



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

7-9 PICCADILLY, MANCHESTER

REFURB & EXTENSION TO FORM 6 no. UPPER FLOORS OF OFFICE SPACE

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Thackeray Investments

VERSION A: 08/12/2021

REFERENCE: 2018/0407/CIS/01

7-9 Piccadilly, Manchester

URN: 2018/0407/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements advised

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The control of access into/around the building is paramount to the security of the scheme, including a staffed entrance lobby, out-of-hours access, access to each individual office floor/suite (if there are to be multiple tenants) and any doors providing access between the retail/commercial and office uses within the building.
- Where possible, any new emergency egress/service doors should be brought forward to the building line, to remove any sheltered recesses that could be vulnerable to fostering nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal activity along Back Piccadilly.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the north side of Piccadilly and backs onto Back Piccadilly, within Manchester city centre. It is currently occupied by a three-storey building, with a Greggs bakery/hot food takeaway unit and a Superdrug retail unit fronting onto Piccadilly.

Piccadilly is a very busy pedestrian route, with Metrolink lines running between Market Street, Piccadilly Gardens and St. Peters Square stops. To the immediate west of the site is a Halifax bank and to the immediate east is a McDonalds restaurant (open until midnight).

The rear of the unit is largely a blank brick façade, with recessed service/emergency egress doors secured with shutters out-of-hours.

Back Piccadilly is a relatively narrow route that benefits from limited levels of activity, surveillance and overlooking, backed onto by buildings fronting onto the busier routes of Piccadilly, Tib Street and Oldham Street. The Britannia Sachas Hotel lies on the opposite side of the route from the site (at the junction of Tib Street and Back Piccadilly), which does have a short active frontage along part of the street. There is a large amount of graffiti to the buildings along the route. Such evidence of disorder can attract further abuse if not cleared/rectified immediately, as it can give the impression that buildings are not cared for and that crime and disorder are tolerated. There are numerous blank facades along the route and the buildings have been heavily fortified with shutters and bars/grilles to any door and window openings. There are many similar 'back' streets within the city centre, which have limited levels of pedestrian footfall and vehicular movement, particularly at night, and this can leave buildings potentially vulnerable to unauthorised access or damage unseen, as well as to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues.

Piccadilly Gardens is a very busy area of public realm containing a public transport interchange and surrounded by retail units, bars, cafés/restaurants, office premises and hotels. It is also a hotspot for crime and disorder incidents - particularly late at night/during the weekend.

The Northern Quarter lies to the north and north-east of the site, which houses a concentration of independent retail units, bars, cafés/restaurants and office premises, as well as some residential units and budget hotels.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2018 to 31st January 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
53	139	318	2011	1128	218	57	273	26	179

- 2.1.1 In the local area, the volume of crime is very high, particularly the levels of violence and theft, reflecting the site's location on the edge of the city centre. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of such crime and disorder issues. The majority of reported crimes have taken around Piccadilly Gardens and the Northern Quarter areas.
- 2.1.2 The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises, often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts.
- 2.1.3 Thefts in the local area have mostly been taking place within/around the licenced premises, restaurants and retail premises situated within the Arndale Centre, along Market Street and within Piccadilly Gardens and the Northern Quarter, with offenders primarily targeting mobile phones, wallets/purses and cash. Offenders have mostly used pick-pocketing and distraction methods to obtain the personal belongings.
- 2.1.4 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to proposed office use (with retained retail units), the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

Manchester Office Burglary – Point of Entry




- 2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.


2.3 Theft (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.

Manchester Office Theft – Day Range






Manchester Office Theft – Time Range



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut).
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



2.4.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester peaks slightly on Wednesday, but remains relatively consistently high across the week.


2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late and night and during in the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target commercial premises at these times when they are closed, it is dark and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** In burglaries at Manchester retail premises, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.
- Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.
- Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.
- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

2.5 Theft (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester retail premises remains consistently high across the week. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and early evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or of/from the handbags of shoppers (such as mobile phones, purses etc.). Thefts of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.

2.6 General Risk Factors

- 2.6.1 **Offices:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

- 2.6.2 **Retail:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups

- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting Manchester office and retail premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Manchester Offices & Retail:** Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure to gain entry

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting (see Section 4.6) and CCTV (see Section 4.7) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- **Manchester Offices:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers/visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to office buildings are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Section 4.1). All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

- **Manchester Offices:** Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain access

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.4), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- **Manchester Retail:** A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (to LPS 1175 SR 1/2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- **Manchester Retail:** Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.

Possible Solution - All external windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.3) where possible, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.4), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Vulnerable shopfronts should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours.

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- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Sections 4.1/4.2).

- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to retain the existing ground floor commercial units, partially demolish the existing upper floors and extend the building to form a six storey office development, together with rooftop amenity area, cycle parking, public realm improvements and associated works.
- 3.1.2 The proposal includes upgraded facades to Piccadilly alongside a new frontage and accesses (pedestrian and servicing) to Back Piccadilly, to incorporate a new office entrance/reception area. The basement of the building will house Greggs and Superdrug storage areas and staff facilities, office staff male and female changing areas, a drying room, a gym, cycle and refuse stores, general stores and plant/meter rooms. The ground floor of the building will continue to house the Greggs and Superdrug units fronting onto Piccadilly, with an office café/reception fronting onto/accessed from Back Piccadilly, with an adjacent CCTV room and a goods lift lobby. The first floor of the building will house a lounge, a board room and open plan offices (with W/Cs). Floors 2 to 5 will also house open plan offices and W/Cs, as will Floor 6 - in addition to external communal and private terraces and a small plant room. The roof of the building will also house a plant enclosure.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 Although Back Piccadilly is a narrow route that benefits from limited levels of activity, surveillance and overlooking (especially at night), the main entrance serving the upper floor offices will be capable of being seen from the wider, busier route of Tib Street that benefits from good levels of natural surveillance, particularly during the day.
- 3.2.2 The office frontage will also provide activity and overlooking over the route during office hours. The glazed façade of the building will offer both surveillance opportunities and a greater level of artificial light onto the street/public realm.
- 3.2.3 There will be clearly-defined, entirely separate entrances off Piccadilly and Back Piccadilly serving each of the different uses within the building, which reduces the opportunities for confusion and conflict and reduces the opportunities to criminals.
- 3.2.4 The upper floor offices will have a single access/egress point, capable of being robustly managed to control access. The entrance lobby will accommodate a staffed reception desk, providing surveillance over everyone entering/leaving the building and vetting and directing any visitors.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design/construction of the scheme. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design/specification of the scheme can ensure it is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The control of access into and around the office portion building is paramount to the security of the scheme. The reception desk within the ground floor entrance lobby off Back Piccadilly should be staffed at all times when the building is operational and should have full surveillance of everyone entering/leaving the building. All visitors should report to reception for vetting by staff before gaining access to the rest of the building. The entrance door should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby (see Sections 4.1/4.2). If the building is to be open at any time without a concierge staffing the entrance lobby area (e.g. outside of normal office hours), the entrance door should be secured and controlled by means of staff card/fob and a video access control system linked to each individual office suite/floor (allowing staff to vet callers before allowing them access).

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- 3.3.2 If the office floors are to be occupied by multiple tenants, it should not be possible for the staff/visitors of one office floor/suite to access another. All individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and any rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. Any fire escape cores/stairs should be secured with fail-safe maglocks to prevent unauthorised access between floors/suites (see Section 4.1). Access to all plant/service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (for authorised personnel only), as should any staff locker/changing areas, cycle or refuse stores (see Sections 4.1/4.2).
- 3.3.3 As proposed, the basement and ground floor of the building will house back-of-house/staff areas for Greggs, Superdrug and the proposed offices. Ideally, the different uses within the building, including any access to bin stores, cycle store or fire escapes should be entirely separate to prevent unauthorised access between them (which may provide opportunities for criminals to exploit). Where staff-only access is required to common basement cycle/refuse stores or shared emergency egress routes/stair cores, interconnecting doors between uses should be security-certified (see Sections 4.1/5.1) and alarmed, with signage to deter mis-use. Internal walls between uses should also be robust enough to withstand penetration (see Section 4.4).
- 3.3.4 Given that the existing recessed doorways along Back Piccadilly have been fitted with external shutters to prevent access to the recesses and the doors themselves, it is highly recommended that any new emergency egress/service doors are brought forward to the building line if at all possible, to remove any potentially vulnerable recesses - preventing them from fostering nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal activity. The doors themselves must be security-certified and be of steel construction to ensure they are robust enough to withstand damage/attack (see Section 4.1).
- 3.3.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and guests.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All new external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2+. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be of steel construction, alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Outside of normal working hours or if the building is to be open at any time without a concierge staffing the office reception/entrance lobby area, the single-leaf entrance door (which should be compliant with and certified to one of the above standards) should be controlled by staff key-fob/card and by means of a video access control system linked to a security office or to each individual office suite, allowing staff to vet visitors before allowing them access. See Section 4.2 for more information.
- ☐ The external doors leading to the goods lift lobby must be compliant with and certified one of the above standards, with a multi-point locking system permitted under the security certification of the product, controlled by staff key/fob.
- ☐ If the offices are to be occupied by multiple tenants, all individual office floors or suites should be fitted with self-closing, access-controlled, solid-core doors (minimum 44mm thick), operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions. All individual rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. The doors into any dedicated emergency escape cores at each level should also be solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with electromagnetic locks connected to the fire alarm, so that people at one level cannot access other levels. Once an emergency escape core is accessed, the only means of egress should be externally at ground floor level.
- ☐ Any internal doorsets at ground and basement levels providing access between the retail/commercial and office uses within the building (e.g. providing access to common cycle/refuse stores or to shared emergency egress routes/stair cores) must be self-closing and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2, operated by staff key-fob/card or access and egress (which fail safe in the event of a fire alarm). It should not be possible for patrons/staff of the ground floor retail/commercial units to gain access to the upper floor offices and the basement back-of-house areas that serve them, or vice versa.
- ☐ The internal doorsets to the ground floor cycle store and staff changing areas should be self-closing and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2, operated by staff key-card on access and egress. Internal doors/frames to all other back-of-house plant/service/storage areas should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls (see Section 4.2). More information relating to the cycle store and changing/locker areas can be found within Section 4.8.

4.2 Access Controls

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads (which can be easily shared or observed and are rarely changed). The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The main entrance doorset - operated remotely by reception staff or by staff fob/card outside of normal working hours/when required.
 - The external doors to the goods lift lobby – operable by staff fob/card.
 - Internal doors to each individually let office suites/floors – operated by staff fob/card or remotely by individual office suite reception staff.
 - Any internal doors at ground and basement levels providing access between the commercial and office uses within the building (e.g. providing access to common cycle/refuse stores or to shared emergency egress routes/stair cores) – operable by staff fob/card.

- Internal doors to the basement staff changing facilities/lockers and cycle store, as well as all other back-of-house/plant/service/storage areas – operated by staff fob/card.

- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allowing the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work and keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows, where possible, should be certificated BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any ground floor or first floor opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than just to perimeter columns.

4.4 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground and first floor glazing must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. All upper floor glazing should incorporate an internal pane rated as at least P1A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ If possible, the glazed frontage to the office reception area should be protected by anti-ram bollards or other similar hard/soft landscaping features to deter such an attack. If this is not possible, consideration should be given to re-enforced stall risers to the glazed frontage.
- ☐ Internal walls between the retail/commercial and office uses within the building should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

4.5 Alarm

- ☐ Comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover the proposed offices (including any individually let office floors/suites), linked to contacts on all external doors, internal doors between uses and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre or security office).

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all external doors, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide or LED bulbs should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids to the building. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *all building facades and external entrances, the main entrance lobby, any internal doors between uses, the entrances to the cycle store and changing/locker rooms and lift lobbies/stairwells at all levels.*
- ☐ It is highly recommended that CCTV coverage over any vulnerable areas is monitored at the reception desk, to ensure there can be an immediate response to any issues recorded.

4.8 Other


- ☐ The secure cycle store should include either secure lockers or stands that allow staff to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>
- ☐ Lockers should ideally be provided within the basement changing rooms. The lockers themselves must be robust/secure and all users must be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended/insecure in changing rooms or in the gym.
- ☐ A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Internal Layout Guidance for the Café within the Office Entrance Lobby

The internal layout of any café within the office entrance lobby should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5.1.1 It is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- Consideration should be given to high/wide service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).
- Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- All back-of-house/staff-only areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.



- It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see above).

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the building must be prepared and remain in place for its day-to-day running. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of the office building and the ground floor commercial units, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 6.1.2 All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 6.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.
- 6.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
9 th November 2021	Barton Willmore	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
10 th November 2021	Barton Willmore	Quote issued
10 th November 2021	Barton Willmore	Confirmation of instruction & fee
8 th December 2021	Barton Willmore	Email sent re: report completion & payment
9 th December 2021	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
05936_MP_00_0000	Existing Site Plan Red Line Boundary	06/07/21	0
05936_B1_02_2199	DRAFT Basement Level Proposed GA Plan	03/06/21	0
05936_B1_02_2200	DRAFT Ground Level Proposed GA Plan	03/06/21	0
05936_B1_02_2201	DRAFT Level 01-04 Proposed GA Plan	03/06/21	0
05936_B1_02_2205	DRAFT Level 05 & 06 Proposed GA Plan	03/06/21	0
05936_B1_02_2207	DRAFT Level 07 Proposed Roof Plan	13/10/21	0
05936_B1_04_2200	Proposed General Arrangement Elevations - Elevation A	21/10/21	B
05936_B1_04_2201	Proposed General Arrangement Elevations - Elevation B	21/10/21	-
05936_B1_04_2202	Proposed General Arrangement Elevations - Elevation C	21/10/21	B
05936_B1_04_2203	Proposed General Arrangement Elevations - Elevation D	21/10/21	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk