CIS version A issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
C3-AKL-G200-PL-00-0010	Proposed Ground Floor	Feb 22	
C3-AKL-G200-PL-01-0011	Proposed First Floor	Feb 22	
C3-AKL-G200-PL-02-0012	Proposed Second Floor	Feb 22	
C3-AKL-G200-PL-03-0013	Proposed Third Floor	Feb 22	
	Approved Parameter Plans		
C3-AKL-G200-PL-A-0005	Proposed site plan	Feb 22	
C3-AKL-G200-EL-XX-0015	Proposed North and South Elevations	Feb 22	
C3-AKL-G200-EL-XX-0016	Proposed East and West Elevations	Feb 22	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door / window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French / double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk